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SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND: OUR NEXT TASK IN CHURCH UNION[1]

by The Rev. DAVID C. LUSK

I have chosen a subject both common and extremely difficult. Where is God leading us, in the matter of Church union? What is our next task, in the Church of Scotland? We older members remember two Church unions. I do not expect to see a third—unless it be with some of our own separated fragments in the Highlands, or with the United Free Church. May God grant these in His time. For the moment these hardly appear to be tasks. What can we do but pray for the Spirit of God to move both these Churches and ourselves, and live as 'visible Christians' alongside them?

There are more perplexing problems. We know that our unions of 1900 and 1929 have been part of something greater, a 'movement', a 'vision' (we say) of our era. But the next steps for ourselves, what are they to be? Our unions of 1900 and 1929 were 'cheek by jowl' re-unions. Those towards which we are now being drawn, are mostly strange to our people. I imagine everyone who has tried to prepare our people, in any way, for whatever 'drawing closer' may be God's will, has found that. The difficulty of 'ecumenism' is not just the name. It means other churches that are strangers to the vast majority of our folk. Societies aiming at Church union not infrequently find, that eager members of a few years back have left them, feeling that they were 'getting nowhere'. Conversations with the Church of England continue; and we thank God. Yet results are meagre (no blame to our representatives). And surely the Church of England *is* 'our next task'—not, it may be, administrative union, but *better κοινωνία, sharing in all God's gifts, and in all His tasks, together.*

Need I try to remind you how important are better relations with Anglican Churches today? On every mission field Younger

[1] Given in an altered form as Presidential Address to New College Union, Edinburgh, 8th October 1953.

Churches are impatient with our divisions, and especially with this one. It is almost an assumption, in some ecumenical circles, that *we* shall follow South India! Well—what was accepted as God's will for South India may not appear just the same for Scotland.

Again, in Scotland itself, the greatest growth among any of our non-Roman neighbours, in the last hundred years, has been the growth in the Scottish Episcopal Church. Anglican influence today is strong, in parts of our educational system; and in Broadcasting, with incalculable effects. There is more and more coming and going across the Border in both directions; and that will increase. We have, more and more, to share the same life, and the same far-reaching responsibilities. Deeper, 'our Church' is not ours but Christ's. We and our Anglican neighbours have to find his will, and to do it. Christ has need of His whole Body. He intends that it should work as one. In Britain it does not. We are—how must I put it?—in a condition of *one-sided excommunication*, with a few well defined exceptions, whose careful definition (welcome though the exceptions are) has thrown into sharper relief the darkness of the rest. Is it not so? Fifty years ago there was a good deal of undefined inter-communion. Many of us have thankful memories of Anglican Communions. Now, for ordinary folk there may be less. Some of us have become academically inured to this, in S.C.M. gatherings and the like. Occasionally a sense of the horror of it breaks out; as in the Editor's first article in the September 1953 number of *Life and Work*. I do not myself see dramatic possibilities in the situation, such as *Life and Work* seems to imply; that we should be ready 'to be humiliated, in possible refusal, without losing love'—so as to rouse slumbering consciences. I do not think that any of us is ever likely to be turned away from an Anglican Communion, or denied the Sacrament. But, if a man is given to know, that he is not welcome at the Lord's Table, he *is* excommunicated.

The Times newspaper, several months ago, noted the fact that the presenting of the Bible by the Moderator at the Coronation was to be altered to an earlier point in the service than formerly; and (if I am not mistaken) it seemed to approve of the change for this reason (amongst others), that it would be clearly removed from the Communion Service.

May God forgive us all, that such a situation should be possible. Three hundred and fifty years this year, seeking unity! And the world in such need!

Excommunication implies sin. The sin presumed, in the case of the Church of Scotland, is in her re-forming of her ministry, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is seen as *disobedience* to the laws of God for His Church. The presumed sins of the fathers are visited still upon the children—to the thirteenth and fourteenth generation.

Why should England and Scotland find it so hard to see eye to eye? We have in common almost all the riches of God's grace, but for this 'stumbling-block', this σκάνδαλον (as William Temple called it) in every sense of the word.

Nowadays we meet in the Ecumenical Movement, as parts of a world-wide company, where everyone lays all his cards on the table. We set out our own beliefs. We respect one another; though, so far, we mostly stay as we have been. 'Faith and Order' at Lund, in 1952, was very conscious of deep-rooted differences springing from differences in history. As I see it, Scotland and England have two interrelated difficulties in understanding one another: (*a*) one is difference in historical backgrounds; (*b*) the other I should call a certain unwillingness 'to speak each other's language', really to 'meet'.

(*a*) To illustrate our curious background difficulties, take the matter of Church and State. When we in Scotland triumphantly solved that problem with our Articles Declatory in 1921, we thanked God. We also hoped that our success might help other Churches to a like freedom of conscience. Every now and again Anglicans say, 'The Church of Scotland has found the solution'. Yet the Church Assembly of the Church of England appointed a Commission on the subject, under Sir Walter Moberly as chairman, and that Commission reported last year, that our Scottish solution, though admirable, is not of practical use to the Church of England today. Dr Garbett, the Archbishop of York, in his recent book, *Church and State in England*, says the same. And may I quote from an article in *Theology* of May 1952, by Dr A. T. P. Williams, then Bishop of Durham (now of Winchester)? He is writing on Sir Walter Moberly's Report: 'Scotland admittedly is our neighbour;

Macedon and Monmouth admittedly share an initial letter; but the other characteristics which they do not share, are not more completely different, than those which distinguish the Scottish from the English situation, in the matter of churchmanship.' He speaks of 'the depth of the gulf between English and Scottish conditions. Is it an exaggeration to say' (he goes on) 'that, since the Reformation, two neighbouring Christian countries could hardly have had more utterly discrepant ecclesiastical experiences?' He finds fault with the Moberly Report, for speaking merely of 'great dissimilarity in historic conditions', for such a phrase is 'not strong enough'.

Now Dr A. T. P. Williams is a historian of distinction, and friendly to the North. He was one of those appointed by the Church of England a few years ago, to hold 'conversations' with ourselves. Not infrequently he is a welcome visitor to Scotland. But, with the greatest respect may I say it, a more despairing comment on the relations between the two Churches, at least as regards Church and State, I hope I may never see. I suppose the Scottish ideal of 'two kings and two kingdoms in Scotland', means the freedom of the Church to influence the State, almost 'from without', as an independent authority; whereas the English ideal is, that the Church has a place in the government of the country, and influences the State 'from within'. But with all such understandable allowances, that so thoughtful an English churchman should find a 'deep gulf' between the English and the Scottish situations, owing to 'utterly discrepant' past histories—and this in a problem in which we had hoped to be so helpful!—is sadly perplexing. It is a warning, that there is much historical interpretation of each to the other still to be done.

(*b*) The second difficulty I see, is a kind of unwillingness 'to speak each other's language', really to meet. I mean for example, *they* say 'historic episcopate'; we reply 'episcopate in commission' (as in a Presbytery). They say 'apostolic succession'; we reply 'apostolic doctrine'. The lines on which we habitually think are parallel; they do not quite meet.

King Solomon has a wise word on that situation, though he put it in blunt language, which I had rather not use. If you meet a man who differs from you somewhat fundamentally, you find yourself in a dilemma. You are reluctant to 'answer

him according to his folly'—'lest you be like unto him'. And yet you must. 'Answer him according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceit'. The dilemma applies to dealing with wise men, as much as with fools, if these wise men (as in the present case) hold very different points of view from our own. The Church of England reiterates 'the historic episcopate; and apostolic succession'. We are reluctant to speak their language. The Moberly Report says that, in contrast to the Scots, 'the English are more deeply moved by tradition than by logic'. They want 'precedents', not arguments!

At Lund last year, a brave attempt was made to rise above historic forms. Professor T. F. Torrance has declared, most truly, that 'in every true Eucharist . . . there is a suspension of historical continuity and the order and authority which that involves'. These things are transcended, by the presence of the living and eternal Christ. I think most Anglicans would agree; and we ourselves might gladly rest in Dr Torrance's position. But the Anglicans would not rest there. They go on to ask for 'historical continuity and order and authority', after the sacrament as before. We may be unwilling really to 'meet', to speak their language. But while we hesitate, they remain 'wise in their own way of thinking'. The Church of England, whether we like it or not, has appealed to history. We may be reluctant, but we need not be afraid to answer, 'To history shall you go'.

II

A distinguished American, writing on Lund, has said it is not enough, that every group should have set forth its own position; what is next wanted is a 'synoptic view', a seeing of them together; and he wisely adds, that we each may understand our own position all the better, when we look at it alongside of others. Could we reach *a 'synoptic view' of our own and the English systems* of Church order?

One of the things that has often troubled me, is (what I was told long ago) that among ourselves there are two schools of thought as to what our system [the presbyterian] really is. We ought first to try to focus our own views into a clear picture; we *may then*, I think, get a 'synoptic view' of ourselves and England. One of our two schools of thought I associate with

the late Dr George W. Sprott, a generation ago; with Doctors Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick, in that masterpiece of careful writing *A Manual of Church Doctrine*; and with other learned writers of the present day. The other I associate with the late Principal T. M. Lindsay, in his important book *The Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries*.

Characteristic of Dr Sprott's school is that it keeps close to the New Testament and has little or no use for the second century; (it is very faithful to our seventeenth century 'standards'); and that it, consequently, prefers to soft-pedal our Eldership, it is 'lay eldership', not presbyters in the New Testament sense. You remember that the *Form of Church Government*, of 1645, speaks of these 'helps' and 'governments' (1 Cor. 12.28) as 'commonly called Elders'; just a little grudging! I think we might say that this school concentrates more on the Presbytery (as we call it now), than on the Parish.

Characteristic of Principal Lindsay's school is, that it is interested not only in the New Testament, but also in the second century development of the 'threefold ministry'; and it boldly recognises the close similarity between the earliest appearance of what is today called the 'historic episcopate'—i.e. bishop, presbyters and deacons (in that century), and our own system.

Dr Lindsay's view seems to have been unacceptable to Dr Sprott's (the classical) school, presumably for two reasons: (*a*) he went beyond the NT, a dangerous thing to do; (*b*) he had too friendly a leaning towards the Congregationalist principle, that authority resides in the whole Christian people, rather than in the ministry. Actually I think his Congregationalist leanings have been exaggerated, and are not, for us, important; while his going beyond the NT is important and helpful. For the school of 'classical presbyterianism' (Dr Sprott's) is right in setting forth the NT as our foundation. *But we have in fact* built upon that foundation, and we find ourselves with an organisation that is only *foreshadowed* in the NT. We have used NT principles, but we have built more than the visible NT pattern. For instance, I have never been able to find a 'parish minister' in the New Testament! (I shall be glad to be enlightened.) Presbyteries yes, large and small, but no 'presiding presbyter'; just a hint of differentiation among presbyters, if some 'laboured in the word and teaching'.

The first clearly recognisable 'parish minister' is in the second century, and he is called 'the bishop'—that is, bishop now par excellence, for of course all presbyters were bishops in the New Testament. A strange consequence! It is only when we get over the border of the century to the 'episcopalian' system of the 'Letters of Ignatius', that we see ourselves as we are.

Am I being obscure? I recommend a study of *The Letters of Ignatius of Antioch* to all ministers; and especially the one to Polycarp. I confess Ignatius is one of the bees in my bonnet, and some of my friends have heard me *ad nauseam* on the subject.[1] If you want a picture of a parish minister and his elders and deacons working together—'Rise up together, lie down together; toil together, suffer together'—go to Ignatius. (You will not find it in the NT.) It is our ideal picture—of parish-bishop, in the likeness of Christ, with the band of elders about him in the likeness of the Apostles, and with deacons in support. Note, it is the elders who have to represent the Apostles; the minister has the more awesome task, to represent his Master.

What has happened? Differentiation within the presbyterate has slowly come; the differentiation foreshadowed in the NT. And why not? Was it not inevitable? The presbyterate was not in origin Christian. It was of the Old Testament, and indeed universal. Its principle was seniority. We cannot forget, that it was a Presbytery that condemned Christ. The Apostles appointed presbyters in every church; but the presbyterate had to be christianised; and there were two distinctive principles, both from Christ Himself, which 'christianised' the presbyterate of His Church. You know them. One, *διακονία*, service, 'ministry'; the foundation of all, and *permanently characteristic* of all, from lowest to highest ('this ministry and apostleship' as the prayer in the first chapter of Acts has it). The other, *ἐπισκοπή* —a common word for many kinds of 'oversight', but here that of the shepherd: 'Feed my sheep, tend my sheep', says the risen Christ to Peter; and Peter, in his turn, calls Him 'the Chief Shepherd', 'the *Shepherd and Bishop* of your souls'. 'Take heed to yourselves,' says St. Paul to the presbyters from Ephesus, 'and to all the flock over which the Holy Ghost has made you *ἐπισκόπους*.' That is the Christian ideal for all presbyters!

[1] cf. *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Sept. 1950; art. 'What is the Historic Episcopate?—a study of the Letters of Ignatius', by D. C. Lusk.

So they began. But differences of gifts lead to differences of service. Not all were 'apt to teach'; not all had gifts for the full task of the *Episkope*. Gradually came differentiation. How we do not know. Only that it came to be seen as 'agreeable to the Word of God', and 'expedient for edification' (to use seventeenth century language) that a fit man should serve as 'episkopos' par excellence. That is what the early Church developed by the second century, building upon the first—and that is what we have developed, building also upon the first century. Because our fathers did not find their whole system in the New Testament. When we say it is 'agreeable to the Word of God', we allow that. They concentrated, in their stormy days, upon the 'presbyter-bishop', in the full undifferentiated sense of that ideal, as the full minister of Word and Sacraments. And they grouped these ministers into presbyteries, as in the NT, often covering wide areas. Yet they also planted each man in a parish, where he, in turn, surrounded himself with assistants in pastoral rule, whom he called 'elders', and sometimes with other helpers called 'deacons'. That is not a first century pattern. But it is clearly recognisable as a second century pattern. What they did in congregation and parish, was what had been done in near-to-apostolic times.

Now how did they come to this? They did not, and could not, know what we know now about the second century. They did *not*, therefore, try to copy its system; but, what is *much more impressive*—they (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), seeking the will of God for their own day, by the light of the New Testament, and the help of God's Spirit, *reproduced the second century system*. Can we not begin to catch a glimpse of a 'synoptic view' of our own church-system alongside of England?

Did Principal Lindsay catch sight of this? One strange blind spot in Dr Lindsay's notable book is his failure to see this. Lightfoot and Sanday, on the part of the Church of England, had recognised that the bishop of the second century, and indeed of much later, is minister of a congregation. *They* did not realise how the threefold ministry had come to life again in Scotland. But if they were blind to Scotland, Dr Lindsay is most curiously blind to England. For he remarks: 'The threefold ministry is not exhibited in an English parish. It appears,

however, as soon as the Border is crossed into Scotland—or over to Holland.'[1] How strange, that Dr Lindsay should ever have looked for it in an English parish; that he should have apparently failed to consider that the English unit of Church life (I mean the area in which its characteristics are seen) is not the parish but the diocese! Of course the threefold ministry is not in an English parish. Dr Lindsay even says: 'The modern episcopal system, apart from the name of "bishop", has fewest points of resemblance [fewest in any modern system] to what we find in the ancient manuals'.[2]

That was written over fifty years ago. I can hardly imagine a writer of today failing to appreciate, that the modern episcopal system is the same as the earliest, except that it has been enormously enlarged! The old parish has become the diocese. That is, of course, why the English bishop still confirms every member of his flock; why bishops have a special care for doctrine (as you ministers have); and for the ordering of services (as you have); why bishops are all equal (as you are), while their presbyters are, or have been (in the past at least), rather administrators, more like 'ruling elders', in their relation to him, 'rectors'. Dr Lindsay doubtless *knew* all this. He was a great scholar. But he does not see it in a perspective which we today can hardly miss. Scottish parish and modern English diocese are microcosm and macrocosm of *one pattern.*

How the enormous expansion came, belongs partly to the history of missions, partly to the relations of Church and State. Our own Foreign Missions illumine the subject every day. The spread of the faith in Europe, especially after Constantine; the struggle to evangelise the northern pagans; the few facilities for training and supporting a sufficient ministry; these and other influences, notably administrative convenience *vis-à-vis* the State, produced the hugely distended unit, the medieval diocese, which persists in England. Yet our systems are not disparate. The difference between them is not so much in essential structure, as in proportion. It is not as though our system were an amputated form, with an important limb cut off. Rather is our system a 're-birth', which has the *unmistakable family likeness*—and refuses to become overgrown. If only Dr

[1] Lindsay, op. cit., p. 260, n. 2. [2] ibid., p. 261.

Lindsay had not dismissed the Church of England so scornfully; if only our own classical presbyterians had been ready to admit that the New Testament system was ripe for development and did develop, just as our own system developed from it; I think we might have been farther on today in our relations with England.

Why should we hesitate to focus our own two schools of thought into one? Both are needed for a clear picture. Dr Sprott is right about the foundations. Dr Lindsay is right about the further structure. We have reproduced 'the historic episcopate' on a parish scale, which was its original scale; not by setting out to do so, only setting out to find the will of God. *Must we not say*, that each development, that of the second century and that of the seventeenth, confirms the rightness of the other? If this is so, it is not a matter for scholars' satisfaction; *it is a thing to make us worship.*

The Church of England should be not altogether unprepared today to come some part of the way to meet us in this. They now know that their large scale episcopate is the 'mission-field', or the 'administrative', scale. Dr Kirk, the late Bishop of Oxford, wrote in *The Apostolic Ministry* that the Lambeth demand for the historic episcopate, in large modern form, is 'in fact making the fourth century development compulsory. That may be convenient' (he said) 'but it is quite unjustifiable.' In the same important book Bishop Kenneth Mackenzie, formerly of Brechin, writes of Scotland: 'The minister surrounded by his elders . . . does remind us irresistibly of the primitive bishop with his "crown" of presbyters. Indeed the functions of the modern Presbyterian group exhibit a remarkable correspondence with those of the primitive one.'

If we in the Church of Scotland can focus our own thinking more clearly, and can thus get a 'synoptic view' of our own system alongside the English, we shall understand better not England only but ourselves as well. For one thing, Bishop Lesslie Newbigin of South India, who is still a Missionary of the Church of Scotland, will appear not as an incongruity, only an 'enlargement'. He has a wider pastorate than before. Yet he performs no sort of ministerial act, in which he did not previously take a part as a minister of Christ's Word and Sacraments.

For another thing, our Elders will be seen as an integral part of the system, with good 'canonical' precedent. And if, at any time, we should be asked to take 'the historic episcopate' into our system, *what can we reply* but, that we have been doing our best to work it, for several generations, in its most nearly apostolic form?

I respectfully suggest, that *our own* 'next task' should be to clear our own minds; and to accustom ourselves to some such re-stating (if need be) of our Presbyterian system, so as to show it, not only as derived from the New Testament, but also as exhibiting a true form of the historic episcopate. And this must be in no controversial or arrogant spirit, but in a reverent recognition of the work of the one Spirit of God, in two widely sundered eras; in the first and second centuries, which directly moulded the life of so many Churches, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which have more immediately moulded the present day life of our own.

Note. It is not surprising, if the seventeenth century was a little hesitant about the Elder's office. St. Paul's words, 'helps, governments' (1 Cor. 12.28), on which it was grounded, are vague to us; or rather they denote spiritual 'gifts', rather than office. Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick have suggested that elders might properly be considered 'seniores', rather than presbyters; for Reformed Churches in France and Switzerland use for their elders the word 'seigneurs', derived from 'seniores'. Actually, however, the Latin of the Vulgate shows there is little reality in such a distinction of names. In a few cases, where Christian office-bearers are to be clearly indicated, it *transliterates* the Greek πρεσβύτεροι as 'presbyteri' (so Acts 14.23); but in a very large number of other cases, including many Christian office-bearers (and all the Jewish), it *translates* as 'seniores'. In Acts, 'presbyteros' is used in 15.2, and 'seniores' in 16.4, for the same persons and in the same connexion. And 'seniores' is used for those most august of all presbyters, the four and twenty elders of the Book of Revelation.

There *is* a distinction between the Christian presbyter in the fullest exercise of his office and one ordained to do less; but there seems to be no sufficient reason to grudge the name of presbyter to both. Are not our elders quite properly 'presbyters', ordained to limited duties, within that capacious ideal the Christian presbyterate?

We should remember that the seventeenth century was concerned to restore the apostolic ideal of the presbyterate, and in particular to maintain that bishop and presbyter were essentially one. But while it was one thing for St. Peter to call himself a 'fellow-elder' of the most backward country elder in Bithynia, it was more difficult, in the seventeenth century, successfully to stretch the name presbyter all the way, to cover medieval prelate; parish minister; and his helper in rule, the parish elder.

III

May I add a little about 'succession'? The Church of England knows its deep unity with us in Christ. It may even come to see its kinship with us in essential structure. It would still be uneasy, in thinking that we had made a break in continuity, in a disorderly way, at the Reformation. Our usual reply has been, that historic continuity is traceable through the presbyterate, as it was in the early days of the Church. I wonder if that is all that should be said? We should be frank. Calvin was conscious of a break somewhere, at least in the Church he knew on the Continent. Calvin had a most orderly mind; and he had been trained to the law, to Church law. His own system demands continuity, and we today keep it carefully. He had the greatest respect for 'the holy bishops' of early centuries, with their 'threefold ministries'.[1] Why then, Anglicans say, did he *wilfully break with* 'canonical order'? The answer is, that he did not. He knew canonical order so well, and cared for it so keenly, that he came to the conclusion, that it had been already broken. Of the bishops of his day, he declared that, on grounds of both personal fitness and *canonical regularity of appointment*, there was 'scarcely one who, according to ancient canons, would not be deposed'. 'There is today' (he wrote) 'no canonical election remaining in all the papal system.'[2] What degree of truth there was in that, may have varied from country to country. Was there in Scotland an apostolic and canonical ministry, from which our Reformers broke away?

Most of us here (thanks to the Edinburgh Festival) know Sir David Lyndsay's *Three Estates* (1540). Is that Satire a fair picture of the Church of his day? May I commend to you an impartial book by Dr W. Murison, entitled *Sir David Lyndsay* (Cambridge Press, 1938), which has collected contemporary opinions, including that of a papal legate? If we consider these, we shall hardly doubt, that our first reformers did not, either wilfully or ignorantly, *break with good order*. They believed they found canonical order *already broken*. They knew their Scotland better than we can. Who can say they were mistaken?

They believed that, for their extraordinary need, God was raising up what Calvin called 'evangelists', as '*extra*-ordinary

[1] *Institutes*, Bk. 4, ch. 4, par. 1. [2] *Institutes*, Bk. 4, ch. 5, par. 2.

ministers'. Afterwards (especially in the seventeenth century), the fact that many of these 'evangelists' had been in orders before the Reformation, was noted, and was put forward to exhibit an actual succession, mostly, though perhaps not only, through the presbyterate. Distrust of a questionable succession, through the sixteenth century Roman hierarchy, was by no means repudiation of orderly succession as such. Rather it was intended to be a vindication of it; and so it worked out in practice. Respect for due succession in the ministry became and has remained a strong characteristic of the Scottish people.

God has His own ways of working; and it is difficult for us to measure the value in His sight, of that or any other succession. Today, for somewhat inscrutable reasons of their own, our fellow-Christians in England ask us (or may soon ask us) to accept their 'succession'. We have done it in South India. Scotland, I need hardly say, is in a different case. We may understand, however, that, if only we accept an episcopate of this succession, we might work it into our own system in our own way! (I refer to the Archbishop of Canterbury's Cambridge sermon of November, 1946.) It is not easy to see how. Twice in the seventeenth century the Church of Scotland accepted an episcopate, of the English succession, and on the medieval (diocesan) scale. Our memories of these experiments are not happy. No doubt a prime cause of the trouble then, namely crown interference, has disappeared. Yet memories of martyrs do not lightly die; and a distrust of 'prelacy' remains very deep.

Our task today is not to justify those before us, much less is it to justify ourselves. It surely is, to understand what God has done, *to see where and how He is at work around us, and to answer His calls.* To refuse to see His work, is to sin against the Holy Spirit. Today we cannot but see, that God's ways are wider than our old horizons. We cannot but see, for example, God's work in communities with so little apparent order as the Quakers, or with so few defences against error as the 'Independents', or in so 'Erastian' a position (as our fathers would have said) as is the Church of England. There is something new here; new not just for ourselves, but for Church history. Its importance is clear, when we realise, that only in recent

centuries has religious toleration *found scope*; and that, consequently, what we are confronted with is something which could not have been before the minds of the men who framed the older canons of the church.

There was much wisdom in the old canons. In early days succession in office provided a reasonable presumption of continuity of teaching. If a church could claim continuous life since apostolic days, and could also claim that certain doctrines had always been held among its presbyters, while others had not, there was a likelihood that the former were apostolic. So Irenaeus argued, in the second century. It was an argument particularly useful before the canon of the New Testament was certain. Or again, to hold an authority handed down from Christ Himself could be a wonderfully fortifying belief, when the pagan state had to be withstood at great risk, as in Cyprian's day. It is very near to our 'Two kings and two kingdoms'. Even Newman wrote that his chief gain from a study of early Church history was 'a vivid perception of the divine institution of the episcopate; that is' (he says) 'an implicit aversion to the Erastian principle'.[1] We willingly pay homage to those great ends, towards which succession has been held to be a means.

Yet, on what conditions God uses succession, in office, or by ordination, as means of grace, it is hard to define. Of itself, succession within the Church has not prevented heresy; and, on the other hand, '*episcopi vagantes*' (men who claim 'succession', but are out of right relation to the Christian community) have always been deprecated. How far it is possible for true doctrine to be maintained without a ministerial succession is unknown. It is remarkable, that many reformers before the Reformation, began their work as laymen, as did Francis of Assisi. The Church is built upon prophets as well as on Apostles. Great reforming monastic orders were only possible outside the territorial ministry, and when centralised under the 'Vicar of Christ'. It is probably true to say that from Constantine to the Reformation the use of force, to suppress all movements that could not be somehow drawn into the organisation of the Great Church was so common, that only since toleration has had time to bear its full fruits—that is, since *long after* the Reformation—has it begun to be possible to form a just opinion

[1] *Correspondence of J. H. Newman*: p. 196 n.

on such a question as the *necessity* of ministerial succession for the maintaining of truth and grace. That is why we see Quakers, Independents, and others, differently from the way our fathers saw them.

Christian toleration, the patient applying of our Master's rule for doubtful cases, 'By their fruits ye shall know them', may demand even longer time, and more patience, towards communities than in the case of individuals; it may leave deplorable 'tares' to grow, and extravagances such as Monsignor R. A. Knox has collected in *Enthusiasm*; it may endanger mission fields; but it has yielded richer varieties of good seed than could have been looked for by any of our older canonists. To see one's own era in perspective is notoriously difficult. But surely here is one of the inescapable discoveries of the last two or three hundred years. It sets us many most difficult tasks: to 'try the spirits, whether they be of God'; but it has already yielded a great harvest, ripe for the study of the most conservative of churches.

Doctrines of Succession[1] belong to canon law rather than to demonstrably apostolic doctrine. What we call 'Canon Law' is a vast accumulation of rules or canons (some local, some general), by which the Church, in its long history, has sought to order its life according to the will of God. Although founded upon the teachings of our Lord and His Apostles, these rules have varied with time and place; and sometimes they have become contradictory. A living Church has a duty from time to time to revise them. The most famous compendium of Canon Law in the Middle Ages, the twelfth century *Decretum* of Gratian, was named by himself *A Concordance of Discordant Canons*. I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I say that the task before the World Council of Churches in our day is, in one aspect, an old task—to help Churches with 'discordant canons' to find their own ways to new concord. For have not we all been slowly learning that the most 'irregular' element in modern Christian history—irregular according to the canons of *any one of our denominations*—has been no less than God Himself? He has been breaking our rules. And He has been doing it *not* just

[1] A recent study of the *earliest origins* of the doctrine, by a German scholar now in the Church of England, connects it with Jewish-Christian 'anti-Paulinism'. *The Apostolic Succession*: A. Ehrhardt. Lutterworth Press, 1953.

occasionally, and by way of what we incline to call 'exceptional' (or even 'uncovenanted'), but quietly and very persistently; although *never* relaxing His supreme requirements, truth, faith, love. He is a poor Church historian, who does not see, that it is a new thing to be able to observe, over what is now a long period, the 'fruits of the Spirit', in communities whose order is very different from our own. It is no light thing for any Church to modify its venerable canons. It is only to be done, when that Church comes to say, with St. Peter, 'If God has given, to these others, the same gift as to us, . . . who are we, what power have we, to stay God's hand?' (As. 11.17). That earliest revision of historic canons was made by obediently observing the acts of God. It was a momentous, joyful enlargement, to meet the greater wideness of His grace. Precedents have their uses; but the highest law of the Church must always be (as her greatest lawyers have always known) obedience to the living Spirit of God. A respect for history half understood can mean an antiquarian bondage. The more deeply the Church *knows* her own history, the more courage will she have, under God, to make history.

IV

The practice of *Intercommunion* with fellow Christians, especially with those with whom we share life and responsibilities at home and abroad, is one of the ways by which, in the Church of Scotland, we have been learning to apply God's new teaching. It is now a common practice among us to welcome to the Holy Communion those who are already communicant members in any Christian Church. Our canonists might make out a strong case against this practice; but I hardly think any of them would apply it to the world of today. We have been widening our practice, to come a little nearer to the observed wideness of God's grace. Is it too much to hope, that a very old rubric in the *Book of Common Prayer*, obviously (and wisely) drawn up to guide a parish 'Curate' in the admission of children to first Communion, and requiring their Confirmation, should not today exclude the whole company of devout Scottish Church people, because the minister in their Confirmation has not been a bishop of the English succession? We cannot but find such an interpretation strangely harsh, and indeed unreal,

for so it must seem to any one who really knows Scotland. Those few of us, who have in the past thankfully received the Holy Communion in Anglican Churches, in Scotland and in England, know that there is little prospect for our people at large, of beginning to understand Anglicanism, until at least that measure of intercommunion is more widespread, and we can pray together in our holiest moments.

A few years ago the Church of England inclined to say: 'First corporate union; then communion.' But then followed agreement for intercommunion between the Church of England and the Old Catholic Church—with no hint of incorporating union! This abandonment of the 'union first' position seems to underlie the Archbishop's Cambridge sermon. Why then can there not be agreement between the two historic Churches that are the mother Churches of our nation, so that communicant members of one, who so desire, may freely communicate in the other? There need never be argument why Christian men should communicate together; the burden lies on any who say that they shall not. The alternative to intercommunion, however it may be veiled, or eased by exceptions, is *excommunication*. And that grave sentence is a wrong, if it is used against those whom God does not condemn.

If it is pled, in extenuation, that the Church is to be 'visible', and that that demands certain definable limits, it must be answered, that visibility and definableness-by-limits are not the same, though we often confuse them. A sun-lit cloud is visible, but it may be part of its very glory that its limits are not to be drawn. So it is in many of God's finest gifts. So, surely, of His Church. Israel might never be numbered. The Greek strain in our thinking asks for definition, and the Latin strain finds that a practical convenience. A great Roman Pope like Hildebrand might say: 'Let none be considered catholic, who is not in agreement with Rome.' That was to define by a convenient limit; and for a while it worked. Contrast the earliest use we know of the words 'the Catholic Church'; it has a more Palestinian tone; it is by Ignatius of Antioch[1]: 'Wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the Catholic Church.' Not so much a *definition* by limits as a description *from the living centre*. We do not define a myriad points of light; but we see them.

[1] *Smyrnaeans*, 8.

That earliest use of the noble name 'Catholic Church' may well be the truest, and, if so, the most lasting. For it is the recognition of the living presence of Christ in our various communities, that draws us together today. Our spiritual unity with one another is itself a mystery, and the sign of our unity should correspond to the nature of the unity. Why then should it not find its most fitting expression in a mystery, the sacramental mystery of our union with Him?

With a greater measure of intercommunion, England and Scotland may gain much from one another. Why else has God brought us together, yet by so different roads? For He has brought us together. Again and again, in our lifetime, He has been binding us still closer together, in life and in death. What is His purpose? Not that we should settle down to find fault with one another. But that, with all our differences (in so far as they come from Him), we should *be* His Church together—should be 'workers together with Him'. God's gifts, when we use them rightly, are not 'discordant'.

Very likely it is more difficult for the English to understand the Church of Scotland than for ourselves to understand the Church of England. We can hardly escape some English history. We know only too little of our own Scottish history; and, beyond a few romantic figures, we may safely assume that the English, as a rule, know nothing of it. It is very true, as the Bishop of Winchester feels so strongly, that the past histories of our two countries have been very different, and that far back things whose roots are hidden, may, consciously or unconsciously, affect us still. This is not the place to go into such matters but one of them is the simple fact that, of the two Churches, the Church of Scotland is (in the providence on God) the older by some two centuries; and that she is not conscious of having been founded by any other Church, but rather of being 'a branch borne on the root of primitive Christianity'.[1] Another fact is, that, in the same providence, the Scottish Church was the mother-church of about two thirds of England. 'Augustine was the apostle of Kent', wrote Bishop Lightfoot, 'but Aidan was the apostle of England.'[2] (England turned her back upon

[1] Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick, op. cit., p. 134.
[2] *Leaders in the Northern Church*, p. 11. Aidan was sent from Iona.

her northern mother painfully soon.) Again, in the old Celtic Church the presbyters carried great responsibilities; the bishops were free from the harassing cares of a great diocese, they ordained, which implies that they examined, and presumably also taught (surely the dream of every care-worn prelate!). Something like a divinity professor, I think, the Celtic bishop must have been. Again, it is not irrelevant to notice, that, though we had Normans among us, we never had a Norman (or any other) Conquest; so that our people do not take naturally to fissures in Church life which in England sometimes seem to reflect such an origin. But what is more important is the fact, that at the Reformation we followed the *only one* of the three great 'reforms' (Lutheran, Anglican, and 'Reformed' as it is simply called on the Continent) which showed itself catholic in being adaptable to the racial varieties of Europe. The Church of Scotland has always been in communion with Christians who speak other languages—in France, Holland, West Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, Italy—a concrete catholicity such as we look for in vain in the venerable, but 'English speaking', Anglican Communion.

Many other clues to our present differences are to be found in history. What matters now is that, by patient understanding and faithful obedience, we should find the purpose of God for both Churches. If He should will that, one day, His all-wise solution of our long-continued problems should be made clear to us, it would be gain to all Christendom. Meanwhile, in the life of our peoples at home, and in tasks shared increasingly for God overseas, may He lead us both into courageous acting upon the truth of our oneness already in Him, and a fuller carrying out together of His great commission.

Nevertheless the firm foundation of God standeth, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are His; and, Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity. Follow righteousness, faith, charity, peace, with all them that call on the Lord out of a pure heart. But foolish and unlearned questions avoid, knowing that they do gender strifes. And the servant of the Lord must not strive; but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, tolerant, in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves; if God peradventure will give them a change of mind, to the acknowledging of the truth. (2 Tim. 2.19-25.)

EPISCOPACY IN POST-REFORMATION SCOTLAND

by The Rev. STEWART MECHIE

The purpose of this paper is to examine Scottish Episcopacy in the period 1560 to 1689 with a view to discovering how it was regarded by those chiefly concerned and how near or far apart the Churches of Scotland and England were at that time. In estimating these matters reference will have to be made to the doctrine of apostolic succession, by which we shall mean the doctrine that bishops who have received their office by succession from the Apostles are the necessary ministers of ordination and that the apostolic succession so understood is essential for the authority of the ministry, the visible unity of the Church and the validity of the Sacraments.

When was there episcopacy in post-Reformation Scotland? The answer depends on whether the frame of reference is ecclesiastical or constitutional. In the constitutional frame of reference the bishops continued to be one of the estates of the realm from the Reformation to the Revolution, except during the twenty years which saw first the dominance of the Covenanters and then that of Cromwell, a period when the constitution suffered eclipse both in England and Scotland. After 1560 the Roman bishops, of whom only four threw in their lot with the reformers, retained their titles, the greater part of their revenues and their places in Parliament. They continued to give collation to benefices in their dioceses, and no one could say that this function, as one derived from Rome, was illegal. The spirituality had always been represented in Parliament by bishops, abbots and priors, and one of the scandals of pre-Reformation times had been the bestowal of abbeys and priories on laymen who could not perform the duties attached to these offices and had no intention of acquiring the ecclesiastical status which would enable them to do so. Moreover, it was the custom that men nominated to bishoprics were invested with all their civil rights and privileges without waiting for the

consecration by which they were empowered to fulfil their spiritual functions. Legally and for purposes of State, they were already bishops. Against that background it is not surprising to find that after 1560 the Roman bishops continued to enjoy their civil and political rights, though the tie with Rome, the basis of their ecclesiastical authority, had been broken. Between 1560 and 1567 several sees became vacant and were quickly filled by papal provision or crown gift. Later, as the pre-1560 prelates and these few post-1560 Roman prelates died or were subjected to forfeiture for being papalists or Marians, the regents and later King James chose Protestant ministers to fill the vacant sees—the so-called tulchan bishops. From the constitutional point of view this maintained the balance of the estates of the realm. It also gave the Crown a measure of control over the Church, besides affording opportunity for advantageous bargains with the new bishops over the revenues of their sees. By virtue of their appointment these bishops were by law essentially what their predecessors had been and what their successors in 1610 and 1661 were to be. Ecclesiastically, however, they remained what they had been before their promotion —ministers of particular kirks. Only the General Assembly could invest them with higher ecclesiastical status, and that it was generally unwilling to do.

Constitutionally that was the situation down to 1689, and it might have remained so after 1689, if the then bishops had been minded to desert the Stewarts and give loyal support to William and Mary. The presbyterian settlement of 1690 was not, it seems, what William would have chosen; but he was shut up to it by the obstinate loyalty of the Scottish bishops to the exiled royal house. William was thus driven to dispense with the bishops as an estate of the realm. That is a constitutional way of stating the matter. Ecclesiastically it meant that the top storey was chopped off the ecclesiastical establishment of the 1660-1689 period, and that involved new vigour for all the rest—kirk-sessions, presbyteries, synods and especially the General Assembly, which had never been called during these years but had also never been abolished. Episcopacy in Scotland, as W. L. Mathieson put it, had 'never been more than a government super-imposed for political purposes on a Presbyterian Church'; and, in 1690, this superimposition being re-

moved by the exclusion of the bishops, the Church became fully Presbyterian again.

In the ecclesiastical frame of reference our question would be better phrased, When was there episcopacy in the Reformed Scottish Church? The answer is threefold—first, from the Concordat of Leith in 1572 till the decision of the General Assembly of 1580 that the office of bishop had no warrant in the Word of God; second, from 1610 till 1638; third, from 1661 till 1690.

I. 1572-1580

In the first Book of Discipline, addressed to the Great Council of the nation in 1560, the reformers asked for the appointment of superintendents for the reformed kirk, and five such officers were in fact appointed. For our present purpose it is unnecessary to raise the question whether, as has been generally held in the past, they were regarded as merely a temporary expedient to meet a difficult situation, or whether, as seems almost certain, they were intended to be a permanent part of the constitution of the reformed Church. At all events there is no reason to believe that the Scottish Reformers held the later presbyterian doctrine of the parity of ministers. The contrary is clearly stated in the exchanges which followed the execution of Archbishop Hamilton for treason in the early part of 1571. In the autumn of that year the regent's government nominated Archbishops to St. Andrews and Glasgow without even the form of an election. This seemed to imply that the nominees were intended to be mere titulars, fulfilling no spiritual functions. For the Church the situation was critical, and its attitude was set forth by John Erskine of Dun, Superintendent of Angus, in a letter to the Regent Mar. Erskine argued that the secular power must not usurp spiritual authority by appointing bishops or pastors, and he adduced evidence from Scripture to show that it was the function of bishops and superintendents to examine candidates for office in the Church, to admit them and supervise their work. 'To tak this power from the bishop or superintendent is to take away the office of a bishop that no bishop be in the kirk, which were to alter and abolishe the order which God hath appointed in his kirk.'[1] Thus Erskine

[1] Calderwood, *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, III, p. 157 f.

finds warrant in Scripture for the office of bishop or superintendent. In January 1572 an extraordinary General Assembly, known as a Convention, met at Leith and appointed commissioners to treat with the government. The outcome was the Concordat of Leith, a compromise which provided that while the appointment of bishops was to lie, in effect, with the Crown, yet there was to be a form of election by reformed chapters, and the new bishops were to be subject to the General Assembly in spiritual matters. The procedure approved at Leith was at once used for the admission of John Douglas to St. Andrews and in the next five years appointments were made to several other sees, the new bishops fitting easily into the existing structure of the Church, since they were regarded as having the same powers as the superintendents and commissioners already functioning in certain parts of the country.

There was dissatisfaction with the Concordat of Leith, as was inevitable seeing it was a compromise. John Knox, who appears never to have condemned episcopacy as such but only certain bishops and kinds of bishops, was suspicious of it and strongly disapproved of the elevation of John Douglas to the Archbishopric of St. Andrews. It seems clear, however, that his objections were not to the making of an Archbishop, but to Douglas's age and incompetence, to the fact that he already held a university post, and to the agreement, savouring of simony, which he was believed to have made with the Earl of Morton. Confirmation of this view is found in Knox's letter to the General Assembly of August 1572 with the accompanying articles.[1] He did not condemn the institution of bishops, but urged the adoption of certain provisions in addition to the safeguard of the bishops' being subordinate to the General Assembly. His main objects were to prevent long vacancies, to bar the appointment of laymen and other unqualified persons to bishoprics and to have it laid down that bishops must render to the General Assembly an annual account of their handling of their revenues. To Knox apparently it was a secondary matter whether the subordinate executive functions of the Church resided in bishops or presbyters so long as the supreme jurisdiction remained in the General Assembly. The bishops that Knox abhorred were the dumb dogs of the Roman

[1] Calderwood, op. cit., III, p. 767.

obedience, idle, wealthy and corrupt; but a godly bishop, versed in the Word of God, devoid of papistical rags and ritual, and responsible to the General Assembly, Knox would have welcomed. The General Assembly objected to unscriptural titles such as archbishop; but there are no signs that the broad lines of the Concordat aroused serious opposition for a number of years. Ere long, however, the draining of the Church's patrimony into lay hands by way of the tulchan bishops aroused keen indignation, and that proved a favourable seed-bed for Andrew Melville's ideas about the parity of ministers.

Accepting, then, the view that the Scottish Reformers had no objection to episcopacy as such, we must ask whether they had a purely administrative episcopacy in view or whether they held something like the doctrine of apostolic succession. Important light on this question is found in the First Book of Discipline[1]: '. . . for albeit the Apostles used imposition of hands, yet seeing the miracle is ceased, the using of the ceremonie we judge not necessarie'. The Second Book of Discipline did indeed reintroduce 'imposition of hands of the eldership'; but there is no reason to suppose that there was any reversion to the view that something derived from the Apostles was thereby being handed on. Grub, referring to the fact that John Douglas was admitted to St. Andrews by the laying-on of the hands of the Bishop of Caithness, the Superintendent of Lothian and David Lindsay, minister of Leith, remarks that 'the Bishop of Caithness . . . appears never to have been consecrated, and it is possible that none of the three had even received orders as a priest'.[2] Another light on the question is afforded by the fact that Knox dated his ministry not from his ordination as a priest but from his public call to the office of preacher at St. Andrews. Further, in Knox's Liturgy the form and order for the Election of Superintendents is declared to be such as 'may serve also in Election of all other ministers'. Canonical orders cannot have been in the Reformers' minds, for they made no provision for the canonical deacon, and this one order of admission—call it ordination or induction—apparently served both for the elevation of John Winram from minister to super-

[1] Ch. IV, iii.10.
[2] Grub, *Ecclesiastical History of Scotland*, ii, p. 180.

intendent and for that of John Erskine from layman to superintendent.

Fundamentally, the objection of the Scottish Reformers was not to bishops but to priests. What they demanded was not a mass-priest, but a man capable of expounding the Word of God —whether bishop, superintendent or minister. If they denounced Roman bishops, it was because they were profligate, priest-making, pope-obeying, dumb dogs: if they hesitated about Reformed bishops it was more from political than from religious motives. While the Scots Confession and the First Book of Discipline give large powers to the godly prince or magistrate, a few years' experience was sufficient to show that the godly prince was not easy to come by, and that an ungodly prince could more easily manipulate a dozen superintendents than several hundreds of ministers. The prime requirement, however, was capable ministers of the Word and Sacraments. Compared with that, names, orders, successions mattered little, for, let us remember, the 'miracle is ceased'.

Thus from the point of view of a believer in the apostolic succession the Churches of England and Scotland were far apart at this period. Grub remarks on the resemblance between the external polity of the Church as established by the Concordat of Leith and the polity sanctioned by law in England at that time, but points out 'one fatal deficiency, which made the new polity, however outwardly fair and regular, a mere empty form. The persons to whom the office of consecration was intrusted had not themselves the gift which they were required to bestow on others'. On the other hand it must be insisted that the doctrine of apostolic succession, as we have defined it, was then and still is no part of the official teaching of the Church of England—witness the Preface to the Ordinal. In fact, at this time the two Churches recognised one another, and even went so far as to share personnel. English churchmen believed that the Scottish system was defective, especially in its ritual and in the ordination of its ministers, but so late as 1604 one of the canons approved by the Convocation of Canterbury required prayer 'for Christ's holy Catholic Church, that is, for the whole congregation of Christian people dispersed throughout the whole world, and especially for the Churches of England, Scotland and Ireland'. There can be no doubt that this meant

the acknowledgment of the Scottish establishment as a Christian Church. More notable is the fact that in 1582 Dr Aubrey, Vicar General, with consent and express command of Archbishop Grindal, granted licence to John Morrison, who had been admitted minister of Yester in 1575 and of Garvald in 1576, 'to celebrate Divine Offices, to minister the Sacraments, etc.', in the province of Canterbury, he having been 'admitted and ordained to Sacred Orders and the Holy Ministry, by the Imposition of Hands, according to the laudable Form and Rite of the Reformed Church of Scotland'.[1] Again, John Willock, who had been first presented to the parish of Loughborough in Leicestershire in Edward VI's reign, held it again in Queen Elizabeth's reign; but he was also active in Scotland from 1558 to 1565, was associated with Knox in St. Giles, Edinburgh, in 1560, became that same year Superintendent of Glasgow and the West, and was Moderator of the General Assembly in 1563, 1564, 1565 and 1568. Despite these duties in Scotland he continued in his charge in England and died there in 1585.[2] It would seem that Croft Dickinson is justified in saying that, 'To Knox and his fellow-ministers polity was no barrier between the Church of England and the Church of Scotland: at this time the English prelates were recognised in Scotland and the Anglicans recognised the Scottish ministers'.[3]

II. 1610-1638

In 1610 the General Assembly meeting in Glasgow decreed that synods should be held in every diocese twice a year, at which the bishop was to be moderator, that the bishop, or in his absence a minister to be named by him in diocesan synod, was to moderate at all meetings of ministers for the exercise—the very name of presbytery being deliberately avoided—and that all presentations to benefices were to be directed to the bishop of the diocese, who was to try and examine the presentee and 'assisted be such of the ministry of the bounds where he is to serve as he will assume to himself' was to 'perfect the haill act of ordinatione'. Thus King James's efforts to subvert the presbyterian system attained success, and a polity similar to

[1] Strype, *Life and Acts of Archbishop Grindal*, II, ch. 13.
[2] H. Scott: *Fasti Eccl. Scot.*, I, p. 50 f.
[3] W. Croft Dickinson, *Andrew Lang, John Knox and Scottish Presbyterianism*, p. 17 n.

that which had been agreed to at Leith in 1572 was again established. The king, however, was anxious for one thing more—that his bishops should receive a valid consecration. Soon after the Assembly, therefore, Spottiswoode, Archbishop of Glasgow, Lamb, Bishop of Brechin, and Hamilton, Bishop of Galloway, were summoned to London, where the king told them what he had in view for them. The only hesitation that Spottiswoode expressed was lest by this step the Church of Scotland might be held to be subjected to the Church of England. James assured them that he had guarded against that danger by arranging that neither of the English metropolitans should assist at the consecration. At this point another difficulty appeared. Andrewes, Bishop of Ely, pointed out that the Scots lacked episcopal ordination: they ought to be made priests before they were made bishops. Bancroft, however, over-ruled the objection, declaring that, where bishops were not to be had, ordination by presbyters must be esteemed valid, otherwise it might be doubted whether there was any lawful vocation in most of the Reformed Churches. Moreover there was no necessity for the Scottish bishops to pass through the orders of priest and deacon, because—as several cases in the ancient church sufficed to show—the episcopal character could be given at one consecration. All difficulties being thus removed the three Scots were consecrated according to the form of the English Ordinal by the Bishops of London, Ely, Rochester, and Worcester.

Back in Scotland, the three bishops consecrated the Archbishop of St. Andrews in December 1610; and in the course of the next few months all the other bishops received consecration from some who had been already consecrated. No attempt, however, was made to re-ordain ministers who had been ordained in the presbyterian way by prayer and the laying-on of the hands of the local presbytery. It appears, too, that even as regards ordinations after 1610 the episcopal practice was not rigidly enforced, and the presbyterian form—that of the Book of Common Order, often known as Knox's Liturgy—was widely used. It is true that the Scottish bishops issued a Scottish Ordinal in 1620. It is printed in the *Miscellany of the Wodrow Society*, and it includes the direction that 'the Bishope, with the ministers that are present, shall lay their hands upon the

head of him that is to be admitted'. This Scottish Ordinal owed much to the Anglican Ordinal, and it is probable that some of the Scottish bishops used the Anglican one instead of it; but from the point of view of Catholic theory it had two defects. For one thing, it made no provision for the third canonical order, that of deacon, and for another, it omitted words reckoned essential for the conferring of the priesthood. The suggestion has indeed been made that the statement that it was to be used 'by those who have power to ordain or consecrate' may have been deliberately ambiguous. It could certainly be taken as opening the door to purely presbyterian ordination.

It is certain that such ordinations did, in fact, continue to take place. When William Row, younger, was admitted 'fellow-helper' to his father in the ministry at Forgandenny in 1619, Mr Alex. Lindsay, Bishop of Dunkeld, professed that he came not there as a bishop, but as a member of the presbytery, and that he would not ask a word but what was in the Psalm-Book, i.e. Knox's Liturgy, generally prefixed to the Psalter, and so he did.[1] Again, in the *Life of Mr John Livingstone*,[2] referring to the year 1626, Livingstone says that he was going to be ordained and inducted to Torphichen, 'but Mr John Spotiswoode, the pretended Bishop of St. Andrews, stopped all because of my unconformity: and when the Earl of Lithgow and Lord Torphichen and some others dealt with him upon my behalf, for even at that time some few by moyen were suffered to enter the ministrie without conformity, he pretended that, notwithstanding of my unconformity, he should not hinder my entrance in some other place, but that was promised to Mr George Hanna'. Here is a definite statement that ministers were being admitted to office without episcopal ordination, and that, apparently, with the connivance of some of the bishops. One can understand that this might well be the case in view of Grub's statement that the general feeling among these bishops was 'that Episcopacy was both lawful and expedient, and most in accordance with the practice of the Apostles and the ancient Church, but that it was not absolutely necessary as a form of ecclesiastical government, and that holy orders and the grace of the Eucharist might exist independently of episcopal ordi-

[1] Row, *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, p. 326 f.
[2] Wodrow Society, *Select Biographies*, vol. I, p. 136.

nation'.[1] Bishop Patrick Forbes of Aberdeen, for instance, rejected the doctrine that succession through a line of bishops constituted the true apostolic chain, and held that the true apostolic succession exists only where there is identity of holiness and doctrine with the Apostles. Both he and his son, Dr John Forbes, believed that episcopacy was not of the *esse* but rather of the *melius esse* of the Church.[2] On the other hand, William Forbes, first Bishop of Edinburgh, took up a firmer attitude, for he taught 'that Episcopacy was not an institution of human appointment, but a divine ordinance, founded on the Word of God, the practice of the Apostles, and the authority of the primitive Church'.[3]

One may conclude that during this period ordination continued to be regarded as at least as much an act of the presbytery as of the bishop—the latter acting as Moderator, but being assisted in the laying-on of hands by representatives of the presbytery of the bounds. If that is questioned, in view of the decree of the 1610 Assembly that the bishop, assisted by some of the ministers of the bounds, was to 'perfect the haill act of ordinatione', one must reply that the instances above cited can only be harmonised with that requirement on the assumption that the bishop sometimes delegated his part to another minister or to the presbytery—shall we say on occasions when he deemed it prudent not to assert his rights?—and that, on such occasions, the ordination was considered to be 'perfected' by his commission and authority rather than by his actual presence at the laying-on of hands. Once the revolt against the bishops began, ordinations took place without their knowledge and consent, and this gave much offence to King Charles, a notable instance being the ordination of George Gillespie at Wemyss in April 1638 by the Presbytery of Kirkcaldy.

In view of all this, it may almost be asserted that the only interference with the ecclesiastical situation in Scotland resulting from the consecration of the 1610 bishops was that consecration itself. All else remained substantially as it was. In particular, there is no hint that even a single minister was re-ordained; yet the Church of England and the Church of

[1] Grub, op. cit., ii, p. 295 f.
[2] W. G. S. Snow, *The Times, Life and Thought of Patrick Forbes, Bishop of Aberdeen*, p. 153 f.
[3] Grub, op. cit., ii, p. 332.

Scotland recognised one another and were in full communion.

III. 1661-1690

What happened at the Restoration of the Stewarts? The Scottish Parliament by the Act Recissory abolished the presbyterian form of Church government, and, by a statute which followed, the king was empowered to settle the ecclesiastical polity of Scotland. By the early autumn of 1661 he had declared for episcopacy. The only bishop surviving from the 1610-1638 period was Sydserf, Bishop of Galloway. He was not made primate, as might have been expected, but was translated to Orkney. Sharp was appointed Archbishop of St. Andrews and Fairfoul, Archbishop of Glasgow; while Hamilton went to Galloway in place of Sydserf and Leighton went to Dunblane. These four were assembled in London and arrangements were made for their consecration in December 1661. Fairfoul and Hamilton had been ordained by Scottish bishops of the earlier period, and as to them there was no question. Sharp and Leighton had only presbyterian ordination, and it was required that ordination as deacon and priest should precede their consecration. Leighton made no difficulty. His opinions in these matters were far from rigid. While preferring episcopacy as a form of government and as sanctioned by the practice of the early Church, he held that his presbyterian ordination was valid, but was willing to be re-ordained so as to conform to the rules. Sharp, however, protested against re-ordination and appealed to what happened in the similar cases in 1610. Sheldon and most of the English bishops held higher views of episcopacy than had been common at the earlier date, and they could also point out that what had been allowable then, when the Scottish Church first recovered canonical bishops after the Reformation, was not necessarily allowable later, when rebellion, not necessity, had left that Church without regular orders. James Sharp was not the man to carry scruples too far: he submitted, and he and Leighton were ordained deacons and priests privately. Thus the way was open for the consecration of the four Scots at the hands of the Bishops of London, Worcester, Carlisle, and Landaff. Returning to Scotland in the spring of 1662 the four bishops proceeded to consecrate the men nominated to the other sees. 'It is probable', says Grub,

'that most, if not all, of the newly consecrated prelates had formerly received episcopal ordination; but, if any of them had merely presbyterian orders, there is no evidence that they were re-ordained.'

By a statute of the Scottish Parliament of June 1662 all ministers admitted since 1649 were to be deprived of their benefices unless before 20th September they had obtained presentation from the patron and collation from the bishop and had taken an oath of canonical obedience to the bishop. Notice the date mentioned, 1649, the date of the abolition of patronage, and notice that no question was raised in the case of ministers admitted between 1638 and 1649, who must also have lacked episcopal collation. Clearly it was the rights of patrons rather than the virtues of episcopal collation or ordination that the Scottish Parliament had in mind; and that is not unimportant, for it confirms what in any case one might expect, that Charles II and his advisers were not keenly interested in canonical orders, and were not likely to bring pressure to bear on the bishops to re-ordain those of the post-1649 ministers who sought episcopal collation. Such submission, however, no convinced covenanter could make; and some three hundred ministers left their parishes rather than seek episcopal collation. Twice as many, however, accepted the conditions imposed by law and, as more than twenty years had elapsed since the last episcopal ordinations, there must have been many among them lacking canonical orders. Under normal conditions collation would only be granted to priests. Are we to assume, then, that all who in 1662 had not been episcopally ordained and sought collation were required to be re-ordained?

This question has been raised again by the publication of Mr F. Goldie's *A Short History of the Episcopal Church in Scotland* (1951) where on page 15 he says, 'Collation from the Bishop, after presentation from the lawful patrons, involved submission to episcopal ordination in the case of Presbyterian preachers, unless they had been ordained by the Bishops of the Spottiswoode succession before 1638, or by Bishops in England or Ireland'. Strictly speaking, of course, collation by its very nature did not *involve* ordination. It might, however, have been *accompanied by* ordination; and the important question arises whether there is any evidence that it was. Two passages from

the *Diary of John Nicoll* may be so interpreted. 'At this time sundry of the ministry came in to the archbishops and bishops and submitted themselves to them and to their orders, and gave oaths to them as their ordinaries, and received new presentations from them conform to the act of Parliament. Others of the ministry refused to give obedience . . .'.[1] Again, 'The indulgency given by the Bishop of Edinburgh to the ministry of his diocie did move many of them to come in and accept collation from him before the day appointed, and to submit themselves to the prelatical orders'.[2] These passages, however, are not free from ambiguity, for 'submit to their orders' or 'submit to the prelatical orders' does not necessarily mean 'submit to ordination'. Again, in his diary, Alexander Brodie writes, 'I spok with Mr Wm. Falconer to adviz the Bishop to moderation and to lay noe hands on Ministers.'[3] This suggests that the Bishop of Moray was inclined to re-ordain ministers; but whether he had already done so or not, and whether Brodie's advice was taken or not, is not clear. Again, an episcopalian writer, referring to a certain Doctor Robinson, one of the ministers of Edinburgh, says, 'especially the Doctor, whose great complaint it has been of late that he has groaned these twenty-seven years bypast under the yoke of Episcopacy, although at the Restitution of the Government, he did not think his Mission good, having had only Presbyterian Ordination; and therefore was re-ordained by a Bishop'.[4] If an episcopalian in 1690 thought it worthy of note that a minister in 1662 sought re-ordination, may we not conclude that such re-ordination was not usual? Again, John Skinner in his *Ecclesiastical History*, which is not contemporary, but may well incorporate an accurate tradition as to what took place in the North-East of Scotland, says, 'Others who had entered with orders only from the presbyteries, or, as some did, at their own hands without any formal ordination at all, were either ordained anew by the Bishops, which mightily offended the outstanders; or where circumstances appeared favourable were received on their submission and swearing canonical obedience to the Bishop, and by him empowered to exercise the office

[1] *Diary of John Nicoll*, p. 374. [2] ibid., p. 381 f.
[3] *Diaries of the Lairds of Brodie* (Spalding Club), p. 274.
[4] *An Account of the Present Persecution of the Church in Scotland* (London, 1690), p. 42.

and function of Presbyters in the Church, according to the present constitution'.[1]

On the other hand there is at least as good evidence that some presbyterians continued as ministers without episcopal ordination. Neither the collation nor the oath to the bishops necessarily involved acceptance of episcopal ordination, though the latter involved at least some acknowledgment of the existing episcopal government of the Church. Wodrow states that the style of collation in use included the phrase: 'I do hereby receive him into the function of the Holy Ministry.'[2] That, in the case of a man ordained by a presbytery, was clearly a reflection upon the worth of presbyterian ordination; but, at the same time, that phrase would seem to imply that collation was not being accompanied by re-ordination, for re-ordination would make such a phrase quite superfluous.

Grub's statement on the subject is that, 'Ordination was conferred by the bishops, with the assistance of their presbyters; but none of them, except Bishop Mitchell, insisted on re-ordaining ministers who had received only Presbyterian ordination, though they did not refuse to do so when asked'.[3] Even without legal powers of compulsion a bishop might, if he were so disposed, exert very considerable pressure; and it is highly probable that Skinner and Grub are right in holding that re-ordinations did take place in the Aberdeen region. The bishop there, till his death in 1663, was David Mitchell, formerly minister at Edinburgh, who is described by Grub as 'a zealous disciple of the theological school of Laud'. The views of such a bishop and the episcopalian sentiment of the diocese of Aberdeen make it most likely that he insisted on re-ordination wherever he could. Similarly, the probabilities of the case, taken along with Nicoll's statement quoted above, make it likely that Bishop Wishart in Edinburgh was able to induce some ministers to be re-ordained. On the other hand, it is incredible that Leighton, a champion of moderate episcopacy, who appears to have followed all the accustomed usages of the Presbytery of Dunblane and to have behaved among its members as no more than their Moderator, should first have re-

[1] John Skinner, *An Ecclesiastical History of Scotland*, ii, p. 462.
[2] Wodrow, *History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland*, i, p. 119.
[3] Grub, op. cit., iii p. 218.

ordained them. It is also unlikely that Sharp would affront popular prejudice more than he was obliged to do by interpreting collation in any sense stricter than the legal one, while Guthry at Dunkeld is said to have been noted for his moderation. In short, the evidence from other parts of the country than the North-East is so slight and so ambiguous that one must conclude that while re-ordination almost certainly took place in some areas and possibly in others, too, when it was requested, it was not universal and not even general. Men who became ministers between 1638 and 1649 must have been ordained by presbyteries. Their position as ministers was not questioned by the act of 1662, for they were not required to make any application to the bishop. It is, however, possible that some of them were persuaded to accept episcopal ordination. Finally, it should be noted that a number of men in presbyterian orders who left their parishes in 1662 rather than seek the presentation and collation required by law, were later allowed under the terms of the Indulgences to exercise their ministry. In such cases there seems to have been no attempt to impose episcopal ordination upon them.

Once again, therefore, we find the Church of England and the Church of Scotland in full communion for nearly thirty years, though many Church of Scotland ministers—probably the vast majority—were not in canonical orders.

We may now conclude our survey with these propositions. First, episcopacy as a method of Church government was not so universally reprobated by the Scottish Reformers as has often been supposed, if indeed it was reprobated at all until the rise of Andrew Melville.

Second, the doctrine of apostolic succession found negligible support either in theory or practice at any time in post-Reformation Scotland; and, though it has had great influence among English churchmen, it is not stated in the official doctrine or formularies of the Church of England.

Third, a Scottish churchman, therefore, without being disloyal to the tradition of the Reformers of his Church can accept the historic episcopate, in the sense of an episcopate regarded not as of the *esse* of the Church but simply as a valuable witness to the continuity of the Church and a useful agent of Church government; while an English churchman, without being dis-

loyal to the official position of his Church or to the early post-Reformation practice of his Church, can enter into full communion with such a Scottish Church.

We are not, however, so naive as to imagine that recognition of the historic facts as summarised above will of itself change the opinions of churchmen on the vexed questions of intercommunion and reunion. All that is claimed here is that the historic facts have some importance, for they are calculated to safeguard those who accept them from the ignorant appeals to traditional sentiment and prejudice on both sides, which sometimes pass for discussion in matters of this kind.

THE THEOLOGY OF BAPTISM[1]

by The Rev. JOHN HERON

In the Bible we find Baptism suddenly appearing for the first time in that action of John the Baptist which, according to one way of reading Mark 1.1, was 'the beginning of the Gospel'. The Evangelists speak of Baptism not as a strange rite invented by John, but as something so familiar that it requires neither detailed description nor careful explanation.

To readers of the present day, however, the sudden appearance of Baptism at the beginning of the New Testament is a source of bewilderment which can easily lead to the kind of false interpretation of Scripture that underlies the Baptist movement *et hoc genus omne.*

It is therefore necessary to try to discover all we can as to the origin and significance of this strange rite.

The New Testament uses two cognate nouns: *βάπτισμα* and *βαπτισμός*. *βάπτισμα* is found only in the New Testament and in Christian writers, and in the New Testament is used only of Baptism, whether it be John's Baptism or Christian Baptism. *βαπτισμός* is used in the New Testament meaning a special form of 'washing'. It occurs only at Mark 7.4, Heb. 6.2 and 9.10. In all these cases the reference is to ritual washings either of persons or of things. It is never used of Baptism in the New Testament, though Josephus, the only profane author to use the word, applies it to John's Baptism (Ant. xvii.v.2).

The root from which these nouns come is *βάπτω*, a verb common in classical Greek. Its basic meaning is 'to dip', and from this there is a natural development to the further meanings 'to steep', 'to dye', 'to fill' a vessel by dipping it in a liquid, and so 'to draw', e.g. water. It is also used intransitively meaning 'to sink', and metaphorically in a variety of senses somewhat as the expression 'to be sunk' is used in present day spoken English.

[1] Part of a paper read at the Conference of the Scottish Church Theology Society at Crieff, January 1954.

βάπτω is used in LXX to translate טָבַל in passages such as Exod. 12.22 (of dipping hyssop in the blood), Lev. 14.16 (of dipping a finger in oil), and Joshua 3.15 (of the priests' feet dipping into the Jordan).

βαπτίζω is the frequentative or intensive form of *βάπτω*. Hence its root meaning is 'to dip repeatedly' or 'to sink completely'. Its metaphorical meaning is 'to overwhelm'. Thus Josephus says of the refugees flooding into Jerusalem *ἐβάπτισαν τὴν πόλιν* (Jewish War IV.iii.3), i.e. they swamped the city.

In LXX *βαπτίζω* is used in 2 Kings 5.14 (translating Heb. טָבַל of Naaman 'dipping' in the Jordan. In Isa. 21.4 LXX gives *ἡ ἀνομία με βαπτίζει* 'wickedness overwhelms me' for the Hebrew פַּלָּצוּת בִּעָתָתְנִי 'horror has appalled me' (R.S.V.).

In the Apocrypha LXX uses the verb *βαπτίζω* in two very interesting passages: Sirach 31 (34).30: *βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ*, and Judith 12.7: *ἐβαπτίζετο ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ ἐπὶ τῆς πηγῆς τοῦ ὕδατος*. These two passages have frequently been taken as though the verb meant 'wash', and, of course, we have no Hebrew text to use as a guide, but there is nothing in either instance to justify such an interpretation.[1]

In the Old Testament the verb used for Levitical washings is רָחַץ which LXX always translates by *λούω*. It is unnecessary to examine in detail instances of this equation רחץ = *λούω* which can be found in Lev. 14.8, 9, 15.5 ff, 17.15, 16.4, 24, 28; Num. 19.7, 19; Exod. 19.10, 29.4, 40.12; 2 Kings 5.10; Isa. 1.16; LXX thus never uses *βάπτω* or *βαπτίζω* for 'washing' (רָחַץ), but *only* for 'dipping', 'plunging', 'staining', 'dyeing', or metaphorically, 'overwhelming' (טָבַל).

[1] Judith 12.7 is most naturally translated 'she dipped herself in the spring of water within the perimeter'. That the verb signifies 'dipping' rather than 'washing' is borne out by the following verse: *καὶ ὡς ἀνέβη, ἐδέετο τοῦ κυρίου*, 'and as she *came up* (out of the water) she prayed to the Lord'. Sirach 31 (34).30 is rather different, but very significant. It refers, not to ordinary Levitical lustrations, but to the special ritual for purification of one who has been defiled by contact with a dead body. (Num. 19): In this ritual the defiled person or thing was sprinkled with water that had been mixed with some of the ashes of the burnt sin offering, and the sprinkling was done by dipping hyssop in the water and then shaking it over, or towards, the person or thing to be cleansed. Numbers 19.18: *καὶ λήψεται ὕσσωπον καὶ βάψει εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ, κ.τ.λ.* (Heb.: וְלָקַח אֵזוֹב וְטָבַל בַּמַּיִם) Sirach 31 (34).30 therefore uses the verb *βαπτίζω* in a technical sense which merits the translation: 'He that is baptised from the dead.'

When, as in Sirach, *βάπτω* or *βαπτίζω* are used in a ritual sense, the reference is always to the rites described in Num. 19, which have to do with cleansing from death and the renewal of life.[1]

In the New Testament *βάπτω* is used only three times: Luke 16.24, of Lazarus dipping the tip of his finger in water; John 13.26, of dipping the sop; and Rev. 19.13, of the garment dipped (or dyed) in blood.[2] Most New Testament instances of *βαπτίζω* refer to Baptism, either that of John or Christian Baptism. Exceptions are Mark 7.4, where the text is uncertain, but the best MSS. B and ℵ have *ῥαντίσωνται* instead of *βαπτίσωνται*, so it would be unwise to build on this verse. Luke 11.38, *ὁ δὲ φαρισαῖος ἰδὼν ἐθαύμασεν ὅτι οὐ πρῶτον ἐβαπτίσθη πρὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου*. This is usually translated 'because he did not wash himself before eating', but Professor William Manson takes it to refer not to the ordinary washing, in which water was poured over the hands, but to the more formal washing involving dipping the hands right into the water as was done before eating sacrificial food.[3] There are also a few cases in which the verb is used in the metaphorical sense 'to overwhelm': viz. Matt. 20.22, 23 (not in the best MSS.), Mark 10.38, 39, and Luke 12.50.

To sum up: the linguistic evidence does not justify the traditional interpretation of John's Baptism as a symbolic washing analogous to the Jewish Levitical lustrations.[4] Rather does it suggest that it must be thought of in the light of the associations of the root with submerging, overwhelming, or even drowning, together with the liturgical associations of cleansing from death and renewal of life. On the linguistic evidence, therefore, John's baptism would seem to have been an act of prophetic symbolism in which, by an acted parable of drowning, the candidate went down into the water to mark the end of his old life in order that he might emerge a new man. *Not cleansing, but death and re-birth*, was, then, the basic meaning of the symbolism of Baptism.

[1] For this point, and for suggestions worked out in the above lexicographical discussion, I am indebted to the Rev. Professor T. F. Torrance.

[2] The text of Rev. 19.13 is doubtful.

[3] Moffatt Commentary in loc.

[4] It should, however, be mentioned that in post-biblical Hebrew there is a tendency to use טָבַל where the OT would use רָחַץ and thus to blur the difference in meaning between these two verbs.

Jewish Practice

Confirmation of this interpretation of the significance of Baptism as a rite intelligible to Jews is to be found in the Jewish practice of Proselyte Baptism. Gentile converts became Jews, after instruction, by a threefold rite: circumcision, followed, usually some days later, by baptism, followed by sacrifice. (In the case of female converts initiation was by baptism followed by sacrifice). After the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70, it was no longer possible for sacrifice to be made, and so the admission of proselytes came to be by circumcision followed by baptism in the case of men, and by baptism alone in the case of women.

For our knowledge of Proselyte Baptism we have until very recently, had to depend upon Jewish sources which, in their written form at least, are post-Christian in date. Hence it has sometimes been argued that Proselyte Baptism might have been introduced in imitation of Christian Baptism.

Until recently it looked as though the question could not be definitely settled. The position today is, however, more encouraging. The work of Oepke and of Jeremias[1] show that the case for a pre-Christian date for Proselyte Baptism is very strong, and, still more recently, the Dead Sea Scrolls have given incontrovertible evidence of Baptism as a well known practice within Judaism before the time of Christ. Particularly interesting is the 'Manual of Discipline', which seems to come from the same sect or movement as produced the 'Zadokite Fragments'. According to this document initiation into this sect was regarded as initiation into the Covenant (the Mosaic Covenant from which the mass of Jewry had drifted away). Initiation was by Baptism, but this was far from being merely or even chiefly a washing. First there had to be repentance—an oath to return to the Torah of Moses, corroborated by a visible change in the candidate's way of life. After a probationary period came Baptism: a threefold immersion in running water accompanied by the recitation of the Decalogue and confession of sin. Once

[1] A. Oepke: Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung der Kindertaufe (*Festschrift für Ihmels*, 1928); Article in Kittel: Theologisches Wörterbuch zum N.T., Vol. I; Urchristentum und Kindertaufe (*Zeitschrift für N.T. Wissenschaft*, 1930, pp. 81-111). J. Jeremias, *Hat die älteste Christenheit die Kindertaufe geübt?* (1938), 2nd edition 1949; Der Ursprung der Johannestaufe (*Zeitschrift für N.T. Wissenschaft.*18 (1929), pp. 312-320).

his Baptism was complete, the initiate participated in a sacred meal of bread and wine called 'the purity of the holy men'. It looks very probable that John the Baptist may have learned from this sect. Certainly his Baptism must have had definite affinities with the Baptism of the sect.[1]

This newly-discovered evidence clearly points to Baptism as a rite by which men enter into the Covenant.

It has commonly been said that it represents the washing of their bodies and of their clothes which the Israelites were commanded to carry out as a preparation for the making of the Covenant at Sinai (Exod. 19.10),[2] but against this must be set 1 Cor. 10.1-2, and a great deal of rabbinical evidence that associates Baptism, not with the comparatively ordinary act of purifying oneself by bathing and washing, but rather with the awesome experiences of *passing under the cloud*, and of *crossing the Red Sea*. Other passages associate Baptism with the Flood, or with the crossing of the River Jordan. These were all outstanding events in which the power of God was manifested in such a way as to bring fear or even terror to men. They expressed both His judgment upon sin and His gracious deliverance of His Chosen People, thus making possible for them a new beginning in a covenant relation with Himself. Baptism, thus signifies something much more profound than cleansing. As Walter Grundman says, 'baptism . . . has its prototype in the flood (1 Peter 3.20 f), and is to be understood as *voluntary submission to the Judgment and deliverance from it*.'[3]

Baptism as a Jewish Rite signified not so much 'cleansing' as 'overwhelming' or even 'death and rebirth'. Proselytes were regarded as *dying*, as far as their Gentile life was concerned, in the water of Baptism from which they emerged *new born* as Israelites.[4]

The theological basis of both Proselyte Baptism and Sectarian Baptism (including, presumably Johannite Baptism) is to be found in rabbinic teaching as to how Israel entered the Covenant. Maimonides repeating age-old tradition says: 'By Cir-

[1] For the substance of this paragraph I am indebted to the Very Rev. Principal Matthew Black.

[2] Maimonides, *Isure Biah*, 13, 14.

[3] Sin (Bible Key Words from Gerhard Kittel's Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament translated and edited by J. R. Coates), p. 70.

[4] Cf. Brandt, 'Baptism' (Jewish), *E.R.E.*, ii, p. 408 f; G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, Vol. i, p. 333.

cumcision, and Baptism, and Sacrifice did Israel enter into the Covenant.' Circumcision was related to what Israel did in Egypt, and Baptism was related to, or even regarded as *a re-presentation or liturgical extension of, the passing through the sea* in which Israel, by the mighty act of God, was delivered from the realm of slavery, and began a new life as God's People, united to Him by His Covenant sealed in Sacrifice.[1]

Baptism, therefore, as a liturgical participation in the crossing of the Red Sea, signified cutting loose from the past in order to make a fresh start as members of the People of God. In the work of John the Baptist this association was all the more emphasised by the place of his preaching and Baptism. He called those who nominally belonged to Israel out into the wilderness to show them that they were far removed from the Realm of God, and in Baptism led them, like Joshua of old, through the waters of Jordan (which was regarded by the Rabbis as a parallel to the crossing of the sea) that, leaving their sinful past behind them, they might be made truly ready to enter the promised land.

The Baptism of our Lord by John

The connexion between John's work and that of Christ, as the Gospels clearly show, lay in the eschatological significance of John's work. John's task was to prepare for the coming of the Kingdom of God. Our Lord, by coming to John's Baptism, accepted him as His own forerunner. 'To everyone else this preparatory act was a baptism of repentance. The Messiah, who needed no repentance, could yet accept the preparation. By means of this rite the people were consecrated to receive salvation, and He was consecrated to bestow it.'[2]

Our Lord's purpose in going to be baptised by John is given in Matthew 3.15: *οὕτως γὰρ πρέπον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν πληρῶσαι πᾶσαν δικαιοσύνην*. This is probably to be understood not primarily as an expression of that filial humility which fulfils all duty to God[3] but rather, stressing the word 'all', as meaning: This is

[1] Cf. Jeremias: Der Ursprung der Johannestaufe, *ZNTW*, 1929, pp. 312-320. 1 Cor. 10 is not a piece of private speculation on the part of Paul. The association of Baptism with the Cloud and the Sea was accepted Rabbinic teaching before Paul's day.

[2] Alfred Plummer in *H.D.B.*, Vol. i, p. 240*b*.

[3] Gottlob Schrenk, art. 'Righteousness' in Kittel (*T.W.N.T.*). Eng. tr. by J. R. Coates, p. 35.

the proper way for us to act in order to make the 'righteousness' or 'salvation' of God available for all men.[1]

Cullmann's analysis of the whole passage rightly shows that our Lord's going down into the Jordan was a step down to death as the Elect Servant of Yahweh who bears the sins of many. That Jesus Himself recognised this is plain both from the accounts of His Baptism, which, like those of the Temptations, must come ultimately from His own teaching of the Disciples,[2] and from His significant use (Luke 12.50; Mark 10.38) of the word 'Baptism' as a metaphor for His death, or rather for 'His whole existence in the form of a servant, all that is included in His being upon earth "not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many" (Mark 10.45).'[3] 'The essential meaning of Jesus' baptism is precisely that He was "numbered with the transgressors" and "bare the sin of many" (Isa. 53.12).'[3] The Cross was the nadir of that Baptism, that 'plunging' down from the heights of Heaven into the depths of Hell which began in the Incarnation.

The One Baptism

The Baptism of our Lord was *not* the institution of Christian Baptism. The Baptists, Zwingli, Barth, and all who make this mistake are led by it into further errors.[4] His Baptism in Jordan was a pointer to, or rather an early part of, His Baptism into death and hades; and this Baptism which He underwent for us is the 'One Baptism' (the ante-type of the Red Sea and Jordan crossing) which is re-presented each time the Sacrament of Baptism is administered, for then a new person is being made to share in the one Baptism πληρῶσαι πᾶσαν δικαιοσύνην.

The heart of the κήρυγμα, of the life of the Church, and of the message of the Bible as a whole, is salvation from the power of

[1] Cf. Oscar Cullmann, *Baptism in the New Testament*, p. 18.

[2] T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus*, p. 103. 'The Marcan account makes it clear that it was Jesus Himself, and He alone, who saw the vision and heard the voice: and if that be so, it will follow that this account derives ultimately from the Master Himself.'

[3] J. A. T. Robinson, 'The One Baptism as a Category of New Testament Soteriology' (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 6, pp. 257 ff).

[4] Cf. H. J. Wotherspoon, *Religious Values in the Sacraments*, p. 164: 'the appeal of those who set aside the Baptism of infants and rebaptise—the appeal to "follow Christ into Jordan"—gains much of its force with not a few devout persons from a mistaken identification of the Baptism which our Lord in His own person accepted with the Baptism which He bestows upon us.'

sin and death through Jesus Christ, incarnate, crucified, risen and ascended, who shall come again in glory to judge the living and the dead.

We are saved by Him not by any mere transaction external to ourselves, nor by the mere performance of any rites, but through a personal relationship which grows and deepens, making us to share in what He underwent for us, and which will, in the end, completely transform us into His likeness. And as all personal relationships are made through the body we must be united with Christ in His Body.[1]

Christian Baptism

'Fundamental and elemental incorporation in the Body of Christ takes place through baptism.'[2] This means that the administration of the Sacrament of Baptism is an initiation into a life of growing participation in the death and resurrection of Christ, a life whose essential character consists in a continually repeated dying of self and rising with Christ. Only so do the baptised, who in the Sacrament have been *grafted* into the Body of Christ, *grow into Him* as true members of the Body through which He continues His work.

Since the bond of union between the members and the Head is the Holy Spirit, Baptism is also spoken of as Baptism 'in', 'into', or 'with' the Holy Spirit. Christian Baptism, therefore, could not begin until the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost, when the Risen and Ascended Lord sent forth the Spirit; but at our Lord's Baptism by John this was foreshadowed when He saw the Spirit come upon Him, not for the first time, but in a significantly new way, 'in bodily form' (Luke 3.22), thus equipping Him to be the one through whom—through the breaking of whose very body—the Spirit was to be bestowed.

'Christian baptism is none other than the great baptism of Christ now made individually effective.'[3] This is its primary meaning, and we must be on our guard against the danger of obscuring this by over-emphasising the importance of the churchly act of baptising, or the importance of the human response of faith.[4]

[1] Cf. R. S. Wallace, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament*, p. 145.
[2] Gustav Aulen in *The Universal Church in God's Design*, p. 24.
[3] J. A. T. Robinson, op. cit., *S.J.T.*, Vol, 6. p. 267.
[4] Cf. F. W. Robertson, *Sermons* (2nd Series), 1886 ed., p. 56: 'Herein lies the

The Place of Faith

Faith is essential for our growing into Christ. It is our response to or 'closing with' His Grace, wherein He was incarnate, crucified, and risen for us, and which is offered to us in the Sacrament of Baptism. But our faith is not Baptism, nor is it a part of Baptism. Rather is it our response to the general Baptism which Christ underwent for us, and to our own Baptism wherein He has laid His hand on our head and said to us: 'Fear not, for I have redeemed you; I have called you by name, you are mine' (Isa. 43.1 RSV).

The over-emphasis on faith, making it a condition of Baptism, springs from a Pelagian view of human nature, which imagines that unregenerate man can choose whether to sin or not. The truth is that the unbeliever cannot but serve sin, and that it is only in Christ that it is made possible for men to disown sin and to choose Him. The optimistic doctrine of man that underlies theological liberalism denies this truth and so obscures the significance of Baptism wherein we are grafted into the Body of Christ and given the power to choose whom we will serve.

Infant Baptism

The assumption that Infant Baptism arose in the second century A.D. has been very widely held. Even defenders of Infant Baptism have often taken it for granted, and, consequently have tended to adopt an apologetic attitude in controversy with Baptists. The situation today is different, largely because of the challenge thrown out by Oepke in 1928 and the work of Jeremias.

In the second edition of *Hat die älteste Christenheit die Kindertaufe geübt?* published in 1949 under the title *Hat die Urkriche die Kindertaufe geübt?*, Jeremias reviews the debate which has been going on since Oepke's challenge, and makes a very strong case for believing that the Church accepted Infant Baptism at an early date almost as a matter of course.[1] He shows that, at least from the beginning of the Christian era,

error, in basis identical, of the Romanist and of the Calvinist. Faith is to one what baptism is to the other, the creator of a fact; whereas they both *rest* upon a fact, which is a fact whether they exist or not—before they exist; nay, without whose previous existence both of them are unmeaning and false.' This criticism does not apply to Calvin himself, but it does apply to some modern Calvinists, and certainly to Karl Barth.

[1] Cf. J. C. Campbell, Review of Jeremias' work in *S.J.T.*, Vol. 4, pp. 203 ff.

and probably earlier, proselytes and their minor children were baptised.[1]

Opponents of Infant Baptism have not been able to produce any historical grounds for rejecting Jeremias' contentions, and have been driven to such extremes as to relegate the texts he quotes to a date in the second century A.D. solely on dogmatic grounds,[2] or else flatly to deny that any Jewish practice can be considered to shed any light on Christian Baptism.[3] It hardly seems necessary to go over this debate, since the new evidence of the Dead Sea scrolls appears to settle the matter decisively in Jeremias' favour.

Proselyte baptismal practice has been summarised by J. V. Bartlet thus: 'Where the proselyte father brings the children, their solidarity with him as their head or authority is enough to warrant baptism; where only the mother, baptism is conferred "on the authority of a *beth din*" or Jewish court of law. . . . In either case its effect is only provisional; the child is brought within the covenant as far as social or family life goes, but his personal or subjective relation to the covenant waits on the development of reflective will, just as with the circumcision of a born Jew, who, as a rule, became a "Son of the Law", and was publicly accepted into the visible membership of the Synagogue, only on his thirteenth birthday.[4]

The prayer said today by a Bar Mitzvah probably goes back in substance a very long time, and may therefore throw some light on the practice of Jews in New Testament times. It begins as follows:

> O my God and God of my fathers! On this solemn and sacred day, which marks my passage from boyhood to manhood, I humbly raise my eyes unto thee, and declare, with sincerity and truth, that henceforth I will keep thy commandments, and undertake and bear the responsibility of mine actions towards thee. In my earliest infancy I was brought within thy sacred covenant with Israel; and today I again enter, as an active

[1] J. J. von Allmen considers Jeremias' arguments to be decisive, vide 'L'Eglise primitive et le baptême des enfants' (*Verbum Caro*, No. 13, pp. 43-7).

[2] Cf. A. Benoît, 'Le Problème du pédobaptisme' (*Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, 1948-9, No. 2, p. 135).

[3] F.-J. Leenhardt, 'Le Baptême des enfants et le N.T.' (*Foi et Vie*, Jan. 1949, p. 90). When a man is driven to such a monstrous position, we are not very surprised to find him denying the honesty of his opponents. (Barth also is guilty of this!) One does not need to be a Freudian to understand!

[4] J. Vernon Bartlet, 'Baptism' (NT), *E.R.E.*, ii, p. 379.

responsible member, thine elect congregation, in the midst of which I will never cease to proclaim thy holy name in the face of all nations.[1]

The relevance of the Bar Mitzvah rite becomes apparent when it is recognised that Christian Baptism stands in the closest possible relation to the Covenant, and its OT sign Circumcision. It is therefore impossible rightly to understand Baptism from the New Testament alone. Yet the Commission on Baptism of the French Reformed Church in its report quoted only from the New Testament, and Barth in his pamphlet: 'The Teaching of the Church regarding Baptism' only once quotes from the Old Testament, and that not in connexion with Baptism.[2]

Here we have better guides in the *Westminster Confession* and in Calvin, and if we have fallen into error in more recent generations it has been largely through neglecting these classical guides.

The Covenant

We cannot understand the Bible if we ignore the doctrine of the Covenant, nor shall we ever rightly grasp the doctrine of Baptism unless we understand it in terms of the Covenant.[3]

The Covenant of Grace expresses God's voluntary condescension 'wherein He freely offereth unto sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ. . . . This covenant was differently administered in the time of the law, and in the time of the gospel: under the law, it was administered by promises, prophecies, sacrifices, circumcision, the paschal lamb, and other types and ordinances . . . all fore-signifying Christ to come. . . . Under the Gospel, when Christ, the substance, was exhibited, the ordinances in which this covenant is dispensed are the preaching of the Word, and the administration of the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. . . . There are not therefore two

[1] Authorised Daily Prayer Book of the United Hebrew Congregations of the British Empire, 15th edition, p. 309*a*.

[2] Pierre Ch. Marcel, *The Biblical Doctrine of Infant Baptism*, p. 16.

[3] W. Eichrodt has found it possible and helpful to make Covenant the key to the exposition of OT theology: vide his *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Vol. 1. Professor Vasady of Lancaster, U.S.A., when asked some years ago about Barth's views on Baptism, which were then recent news, said that if the Church were to follow Barth's advice it would be necessary for it to invent something to express the fact that the children of believers are within the Covenant. The growing practice of Infant Dedication among the Baptists is further confirmation of this need, though as an act of the parents only it cannot really supply what is lacking.

covenants of grace, differing in substance, but one and the same, under various dispensations.' (*Westminster Confession*, chap. vii.)

This substantial unity of the covenant of grace under its OT and NT dispensations applies also to the sacraments: 'The sacraments of the old testament, in regard to the spiritual things thereby signified and exhibited, were, for substance, the same with those of the new.' (ibid. chap. xxvii.5.)

Baptism means sharing in the new dispensation of the Covenant in the Blood of Christ, in which the old dispensation is fulfilled. Hence in the new dispensation, Baptism took the place of Circumcision as the seal of the Covenant. This was clearly the view of the New Testament. It is explicitly stated in Col. 2.11 f, and is implicit in such passages as Eph. 2.11 ff.[1] And it is this substitution of Baptism for Circumcision that explains why, despite the lack of explicit prescription of Infant Baptism in the New Testament, the practice of baptising the infants of believers grew up naturally from the first, and was never the occasion for debate, as would have been the case if it had been felt to be the introduction of some new thing. In the New Israel as in the old Israel, the children of believers were regarded as born within the Covenant of Grace (1 Cor. 7.17), which was sealed to them in the sacrament of Baptism as under the old dispensation it had been sealed (though to male children only) in the sacrament of Circumcision.

The very strangeness to modern ears of the words Covenant, Seal, Election, etc., in their Biblical sense, is a measure of the extent to which 'Christian' thinking has departed from Biblical categories and norms. It is therefore not surprising that many within the Church today see no necessity for Baptism except the Divine command. As Professor T. W. Manson has put it:

> I venture to think that the main cause of most of our difficulties about baptism is an atomistic individualism that will keep on infiltrating into our thinking and persuading us that the matter of primary importance is my salvation or damnation; and that this is a matter of individual decision either by God in His eternal decrees, or by me at my conversion, or somehow by both of us together. Such a view leaves no real place for Church or Sacraments. . . .[2]

[1] Cf. Oscar Cullmann, *Baptism in the New Testament*, chap. 4, and G. W. H. Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit*, p. 84: 'Baptism is the real fulfilment of circumcision. . . . In Col. 2.11 St. Paul plainly contrasts circumcision with the spiritual circumcision in Christ effected through Baptism.'

[2] 'Baptism in the Church' (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol. 2, p. 398), see also

God, the Bible testifies, has chosen to redeem mankind through a particular series of historic events, the heart and meaning of which are to be seen in the Incarnation and the Cross and Resurrection. To the philosophical (Greek) mind there is something scandalous in the claim that certain historic events should have such unique significance (*Einmaligkeit*), yet this scandal is of the essence of the Gospel to which the Bible testifies, which the Church proclaims, and by which the Church lives.

Election

Now 'election' is necessitated by God's choice so to redeem men. The Church, both in its OT form and in its NT form is part of the particularity of the '*Heilsgeschichte*'; in fact the Catholic Church (i.e. the NT form of the Church in contrast to its OT form), is 'a corollary of the Incarnation, a form of the continuing Ministry of Christ himself'.[1] Even in the OT, 'The Children of Israel were by the grace of God always a true Church, organically connected to Christ as members to the head of a body'.[2]

Baptism is the sacramental incorporation of the candidate into the Body of Christ.

When Paul wants to state how it happened that the Christian died to the law, he says that it came about 'through the body of Christ', *διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Paul is manifestly thinking of Christ's death. But what is the reason for this peculiar and special emphasis on the body of Christ, that it was through *it* that we died to the law? . . . the correct explanation is easy to find, if we only remember what *σώμα Χριστοῦ* . . . means to Paul . . . the Christian's participation in the death of Christ . . . is effected through baptism. In baptism we are incorporated into Christ, made members of 'the body of Christ'. 'By one Spirit we were all baptised into one body' (1 Cor. 12.23).[3]

Baptism of the Spirit

This understanding of Baptism as incorporation into the Church, the Body of Christ, provides the only right approach

J. A. T. Robinson, *The Body*, on the impossibility of understanding the NT teaching about the Church or Baptisms in terms of modern individualistic thinking.

[1] T. W. Manson, ibid., p. 400.

[2] R. S. Wallace, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament*, p. 42.

[3] Anders Nygren, *Commentary on Romans*, p. 274.

to the understanding of Baptism as Baptism ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ (Matt. 3.11). 'That the Holy Spirit is the bond which unites the ascended Lord to His followers and the agency through which they become His members, sharing in His Messianic unction, is the general teaching of the New Testament as a whole. . . . Because the Spirit is the link between Christ and the believer, it is through the κοινωνία of the Spirit that there comes into being the fellowship of the Church. . . .'[1]

Baptismal Regeneration

It is as incorporation into the Church, the κοινωνία of the Spirit, that the NT speaks of Baptism as 'regeneration' (John 3.5, 6; Titus 3.5).[2] This term has been so misused in controversy that it is well to remember that it means nothing more than re-birth. As W. F. Hook put it:

> Regeneration was the term applied to baptism by all the Fathers; by every writer, I believe, till the Reformation, and it was used to denote, not the final triumph of grace over the heart, but the primary operations of the Spirit in the scheme of man's redemption. The Puritans used the term to signify the final triumph of grace over the heart; and then giving a new meaning to the term, abused the Church for using the word in the old sense.[3]

Wotherspoon homologates this judgment:

> No one, so far as I know or can imagine, has taught Baptismal conversion or Baptismal salvation. Conversion, repentance, faith are movements of life in us: but generation is antecedent to life—it is the act which precedes and initiates life; and if we speak at all of regeneration, our thought must follow that analogy. God is first: something of His . . . which makes it possible for us to believe or repent or convert . . . is what in this use is meant by regeneration.[4]

The Body of Christ, into which we are incorporated in Baptism, is the instrument of His continuing ministry: and as He came not to be served but to serve, so the Church, His Body, exists, not in order to assure the salvation of its members, but in order to seek and to save the lost. Those members most truly

[1] G. W. H. Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit*, p. 53.

[2] Cf. the Rabbinic saying that a proselyte on emerging from the water of baptism is 'an Israelite one day old', i.e. he is reborn or regenerate into Israel.

[3] W. R. W. Stephens, *The Life and Letters of W. F. Hook* (1878), I, p. 267. q. A. R. Vidler, *The Theology of F. D. Maurice*, p. 113.

[4] *Religious Values in the Sacraments*, p. 170. See also Oscar Cullmann, *Baptism in the New Testament*, p. 48.

belong to Christ who, like Moses and Paul, are more eager for the salvation of others than for assurance of their own salvation. Election, which is God's call to men to belong to the People of the Covenant, is primarily election to service rather than election to salvation.

Since the Body is Christ's, not ours, it follows that He and He only can incorporate men into Himself. Certainly, incorporation, to accomplish its purpose, requires that those elected give their response of faith; but God's election of men—His grafting of them into Christ's Body—is primary. It is not possible for any merely human act to effect this grafting contrary to the will of God nor for any merely human refusal to perform the rite of incorporation to exclude one called by God.

The Church, as the sacramental Body of Christ, is not to be identified with its human and visible aspect alone. The outward and visible actions of the Church ought therefore to be guided, not by the judgment of men, but by the will of God. This holds of the Sacrament of Baptism as of every other Church act. Baptism, the Seal of Election, can properly be administered only where God has given a sign or token of His Election.

'Calvin appeals for the most diligent care in bestowing the sacrament only on those from whom there are clear signs either that they have faith or that they are likely to come to full faith.'[1]

In the Old Testament dispensation the indications of election by God warranting the granting of its 'sign', i.e. Circumcision, were (1) in the case of an adult Gentile, repentance and faith, (2) in the case of a minor Gentile the repentance and faith of his parent, and (3) in the case of a child born within Israel the fact that in the Providence of God he had been born within the People of God.

Under the conditions of the New Testament the signs are essentially the same. The practical problem is to know under what circumstances one who has been from birth within the community of the People of God can by his own action so put himself outside the Community that his children ought no longer to be considered as having in their birth the sign of Election.

The conflicting views on this point which are held today tend

[1] R. S. Wallace, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament*, pp. 184 f.

to coincide with those advocated in the past by Samuel Rutherfurd and Thomas Boston of Ettrick.[1]

Rutherfurd regarded it as sufficient that one parent be nominally Christian, even though he might not be a Communicant nor be such that any Kirk Session would admit him as a Communicant. Boston argued that no child has a right to Baptism unless his parent has a right to come to the Lord's Table.

It seems to me that what was said above about the 'provisional' character of Circumcision until the child, on coming to the age of discretion, became a 'Bar Mitzvah' and himself accepted the obligations of membership in the People of the Covenant provides us with a vital clue. If so, our Scottish tradition has been at fault in failing to lay sufficient stress upon the Christian 'Bar Mitzvah' ceremony in which a person who has been baptised in infancy makes profession of his faith and accepts the obligations of the Covenant in the Blood of Christ.

In any case, Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick are surely right when they say:

> What the Church requires as a condition of the Baptism of an infant is . . . reasonable guarantee that the infant shall be reared in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. Where this prospect exists, the Church recognises providential indication of a call to baptise. The child may be regarded as a disciple and the proper subject of the precept to baptise such and to teach them all that Christ has commanded. Where such prospect is wanting, the Church dare not involve a soul in the responsibility which Baptism constitutes.[2]

The doctrine of Baptism cannot be isolated from other doctrines, since Christian belief is an organic unity. In fact, the touchstone of every system of dogmatics is the doctrine of the sacraments.[3] The reason for this is that, in the last analysis, our doctrine of the sacraments will prove to be of the same sort as our doctrine of the Church, and our doctrine of the Person of Christ.[4]

[1] See *The Doctrine of the Church in Scottish Theology*, by John Macpherson (Edinburgh, 1903), pp. 82 ff.

[2] H. J. Wotherspoon and J. M. Kirkpatrick, *A Manual of Church Doctrine*, p. 50.

[3] H. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, IV, p. 221; cf. Pierre Ch. Marcel, *The Biblical Doctrine of Infant Baptism*, p. 17.

[4] Calvin recognised in the relation between the sign and the matter or substance grace in the sacraments a parallel to the relation between the human and the divine natures in the person of Christ. Cf. R. S. Wallace, op. cit., pp. 167 ff. The principle was adumbrated in Augustine and even as early as Irenaeus.

The Church, the Bible, Preaching, and the Sacraments are all forms in which Christ continues His seeking and saving of the lost. In each of them the outward and visible element is to be distinguished from the inward and invisible reality, for the two natures must not be confused. Failure to observe the distinction underlies the errors of traditional 'Catholicism'.

On the other hand the two natures must not be separated lest the unity of the Person be destroyed. Then at best the outward and visible becomes a 'bare sign' pointing to the spiritual reality. Failure here characterises some forms of 'Protestantism' in which the Sacraments are reduced to mere pledges of our faith and loyalty.

Of these two errors the former does seek to conserve the truth that God acts through the Sacraments, and the second the truth that the Sacraments require our response of faith and obedience; but each attempts to do this in a mistaken way.

The true, 'Chalcedonian' principle finds in the Sacraments not bare signs, but symbols which represent a reality far transcending themselves yet which at the same time, in some sense, partake of the character of that which they symbolise (Tillich). As in the days of His flesh the eternal Word of God was at the same time hidden and revealed in and through His humanity, so today the Church, Bible, Preaching, and Sacraments both conceal and reveal 'God our Saviour'. In these veils He is hidden from the proud and rebellious, yet to those of humble and childlike spirit the outward signs become the means of evoking faith, and to faith 'in those outward, visible signs, which constitute the Church, the new Reality of Christ is actually and really present *hic et nunc*'.[1]

[1] K. E. Skydsgaard, 'Kingdom of God and Church' (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 4, pp. 394 f).

THE BAPTISM OF OUR LORD—A STUDY OF ST. MARK 1.9-11

by The Rev. C. E. B. CRANFIELD

Both the construction καὶ ἐγένετο . . . ἦλθεν ('And it came to pass . . . that Jesus came') and the expression 'in those days' have a distinctly OT flavour (cf. e.g. Exod. 2.11). As neither is frequent in Mark, we might perhaps venture the suggestion that either consciously or unconsciously he is giving to his narrative a special touch of solemnity at the point at which he introduces Jesus for the first time.

That Jesus *was* baptised by John[1] can scarcely be doubted. The fact that the submission of Jesus to a baptism of repentance caused the early Church embarrassment, as may be seen in Matt. 3.14 f and in the Gospel of the Ebionites and the Gospel according to the Hebrews (see Huck, *Synopsis*, 9th edit., p. 12), makes it extremely unlikely that the Church would ever have invented the incident.[2]

To the question *why* He submitted to baptism various answers have been given. Some have suggested that it was because He was conscious of sin and felt the need to repent[3]; but this seems to be ruled out by what Dr Taylor has called 'the entire absence of the consciousness of sin in His personality, as it is revealed in the Gospels'.[4] Others have suggested that Jesus was simply availing Himself of John's baptism 'as a means of expressing the will to live a pure life'[5] or that He submitted to it merely in order to show His personal approval of the Baptist's movement. These suggestions seem scarcely adequate. On the other hand, it seems unnecessarily negative to give up as useless, as others do, all attempt to discover what were Jesus' motives.

[1] The passive ἐβαπτίσθη and the words ὑπὸ Ἰωάννου imply that John actually administered the baptism, whereas in Jewish proselyte baptism it seems that the proselyte baptised himself in the presence of witnesses. Cf. W. F. Flemington, *The New Testament Doctrine of Baptism*, p. 16.

[2] Cf. Flemington, op. cit., p. 28.

[3] e.g. J. F. Bethune-Baker quoted in A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. 252.

[4] *The Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. 618.

[5] A. Loisy quoted in Rawlinson, op. cit., p. 252.

Calvin's twofold answer to the question is still fundamentally sound[1]—though valuable fresh light has been shed on the problem by the work of Professors Barth and Cullmann, Mr Flemington, and Professor Lampe. He suggests a general and a special reason. The former is indicated by Matt. 3.15, where Calvin prefers to take 'righteousness' to refer, not to the general requirements of the law, but to the specific requirements of our Lord's own vocation. It was 'that He might render full obedience to the Father' by the faithful fulfilment of the mission that had been entrusted to Him. Calvin hints at the nature of this mission, when he uses the word 'servant', referring to Phil. 2.7, and says that 'it was for the sake of others that baptism was asked'. What Calvin thus provides a hint of, Professor Cullmann brings out clearly, when he finds the clue to the meaning of our Lord's baptism and the answer to the problem why in spite of His sinlessness He submitted to it in v. 11—in the fact that the words of the voice contain an echo of Isa. 42.1.[2] We have here a reference to that Servant of the Lord, whose mission is further described in Isa. 52.13-53.12. The righteousness that Jesus was determined to fulfil to the uttermost was the role of the Suffering Servant of the Lord. His submission to the 'baptism of repentance unto the remission of sins' was (in Dr Taylor's words) 'an act of self-dedication to His mission'.[3] It was His mature self-dedication to that self-identification with sinners, which in due course would involve the cross. That Jesus at a later time in His ministry did associate baptism with death seems to be indicated (as Barth,[4] Cullmann,[5] Flemington[6] and Lampe[7] all point out) by the two sayings, Mark 10.38 and Luke 12.50, in which 'baptism' and 'baptise' are used. His baptism at the hands of John foreshadowed the baptism in death which He would accomplish once for all on behalf of all men on the cross—and also His triumphant emerging from it in the resurrection.

That brings us to Calvin's second or special reason—'that He might consecrate baptism in His own body, that we might

[1] *Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and Luke* (translated by W. Pringle), vol. 1, pp. 201-2.
[2] *Baptism in the New Testament*, pp. 16-22. [3] op. cit., p. 618.
[4] *The Teaching of the Church regarding Baptism* (trans. E. A. Payne), p. 18.
[5] op. cit., p. 19. [6] op. cit., p. 31 f.
[7] *The Seal of the Spirit*, pp. 38-40.

have it in common with Him'. Jesus, he says, 'received the same baptism with us, in order to assure believers that they are ingrafted into His body, and that they are "buried with Him in baptism", that they may rise to "newness of life" '. We may perhaps hesitate to regard this as a conscious motive of Jesus at the time, but we can agree with Calvin that there is the closest possible relation between the baptism of Jesus and Christian baptism. It is our Lord's submission to baptism by John that is the fundamental dominical institution of the Christian sacrament of baptism. The water-baptism of repentance and remission of sins gets its effectiveness, according to Barth, from the fact that He who did not need it submitted Himself to it and so set forth His solidarity with sinners. 'Baptism was thereby made a living and expressive representation of Christ's high-priestly death and resurrection. . . . By thus Himself sharing in that which first set forth the covenant of grace (to be established by His death and revealed by His resurrection) by prefiguring it and afterwards was to set it forth by continuing to represent it, Jesus Christ "instituted" baptism.'[1] When the connexion between Christian baptism and our Lord's baptism and between our Lord's baptism and His death and resurrection is realised, the explanation of the parallelism between being baptised and dying and being raised with Christ, which is most clearly expressed in Rom. 6 but also traceable throughout the NT is ready to hand.[2]

On the arguments whether v. 10 and parallels are meant to indicate a time-interval between our Lord's baptism and His receiving the Spirit and whether they throw light on the relation of confirmation to baptism, reference may be made to Professor Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit*, p. 41 f. Suffice it to say here that attempts to discover in this narrative grounds for maintaining any separation of the gift of the Spirit from the sacrament of baptism seem singularly futile.

The suggestion that we should see in Mark's use of *ἀναβαίνω* an intentional allusion to Christ's ascension[3] seems to the present writer far-fetched. The verb is certainly used in the NT of Christ's ascending, but it is much more often used in quite

[1] op. cit., pp. 17 f. For the second sentence of this quotation I have used my own translation.
[2] Cf. Cullmann, op. cit., p. 15 f.
[3] Cf. Lampe, op. cit., p. 42 f.

ordinary senses (e.g. in 3.13 of climbing a mountain, in 6.51 of climbing out of the water into a boat, and in Luke 19.4 of Zacchaeus climbing a tree) and is a perfectly natural word to use here of Jesus coming up out of the river on to the bank.

The subject of εἶδεν ('saw') is Jesus, and there is nothing in Mark's account that necessarily implies that anyone besides Jesus saw the heavens opened and the Spirit descending or heard the voice. It is therefore open to us to assume that Mark intended to record not externally objective phenomena but a vision—albeit a vision that was no empty dream but a *real communication* from God. That Jesus did at this time experience such a vision seems likely enough, and we may suppose that the account of it derives ultimately from Himself.[1] An objectification of the elements of the vision seems to be indicated by the form of Luke's narrative (ἐγένετο . . . ἀνεῳχθῆναι . . . καταβῆναι . . . γενέσθαι) and is perhaps further indicated by the insertion of σωματικῷ εἴδει ('in a bodily form'). (But is it perhaps possible to take σωματικῷ εἴδει closely with 'as a dove' rather than with 'descended', and render 'like a dove in appearance'?) The form of Matthew's account, as it appears in Nestle or Huck for example, seems to imply the same objectification (the order ἰδοὺ ἠνεῴχθησαν οἱ οὐρανοί, καὶ εἶδεν . . . and, still more, the use of the third person in v. 17 suggesting that the voice was heard by others); but it is possible that in Matthew this objectification has occurred in the transmission of the text rather than in the original. The present writer is inclined to follow *Iϵ D a sy*$^{sin\ cur}$ with some patristic support in reading the second person and to regard the third person here as due to assimilation of the text to that of the Transfiguration narrative, and at the same time to accept αὐτῷ ('unto him') after 'were opened' (it is read by the great majority of MSS.). That there should be a tendency toward objectification would not be surprising.

We take it that Mark intended to describe a vision and that in this intention he was true to history. What then can be ascertained about the significance of the vision?

We begin with the words σχιζομένους τοὺς οὐρανούς ('the heavens being opened' or 'opening' or 'being rent apart'). Cf. Isa. 64.1; Ezek. 1.1; John 1.51; Acts 7.56; Rev. 19.11; and in the Pseudepigrapha Test. Levi 2.6, 5.1, and especially 18.6 and

[1] Cf. Flemington, op. cit., p. 29.

2 Bar. 22.1, where the opening of the heavens is associated with the hearing of a voice, and Test. Jud. 24.2 f, where it is associated with the pouring out of the Spirit. This imagery, though it also occurs in pagan sources,[1] is thoroughly Jewish. On the meaning of 'heaven(s)' in Scripture the reader may refer to Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, III/3, 426-623 (esp. 486-558), which is discussed by W. A. Whitehouse in *SJT*, 4, 376-382. Professor R. H. Lightfoot makes the interesting suggestion that the rending of the heavens here is Mark's 'description of the incarnation, in and by which heaven and earth were joined in an irrevocable, unbreakable union';[2] but in the present writer's judgment it is too forced to be accepted as exegesis—in spite of its suggestiveness. It is surely better, in view of the OT and pseudepigraphical passages cited above, to regard the opening of the heavens here as being simply (in the imagery of a vision) the natural prelude to a divine communication.

Evidence for the expectation that the Messiah would be specially endowed with the Spirit of God is to be seen in Isa. 11.2, 42.1 (for its messianic interpretation see *TWzNT*, V, 685 ff), 61.1 (connexion between anointing and possession by the Spirit), perhaps Ps. 89.20 f (if 'hand' and 'arm' are here equivalent to Spirit, as has been suggested),[3] 1 Enoch 49.3, 62.2; Pss. Solomon 17.42, 18.8; Test. Levi 18.6 f, 10 f; Test. Jud. 24.2 f; Zad. Frag. 2.10. In view of this it is reasonable to suppose that the early Church saw a messianic significance in the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus—reasonable also, we think, to suppose that Jesus Himself did so.

For the comparison of the Spirit to 'a dove' we need not turn to pagan sources with Gunkel and Leisegang.[4] It probably goes back to Gen. 1.2, where the Hebrew word *m^e rahepheth*, which suggests the brooding of a bird, is used of the Spirit of God. There is Rabbinic evidence[5] that on the basis of that text the Holy Spirit was sometimes likened to a dove (though it is true that in the Rabbinic literature the dove is more often an emblem of Israel).

[1] e.g. in the Mithraic liturgy. See *TWzNT*, I, 519.
[2] *The Gospel Message of St. Mark*, p. 56. Cf. H. B. Swete, *The Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. 9.
[3] Lampe, op. cit., p. 30.
[4] See C. K. Barrett, *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition*, pp. 35-8.
[5] For the relevant passages see Strack and Billerbeck, I, 123-5, and Barrett, op. cit., p. 38 f.

We suggested above that Mark is here describing a vision experienced by Jesus, but qualified this by saying that we meant by vision not a mere empty dream but a real communication from God. We must now try to indicate rather more exactly what was meant. The crucial question would seem to be whether to the participle *καταβαῖνον* ('descending') there corresponds a real event. Is it simply a matter of God assuring Jesus of a truth about Himself by means of the symbolism of a vision? Or was there an outpouring of the Spirit upon Jesus at the time of His baptism? We want to suggest that there was and that it was an invisible and indescribable event (just as the gift of the Spirit in Christian Baptism is an invisible and indescribable event), but that at the same time Jesus experienced a supernatural vision, the symbolism of which was an assurance of the reality of the unseen event. That the imagery of the vision should be derived from the OT and Judaism is of course what we should expect.

With *φωνὴ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν* cf. 9.7 and parallels, and John 12.28, and also Test. Levi 18.6; 2 Bar. 13.1, 22.1; Josephus, *Ant.* XIII.X.3, and the various passages in the Rabbinic literature which speak of a *bath-qol*.[1] The expression *bath-qol* (Aramaic *bᵉrath-qala*, *bᵉrath-qal*) means 'daughter of the voice' and signifies an echo of a heavenly voice. In Jewish thought the *bath-qol* is regarded as an inferior substitute for the Word of God given directly by the Holy Spirit to the prophets. 'When Haggai, Zechariah and Malachi, the last prophets, died, the Holy Spirit vanished from Israel; but they were allowed to hear the *bath-qol*' (TSota 13.2). It would seem that Mark was thinking in terms of a *bath-qol* here and that Jesus Himself had probably thought about the message He had received in that way too. With reference to the voice and the descent of the Spirit Mr Barrett says: 'Jesus is thus brought at once into the category of the Rabbis and into that of the prophets.'[2] During His earthly life our Lord's intercourse with the Father was subject to human conditions and limitations.

The content of the *bath-qol* is variously recorded in the Synoptic Gospels as they appear in Huck's *Synopsis*. As far as Matthew is concerned, we have already suggested that the reading of Codex Bezae, etc. (the second person singular) may

[1] See Strack and Billerbeck, I, 125-34. [2] op. cit., p. 40.

well be original. Luke does have in the great majority of MSS. the same text as Mark here; but there are some who would accept the western reading, and it is printed in Huck (9th edit.). This western reading is an exact quotation of the LXX text of Ps. 2.7: *υἱός μου εἶ σύ, ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε*. It is now increasingly recognised that this reading should be rejected.[1] It was probably accidentally introduced by a copyist whose thoughts turned to the Messianic Psalm.

But was that copyist at least right in thinking that he had before him a reminiscence of Ps. 2.7? Most people see in the words *σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱός μου* ('thou art my son') such a reminiscence. Recently, however, it has been strongly argued that originally there was no reference to the Psalm. That the latter part of the *bath-qol* is reminiscent of Isa. 42.1 is generally agreed. In the LXX Isa. 42.1 reads: *Ἰακὼβ ὁ παῖς μου, ἀντιλήψομαι αὐτοῦ· Ἰσραὴλ ὁ ἐκλεκτός μου, προσεδέξατο αὐτὸν ἡ ψυχή μου, ἔδωκα τὸ πνεῦμά μου ἐπ' αὐτόν . . .* But in the Hebrew there is no equivalent of *Ἰακώβ* ('Jacob') and *Ἰσραήλ* ('Israel'), and the reference is to the Servant of Yahweh. In Matt. 12.18-21, Isa. 42.1-4 is quoted, and here the form of 42.1 agrees more closely with the Hebrew: *ἰδοὺ ὁ παῖς μου ὃν ᾑρέτισα, ὁ ἀγαπητός μου ὃν εὐδόκησεν ἡ ψυχή μου· θήσω τὸ πνεῦμά μου . . .* When we compare this form of Isa. 42.1 with the *bath-qol* here, the connexion becomes much clearer. Professor Jeremias (following Dalman and others) argues that originally the words of the voice were reminiscent only of Isa. 42.1 and that behind *ὁ υἱός μου* we should recognise an earlier *ὁ παῖς μου* ('my servant').[2] In support of this he argues (1) that we should expect the voice to explain the descent of the Spirit as a fulfilment of Scripture and this would be so, if the reference is to Isa. 42.1 with the latter part of the verse in mind though not actually quoted (a common form in Rabbinic literature); (2) that *ἀγαπητός*[3] ('beloved') here and in 9.7 = Matt. 17.5 and 2 Pet. 1.17 and *ἐκλελεγμένος* ('chosen') in Luke 9.35 would be variant

[1] So for example by J. M. Creed and K. H. Rengstorf *ad loc.*, J. Bieneck, *Sohn Gottes als Christusbezeichnung der Synoptiker*, p. 59, Taylor, op. cit., p. 162, Barrett, op. cit., p. 40, n. 4, J. Jeremias in *TWzNT*, V, 699, n. 349.

[2] In *TWzNT*, V, 699.

[3] In Mark 1.11 *ὁ ἀγαπητός* can, of course, be taken with *ὁ υἱός μου*; we should then translate either 'my beloved son' or, since *ἀγαπητός* can signify 'only' (e.g. LXX Gen. 22.2, 12, 16), 'my only son'. But in view of Matt. 12.18 it is perhaps better here to take *ὁ ἀγαπητός* as a separate designation, an echo of *bᵉḥiri* in Isa.

translations of the Hebrew *b'hiri* of Isa. 42.1; and (3) that in John 1.34 ἐκλεκτός ('elect' or 'chosen') should probably be read rather than υἱός ('son'), and that, if so, we should have further evidence that the original words of the voice were a reminiscence of Isa. 42.1 only. So he thinks that the ambiguous παῖς (it can mean either 'servant' or 'son'), that had represented the Hebrew *'ebed*, was changed by Greek-speaking Christians who regarded it as too humble a term to υἱός ('son') at an earlier stage than the composition of the Gospel.

This explanation is certainly attractive on theological as well as other grounds; for in eliminating the reference to Ps. 2.7 it would also rid us of any suggestion of royal enthronement, adoption, etc., as Jeremias points out. We are inclined to go so far in agreement as to say that the only certain OT reminiscence here is the reminiscence of Isa. 42.1 and that it is highly doubtful whether Ps. 2.7 comes into the picture at all. But there is a very important reason for thinking that the original words of the voice contained *some* reference to sonship—the presence in the Temptation narratives in Matthew and Luke of the twice repeated (and by its order very emphatic)[1] εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ('if thou art the son of God'). In view of the close connexion between the Baptism and the Temptation according to all three Synoptics it is natural to expect this 'if thou art the son of God' to refer back to the words of the *bath-qol*. Jesus, it would seem, is being tempted to misuse His divine Sonship, of the reality of which He has just been assured, by seeking to be Son of God without at the same time behaving as the Servant.[2] The probability that the words of the voice did contain a reference to sonship is further indicated by the number of passages in the Synoptic Gospels which reflect Jesus' filial consciousness.[3] So we think that Jeremias is wrong in maintaining that the words of the voice did not refer to sonship at all. At the same time we think he is right in maintaining that there is no reminiscence of Ps. 2.7; for had Mark himself regarded the first part of the *bath-qol* as an echo of Ps. 2.7, one would surely have

42.1, and so to translate 'my son, my beloved' or 'my son, the beloved'. See further the note in J. A. Robinson, *Ephesians*, pp. 229-33, and C. H. Turner in *JTS*, 27, 113-29.

[1] Cf. A. Schlatter, *Der Evangelist Matthäus*, p. 101 f.

[2] Bieneck, op. cit., pp. 37, 63 f.

[3] For a survey of the passages, see Bieneck, op. cit., pp. 35-69; W. Manson, *Jesus the Messiah*, pp. 103-9.

expected him to have reproduced the order of the LXX text (*υἱός μου εἶ σύ*), as is done elsewhere in the NT, when Ps. 2.7 is quoted.

But how are we to understand 'thou art my son' here? In his very valuable book, *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition*, Mr Barrett, in the course of his argument against Dr Leisegang's theories, seems to countenance the view that we have here to do with 'an adoption formula'. He argues that, as in Ps. 2 'the speaker becomes God's son, not through an act of begetting or any analogous divine process, but by adoption on the occasion of his elevation to the throne of David' so 'in the Gospel, Jesus at the baptism becomes, or is revealed as, Son of God, not as the result of a divine begetting but because he is then installed as King Messiah, the true successor of David',[1] and a little later he says, 'Jesus is addressed as the newly established son of God in virtue of his installation as Messiah'.[2] With Mr Barrett's opposition to Dr Leisegang we heartily agree; but his own statements here seem open to objection. We would make the following observations: (1) As has been said above, it is by no means certain that there is a reminiscence of Ps. 2.7 here. (2) Assuming, however, that there is, it does not follow, because Ps. 2.7 was originally an adoption formula,[3] that either Jesus or the earliest Church must therefore necessarily have understood it in that sense. If Midrash Ps. 2.7 and Targum Ps. 2.7 are admitted as evidence for Jewish exegesis in the time of our Lord, they do not point in this direction, but ethicise away the idea of sonship. The former says: 'as a servant, to whom his master, wishing to impart peace of mind to him, says, "I love thee as my son" ';[4] the latter: 'Dear as a son to his father art thou to Me, innocent as if I had created thee today'.[5] (3) Even if Ps. 2.7 was recognised as an adoption formula, that would not necessarily have ruled out the quotation of a part of it in a quite different sense. The fact that (assuming we have an echo of the Psalm here) the latter part of the verse is not reproduced, except in the western reading in Luke which is to be rejected, might possibly indicate that 'this day' was regarded as inapplicable to Jesus. (4) The evidence in the Pseud-

[1] p. 41. [2] p. 44.

[3] On Ps. 2.7 and on the use of 'son of God' with reference to the king in Israel see Bieneck, op. cit., pp. 19-24.

[4] Str.-B., III, 21 f. [5] ibid., p. 20.

epigrapha (in 1 Enoch and IV Ezra) for the use of 'son of God' as a messianic title is scanty and doubtful,[1] while in the Rabbinic literature the Messiah is never referred to as 'son of God' except in connexion with a particular messianically-interpreted passage of Scripture that expressly suggests this description,[2] and even then the tendency is to explain away the divine sonship in an ethical sense (as in the Midrash and Targum quoted above, with which Targ. Ps. 89.27 may be compared). While it would, we think, be going too far to assert definitely that 'son of God' as a Messianic title was unknown to the Judaism of our Lord's day,[3] the evidence should certainly make us hesitate to assume that in Mark 1.11 the idea of Messiahship is the fundamental thing and that of sonship derivative. (5) An important indication that 'son of God' is not merely a synonym for 'Messiah' in the Synoptic Gospels is provided, as Dr Bieneck shows,[4] by the exorcism narratives in which the demons regularly address Jesus as 'son of God'. If they used the title merely as a messianic title, we should expect them sometimes to use other messianic titles of more common occurrence in contemporary Judaism; but in fact they do not.

That Mark saw in the Baptism, the descent of the Spirit, and the heavenly voice a messianic significance we do not doubt; and it may well be that Jesus did too. But Messiahship is not, we would suggest, the primary category here, nor is 'Son of God' to be explained in terms of Messiahship. The voice is not to be understood as the proclamation of Jesus' newly established status of sonship consequent upon His installation as Messiah, but rather as a confirmation of His already existing filial consciousness. In response to His self-dedication to the mission of the Servant, made when He submitted to the baptism of repentance, He is given a confirmation of His own consciousness of being the Son of God that is at the same time a confirmation of His Servant-vocation, as the echoes of Isa. 42.1 indicate.

This interpretation of Mark 1.11 is corroborated, we believe, by a consideration of those passages in the Gospels where an

[1] Str.-B., p. 17., Bieneck, op. cit., p. 24 f.
[2] Str.-B., III, 20.
[3] There is the possibility that the Rabbis' avoidance of the title was due to anti-Christian polemical motives (see Str.-B., III, 20). There are also a few NT passages which might seem to presuppose that 'son of God' was a current messianic title (e.g. Mark 14.61).
[4] op. cit., p. 46.

indication of the nature of the divine sonship is actually given; for we are unable to discover either in Jewish messianic expectation or in Hellenistic religion anything from which the conception of divine sonship that is reflected, e.g., in Matt. 11.25-27 could reasonably be supposed to have developed,[1] and we are therefore driven to the conclusion that it is to Jesus' own filial consciousness that we must look for the origin of the NT use of the title 'Son of God'.[2]

[1] Cf. Bieneck, op. cit., pp. 70 ff.
[2] Cf. W. Manson, op. cit., p. 106.

THE REFORMATION OF WORSHIP

II. The Use of our Heritage

by The Rev. D. H. C. READ

There are signs in nearly all the Christian communions of the Western world today of restlessness and dissatisfaction with our inherited patterns of public worship. This is indicated by the numerous experiments that are being made and by the movements for liturgical reform that are active in many denominations. A great variety of motives lies behind these movements for reform; but in general it might be said that we are conscious of living in a world that has changed more fundamentally in the last fifty years than in any remotely comparable period of the past, and feel that these changes, while not affecting the essence of Christian worship, must surely be reflected in its forms. This is felt by convinced and instructed Christians who have a vision of what worship might be as the expression of our highest and holiest activity and are disappointed at its meagre realisation in the normal practice of their church: it is felt even more by the semi-convinced who are genuinely seeking to know and experience more of what we mean by worship, and who find our services unilluminating and uninspiring. It is certainly not ill-will, and may not even be indifference, that keeps multitudes of potential worshippers from entering our churches. The blight that seems to afflict public worship in our day might be characterised in one word —irrelevance.

Now the charge of irrelevance is not to be disposed of by a series of sermons on the relevance of the Christian faith and of Christian worship. The mere fact that we find ourselves so often using this word in sermon-titles or public addresses is a tacit acknowledgment that we are caught up in a religious network that has lost touch with modern conditions. If our worship really *were* relevant we should not need to talk about its relevance. This problem has to be tackled from the inside.

While we know that there is a sense in which worship can never be relevant for those whose lives are godless, and that therefore no amount of tampering with orders of service will make Christian worship anything other than pointless for many whose lives are bounded by the material world, we must admit that a sense of unreality too often pervades our services and most of us would admit to a frequent sense of frustration when attending or conducting public worship. At times an almost suffocating atmosphere of remoteness assails us as we enter an old-fashioned building, sing hymns saturated with the piety of another age, listen to stories of ancient Hebrew history, try to keep track of prayers through Elizabethan or Victorian circumlocutions, and then are confronted with a sermon that tries to relate it all to the atomic bomb.

This sense of irrelevance has, of course, much to do with the changed environment in which the worship of the Church is conducted. It is least to be marked where men and women are near to the fundamentals of human life. There is little sense of irrelevance when worship is conducted in the presence of a deadly enemy—as, for instance, when a chaplain conducts a Communion service in the open with enemy bombers hovering overhead ('My table Thou hast furnished in presence of my foes'); when a country congregation celebrates a harvest festival; when a service is held at sea; when a nation is stirred by sudden calamity or the death of a king. We must remember that our system of church worship grew up around the idea of a parish living close to the land, in daily contact with the realities of life and death, and exposed to many sudden dangers. (You will have noticed the emphasis in ancient collects on deliverance from perils.) The great change that swept over Western civilisation with the industrial revolution has created a totally different environment for worship. No longer is the church the living centre of a community that lives close to nature. It is one institution, among many others more strident and more attractive, raising its voice for God in a society that has been cushioned to a fantastic degree against the rugged facts of our existence and the grim reminders of our mortality. To lives without roots in the soil, swirling among the anonymous masses of urban society, dependent on the intricacies of an economic system, mechanised in both work and leisure, the

realistic simplicities of Christian worship must often appear irrelevant to the highest degree.

What, then, are we to do? There are those who would seek radical solutions. They would have us cut loose from the heritage of the past and devise a worship that shall be entirely relevant to modern conditions. This can be accomplished easily enough, and in one way or another we see the attempt being made. Modern man prefers a variety show to serious drama: then let us scrap any ordered liturgy and give him a bright selection of introits, anthems, quartets, solos, dramatic readings, quavering organs and coloured lights. Modern man is terribly introspective and insecure: then let us cease to bore him with the Bible and tell him how to win friends and influence people. Modern man has no time to read, so let us give him digests of sermons and snippets of doctrine. Modern man prefers committees and gadgets to meditation and prayer: therefore let us thoroughly mechanise the Church as an efficient social instrument in the community. Modern man hates to think about death: so let us aid and abet the current conspiracy to pretend that it doesn't happen. Modern man is largely cut off from his historical roots: therefore we shall dispense with tradition and give him a psychological technique for getting along in the modern world.

Yes, relevance of a kind can be had at a price; but the price is the disappearance of Christian worship, and abandonment to the spirit of the age. Any real reformation of worship must take into account the spirit of the age so that our forms of expression are relevant to our society and not one that is past; but if worship has to do with the communion of man and God at the deepest levels of existence there is obviously a central element in it that remains from age to age. If worship is traffic between man and God its forms may vary with the different areas of history and geography, but the God who is its end and object is the One 'in whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning'. The direction of our thoughts and feelings and wills towards Him is the most relevant human act of any age in history, and to deflect our worship from Him to some lesser good is the supreme irrelevancy of the Church.

The question, then, of the reformation of the worship of the Church is largely one of relating the continuous and universal

elements—adoration, absolution, prayer, and communion—to the contemporary conditions of mankind. As the tradition of worship has come down to us from our forefathers, and as none of us can, however hard we try, detach ourselves from the stream of history out of which we have come, the problem of reformation must always begin with a consideration of our heritage. We have seen what can happen when that heritage is ignored and an attempt made to reform worship entirely in accordance with the spirit of the age. Therefore we are faced with the need to make an appraisal of our heritage; to seek an understanding of it; and to consider how in present circumstances it ought to be used.

First, a word is needed in justification of the idea of reformation. To some minds the very notion of reforming a heritage is sacrilegious. The Church on the whole has been tenaciously conservative through the ages, rightly stressing the eternal and immutable Gospel over against the passing fashions of men. But the quality of eternity and immutability has often been transferred from the Gospel itself to the forms in which it is expressed and modes of worship have drawn to themselves a sacrosanctity which, although valuable and understandable, is hardly to be justified. The Eastern Church, which lives by its liturgy, is perhaps the best example of the conservative spirit that resists reform. The Roman Church, which often appears to present an inflexible attitude in worship and in doctrine, has in the infallible *ex cathedra* pronouncements of the papacy a powerful instrument of change and reform—potentially more radical than any to be found in other Churches, although in practice it is used chiefly for the protection of the *status quo*. Even when a comparative innovation such as the doctrine of the Assumption of the Virgin is promulgated as *de fide* this can be regarded more as a legitimising of devotional practices that have become traditional than as any kind of criticism of the past.

It is to the Churches of the Reformation that we naturally look for an example of the criticism of existing tradition. And here we come up against a curious misunderstanding of their nature and meaning. Some of the most vigorous adherents of a tradition and the strongest opponents of any kind of reform are paradoxically to be found among members of these Churches. We need to be clear as to what happened in the sixteenth

century and what was the intention of the Reformers. Many imagine that what Luther and Calvin did was to found new Churches, with their specific doctrines and forms of worship; and that therefore to be their loyal followers means holding rigidly to these doctrines and forms. Thus any movement to make changes in the established ways of Reformed Churches is always met by cries of 'betrayal of our heritage'. But neither Luther nor Calvin had any intention of founding a Church. They simply set out to reform the Church that Christ Himself had founded. They had no desire to make a break with the Church and its heritage, but were forced to separate from the contemporary Church because of its refusal to reform. Their intention was never to deny continuity with the Christian heritage but rather to restore to the Church her most ancient traditions—those of the New Testament—which they saw had been radically distorted. Hence they were literally re-formers. And nothing could have been further from their intentions than the idea that their Reformation was definitive and authoritative for all time. Thus a loyal son of the Reformation is one who is prepared at all times to reform, and not one who has made of the sixteenth-century Reformation a new idol that cannot be touched. A Reformed Church is a *reforming* Church, and its characteristic ought to be, not a tenacious adherence to sixteenth century forms and principles, but an openness to the leading of the Spirit in every age.

The heritage of worship is the given factor in any situation of reform. That is to say we cannot proceed *de novo* to construct orders of service, but, as in every other sphere of human activity —literature, music, politics, industry, science—we build on the tradition received. Some are temperamentally inclined to accept and reverence the tradition; others to criticise and reform it; but none can pretend it is not there. If the old need to be reminded that all traditions were once innovations, the young perhaps need to be reminded that a tradition is not necessarily false. In worship we have all inherited certain forms of words, patterns of behaviour, hymns, sacraments, creeds, ritual—a complex of thought and action—and these have coloured our attitude far more powerfully than we normally realise. None of us approaches this subject with minds as open as we imagine they are, and this is, of course, true of other

subjects such as politics and the arts. We do not need to be Marxists to acknowledge a social conditioning-factor in our judgments. Tradition is simply the inescapable pressure of our ancestors and cannot be denied even by an apparently orphan generation like our own.

When we come to examine the traditional factor in Christian worship we find that it has positive values far beyond that of mere inevitability. Since Protestant communities are often accused of despising tradition, and since this tendency is liable to be more pronounced in a generation of stupendous technical achievement, it will be worth while to consider what some of these values are.

In the first place, the possession of a heritage of worship reminds us of the truly corporate nature of our faith. It is not simply the presence of other people at divine service that challenges our individualism: it is the realisation that we are linked with a vast multitude in every age. Perhaps at no other point does this become so luminous as in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. 'I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you.' What was delivered to the apostles has been delivered by them to the Church and by each succeeding generation of believers through the centuries; so that when we come to the Lord's Table we enter into communion with not only our immediate neighbours but with the cloud of witnesses, the heavenly host. Perhaps the difficulty many experience in attaching meaning to the affirmation: 'I believe in the communion of saints' comes from a neglect of this aspect of our heritage. Within the tradition of worship we are liberated from a two-dimensional view of the Body of Christ which is His Church. The third dimension here is the eternal world, where those whom we count dead are alive for evermore, and if it is true that 'they without us are not made perfect' it is equally true that we without them can offer only a thin and meagre worship. We need what T. S. Eliot has called 'the backing of the dead'.

In the same way a tradition of worship has immense importance in delivering us from the narrow concentrations and concerns of our particular era. Each generation finds some particular area of worship especially congenial, and delights to dwell on one aspect of God's revelation rather than another.

If our worship is to be based on a fuller apprehension of the richness of God's truth, and a deeper experience of the possibilities of worship, then we need those elements of tradition that correct and enlarge our ephemeral predilections. This is the justification for retaining in our services parts of the Christian heritage that often seem meaningless, or even offensive, to modern minds. It is the justification of liturgy; and we must later ask how in our current reforms we allow for this necessary corrective from the past. It is natural for us, as for past generations, to feel that 'we are the people and wisdom will die with us', but nowhere is the operation of this prejudice so disastrous as in the public worship of God. An illustration of the function of tradition as an enlarger and liberator of our worship lies to hand in our hymn-books. A hymn-book is a heritage, and within its pages we join an astonishing variety of Christian ancestry at worship. Quite recently in choosing Advent hymns, trying to find something that would express the current eschatological conceptions, I found myself looking at two very different pictures of the future on mankind. One read:

> These things shall be; a loftier race
> Than e'er the world hath known shall rise,
> With flame of freedom in their souls
> And light of knowledge in their eyes.

The other read:

> Lo! He comes, with clouds descending,
> Once for favoured sinners slain;
> Thousand, thousand saints attending
> Swell the triumph of His train;
> Hallelujah!
> God appears on earth to reign.

Frankly neither of these verses expresses exactly what I should want to sing about man's destiny. The former breathes an atmosphere of nineteenth century evolutionary optimism that I find much more remote than the traditional theological symbolism of the latter. Yet the latter is hardly the kind of hymn that we should write today. But if the hymn-book were filled with contemporary Christian verse what an impossible impoverishment of our worship that would be. It is a salutary reminder of the theological blinkers of our own, as well as past,

ages to be introduced into a world of Christian witness that spans the centuries.

Again, our heritage of worship reminds us that when on Sunday morning we say: 'Let us worship God', we do not initiate a process. We are not setting in motion a spurt of worship that will remind God of our presence. It is tempting to think of Christian worship as the lighting of little candles here and there throughout the world, whereas the true picture is more of a steady burning flame that shines through the centuries and links heaven with earth. The traditional forms of our worship can assist us to realise that we are joining ourselves to a continuous and universal process, neither initiated nor concluded by us. This is what is conveyed to us sometimes quite powerfully as we enter the precincts of an ancient cathedral where the very pillars and arches seem to be impregnated with the praise and prayers of centuries, and the beauty of form and colour signify a worship that goes on night and day through the years. But it can also be conveyed to us in a simple modern setting when the words of Scripture fall on our ears or when we join in the prayer that has never ceased: 'Our Father . . .' Here is a tradition that stretches back beyond human history into which we are caught up when with 'angels and archangels and with all the company of heaven, we worship and adore Thy glorious name; evermore praising Thee, and saying: Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God of Hosts; Heaven and earth are full of Thy glory: Glory be to Thee, O Lord most high.'

This is the 'given' factor in worship. To use a somewhat discredited and ambiguous word these values represent the 'objective' element over against the subjective influences of temporary fashions of thought and prejudices of the preacher. It is precisely here that so many Protestant services stand in need of reform. When the massive medieval tradition of worship was radically reformed—a reformation which was so clearly necessary that it led to the virtual rejection of an entire pattern of worship—there was obvious danger, explicitly recognised by the Reformers themselves, that worship might lose this objective quality and dissolve in a shapeless mixture of individual piety, temporary enthusiasms, and impromptu inspiration. It was for this reason that Luther and Calvin carried

on a struggle on two fronts—against the Roman Mass which they believed to be a perversion of Christian worship, and also against the Anabaptists and sectaries whose abandonment of all forms and order they considered equally destructive of the true worship of the Church. The 'given' factor in worship was not only expressed but emphasised. It is worth noting what were some of the traditional elements in worship that provided for the Reformed worship an objectivity as real as, and more valid than the Roman Mass.

First, there was the insistence on the Church as the divine community through which and in which worship is offered to God. We are still far from understanding the full significance of the doctrine of the Church in the thought of the Reformers. It is sometimes held not only by the opponents but by the adherents of Protestantism that the Reformation meant the triumph of religious individualism over against the conception of a divine community, continuous and universal. Yet we may read as strong an expression of the priority and centrality of the Church in the writings of the Reformers as in any Roman or Anglican document. 'Apart from the body of Christ', says Calvin, 'and the fellowship of the godly, there can be no hope of reconciliation with God. Hence, in the creed we profess to believe in the Catholic Church and the forgiveness of sins; for God does not include among the objects of His love any but those whom He reckons among the members of His only-begotten Son, and, in like manner, does not extend to any who do not belong to His body the free imputation of righteousness . . . an open departure from the Church is an open renouncement of eternal salvation.' (Comm. on Isa. 33.24, quoted Wallace, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament*, p. 234.) The Reformation then did not mean that the worshipper was deprived of the sense of being drawn up into a fellowship beyond the needs of the moment and resting on something eternally greater than a mere common agreement to come together. On the contrary he knew that he was a member of the Body of Christ, a Body that did not depend on the adherence of this individual or that, but existed throughout the ages as the living expression of its Lord.

The heritage of this Church was preserved by the Reformers according to their principle of discarding only that which was

not in their view consonant with the Scriptural revelation. Thus, while the structure of the Mass was destroyed as representing a disastrous deviation from New Testament teaching, and therefore from the most authoritative tradition of the Church, it is not to be supposed that the Reformers made a clean break with all doctrine and liturgical form as they had inherited them in the unreformed Church. Calvin and Luther make abundant and serious use of the writings of the Fathers of the Church, and the forms of worship which were established at the Reformation were not in any sense new inventions but were related to the services they had known. The Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' Creed, the words of Institution of the Lord's Supper, the administration of infant baptism, collect-forms of prayer—these are all elements in public worship that expressed the sense of continuity in worship in the Church through the centuries.

Then there was the central principle of the Word of God, read and preached. Here, for the Reformers, was the abiding objective element in all worship. This is not a word framed for the moment by the inspiration of preachers, but a given revelation. And when the pulpit moves to a prominent place in Christian worship at the Reformation it is not to provide a platform for man but for God—so that, in St. Paul's words, we might have 'Jesus Christ the crucified placarded before our very eyes' (Gal. 3.1, Moffatt). If the function of our Christian heritage is to reveal that beyond ourselves into which we are drawn in faith then here is the inheritance par excellence. 'Lord, Thy Word abideth; and our footsteps guideth.' And the Reformers were clear that in order to control and check the movement of Christian tradition from age to age a norm was needed. That norm was the written Word, and so the Bible was for them the supreme 'given' element in the Church and the final authority for all our forms of worship.

We must also keep in mind that Reformed worship under the impulse of Calvin's *Institutes* inspired a tremendous sense of the glory and majesty of God. The magnificence of architecture and ceremonial of the medieval Church was not missed as an incentive to the worship of the Eternal by men and women who were intensely aware of the holiness of the Sovereign God, and awed by the thought of His presence. The theology and

devotion of the Reformation is possessed by a spirit of utter humility and reverence before the revelation of the Word as profoundly as Roman Catholic piety before what Chesterton called 'the awful elevation in the Canon of the Mass'.

If then, the strenuous Reformation of the Church carried through in the sixteenth century might be described rather as a purging than a destruction of tradition, and preserved intact the chief values of the Christian heritage, should this not suggest some guidance to us in the problems of worship today? For it is certain that no such extreme reformation is either necessary or desirable at this stage in our history, and therefore it should in theory be easier for us to discern the values of tradition, and less likely that we should be led by the exigencies of conflict into the rejection of traditions that, while not immediately justifiable on Scriptural grounds, conserve true insights and instincts of the Church. It should be apparent that a reforming Church today must reckon seriously with the given element in the Church's worship, and that, no matter how fundamentally human conditions of life have changed, we cannot detach ourselves from our roots. An unfortunate aspect of Protestant Church life today is that we have tended to divide in this matter into two mutually exclusive groups: on the one hand, the innovators who are determined to overcome the irrelevance of some of our traditions and at all costs to speak a language that is significant for modern man; and, on the other, the traditionalists who see in the preservation of the Church's forms and order the one guarantee of her life in an increasingly hostile and indifferent world. It is natural in all forms of human society that we find the two types that are usually described as the progressive and the conservative, but in the Church these two groups have been dangerously out of touch. The innovators have been inclined to ignore the theological significance of the Church's tradition, and the traditionalists to forget that the Holy Spirit is alive in the Body of Christ. The innovator regards the traditionalist as a soporific Sadducee, while the traditionalist regards the innovator as a dangerous heretic. An unfortunate by-product of this schism is that changes in worship are so often carried out either by enthusiasts guided by the temper of the moment, or by doctrinaire liturgiologists with unswerving reverence for tradition. The only way in which the insights of

these contrasted types can be brought together and used for the good of the Church is by a renewed theological understanding of our faith and worship, for both in preaching and in its setting of worship a Word is set forth and a response made which are understandable only in the light of the Gospel of the Triune God. For God the Father is the God of everywhere and always whose worship is continuous beyond the limits of our passing forms: God the Son is the God who is joined to human history at a specific point in space and time and thus becomes an historical Fact to which tradition must continually bear witness: while God the Holy Spirit is the God who is contemporary, with us here and now, and summoning us to a living proclamation and a relevant worship. Traditionalists and innovators are both needed in the Church provided that both are responsive and instructed servants of the Gospel.

The next article will deal chiefly with the question of innovations. Let me conclude this one by some further consideration of our heritage. After all, it is only when we are in a position really to evaluate and understand our tradition that we can proceed to innovation. It may even be that some necessary innovations in Protestant worship should take the form of a return to neglected tradition. (This happened in the Church of Scotland when the liturgical reform at the end of last century reintroduced the Lord's Prayer into public worship after years of omission.)

Suppose we take as a basis for our re-thinking the traditional elements we saw to have been honoured by the Reformers, for this, after all, is our specific heritage in the Church.

First there is the question of our conception of the Church. No innovations in worship can be usefully carried out by those who have no truly Biblical doctrine of the Church. Yet it is evident that this aspect of our Christian heritage became sadly neglected in the course of Protestant history and has only recently been brought again to the forefront of our thinking. We are still suffering from the invasion of humanist individualism which led Christian people to think of the Church as a voluntary association of the religiously like-minded. There are still some who speak of the reformation of worship as if the Church were an *ad hoc* human society whose rules and regulations can be changed at will. But if the Church is the divine community,

the Body of which Christ is the Head, then its worship is not simply ours to manipulate; it is a heritage of the community and can be understood only from within the communion of the saints. We understand this very well when we consider the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Few would suppose that we are free to review according to the whims of the age our use of the water, bread and wine. The way in which they are used, the liturgical setting, and the theological implications may vary from age to age, but we do not imagine that because for many modern men and women such uses are not only mysterious but even absurd, we may reform our worship by dispensing with them altogether. And it is obvious that even the surrounding ritual is one which all churches are most loathe to tamper with. The same holds good of the entire worship of the Church. It contains that which is greater than the devices and desires of any generation, for it represents the voice of the people of God, the community that is more than the sum of its parts.

It is worth noting here that the tradition of the Church meets us today in three concentric circles, and our evaluation of it is based on our appreciation of their relative importance. First, there is the tradition of the local congregation. This, in most of our Protestant communities is very strong—so strong indeed as to be the despair of many ministers. There is a sense in which this can speak powerfully to us of the Christian heritage, and it is foolish to ignore the strength of a local pattern of worship established through the years. Even the minister who feels called on to make innovations in the name of a greater tradition, even the member who is driven to distraction by what seems like mere ancestor-worship must have the humility to recognise here some echo of the voice of that larger community into which he has been baptised. Secondly, there is the wider loyalty which is both national and denominational. Its national aspects need not perhaps concern us much, since they belong to what it is fashionable to call the 'non-theological factors' in the situation. We may, however, note in passing that, if we are to think of the nations of the world as an order of God's creation, there is a significance in our national heritage of worship that ought not to be ignored. If I may take an example from home—it is very clear that a reformation of worship that

took no account of the Scottish tradition would be not only doomed to failure, but would be guilty of neglecting a given factor of Christian tradition in which we must be ready to hear the Word of God. The denominational factor in tradition is of even greater weight. However unreal they have become as dividing-lines for Christians in the twentieth century, and however unjustifiable their existence from the point of view of the New Testament, they represent the form in which Christian tradition of faith and worship has come down to us, and we ignore them at our peril. It is tempting to suppose that a Church which is the result of a union of differing traditions can start afresh in the matter of worship and devise forms and orders according to the best light available in our present situation, but in practice the greatest respect must be paid to the denominational heritage of each party. The Church is not an invisible entity and in our present situation to be within it involves membership in a denomination. There is no other possibility open to us—except the formation of yet another denomination. Therefore reformation of worship must proceed on the greatest possible understanding of the denominational tradition in which we have been nurtured.

The third circle of tradition is that of the Church universal. This means the heritage which we share with Christians of all times: this is the apostolic succession in the full sense of the term. It seems to me evident that this is the tradition which must weigh most with us when considering the reformation of worship. *Quod semper, quod ab omnibus* . . . may be often a matter for controversy, but there is surely no doubt that the collective witness of the ages of faith, the heritage of Christianity, the communion of the saints, ought to be a starting-point for any reform. Yet the curious fact is observable that in many of our churches these concentric circles of tradition are given exactly the opposite importance. The local tradition counts for most, sometimes for everything; the national and denominational tradition can easily be stirred to vigorous and even acrimonious life; while the tradition of the Church catholic, the Church universal is often ignored. In our churches today a tradition that dates back fifty years is often regarded as sacrosanct while one that dates back nearly two thousand years is regarded as a dangerous innovation. If you doubt that, try changing a tune

that was new fifty years ago in a church that has grown to love it; or try introducing the Apostles' Creed in a church that has never known it! One of the first steps to be taken in the reformation of worship in the reformed churches of today is to attempt to get this matter into correct perspective. And if it is asked how we can be sure that a tradition of the Church universal is not in fact a corrupt tradition we have the answer of the Reformers—'always in accordance with the Word of God'. The Scriptures are the continual control upon all traditions—universal, denominational, and local.

This brings us to another decisive point in our appreciation of our heritage. To what extent do we in fact today submit our experiments in worship to the authority of Scripture? We must frankly admit that our attitude in this matter cannot be identical with that of the Reformers. Our understanding of the authority of the Bible is different from theirs. We should not be prepared to derive the authority of all that we do in public worship, any more than that of our forms of Church government, directly from the New Testament; nor should we consider certain questions to be closed with the citation of a single text. Yet, just as the revival of a theology of the Church has been a prerequisite of the reformation of worship, so has the revival of Biblical authority in recent years. The Bible remains the controlling factor in our heritage and we now see how false have been the attempts to reform the practice of the Church which ignore Scriptural principles. Neither æsthetic, psychological, nor sociological considerations should determine the changes that the Church may make—all must be subordinated to the Biblical revelation. To do so is not to atrophy the living Church, for the Word of God is to us not a static but a dynamic principle of her life.

Finally, we must seriously consider the question of the apprehension in worship of the glory of Almighty God. For this is the essence of our heritage—the continuous adoration of the Church in heaven and on earth. If man's chief end is to be fulfilled in the present age we need to restore to the Church a much deeper sense of adoration. And it is at this point that the Reformed Churches have perhaps most signally failed. As we noticed the first Reformers did not miss the majesty of the Gothic cathedrals for they were filled with an awe-inspiring

sense of the sovereignty of God which made the meanest building and the plainest service light up with the flame of praise and wonder. Today we must face the fact that this sense of awe and reverence has to a great extent departed from our churches and in many places there is nothing left now—neither soaring arch nor sense of holiness—to remind the worshipper of his chief end. Too often our worship has become chatty and familiar, and the casual visitor would hardly be reminded that here something tremendous and awe-inspiring was going on. This raises the question to which I must return as to how far we may be justified in using again to a far greater extent the arts of architecture, music, and drama to restore the sense of the holy to our impoverished services, and how far it is more true to say that first we must, through our recaptured sense of the authority of Scripture and the Church, find again a deep sense of the majesty and glory of God.

This, then, is our heritage—that which exists before us and beyond us, the given element in any reconsideration of worship. In a generation that is increasingly rootless and consequently lost we must set forth a worship that is grounded in the people of God of every age. There are two ways in which a tradition can be abused—either by neglect or by a slavish subservience. The Church which worships a God who was incarnate in human history cannot afford to neglect the heritage of that event; and a Church which worships the God who is a living Spirit cannot allow that heritage to become a dead letter of bondage. 'For the letter killeth, but the Spirit maketh alive.'

(Part III will appear in a subsequent issue.)

BOOK REVIEWS

Kerygma and Myth. Edited by Hans Werner Bartsch. S.P.C.K. Pp. xii + 228. 22s. 6d.

The proposal of Rudolph Bultmann, the distinguished Marburg scholar, that the New Testament should be demythologised in order to make the Gospel intelligible and commend it to modern man has already attracted much attention in Britain as elsewhere. But the publication of the present volume has a special importance in that it makes available in an English translation Bultmann's original essay on *New Testament and Mythology* which has excited so much discussion and controversy, and with it translations of some of the more important German (predominantly Lutheran) reactions to Bultmann's proposal. The issues raised are so critical that, whatever the ultimate result of the discussion may be, the views of Bultmann here expressed will have an assured place in the history of theology.

More than half of the volume is occupied by Bultmann's essay, an elaborate reply by J. Schniewind, and the counter-reply of Bultmann. Bultmann wins initial approval by starting with a criticism of Biblical cosmology (the 'three-decker' universe, and so on) which no one is concerned to deny is out-of-date. But it soon appears how radical his criticism is; for he includes in the Jewish apocalyptic and Gnostic mythology unacceptable to modern scientifically-minded and self-understanding man not only the eschatological imagery of the New Testament, but the Biblical notions of sin and redemption, and the God-man nature ascribed to Jesus. Bultmann insists that his object is not to eliminate but to interpret such 'myth'; his critics are more than doubtful whether he succeeds. He substitutes for the New Testament concepts and imagery a form of Christian existentialism, closely associated with the Pauline idea of dying and rising with Christ. Man may pass from an improper to a proper self-understanding in acts of decision in the 'eschatological now'; not, however, using resources that are really his own, as in the systems of non-Christian existentialists such as Heidegger and Kamlah, but through an act of God, the 'salvation-event', which is a 'new creation' and frees man for the future. The significance of the cross and the resurrection, for faith, lies in their bearing upon a man's 'existence'. They are ever-present realities.

Schniewind, like other contributers to this volume, is in partial

agreement with Bultmann. But in a series of 'Theses' he challenges Bultmann at vital points. One is the definition of myth. Bultmann's definition is 'the use of imagery to express the otherworldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side'. It has too wide a sweep, and Bultmann himself does not in practice discuss the wide range of metaphorical expressions, such as the Fatherhood of God, which his definition strictly speaking, includes. Schniewind prefers to speak of the 'observable' and the 'unobservable'. This is confusing to the reader; but it enables Schniewind to distinguish various types of myth, to confine true myth to speculative ideas about things that lie beyond human experience, and to reduce greatly the factor of myth in the New Testament, maintaining, for example, that for the Christian there is nothing mythological in the New Testament interpretation of the cross.

The most important section of Schniewind's essay, from the theological standpoint, is the challenge offered to Bultmann's view of the relation of the Christian kerygma to past historical fact, and particularly to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Bultmann regards the cross as 'a permanent historical fact originating in the past historical event which is the crucifixion of Jesus'. The resurrection is 'the rise of faith in the risen Lord' which becomes significant in the kerygma of the apostolic and all later preaching.

Schniewind maintains that this does not do justice to the meaning for faith of the New Testament ἐφάπαξ, the once-for-all historical character of Jesus' life, death and resurrection. And many readers will agree with him.

Bultmann's counter-reply is closely reasoned, and is valuable as an attempt to remove the difficulties and close the gaps which criticism has revealed in his original essay. Against the charge of subjectivism he maintains that the existential experience 'can occur only through an objective encounter with the proclamation and the act of God which it mediates'; but is Bultmann's proclamation the authentic Christian kerygma? And in reference to the ἐφάπαξ he takes refuge in paradox: 'The Now of the New Testament is both timeless and temporal.'

From a somewhat more detached viewpoint E. Lohmeyer in his contribution *The Right Interpretation of the Mythological* maintains that myth is the language of all religion, and to demythologise is to condemn every religion to silence. Myth is embedded in the heart of the Christian Gospel, and if it is necessary to reinterpret it the 'vessel' must be preserved. H. Thielicke in *The Restatement of New Testament Mythology* may be judged the least sympathetic of these writers to Bultmann's proposals and the least exact in his criticism

of them. But his essay has a special interest. For he writes as a Churchman, and has his eye upon consequences. He must be sincere; what then has he to preach on Good Fridays and at other times? He has fears that in Bultmann's hands the Christian revelation is being 'disintegrated into philosophy'. F. K. Schumann's essay *Can the Event of Jesus Christ be Demythologised?* has some valuable observations on the relation of scientific terminology to the language of proclamation. Dr Austin Farrer concludes the volume with *An English Appreciation.* He objects to the alternative presented by Bultmann —'Embrace existentialism or drown,' and while he welcomes the anthropological insights of that system thinks it sets too narrow limits to Christian faith and thought.

Much of the discussion in these essays is carried on at a rather academic level. One cannot expect the problems of eschatology and 'existence' to be presented without making demands of the ordinary reader, and he will have to sharpen his wits if he is to decipher such sentences as the following, which occasionally occur: 'Clearly, existentialist analysis is founded upon the existential questions of existence.' Any obscurity should not be attributed to the translator, Professor R. H. Fuller, who has evidently used much care in handling the German terminology and producing the essays in English idiom. It is right, of course, that philosophy and theology should keep to their special paths and use precise language and systematic method. It is also right that scholars should attempt to reach a measure of concord before going to the world or even to the Churches with a new interpretation of the Gospel, if that is to be the result of this momentous discussion. But eventually it will be necessary to relate it all, in due proportion, to a wider context.

It is surprising how soon *modern* man (except in his assumed aversion to ancient myth) fades from the picture, though it was in his interests that Bultmann launched his proposal. Is even educated modern man more averse to myth than he is to strict philosophising or theologising? There is a lack of proportion when an existentialist like Bultmann places emphasis, for instance, on the scientific *Weltanschauung* of the man who has a wireless set, while he says nothing about what the man listens to in his encounter with it. Lectures? Symphony concerts? Boxing matches? Dance bands? Still more surprising is it to reflect that these essays were written during the recent war. Perhaps some contemporary references have been removed by the editor. Even so it is surprising to find that these German writers, who must have shared in the intense suffering of their people, refer so seldom to the *plight* of modern man. In assessing the influence of our scientific-technical civilisation it is surely right to consider not only the extent to which modern man

holds a scientific world-view, but the way in which that civilisation hit him at Stalingrad, Dunkirk, in London, Hamburg, Berlin and Belsen. It appears that, if we are to reach a satisfactory conclusion to this debate, we shall have to prove ourselves more existential than the existentialists!

ALLAN BARR

Prophecy and Papacy; A Study of Lamennais, the Church and the Revolution. By ALEC R. VIDLER. S.C.M. Press. 25s.

DR VIDLER makes a considerable claim for Lamennais in describing him as 'one of the most remarkable men that have ever lived'. It is, we think, substantiated in this notable and sympathetic study of the outstanding French churchman of the earlier nineteenth century. Lamennais' Liberal Catholicism (of which he was the prototype as well as, some would say, of Christian Socialism) was founded on the conviction that religion had a primary and essential contribution to make to social well-being. Hence he brought his brilliant literary gifts to the promotion of a programme of religious revival coupled with political reform; the watchword of the movement, 'God and Liberty', is associated with its ill-fated manifesto, the remarkable periodical *L'Avenir*. There is in Lamennais a strong element of paradox: ultramontane (indeed, the founder of modern ultramontanism), yet an enthusiast for religious liberty and to ecclesiastics something of an *enfant terrible*; devoted to the restoration of the Church and in the end estranged from it; concerned with rescuing the Church from the impotence and bondage imposed upon it by the Revolution, yet influenced in great measure by Revolution ideals. That Lamennais was in the line of the prophets is hardly an overstatement. For he was essentially a man with a mission; in him is illustrated the 'perennial tension of prophet and priest'; as the author points out, he made a prophet's mistakes; and the experience of rejection and failure is no less part of the prophetic pattern of his life-story. One of the grounds on which Dr Vidler justifies the choice of this subject for his Birkbeck Lectures, which are reproduced in this volume, is that, by contrast with the 'immense literature' in French, only a single work on Lamennais, and this nearly sixty years ago, has been produced in English. Noting further that the only 'considerable essays' concerning him that have appeared in English during the present century are those of a political theorist and an international historian, the author declares that 'it would appear to be about time that an ecclesiastical historian recorded and reassessed a story that Laski and Woodward (the essayists in question) . . . deemed to be of great and present interest'. Dr Vidler's 'reassessment', based on a wide and thorough examination of

Lamennaisian sources and literature, is likely to be for some considerable time the standard work in English on this subject. This book is a model of well documented and well considered historical interpretation.

D. E. Easson

The Library of Christian Classics: Vol. III, 'Christology of the Later Fathers'. Edited by E. R. Hardie, in collaboration with C. C. Richardson. Vol. XXII, 'Calvin: Theological Treatises'. Edited by J. K. S. Reid. S.C.M. Press. Each 30s.

Two more volumes of *The Library of Christian Classics* come before us for review in their dignified dark blue binding. Volume III brings a selection of writings and documents illustrating the Christology of the later Fathers—that is, of three fourth century Fathers and of the great Councils from the fourth to the seventh centuries. The whole works given are Athanasius' *Incarnation of the Word*, Gregory of Nazianzus' *Theological Orations* and *Letters on the Apollinarian Controversy*, and Gregory of Nyssa's *Answer to Ablabius* and *Address on Religious Instruction*. Selection is a horrible problem, and perhaps no two people will agree whole-heartedly. We can understand Augustine being left out, since he already has a volume to himself and is to have two others. But it is surely a pity that there is to be nothing of Hilary of Poitiers—'the Athanasius of the West'—in all this series. Yet when we come to reckon it all up, we must agree that Professor Hardie has made as good a choice as could be. At least two of these writings are classics, not just of their own century, but of any century, and, taken as a whole, the book effectively represents Nicene Christology. The translations, whether new or based on an earlier version are well-written, clear and dependent on careful textual study.

The second book, Volume XXII, consisting of some of Calvin's shorter theological works, is divided into three parts: Statement, Apologetic and Controversial. It contains most of the better known and one or two less known and hitherto untranslated tracts. Once again, some of the choices seem open to question. Not all the pieces are by Calvin alone, and the authorship of one or two of the others is in doubt—as Professor Reid himself points out. While it is useful to have such documents as the 1536 *Genevan Confession, the Ordinances for the Supervision of Country Churches* or the *Summary of Doctrine concerning the Word and the Sacraments*, we should not have thought it too much of a sacrifice to have had instead, say, the treatise against Pighius or the *De aeterna Dei praedestinatione*. But, as I say, what two men will agree on selection? What is of greater importance is that we have here several of the major treatises of Calvin in a good new

translation. Professor Reid has translated all but three of the works, and those three (by Henry Beveridge) he has thoroughly revised. Some of the Elizabethan translations are good; but they are tiresome to people who do not care for their often cumbrous style. The Calvin Translation Society edition is extremely mixed, some not too bad, but nearly always poorly edited and not infrequently inaccurately translated. Professor Reid's is the first satisfactory modern English edition that I have come across. Such good treatment as this Calvin deserves.

T. H. L. PARKER.

Criticism and Faith. By JOHN KNOX. Hodder and Stoughton. 8s. 6d.

THE conclusions of this study are succinctly stated in the Introduction: 'The problem is . . . that of determining how dependent Christian faith is upon Biblical historical scholarship. Can scholarship seriously impair faith? Can scholarship significantly aid it? The answer to be given to the first of these questions is "No" and to the second "Yes".'

In the last three chapters of the book Dr Knox demonstrates conclusively that scholarship can significantly aid faith, and in particular help the preacher in his task. A good example of this is Dr Knox's own treatment of the eschatological teaching of the Gospel (pp. 119-121); it makes one wish to see those parts of *The Interpreter's Bible* in which Dr Knox has provided some of the expository treatment of the Gospel material.

The answer to the other question, given in Chapters 2 and 3 that Biblical historical criticism does not have it in its power to destroy one jot or tittle of the Gospel' is much more doubtful. It is based on the generally accepted view that the New Testament is 'a record and a reflection of the experience of a more or less continuous and coherent historical community'. We may agree too that 'the very existence of the Church and of the New Testament bear witness to an historical event'. The problem is: What is included in the 'event' which is (if I understand Dr Knox rightly) guaranteed to us by the recorded experience of the early Church? If the 'event' were to include only those mighty acts of God, which were announced in the apostolic *kerygma*, then the argument of these chapters would appear to be valid. Dr Knox, however, obviously includes a great deal more in the 'event', and certainly more is included in what is ordinarily understood as the Gospel.

The 'event' is defined 'essentially and exactly as that particular occurrence or cluster of occurrences through which the Spirit was given and the church was brought into being'. Although at one place Dr Knox refers to the 'event Christ Jesus', he states that the

event is not limited to the historical career of Jesus, and the event is constituted not only by 'circumstances and instances' but also by 'the responses made to them and the meanings found in them'. To say that historical criticism cannot seriously impair our faith in the validity of the Church's experience in all this wide range of event seems to me untrue to fact. The Church is in any case not only interested in occurrences, but also in the personality of Jesus. This is what makes His actual words recorded in Scripture and the details of His life so precious to the believer; we know so little of Him that we look for every genuine detail, and we realise with Dr Knox that it is the historian who decides whether such details recorded in the Gospels are to be regarded as historically probable. Dr Knox accepts many Gospel sayings rejected by the historical critics as 'Christ's words through the Spirit,' but it does make a difference to most of us whether they are words spoken by the historical Jesus or words given by Christ through the Spirit to a preacher last Sunday. Dr Knox indeed seems to set a rather artificial limit to the time that the Church's experience guaranteed the validity of that experience.

Three minor points provoke critical comment.

(*a*) The part played by attribution to an apostle in the placing of a book in the New Testament canon seems to be over-emphasised. This certainly was one factor, but scarcely the most important one; otherwise the 'Gospel according to Peter' with only very slight docetic and gnostic tendencies, would almost certainly have found a place in the canon.

(*b*) Dr Knox considers that 2 Peter, even with its apostolic name could never 'function in the Church as a creative or normative work', and suggests that it is not actually used in preaching. The memory of the Transfiguration in chapter 1 has always appeared to me so full of spiritual insight that I wish I could believe that Peter wrote it, and God's view of time suggested in chapter 4 has surely been the subject of many sermons.

(*c*) Dr Knox appears to exaggerate *ad absurdum* the anti-Semitism of the Gospels. Certainly the writer of the Fourth Gospel tends to refer to those Jews who were hostile to Jesus as 'the Jews', but in three places (8.31, 11.45, 12.11) he makes it clear that certain Jews believed in Jesus, and the statement 'Salvation is of the Jews' hardly suggests an anti-Semitic author. What he gives as an example of anti-Semitism in the other Gospels, Jesus' denunciation of formalism and hypocrisy in the scribes and Pharisees—was surely a fundamental part of the ethical teaching of Jesus, a part that was almost certainly received gladly by other Jews. The statement, 'A Jew crucified by the Gentiles becomes in effect a non-Jew put to death by the Jews', is a travesty of the Gospel records. Jews, as well

as Gentiles, obviously played a part in the death of Jesus. It is this kind of argument that makes the ordinary Christian distrust the Biblical critic.

WILLIAM LILLIE

Revelation and Religion. By H. H. FARMER. Nisbet. Pp. 244. 17s. 6d. net.

THE sub-title of this book describes the author's purpose—*Studies in the Theological Interpretation of Religious Types.* Dr Farmer has undertaken an examination of the fact of religion, as manifest in human life, from the standpoint of Christian theology. At first sight this may seem a strange theme for a series of *Gifford Lectures* which should deal, according to the terms of the Foundation, with some aspect of natural theology. Dr Farmer justifies his choice of topic in the opening chapter by a careful consideration of the senses in which the term *natural theology* is used. He indicates the sense in which he himself uses it and makes the wise suggestion that the term might well be dropped from theological usage. Having argued that inductive reasoning towards theism, from the facts of nature, must always involve an element of subjective judgment based on prior insights and convictions, he pleads justification for consciously using the central affirmations of Christianity as a norm of judgment. In undertaking his task he states and defends the case that there is, in all religions, a personal approach of God to man and that the Christian revelation provides the normative concept of living religion.

Dr Farmer then devotes two chapters to an examination of that normative concept as it is revealed in the distinctive experience of Christian worship. Taking the trinitarian formula as expressive of the most characteristic features of Christian worship he analyses that experience in terms of the formula and distinguishes seven elements in it. These are the awareness of God as the absolute source of all being, as the ultimate source of all values, as personal, as making an absolute claim, as offering absolute succour, as indwelling life and power and, finally, the unique feeling tone which permeates and characterises all genuine religious experience. On the assumption that God's self-disclosure is the ground of all living religion, Dr Farmer maintains, all these elements will tend to be present in the religious life of mankind and the Christian revelation will provide us with the normative concept of religion. 'The living essence of religion is revealed once and for all, in its sole perfect manifestation, in the Christian revelation and in the relation with God which that revelation makes possible for men, and it is exemplified in other religions in varying degrees of incompleteness, fragmentariness,

distortion and perversion.' The Christian revelation provides a norm by which the genuinely religious elements in human experience can be discriminated and evaluated.

Dr Farmer applies his norm first to primitive religion and shows that animism, belief in demons, belief in survival, ancestor worship, totemism, the notion of mana and the systems of tabu have no necessary religious significance. He rejects the view that the widespread primitive belief in the 'High God' is adequate evidence of an original monotheism but he maintains that polytheism was an inevitable stage in man's awareness of God and that the presence of monotheistic trends is evidence of God's personal approach to men.

The norm disclosed in Christian worship is then used to classify and evaluate types of religion in which man's true relation to God is distorted or perverted by the fact that one or other element of the norm has assumed a false dominance. This process is illustrated in religions which tend towards cosmic pantheism, impersonal fatalism, Platonic idealism, immanental piety, rigorous legalism and egocentric eudaemonism. Parallel processes of perversion are also shown to be at work within historical Christianity. Dr Farmer maintains that the corrective influence of other elements is never wholly absent—in justification of his contention that there is a personal approach of God to man in all religions—but that Christianity 'because of the unique and final revelation which lies at its heart . . . continually exhibits the power to overcome and recover from its own weaknesses, aberrations and perversions'.

The author's attention now turns to the subjective factors in religion which arise from the fundamental needs of man's being. Living religion meets those needs but they may find partial satisfaction in non-religious experience. Man is a social being. He has a deep desire for fulness of life and the experience of power. He needs periods of withdrawal from the pressure of daily life. He is conscious of incompleteness and frustration and longs for the assurance of meaning and fulfilment. He feels a deep urge towards unity within his own nature and towards oneness with the permanent unity in or above all the changes and chances of this fleeting world. The dangers which lurk in those subjective factors are exposed and the religious tendencies to which they give rise are displayed and criticised from the same standpoint of God's saving revelation of Himself in Christ.

Like all Dr Farmer's work this volume bears the marks of clear, honest, careful thought. There is a firm framework of logical argument which will not escape criticism but which must command respect. But it is not merely a notable intellectual achievement. Its argument has obviously been wrought out and thoroughly tested

in the workshop of life. It demands a sustained mental effort from the reader but it offers, as reward, the ripe fruit of deeply Christian experience and reflection.

J. W. D. Smith

A Christian Economy. By William G. Peck. S.P.C.K. Pp. x + 164. 17s. 6d. net

This book 'reproduces the essential elements of lectures given in recent years to various audiences', and still bears the mark of its origin. But it has unity of theme. The lectures expound the social doctrine and, to a lesser extent, the social policy of two Anglican sociological groups, the Industrial Christian Fellowship and the Christendom Association, with which Mr Peck has long been identified. The thesis is that at the Renaissance there originated a great 'dichotomy wrought by human pride, in which man undertook to live his mundane life without relating its purposes to the supreme, supernatural purpose of his existence, without finding as the essential purpose of his work, his politics, his science, or his art, the glory of God'. In a word secular humanism. Thus man lost the sense that he is spirit, 'created for communion with God, set down within the human family and the natural order, in and through his relation to which he is to reach the vision of God'. He has therefore lost 'true natural community', and become deracinated, depersonalised, 'massified', and cannot now understand that this is the end-product of 'that fissure between natural and supernatural which occurred at the birth of the modern era'. The Church's task now is not to preach pietism or mere personal morality, but to work for the restoration of 'Christendom', to teach a return, not indeed to the practice of the Middle Ages, admittedly imperfect, but to the social-theological doctrine of the medieval doctors; and to enlist the help of the laity in the task.

It may well be felt that the analysis of the modern situation with all its evils is more striking than the remedies proposed. Mr Peck makes no comment on the instruction given to a young Methodist lay-preacher not to forget to shake his congregation 'over the pit', except to say that 'he must be supposed to have considered his message indispensable'. But he himself gives his readers a good shaking over a fearful pit as he grimly describes the increasing world food shortage and the contracting markets for manufactured goods which threaten the British Welfare State. These are facts which we must hope will be driven home to the mind of even the most thoughtless. When they are understood there may be receptivity for 'an evangel of Christian humanism and personalism'.

Among many important chapters the longest and perhaps the

most interesting is that on Communism as the rival of Christianity. Mr Peck refuses to regard it as a Christian heresy, as some have done, though he does recognise the element of Jewish prophetism in Marx himself. Rather it is the ripe fruit of humanist and dehumanising secularism, which must be met both ideologically and practically. It should at least prevent Christian preachers from hesitating to preach dogma. On this level the Christian answer is naturally to combat the historical determinism of Communism and the primacy it gives to the economic aspect of human life. But who is going to start development of agriculture, dissemination of industries in small units, regionalism and decentralisation of power, and a Guild structure in industry? In fact Mr Peck falls back on the rediscovery of the Christian values.

On p. 97 Mr Peck takes Reinhold Niebuhr to task for the 'extraordinary mistake' of criticising the sacramental philosophy of life 'on the ground that it must necessarily tend to the defence of things as they are: it must tend toward giving a spiritual sanction to the social and economic structures as they exist at a given time'. He admits that that is what sacramentalism has sometimes degenerated into. Even if it has no opportunity so to degenerate today, he should take note of the criticism and be on guard against the danger, which maybe lurks in the medieval conception of Christendom he so much admires.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

The Transcendent Unity of Religions. By FRITHJOF SCHUON. Translated by PETER TOWNSEND. Faber and Faber. 21s. net

THE wrapper is probably right in claiming that the author is 'in no sense a syncretist'. He comes nearer to the attitude indicated by Renan, who affirmed that in order to write the history of a religion a man should: first, have believed it but, second, should no longer believe it *d'une manière absolue.* M. Schuon argues that humanity is divided into a number of worlds each with its own appropriate faith. 'If Christ had been the only manifestation of the Word, supposing such a uniqueness of manifestation to be possible, the effect of His birth would have been the instantaneous reduction of the universe to ashes' (p. 37). Passages from the New Testament receive cavalier treatment in support of the theory. When mention is made of 'every nation under heaven' the reference is only to 'nations known to the Roman world'; and when it is said that there is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved, 'there is no reason to suppose' that the expression carries any wider connotation. The Roman Empire is the world in which Christ is the 'Sun' and the question arises whether the activity of missionaries

working outside the predestined and 'normal' world of Christianity is altogether illegitimate (p. 99).

In view of such a conclusion it is not surprising to find that the author is content with a narrow view of religion ('salvation is merited by action'—p. 29; religious duties present 'the principal condition of salvation'—p. 24) and a very meagre idea of Christianity. This links up with the author's disregard of the prophets of the Old Testament and their contribution to ethical and religious monotheism; and with his conclusion, against the evidence, that the Semitic peoples had a natural tendency towards monotheism. Justification by faith makes an entrance on p. 156 but only to be identified with the *bhaktic* way of knowledge. He misses the essence of Christianity with its claim to be judged by an absoluteness not of morals nor of doctrine but of the Person of Christ. When the New Testament proclaims that Christ is the world's Redeemer, it clearly does more than present one aspect of truth: it proclaims that He *is* the Truth.

With such a narrowly restricted notion of religion as is characteristic of the book and with the discovery of true Christianity in St. Gregory Palamas and Hesychasm, it is not at all hard to trace a 'transcendent unity of religions'; but it should be said in respect that the author was singled out by the late Ananda Coomaraswamy as one of the few Westerners qualified to interpret the Oriental doctrines.

The Greek fount has gone berserk on p. 177. 'Hermetical' on p. 171 is perhaps a slip on the part of the translator, who otherwise has done a patient task well.

EDGAR P. DICKIE

Preaching in a Scientific Age. By A. C. CRAIG. S.C.M. Press, 1954. 7s. 6d.

THOSE who attended Dr Craig's 1953 Warrack Lectures may well be found boasting of the fact, proudly and gratefully, in forty years' time. Utterances of this calibre have become rare. The 'Scientific Age' is a background theme but its bearing upon the task of preaching has been evoked with great skill and economy. What stands in the foreground is the great reality of God of which the preacher is privileged to speak and the real human congregations of Scotland who are still ready to listen to him. In his first two chapters, Dr Craig shows how modern science has 'blown upon the traditional view of the Bible' and made it imperative that the Church should live by a reinterpretation 'as pervasive and persuasive as science itself'. Then he goes straight to the three crucial issues: Preaching on Miracle, Preaching on the Resurrection, and Preaching on the

Last Things. If I illustrate the quality of his wisdom from the chapter on Miracle only, it is because I can see room in that chapter for respectful disagreement. We must preach on miracle because in miracle is affirmed 'the freedom of the Creator to rule over his creation in righteousness and love with utter constancy and infinite ingenuity' (p. 65). But our pulpit handling of the topic should be governed by two further principles. The second of these is admirably invoked—the need to discriminate among miracle narratives by applying to them the methods basic to literary, artistic and historical criticism, as well as to the physical sciences. The other principle is that an element of apologetic needs to be introduced and three lines are suggested—man's crude ability to subdue nature to his chosen ends, the idea that miracle is to science as poetry is to prose, and the uniqueness of Christ's person. This excursus into apologetics struck me as a weak patch, as though the author had momentarily lost the secret of unembarrassed utterance which makes the rest of the book so impressive. In the same chapter (pp. 61-2) there are two paragraphs about 'the Bible's intrinsic power to make men aware of God as real' which I should like to hear Dr Craig amplify. The book offers to us a great theme, drawn out in sparkling language, and applied to our present situation by a diagnosis which is very shrewd indeed.

W. A. Whitehouse

Science and the Human Imagination. By Mary B. Hesse. S.C.M. Press, 1954. 12s. 6d.

The sub-title of this book, 'Aspects of the History and Logic of Physical Science', describes its content precisely. The aspects in question are those in which all who talk about religion and science should nowadays be instructed. The instruction indicated by the term 'Logic' can hardly be made palatable to the casual reader, but it is precisely those chapters, v-viii, which are most to be welcomed, and they are written with exemplary clarity. Dr Hesse gives away the fact that they are based on an academic dissertation, whilst the historical chapters were more popular in conception and they are manifestly more derivative.

Mr Michael Foster's essays in *Mind* (Vols. xliii-xlv) are by now the classical prototype for this historical background to the traditional conflicts between religion and science and much work has been done to fill out the picture which he suggested. In her chapters on medieval cosmology, the new philosophy and the billiard-ball universe, Dr Hesse gives the substance of the story, ending with brave words about Matthew Arnold and his still popular remedy for the conflicts created by the changed world-view. 'It was that the

saving truths of Christianity need restating in the language of each age, and when men demand proof and verification in every sphere, the proof of religion must be made to rest in the inner life of the spirit, not on the "materialising mythology" of traditional dogma' (p. 68). The next chapter on the recent developments which have finally destroyed the billiard-ball outlook is splendidly done, and in particular the reassessment of mathematics and its relation to science (pp. 78-89) is brought into the picture with a masterly touch. In Dr Hesse's judgment, 'it is fairly clear that the transition to a view which takes account of the limitations of knowledge gained by human scientists with material instruments, has something to do with the modern loss of faith in the existence of any transcendent observer, that is, of God' (p. 90). We pass to the current logical discussion with the observation that 'a viable faith in the twentieth century must be able to take into itself a certain scepticism and relativism with regard to all rational systems, but it must do so without abandoning the intellect or losing itself in sentimentality and emotionalism' (p. 90).

How do theories and concepts function in modern science? One kind of answer is suggested by those who treat them as 'logical constructions', and here we meet the work of Pearson, Mach, Russell, and F. P. Ramsey. Dr Hesse thinks that this kind of answer has failed and by failing has led to an eclipse of all attempts to describe scientific perception in terms of sense-data alone. Another approach, widely accepted by working scientists, is to treat a concept as referring strictly to the series of operations and calculations of which it is the result. This promises total liberation from the impossible and misleading task of trying to represent in other terms the concepts which are fundamental in theoretical physics. In fact, however, the programme of eliminating all but strictly operational concepts has not been carried through. This leaves room, therefore, for an inquiry, in the mode of current linguistic philosophy, into the role of models or analogues in scientific thinking. Dr Hesse has made what I venture to think is an important contribution to the inquiry, first by defending the place of analogies which are not used merely for minor heuristic purposes but which 'determine the phenomena to be taken into account, and therefore the direction of research, and the whole framework of a theory' (p. 140), and secondly by contending that serious analogies must be taken to refer to real relations in nature. Then, of course, the historical part of the book comes to its own, because it is crucial to realise how the type of analogy used will still reflect contemporary cultural attitudes and preoccupations—notably at present a preoccupation with mathematical logic.

I am not clear that 'poetry' is the activity which should be called in to redress the balance upset by 'the narrowly rationalist conception of truth and knowledge'. The historical story in the opening chapters leads one to toy with that way of putting things. But I suspect that Dr Hesse shares my own uneasiness lest the story thus told should deflect us from the vital issue 'that there is a definite and nearly conclusive procedure for testing scientific hypotheses against empirical facts' (p. 163). Be that as it may, this book is one that has been needed for some time, not only for its lucid information but for its interesting and robust suggestions and above all for its sane judgments.

W. A. WHITEHOUSE

Tarsus of Jeruzalem. By W. C. VAN UNNIK (*Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde*, N. R., Deel 15, No. 5), Amsterdam, 1952.

AN important contribution has been made to the *Paulus-Forschung* by this Dutch scholar, who raises the question where Paul spent his youth. Submitting to a thorough investigation the few NT passages which are available for a discussion of this question, he maintains that, according to their correct interpretation, the future apostle was brought up in Jerusalem. The book is largely a philological study. For that reason its argument, to be fully appreciated, needs to be read *in extenso;* but a general outline of it may serve to show how fresh and challenging it is.

At the outset van Unnik indicates the importance of the subject which he has taken in hand. Psychologists are now agreed that the *milieu* and impressions of our youth play a great role in the development of our personality and in the shaping of our attitude towards our fellows. The differences that obtained in the first century of our era between Tarsus and Jerusalem were almost those between two worlds. In whichever of these two cities Paul spent his youth, his development would have been very different had he spent it in the other.

At present the question, Where did Paul spend his youth? is answered by practically all NT scholars in one way: they decide in favour of Tarsus. It is true that a few, notably Deissmann, Dibelius-Kümmel and, most decisively, P. Feine, have recognised that from such passages as Acts 22.3 and 26.4-5 it might be gathered that Paul was brought from Tarsus to Jerusalem when he was still a little child. But almost invariably this possibility has been dismissed on the ground that, if he was not brought up in Tarsus, no entirely adequate explanation could be given either of his acquaintance with the LXX or of the Hellenistic elements in his thought.

Van Unnik devotes much attention to Acts 22.3.

(1) He notes that there, in describing the first phase of Paul's development, Luke uses three words: γεγεννημένος, ἀνατεθραμμένος and πεπαιδευμένος. This, he holds, is not an accidental concatenation of verbs, but a triad which formed a fixed literary unit. It is found in a considerable number of passages which he adduces from Plato, Isocrates, Philo, Josephus (?), Plutarch, Clement of Alexandria, Jamblichus and Eusebius; and this frequent occurrence of it is regarded by him as proof that it was a fixed formula or schema. Among writers plying a literary Greek it was the proper thing, in describing the development of a man's youth, to proceed from his γένεσις to his ἀνατροφή and thence to his παιδεία. Luke, it would appear, was acquainted with this schema and has proceeded according to it not only in Acts 22.3, but also in relating the early history of Moses in Acts 7.20-22.

We ought, van Unnik maintains, to recognise this triad in Acts 22.3 and not to break it up by giving to ἀνατεθραμμένος and πεπαιδευμένος practically the same meaning. It is likely that here each verb of the triad has its own specific nuance and that each registers a definite stage on life's way.

(2) Van Unnik now seeks to ascertain the difference between ἀνατρέφω and παιδεύω. Light is thrown on this by the following portion of the quotation from Porphyry made by Eusebius in his *Ecclesiastical History*, VI.19, 7:

> 'For Ammonius, being a Christian, and brought up (ἀνατραφείς) by Christian parents, when he gave himself to study and to philosophy straightway conformed to the life required by the laws. But Origen, having been educated (παιδευθείς) as a Greek in Greek literature, went over to the barbarian recklessness.'

Van Unnik's study of this passage leads him to conclude that ἀνατραφείς and παιδευθείς are not simultaneous, that the παιδεία is subsequent to the ἀνατροφή, and that the latter takes place in the parental home and refers to the whole life of the child up to a time of mental maturity when, putting himself under a teacher, he proceeds to acquire a knowledge of philosophy.

(3) Van Unnik now enters upon a closer investigation of the meaning of (ἀνα)τρέφω. This is conducted in a learned appendix. The main results which it yields him are that ἀνατρέφω embraces both physical and mental upbringing, and that, where it is mentioned, it is always the parental home that is in view.

In the light of these investigations van Unnik concludes that according to Acts 22.3 Paul spent the years of his youth entirely in Jerusalem. Paraphrasing somewhat the words of that verse, he renders it: 'I am a Jew, born in Tarsus in Cilicia, but my parental

home, where I received my early upbringing, was in this city [Jerusalem], and under Gamaliel, a man well-known to you, I received a strict training as a Pharisee, so that I was a zealot for God's cause, as ye all are today.'

Van Unnik's treatment of other passages which bear upon Paul's youth may be indicated more briefly. In Acts 26.4-5 he finds a confirmation of his conclusion. The Jews to whom the apostle there refers were those who had come from Jerusalem to accuse him, and he could not have said of them that they knew him from the beginning unless he had been brought up in their midst. In Jerusalem Paul was called Saul of Tarsus (Acts 9.11) to distinguish him from others there of the name Saul, cf. Simon of Cyrene. Confronted by the power of Rome, Paul naturally appealed to his rights as a citizen of Tarsus (Acts 21.39) and to his derivation from Cilicia (Acts 23.34), but his doing so throws no light on the question whether after his birth he remained in Tarsus for a long or a short time. According to Acts 18.3 he was a σκηνοποιός. The word may mean 'leather-worker'; but even if the meaning be that Paul wrought as a tentmaker, Tarsus was not necessarily the place where he learned to do so.

Aramaic was the tongue of Paul's home. If he was brought up in Jerusalem, it was also the principal tongue of his environment; and from a study of his epistles van Unnik is convinced that, while he wrote in Greek, he thought in Aramaic. During the years he spent in Syria and Cilicia (Acts 9.30-11.26), he had ample opportunity of acquainting himself with the LXX and of making contact with Hellenism in all its forms. Moreover, it needs to be borne in mind that most of his epistles were written in the last period of his life after he had spent a considerable number of years in a Greek environment, and that in writing them he had Greek collaborators.

The acceptance of van Unnik's conclusion would have several quite definite consequences. The questions whether Paul and Barnabas first met one another in Tarsus, and whether Paul attended the university there, would not arise. Klausner's proposition that Paul's desertion of Judaism for Christianity was due to the fact that he was a Jew of the Diaspora would fall to the ground, and so also would that of Enslin that he had no contacts with Jerusalem until after his conversion. Van Unnik's conclusion would provide an excellent explanation of the vigour and violence with which Paul persecuted the Church, and it would make it very difficult for us to regard his conversion as but the final phase of a change that had gradually been taking place in his mind and not such a miracle of divine grace as he himself appears to have esteemed it. If, as this conclusion requires, Paul made his first contacts with the Hellenistic

world as a Christian, then he had not to overcome the sense of difference or the feelings of dislike which in all likelihood would have been bred in him had he been brought up in a Gentile city. If the Jewish was the only way of life which he knew in the days of his youth, his adherence to it in the fulness of his years and the maturity of his Christianity is understandable.

Van Unnik's conclusion upsets several theories, necessitates the abandonment of several widely approved positions, and at several points throws new light on Paul's personality and career. It ought to be closely examined and will doubtless be so.

GEORGE OGG

The Epistle to the Ephesians. Its Authorship, Origin, and Purpose. By C. LESLIE MITTON. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 30s.

A CASUAL reader encountering on page one of the preface to this book the statement that the lack of 'a convincing solution' to such problems as that of the authorship of Ephesians becomes 'a persistent and galling irritant' to the mind, on the removal of which the scholar's 'peace' depends, might be tempted to suspect here a certain impatience of critical temper, or at least an over-great reliance on the powers of criticism to dispose satisfactorily of such questions. No impression of this kind will, however, be left on the mind of the reader who goes forward from the preface and allows himself to come under the full force of the writer's argument, than which anything more judicious, temperate, fair, and open-minded towards the whole nature of the evidence it would be difficult to imagine. Dr Mitton presents all sides of the case, and if he is indisposed to acquiesce in a purely *non liquet* verdict on the issue before him, it is because he very definitely cognises factors in the situation which, he thinks, tilt the scale to the one side. Let it be said at once that, whether or not we accept the conclusion to which the writer comes on the authorship question, Dr Mitton has produced a very able and remarkable book. It is a masterly contribution to the study of Ephesians in all its aspects, and cannot fail to take a place among the premier works of criticism on the subject.

Dr Mitton in Part I surveys the present position of critical opinion on Ephesians. British scholars for the most part (with a notable exception in James Moffatt) have maintained the Pauline authorship; Continental and American scholars (with exceptions like Jülicher, Ernst Percy, and E. F. Scott) have inclined in the opposite direction. In few cases, however, has judgment been given without hesitation and misgiving, so evenly balanced is the evidence. Many who take the conservative side have done so because it is 'easier to account for the non-Pauline characteristics in the Epistle under the

supposition of Pauline authorship than to explain the abounding Pauline characteristics on the supposition of a non-Pauline authorship'. Judgment has, of course, to take account of language, style, the literary relation of Ephesians both to Colossians and to the other Pauline letters, historical background, and doctrine. Dr Mitton carefully examines the data and the variations with which different scholars have laid their emphasis on this or that feature of the evidence. Dr Moffatt, for example, pronounced both the linguistic and the doctrinal evidence indecisive, but found in the style of Ephesians an insuperable obstacle to its attribution to St. Paul. Martin Dibelius, on the other hand, after comparing the epistle with Colossians, judged the linguistic differences to be an absolutely conclusive element in the case, while A. H. McNeile (who accepts the Epistle as genuine) thinks that doctrinal considerations outweigh all arguments based on language and style. Dr Mitton devotes some attention at this point to the position of those who, like Jülicher, E. F. Scott, and C. H. Dodd, find themselves constrained to return an open verdict, and this non-committal attitude would, it appears, have been Dr Mitton's own, but for the entrance into the field of Dr E. J. Goodspeed with his book on *The Meaning of Ephesians*.

It is the merit of Dr Goodspeed's theory of Ephesians, thinks Dr Mitton, that those who are unable on linguistic, stylistic, or doctrinal grounds to assign Ephesians to St. Paul himself are now in a position to surmount the other difficulty of conceiving a set of circumstances in which some other person, not the Apostle, would a generation after Paul be led in the Apostle's name to compose and give to the Church a compendium of Pauline evangelical doctrine based on Pauline language and yet adapted to a later stage of Christian insight and requirement, Goodspeed's theory briefly is that after A.D. 85, when the appearance of the Acts of the Apostles revived the Church's interest in the Apostle to the Gentiles, an Asiatic Christian who was saturated with the language and theology of Colossians—Dr Mitton will not say he was either Onesimus or Tychicus—and who felt that the Church of his day was famished for lack of the Pauline gospel, was inspired to collect and study such letters of the Apostle as he was able to discover among the Churches, and then to publish them to the Church with an introductory dissertation embodying a general summary of Pauline religious teaching and drawing in every line of it upon the language of the Apostle. This general summary, composed in letter form, was our Epistle to the Ephesians. Dr Mitton accepts the substance of Goodspeed's hypothesis, though with qualifications of detail, and thinks on the strength of it to turn the flank of the main obstacle standing in the way of those who on other grounds feel that they cannot assign Ephesians to St Paul.

On page 43 of the book will be found an enumeration of the points at which Dr Mitton thinks Goodspeed to have eased the critical situation for minds like his own.

The most valuable part of Dr Mitton's book lies in Chapters VI-XIV, in which he examines the literary relationship of Ephesians first to Colossians, and then to the other Pauline Epistles. The result of his analysis, which is carried through with an extraordinary patience and thoroughness of detail, is to reveal one absolutely unique feature of Ephesians. No Epistle so reproduces the language not only of Colossians but of the eight other Epistles bearing the Apostle's name as does Ephesians. It is on this feature that Dr Mitton, though not overlooking other characteristics indicative of a post-Pauline date, mainly concentrates. He argues that if the writer were St. Paul we should have to explain why in this Epistle the Apostle chose to repeat himself to an extent and in a manner to which there is no parallel in any other of his writings. This difficulty disappears if we suppose the author to have been an ardent and devoted follower of the Apostle whose mind was steeped in Pauline language and thought, and who felt that he could conscientiously publish the Epistle in St. Paul's name. If the Apostle wrote the Epistle, it would need to be dated within a few weeks or months of Colossians, with which it stands in the closest connexion—compare Eph. 6.21-22 with Col. 4.7—but such a date would render it impossible to explain the development of thought, which comes to light, for example, in the different senses in which the terms σῶμα and πλήρωμα are applied to the Church in Ephesians as compared with Colossians. Dr Mitton would, therefore, assign to Ephesians a post-Pauline origin, roughly contemporaneous with Acts, 1 Peter, and Hebrews. It was, he thinks, written in the period A.D. 87-92.

The evidence consisting in the literary reproduction of the Pauline Epistles in Ephesians is set out in a series of Appendices which form an invaluable supplement to the work. It may be, however, that through immersion in such studies, Dr Mitton has done less than justice to the originality of the Epistle in certain great points of doctrine. The arguments based on such features as the different uses to which the terms σῶμα and πλήρωμα are put in Ephesians compared with Colossians are not convincing. In matters of this kind it is easy to over-strain the evidence, and only probabilities, not dogmatic conclusions, may be asserted. But whether we accept Dr Mitton's final judgment on the case or not, the book is a most important contribution to the study of Ephesians, and all subsequent criticism will have to reckon with it.

WILLIAM MANSON

The Servant-Messiah: A Study of the Public Ministry of Jesus. By T. W. Manson. Cambridge University Press, 1953. 10s. 6d. net

Professor T. W. Manson's *Teaching of Jesus* has found a place on the shelves of minister and scholar alike. It should be joined at once by *The Servant-Messiah*, the Schaffer lectures for 1939 at Yale Divinity School.

The historical background of the Ministry is first sketched in ('The Messianic Hope', 'The Messianic Herald'), followed by the main theme, a study of Christ's conception of His Mission and its fulfilment ('The Messianic Ministry: Principles', 'The Messianic Ministry: Practice', 'The Passion of the Son of Man', 'The Risen Christ and the Messianic Succession'). To a Jewish Messianism finding classic expression in the *Psalms of Solomon*, Jesus opposed his own realised ideal of a Servant-Messiah in Whose Ministry the Reign of God was finally actualised in history. Such a Ministry met inevitable opposition, for it proclaimed and practised a God-given absolute which could brook no let or hindrance from Law or tradition. The Son of man was crucified. But His Ministry was interrupted, not ended: Christ rose to share His unbroken Ministry of service and love with His commissioned followers.

Such a bare outline does no justice to the many original points supporting the main thesis. The crisis in the Ministry came with the Feeding of the Five Thousand, all of them men (Mark 6.44), not just a congregation without a minister, but an army without a leader (Mark 6.34); John's plain statement that they wished to make Him king by force (6.15) reveals the nature of the crisis—and the incident led directly to Caesarea Philippi. Dr Manson has extended (and enriched) his well-known interpretation of the symbolic Son of man by invoking the Hebrew (and Greek) conception of 'corporate personality'. Mark's Passion story describes not just the last journey to Jerusalem, but a Ministry in Judaea and Peraea, and the Cleansing of the Temple took place not at the Passover season, but six months earlier at Tabernacles. St. Marks' Gospel did not end at 16.8; whatever the lost ending, the story is to be supplemented (with some interesting results) by Luke 24.22 ff.

Such observations, however, must take second place to the central thesis of this stimulating and original study. Dr C. J. Cadoux once wrote: 'Whether or no we call him, as Origen did, *αὐτοβασιλεία*, we can say that in him and in his work among men the Kingdom of God was already present and active.' No New Testament scholar is likely to concede less to Dr Manson's view, and many will go much further with him in maintaining that this realised Kingdom of service and love, entering on a new phase after the Resurrection, was the central thing in the mind of Jesus: 'For Jesus the thing of

first importance, the only thing of any importance is his own Ministry, that is to say his task of manifesting the perfect rule of God by being the Servant in perfect love of God and man. For him that is the only thing in the world that comes with an absolute and unqualified claim.'

This is a book that speaks for itself.

MATTHEW BLACK

I Peter. A Paschal Liturgy. By F. L. CROSS. A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd. 3s. 6d.

THIS is a remarkably fresh and illuminating study which greatly strengthens and enhances the thesis that the first Epistle of Peter comprises an early Baptismal Homily. By comparing it with other works such as the valuable *Homily on the Passion* of Melito of Sardis, published by Campbell Bonner in 1940 and a similar homily of Hippolytus, restored to his credit from the *spuria* of John Chrysostom, Professor Cross traces the close interrelation in this Epistle between Baptism and the Eucharist found in the primitive Easter. Too much, I think, is made of the relation between suffering (*πάσχειν*) and the Paschal feast (*πάσχε*) of the Church and not enough of the context of actual suffering in which the Church found itself, but what Professor Cross has to say is very helpful to the understanding of the whole epistle, and, in particular, of its Easter setting. When he works out in detail the construction of the document as a liturgy for the Paschal Vigil he is not so convincing—verses 3-12 of the first chapter belong much more, for example, to the opening charge than to a solemn prayer. Here too there are intriguing suggestions (such as the interpretation of women's adornments in Ch. 3.3) which make it imperative that Professor Cross should enlarge this lecture into a substantial discussion.

There can be no doubt that much more use should be made in a study of this kind of the Hebraic and Talmudic tradition in which the great John Lightfoot was such a master in the seventeenth century. Professor Cross's thesis would have gained very greatly from such a study, not to mention the material now coming to hand in such rich quantities from the new scrolls. By way of illustrating the value of this Hebraic material for such work, three brief comments might be offered.

(1) The terms *sanctify* and *holy* in the way they are used in this epistle came in the Hebraic tradition to be employed as *termini technici* for pre-paschal baptismal lustration, particularly the *piel* form of *qadash*. The very opening words of the Epistle which refer to *sanctification* and *sprinkling of blood* indicate right away that here we have an early Christianisation of the Jewish practice.

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(2) The connexion so close in this epistle between the concepts of *baptism* and *hope* forces us to recall that in the *Mishnah*, for example, the same word, *mikweh*, can be used for both, so that the priestly bath on the day of atonement is deliberately interpreted in terms of Messianic baptism as the hope of Israel—see Danby's edition of the *Mishnah*, p. 172. The same idea lies behind 1 John 3.3.

(3) The word ἐπερώτημα surely refers not to *stipulatio* but to *adstipulatio*, and behind it to the basic pattern of the baptismal liturgy which is to be found in Exod. 19, where verses 3-7 give us the *stipulatio* in the Jewish rite of pre-passover baptism, and verses 7-9 give us the *adstipulatio*. Then there follows the passage about *sanctification* which was read by the Jews as the great warrant for baptismal initiation into the covenant. In proselyte baptism after the stipulation, the candidate while still in the waters was solemnly interrogated by the court (*beth-din*) before admission into Israel. One sees hints of this interrogation in Luke 3.10, 14 in connexion with John's Baptism, but also in a startling way in the incident of the confirmation of Jesus at the age of twelve in the Temple (when every Jewish child was interrogated) where St. Luke uses the same technical term (ἐπερωτᾶν) to describe how Jesus interrogated the doctors of the law who should have beeen interrogating Him. A study of the Jewish liturgy of baptismal initiation and of confirmation, traces of which are here apparent on the pages of the Gospel, has much light still to throw upon the rise of our Christian rites, and upon the construction of such a document as 1 Peter. It is high time that Lightfoot's *Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae* was reprinted.

T. F. Torrance

The Formation of the New Testament. By H. F. D. Sparks. S.C.M., 1952. Pp. 172. 13s. 6d.

The author describes his book as 'no more than a simple introduction, designed for the reader who is beginning the subject'. As such it is a first-rate piece of work, but it also deserves the attention of readers who are quite well versed in New Testament matters.

For this is not an introduction to the New Testament on the familiar lines, book by book. As Professor Sparks expresses it in a Prologue and Epilogue, the Church not only possesses the New Testament, but produced it in the sense both that its constituent parts are the work of members of the Church, and that its limits were defined by the corporate decision of the Church. The New Testament is 'the Church's Book', nothing more nor less. Therefore, while allowing its appropriateness in certain other contexts, Dr Sparks abandons the theological method of approach, which treats

in turn the contents of the individual books as parts of 'a God-given unity', for the historical approach.

The first chapter sketches the growth of the primitive Church and its message. The Church's emancipation from Judaism was made inevitable by the conviction of the first Christians that the eschatological and Messianic hopes whose fulfilment, in the belief of their fellow-Jews, lay in an indefinite future, were already being fulfilled, and that the Messiah was no other than their Master Jesus of Nazareth. The demands of the Gentile mission, which completed the break, produced new problems of interpretation and restatement of the unchangeable message, and of the inculcation of ethical teaching which seemed infinitely more exacting to those reared in paganism than to those accustomed to Jewish standards of morality. The New Testament books enshrine in permanent form this continuing process of restatement and adaptation.

In the second chapter Dr Sparks outlines the main events in the career of Paul, and assigns to their generally agreed context in this career 1 Thessalonians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Romans. The remaining epistles (including the Pastorals) are reserved for special treatment in the following chapter because of the problems connected with them. This, I feel, is a disadvantage, and liable to confuse the uninitiated reader. Yet it seems difficult to avoid in a strictly historical approach such as Dr Sparks adopts. But while every method has its own disadvantages, it might have been better, and might have served his purpose at least equally well, if he had fitted 2 Thessalonians, Galatians, Colossians and Philemon, and Philippians into the contexts which he considers to be right, along with the other letters. Dr Sparks rightly sees no vital objection to the acceptance of 2 Thessalonians as genuinely Pauline. Galatians is taken to be the earliest of Paul's letters, and Philippians is assigned not to Ephesus, though the case for this is fairly stated, but to Rome.

Ephesians and the Pastorals are next discussed in this chapter because of their traditional attribution to the apostle. After a review of the various theories about Ephesians, the position of Goodspeed and Mitton is adopted, that the author is not Paul himself, but one of his disciples who, with Colossians, which Ephesians most closely resembles, as a model, wrote an exposition of Paulinism, perhaps as an introduction to a Pauline *corpus*. The Pastoral Epistles and the difficulties in the way of fitting them into Paul's life as we know it from his letters and from Acts are then dealt with, the conclusion being the prevailing one that these letters are second-century deutero-Pauline productions which nevertheless preserve some genuine fragments from the hand of the apostle.

It is rather surprising to find Hebrews bringing up the rear in this

account of Paul and his epistles. But Dr Sparks shows why the tradition that Paul is the author must be wrong. He follows Origen in the thought that God alone knows who did in fact write it. Hebrews is invaluable as a full and rich interpretation of the Gospel, and perhaps it will always be disputed, despite the title, whether the recipients, as at first sight we might expect, were Jewish Christians or not.

In chapter four we come to the antecedents of the Gospels, collections of 'testimonies' to Christ from the Old Testament and sources, both written and oral, telling 'the things concerning Jesus', and to the finished Gospels and their individual characteristics. It is to be noted that Dr Sparks follows a present tendency to assume greater influence from oral tradition on the evangelists, and this explains why there is no mention of Proto-Luke and M.

Of the treatment of the remainder of the New Testament books in the fifth chapter all that calls for comment is, firstly, that the author's cautious judgment and conservative tendencies are most evident here: he regards as possible the traditional authorship of the Epistle of James, and rather more surprisingly, inclines to the view that Jude was written by the Lord's brother; and secondly, that in asserting the common authorship of the Johannine Epistles and the Fourth Gospel he fails to inform the reader of another view which has much in its favour.

The book concludes with a brief account of the growth of the canon, and an Epilogue in which are drawn out the implications of the maxim that 'the New Testament is the Church's Book'. The New Testament does not exist in its own right, but as the product of the church; it derives its authority from the Church, and is not to be given a permanent authority above the Church. At the same time it is the rule to which the Church has chosen to conform, and it must continually be examining itself according to this standard. Of course, the relation between Scripture and the Church is a very large question. But is Dr Sparks unaware of the dangers whenever the Church neglects to test not only its conduct, but its dogmas by its own New Testament? We all know where to look for the supreme example of this neglect and the resultant unbiblical doctrines.

For 'or', page 29, line 23, read 'For'; for '14', page 52, line 18, read '15'; for 'interrupted', page 125, line 10, read 'uninterrupted'.

A. J. B. Higgins

Rival Establishments in Scotland, 1560-1690. By Agnes Mure Mackenzie. S.P.C.K., 1952. Pp. 47. 4s. 6d.

Dr Mackenzie's first paragraph pays tribute to the moderation and the 'dignified and conciliatory tone' of the Scots Confession of

1560. She is less favourable to the Book of Discipline and the Book of Common Order, but she rightly emphasises that the Knoxian church would seem strange to a modern Episcopalian and a modern Presbyterian alike. Her judgments on the 'rival establishments' which struggled for supremacy from 1575 until 1690 on the whole reflect the moderation of her starting-point. The early seventeenth century saw 'a very interesting form of constitutional episcopacy', in which the episcopalian and presbyterian systems were 'harmonised and combined'. The possibility of an enduring compromise was wrecked by Charles I, who 'used neither time nor tact', and by Laud, who was 'as English as a Kentish hop-garden'; the account of the origins of the revolt of 1638 is one of the best parts of the book. Later, Dr Mackenzie seems to imply that but for the action of the south-western extremists a moderate presbyterian settlement might have been reached in 1661. None of her strictures on the Covenanters are more severe than her censure of Anglicisers and Erastians.

But the Book of Common Order did not 'drop the reading of Scripture in public worship', nor was 'the complete subordination of State to Church' a doctrine of the first generation of Scottish reformers. It is open to argument if the Auld Alliance defended both France and Scotland against attacks from England, and it is most hazardous to define so precisely as 'a ninth' the fraction of the ecclesiastical endowments which reached the Reformed Church. Since the order for the admission of superintendents and ministers was one and the same, Dr Mackenzie should have explained how it could come about that Erskine of Dun, 'though not a minister, was yet Superintendent'. In 1572 it was not the *office* of bishop that was restored, but the *title*: the office and function already existing in the superintendentship remained unchanged. But these inaccuracies—and others—are all in the first six pages, while the remainder of the book contains very few. It is, however, less than just to say that (in 1641) the revenues of the dioceses went 'to the Covenant's lay supporters', for funds from Orkney, Edinburgh, Galloway and Argyll, at least, were devoted to educational purposes and ministerial stipends.

GORDON DONALDSON

The Development of the Papacy. By H. BURN-MURDOCH. Faber and Faber. Pp. 432. 42s. net

DR BURN-MURDOCH does not offer a history of the development of the Papacy in the usual sense. His problem is quite precise and definite. Is the Infallibility of the Pope as defined by the Vatican Council, 1870, as genuine a part of the Catholic faith as any of the clauses of the Nicene Creed, so that a Christian must accept or reject

it 'at his soul's peril'? The 'case' proceeds on the best legal lines. The admitted facts are stated as clearly concisely and objectively as possible, and, as they have to do with almost the whole course of Church History from the Gospels to the Vatican Council, the book may fairly be entitled The Development of the Papacy. The author has taken enormous trouble to get his facts accurate, using innumerable authorities, original and secondary, Roman and Protestant, with invaluable documentation. But for convenience at every stage the narrative pauses to allow papalists and non-papalists, the 'Ayes' and the 'Noes', to plead their respective cases. These pleadings are put with strict judicial impartiality, and decision is left to the jury, i.e. the ordinary reader, who must make up his own mind by an exercise of 'private judgment'.

For those who are already sure of the answer, Dr Burn-murdoch insists, 'this book is not written', least of all to sow doubt in their minds. For those who find themselves on the horns of this particular dilemma there is the guidance that the judge has not made his submission to Rome, and in the concluding chapter gives reasons for hesitation at least. For those who cannot feel the problem as put to be of such compelling urgency the book is full of interest and instruction. It is perhaps also a warning of the extreme difficulty of the much larger question of doctrinal authority in general, which cannot be solved by any appeal to history, or even by 'holding firmly to the Nicene Creed'.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

Nervous Disorders and Religion. By PROFESSOR J. G. MCKENZIE. George Allen and Unwin. 9s. 6d. net

THE interest of this short book is out of all proportion to its size. All through it, the reader is in touch with an original and inquiring mind, full of knowledge of the literature of his subject, and rich in experience as a practising psychotherapist. Thus a relevant and often amusing illustration from Professor McKenzie's casebook is never lacking to illustrate a point of general principle.

One of the book's main theses is the claim that no adequate account can be given of neurotic conflicts and their solution unless the self be taken into account. Here McKenzie criticises the schools of Freud and MacDougall, and expresses his agreement with such writers as Karen Horney, Suttie, and Fromm.

It is a self which breaks down, not a mere bundle of instincts, but a dynamic unity which has certain fundamental needs. Here are included biological needs, the need to preserve the organism, and the need to reproduce our kind. But there are also personality needs, the need to give and to receive affection, the need for status, and

the need for rational and moral unity. Neurotic breakdown results from the failure of the self to achieve integration as a harmonious whole in its inner and outer relations. Human nature is thus something not given, like the nature of plants and animals, but achieved through stress and conflict—and, sometimes not adequately achieved at all. It is not a biological, but a moral and normative entity.

McKenzie lays great stress on the need for rational and moral unity, and gives a very interesting illustration of a case where a clergyman stifled his theological doubts for fear of losing his status as the leader of a party in his church. As a result he felt an unbearable nausea whenever he entered the pulpit or approached the altar. Thus he was able to preserve his status and avoid those situations in which his doubts most sharply assailed him. The acute conflict between the need for status and the need for rational unity was thus staved off.

The need for rational unity requires that men should find harmony, not only with their own selves or their own desires, but with their fellows and the community, and, beyond this, with the universe as a whole. No man who has not faced the question of the meaning of the world and our life in it, can be called an adult human being. This does not, of course, imply that the answer of faith must be given to that question.

Professor McKenzie, who is also a Christian minister, speaks in this book as a psychologist. He draws our attention to the fact that while religion plays a most important part in the integration of a harmonious self, yet there are types of religion which produce narrow, fanatical characters, the type of man who is bullied by a tyrannical super-ego. Such are certain kinds of authoritarian or legalistic religion whose devotees are outwardly submissive to authority, but inwardly rebellious. The type of religion which leads to the fullest integration of the self, is one whose emphasis is on the positive, where love becomes the fulfilment of the law. More than once the author says that his interest is psychological rather than theological, and yet, if his assumptions are true, as I believe they are, when he claims that there is in man a fundamental need for rational and moral unity with himself and the universe, then it will be impossible strictly to draw a line between the two spheres. There is a strong possibility—at the least—that a religion which cuts across this need for rational and moral unity, and produces an anxious and thwarted personality, is a false religion; and so Professor McKenzie says himself in his last chapter.

Thus the study of psychology has a direct bearing on the work of the theologian. There are, for example, certain forms of the substitutionary theory of the Atonement, which modern psychological

insights must make more obviously suspect than they were to previous generations. But we may ask whether there are not aspects of the objective theory, and even of the substitutionary theory of the Atonement, to which Professor McKenzie has hardly done justice.

In view of the growing interest in spiritual healing, special mention should be made of the author's views on this subject. He is a believer in the power of prayer, but is slightly apprehensive about spiritual healing as practised in the churches, where 'there often seems to be no attempt to find out what had caused the symptoms of which the sufferer complains'. This gives a hint to which all spiritual healers should pay attention. There must be the fullest possible co-operation with the doctors, and readiness to use the skill and the knowledge which science gives us, for this also is a gift of God to man. The removal of a symptom while the underlying cause remains, is always useless, and may be highly dangerous, and in cases of neurotic breakdown will usually be followed by the appearance of another symptom or the recurrence of the first.

One may however be allowed to believe that God's power to heal in answer to prayer is not limited by our powers of diagnosis, nor are we justified in thinking, as Professor McKenzie seems to imply on p. 153, that all the healings of Christian Science, or all the healings at Lourdes, are of persons whose organic disease is the result of some psychological illness. We simply do not know enough to say, nor should we limit God's answer to prayer to certain types of case.

We are grateful for the stimulus of this book, not only where we are in fullest agreement with it, but also in respect of these small points which we are inclined to question.

DAVID CAIRNS

Patterns of Protestant Church Music. By ROBERT M. STEVENSON. Duke University Press, 1953

THE book under consideration has been written for three significant groups of people, 'church musicians, many of whom serve in denominations with whose musical traditions they have not familiarised themselves . . . pastors and other religious leaders charged with promoting denominational interests' (p. v). The author has thus committed himself at the outset to an unusually difficult double task. He must address both the church musician who is theologically ill-informed and the theologian who is musically ill-informed. At the same time he intends 'to trace the differing musical traditions that have grown up in the various denominations' (p. v), a proposal which certainly demands that not only the musical and the theological but also the historical conditioning of the patterns of Protes-

tant church music be rigorously confronted. In short, the author's intention is, to say the very least, laudable; the task he has set himself, although formidable, greatly needs to be done. Mr Stevenson has unfortunately not done it.

The major patterns of Protestant church music obviously have their origins in and derive their substantial character from the historical experience of the sixteenth century. If we are really to understand and appreciate why the Reformers felt it necessary at all to discuss church music, we must know what contemporary Catholic theory and practice was; we must be told also whether contemporary Catholic opinion sanctioned that theory and practice. But Mr Stevenson ignores such crucial matter, with the result that Protestant musical patterns instead of emerging, as they did, from an historical and theological matrix of criticism and confusion as well Catholic as Protestant, appear to have been created in a vacuum. Hence, pastors and religious leaders, perhaps even Church musicians, may well wonder not only why Calvin should consider music in the church a problem, but also why Luther should have troubled so to praise it. Some sense of this sixteenth-century background is essential, particularly in a book designed for the general reader; Mr Stevenson definitely should not have omitted it.

'In greater or lesser degree than Zwingli, other leaders such as Carlstadt, Farel, Bucer, and Bullinger, not to mention Calvin (whose philosophy of church music we shall later treat separately), opposed organ playing and polyphonic singing in church' (pp. 3-4). Thus Mr Stevenson begins *and ends* his consideration of the above-mentioned Reformers. The decisive and provocative phrase 'in greater or lesser degree' is never once expanded or illuminated. Why, for example, should Carlstadt, a loyal, even a fanatical disciple of Luther, take such issue with his master on musical doctrine? Or why should Zwingli, of the three major Reformers the most accomplished musician, most completely exclude music from the Zürich liturgy? Mr Stevenson ignores the paradox as well as the problem. He is evidently unfamiliar with G. Weber's informative *H. Zwingli seine Stellung zur Musik und seine Lieder* (1884), or A. E. Cherbuliez's admirable article in *Zwingliana* (IV, 1926, pp. 353-77) on 'Zwingli, Zwick und der Kirchengesang' or even the brief but substantial chapter on Zwingli in P. A. Gaillard's *Loys Bourgeoys* (1948), fundamental studies all of which seek to lay bare and elucidate the important reasoning behind Zwingli's decision. As a result, the theological arguments leading to that decision, although indispensable, are dispensed with nonetheless, and the decision itself in Mr Stevenson's hands seems merely arbitrary, narrow-minded and undeservedly anti-æsthetic.

Furthermore, just as the Reformers were not of one mind on the role of music in the liturgy, so were they also of different minds in their reasoning on this problem, and evidence for such conflict of opinion is not lacking. Raymond Kendall's monumental work on the music of the Reformed church in Basel, for instance, although unpublished, is available to scholars, and had Mr Stevenson read it, he would perhaps not have created the distinctly erroneous impression that Reformed church music presents a united front in theory and in practice.

Beyond this, although Mr Stevenson quite properly stresses hymns, 'because of their first place in any order of Protestant worship' (p. v), he does not even mention such a peculiarly Protestant phenomenon as the Anabaptist *Ausbund*, an extraordinary hymnal compiled in the sixteenth century which still functions as the vital core of the musical life of Amish worship today. In the depth experience of that four-hundred-year tradition is truly a pattern of Protestant church music. Moreover, scholars such as John Umble and George Pullen Jackson have sufficiently investigated many specialised aspects of the *Ausbund* so that a synthetic outline of its tradition, transmission and significance is now not only possible, but urgently needed, especially for the general reader. One therefore particularly regrets that Mr Stevenson failed to take advantage of so considerable an opportunity.

There is then in the entire book only one chapter on Reformed church music, sub-titled 'The Basic Implications of Calvin's Philosophy of Church Music'. The inadequacy of Mr Stevenson's scholarship is perhaps most conspicuous at this point, for he seems to have read neither Marta Grau's *Calvins Stellung zur Kunst* (1917) nor Léon Wencelius' absolutely fundamental *L'Esthétique de Calvin* (1938). Had he done so, the chapter might have been less of a repetition of outmoded charges against Calvin. But as it stands, it is merely a depressingly pedestrian contribution to further misunderstanding of the Reformer.

Mr Stevenson notwithstanding, I venture to submit that Calvin cannot accurately be said even to have had a 'philosophy of church music'; he had rather a *theology of music*, and an extraordinarily penetrating one at that. For example, Mr Stevenson introduces the following passage from one of Calvin's commentaries on the Psalms: 'The Levites, under the law, were justified in making use of instrumental music in the worship of God. . . . But now when the clear light of the Gospel has dissipated the shadows of the law . . . it would be to act a foolish and mistaken part to imitate that which the prophet enjoined only upon those of his own time' (p. 15). Here Calvin understands instrumental music in two wholly separate ways,

theologically (it is conditioned by the Law) and historically (it was proper only in a given time.) But such implications, even as they exist in the passage above, not to speak of the numerous others in Calvin's commentaries and sermons, are not at all investigated. No attempt whatsoever is made to analyse, to explain, even to suggest the richness of Calvin's thinking on the subject of music. And too, what Calvin wrote on music, as also Luther, or Zwingli, or Carlstadt, belongs to a larger body of thought, and is conditioned by that body of thought and cannot be isolated from that body of thought without serious misunderstanding. Yet Mr Stevenson has done just that.

Finally, no importance is accorded to the acumen of Calvin's analysis of the purely emotional potentialities of music. He is conventionally compared to St. Augustine when Mr Stevenson cites the latter's celebrated passage (X, 33) from the *Confessions*. But Augustine, although he feared music, insisted nonetheless that it was essential to the liturgy, as for instance in the passage below, apparently unknown to Mr Stevenson: '*Quando autem non est tempus, cum in ecclesia fratres congregantur, sancta canendi, nisi cum legitur aut disputatur, aut antistes clara voce deprecatur, aut communis oratio voce diaconi indicitur?*' (Benedictine Edition, IV, 480). Now Calvin, because he *thought* about music (unlike Luther who was content largely to enthuse over it) realised, like St. Augustine, that it was on the one hand emotionally dangerous for man, but on the other hand, again like St. Augustine, that it was absolutely essential to man. His theology of music is, therefore, a profound attempt to mediate the conflict between these two points of view, as it is also, historically considered, a mean position between those of Luther and Zwingli: Not even the barest hint of the significance, perhaps even the uniqueness of this dramatic intellectual situation, appears in Mr Stevenson's chapter. The matter is blandly reduced to the following sentence: 'The crux of the issue lies here: Calvinism denied "the power of the Holy Ghost to inspire men afresh in the Praise of God" ' (p. 20).

Mr Stevenson walks on firmer ground in those chapters dealing with the late eighteenth, the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, chapters which discuss such figures as Dr Watts, the Wesleys, John Mason Neale and Ira D. Sankey. But as studies of individual men or as considerations of the development of Protestant church music in its historical and theological setting, these pages are a contribution neither to learning nor to error. The entire chapter on Handelian oratorio is tedious and irrelevant; the latter fact Mr Stevenson himself finally concedes when he asserts that Handel must be 'frankly recognised as no church composer' (p. 91). And yet, Handel did compose music specifically for the Church, notably the twelve

Chandos Anthems, and a serious attempt to understand and appraise them from a religious, possibly even a severely theological, point of view as they stand in the tradition of Anglican church music has yet to be made. Here again Mr Stevenson has missed a valuable opportunity, particularly since Erwin Voelsing's *G. F. Haendels Englische Kirchenmusik* (1940) is by no means the last word on the subject.

The three chapters given over to Bach would necessitate a separate critique. Suffice it to say here, then, that Mr Stevenson never once comes to grips with the really important and profoundly difficult theological and dogmatic problems of Bach's music, problems which, since Hans Besch made us aware of them in 1938, have become increasingly conspicuous in Bach scholarship. Mr Stevenson is content simply to rehearse the platitudes subsumed under the phrase 'Bach and the Lutheran tradition'.

Further criticism of the book is idle. Enough evidence has been adduced I hope, to indicate that Mr Stevenson's *Patterns of Protestant Church Music* is emphatically not recommended. But I hope, too, that some of the problems which must be studied and clarified have also been indicated. We need a full-scale exposition of Calvin's theology of music. We need special monographs or articles on such of the Reformers as Zwingli, Bucer, Farel and Carlstadt. We need a discussion of Luther's attitude toward music which strives for critical and evaluative balance rather than adulation. And together with such individual studies, we must have scholarship directed toward the determination of how changing historical and theological climates of opinion have influenced the patterns of Protestant church music in later centuries. Although immensely difficult, that is immensely rewarding research, and a research the importance of which cannot be overestimated. It is a great work to be done. One sincerely wishes that Mr Stevenson's book had been a step in that direction.

CHARLES GARSIDE

THE OLD TESTAMENT IN CONTROVERSY WITH THE JEWS

by The Rev. M. F. WILES

The extensive use of typology and allegory by the early Church is usually and rightly regarded as the Church's effective answer to Marcion's rejection of the Old Testament. It was also a part of her answer to the Jewish acceptance of the Old Testament. Controversy has a stimulating effect upon the development of new ideas, but it has in most cases also the disadvantage of fostering special pleading and unbalanced exaggerations. It seems worth trying to discover in what ways anti-Jewish controversy and the mere fact of the Jews' use and possession of the Old Testament affected the Church's understanding of it in the formative ante-Nicene period.

Professor Dodd has suggested that the New Testament gives evidence not only of declaratory preaching by early Christian missionaries but also of the use of a 'method of discussion, in which certain questions were propounded—questions arising unavoidably out of the *κήρυγμα*—and answers sought by a study of the Old Testament'.[1] This method would find its most natural and appropriate use in discussion with Jews, though it was by no means restricted entirely to that particular purpose. Such discussions continued through the second and third centuries, though we have only occasional glimpses of them, and they must have become much rarer as the dividing line between Jew and Christian became more firmly fixed. The actual dialogues that we have (which are mostly of a rather later date) are for the most part a purely literary device and do not represent real live discussion. The more characteristic form of literature is the direct anti-Judaic polemic or manual for the guidance of the ordinary Christian who lives in close contact with Jews. But these presuppose the existence of such discussion, and a consideration of the form that such discussions must have taken may help to bring out most clearly the sort of

[1] *According to the Scriptures*, p. 17.

pressure that was helping to determine the Christian use of the Old Testament.

Professor Dodd further suggests that we can see fairly clearly the questions that were usual in such discussions. Thus in Luke's summary of Christ's post-resurrection teaching (Luke 24.46, 47) and in Paul's address to Agrippa (Acts 26.21-23), the same three points recur: (1) that the Messiah is a suffering Messiah, (2) that the Messiah is to rise from the dead, and (3) that Salvation is to be proclaimed not only to the Jews but to the Gentiles.[1] The questions discussed in the period with which we are concerned are a clear development of this framework. 'That the Messiah is a suffering Messiah' retains its important place, though this is now usually not considered sufficient, and the issue at stake is more commonly that 'the Messiah is a crucified Messiah'. 'That the Messiah is risen from the dead' is still discussed but with considerably less frequency. 'That Salvation is to be proclaimed not only to the Jews but to the Gentiles' might still serve as a description of one of the most important fields of discussion, but with the rapid growth of the Church and its complete disassociation from Judaism the issue at stake has again undergone a shift of emphasis; in its developed form this third topic might be summarised as follows: 'that the Jews, according to what had been foretold, had departed from God . . . while the Christians had succeeded to their place . . . coming out of all nations and from the whole world.'[2] In addition to these three topics, must be added a further three closely interrelated subjects: the divinity, the pre-existence, and the virgin birth of the Messiah. It is natural that these issues should become subjects of discussion at a later stage, as they do not appear to have figured at the very beginning in the basic Christian *κήρυγμα*. There is of course, one further important subject of controversy—namely: 'Why do Christians not keep the Law?'—but this is a discussion of a rather different type and would require separate treatment. It is a primary issue as long as the discussions are in some sense discussions within a single Jewish-Christian unity; it becomes secondary when those discussions become discussions between two clearly separated entities.

[1] op. cit., pp. 16, 17.
[2] Cyprian: Introduction to Three Books of Testimonies against the Jews.

These then are the principal subjects of discussion, and we must now look at the form taken by such discussions. There are of course endless varieties, but we might set out a typical imaginary discussion in schematic form as follows:

Christian: Jesus is the Christ, of whom statements *XYZ* are true.

Jew: What is the Scriptural evidence for *XYZ* being true of the Messiah?

Christian: The evidence is provided by the following texts, *ABC*.

The Jew will then use one or more of the following lines of argument as are appropriate in the particular instance:

(1) The precise text you have quoted is incorrect or the meaning you have assigned to these words is not the correct meaning. The determination of the issue will then require textual or philological discussion.

(2) The words you have quoted are either a historical statement about person *D* or a prediction fulfilled by historical personage *E*. The determination of the issue will then require historical knowledge and a consideration of the context.

(3) The words that you have quoted may seem to have a fulfilment in Jesus, but the immediately surrounding context does not, and therefore whatever the correct interpretation of the passage it cannot refer to Jesus. The determination of the issue will then again require careful consideration of the context.

(4) The words that you have quoted may seem to have a fulfilment in Jesus, but there are other facts about Jesus which do not correspond with prophecy and other Messianic prophecies which have no fulfilment in Jesus. The argument will then require on the one hand the production of further appropriate testimonies and on the other hand an answer in terms of the two advents.

We must now try and trace the effect of these lines of argument on the general nature of the appeal to the Old Testament. The first step in the argument, the request of the Jew for specific Scriptural evidence, is sometimes expressed, but is more often implicit. This is significant. Christians and Jews were in basic agreement about the nature of the discussion and the sort of evidence for which they were looking. They

were at one in believing that at the very least some prophecies were of a specific rather than of a very general character. Thus Christians never object to being expected to produce evidence not merely for a suffering Messiah, but specifically for a crucified one. Nor do the Jews ever appear to retort that prophesies adduced by Christians are of so general a character that they could be applied just as plausibly to thousands of others as to Jesus. When this objection is brought forward by Celsus' imaginary Jew, Origen complains that it is not a line that would be taken by any real Jew in discussion.[1] A thoroughgoing Christological interpretation of the Old Testament is thus not so much a result of such discussions as a presupposition of their taking place at all. But this line of interpretation was greatly strengthened and developed by its use in discussion in which it was the accepted presupposition of both parties. The challenge to produce Scriptural evidence for such specific events as the cross or the virgin birth naturally led to some very forced exegesis. The less happy citations for the most part were ignored and not taken up into regular exegesis, but the majority of the texts quoted in evidence became standard not only for apologetics, but for Christian exegesis as a whole. Thus in discussion with Trypho, Justin sees foreshadowings of the Virgin birth in 'the stone cut without hands'[2] and in 'the one like unto a Son of man'[3] of the book of Daniel, but Hippolytus in his commentary on the book does not indulge in any such interpretations.[4] On the other hand, in answer to Trypho's request for specific evidence of the cross, he quotes first the story of the holding up of Moses' hands and Joshua's victory over the Amalekites. This interpretation of the passage appears first in Barnabas, and reappears with regularity, especially in anti-Judaic writings. Justin uses an ingenious argument to show that it is inadequate to interpret the story simply as a picture of prayer; this is presumably designed to forestall the obvious objection that Trypho might have been expected to raise.[5] This seems to have become so much the standard

[1] *Con. Cel.* 2.28. [2] Dan. 2.34-45. [3] Dan. 7.13.

[4] *Dial. Trypho.* 76.1. Hippolytus does interpret Dan. 2.34-45. Christologically as a picture of *Χρίστος ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐρχόμενος* (*Hipp. Dan.* 2.13). Tertullian quotes Dan. 7.13 very differently from Justin as evidence of the real humanity of Christ in a catena of anti-Valentinian texts (*Tert. De. Carne Christ.* 15).

[5] *Dial. Trypho.* 90.4.

interpretation of the passage, that when Origen wishes to interpret it of the consistent Christian life of prayer, he justifies himself in so doing by complaining that the interpretation in terms of the cross has become somewhat hackneyed.[1] Thus while some of the interpretations of Old Testament texts produced in the course of controversy failed to establish themselves, others became the commonly accepted interpretation, even though not the most natural interpretation of the passage in question.

We pass now to the first suggested line of argument brought forward by the Jewish disputant. In this phase of the discussions the Christians, as is well known, do not as a rule cut a very impressive figure. For the most part they are content to accept the LXX unquestioningly, without reference to the Hebrew or even any other Greek version. Justin goes even beyond this and accuses the Jews of excising inconvenient texts.[2] The charge does not seem well-founded, in fact the evidence points rather in the opposite direction. Christian apologists used not merely the LXX, but for certain texts at least a Christianised version of it. Some of the additions and alterations to these texts appear to have been originally Christian interpretations, which have then made their way into the accepted Christian text. They are in fact a natural outcome of the determination to find convincing evidence of every aspect of Christian truth in the Old Testament Scriptures. To this general rule of a complete lack of textual sense or concern, Origen provides an honourable exception. He was fully prepared to use Aquila's and other variant versions of the Old Testament, and even studied Hebrew for the furtherance of his textual studies. This was quite exceptional, and the determination to prosecute such studies would appear to have been influenced by his participation in controversies with Jews. Thus in meeting the Jewish assertion that Isa. 7.14 refers not to a virgin but to a young married woman, he is, unlike Justin, in a position to discuss the relevant Hebrew evidence. This represents an advance, but a very limited one, for the Hebrew evidence that Origen cites in support of his case is given at second hand and is in fact incorrect.[3]

We come, therefore, to the second type of discussion, namely

[1] *Hom. in Lib. Reg.* 1.9. [2] *Dial. Trypho.* 72, 73. [3] *Con. Cel.* 1.34.

the attempt by Jews to apply the sayings, which Christians claimed to be prophecies of Jesus, to specific historical figures. This type of discussion is, of course not exclusive of that already discussed. Thus in his discussion of the true interpretation of Isa. 7.14, Justin accuses Jewish teachers of trying first to deny the obvious meaning of awkward texts and then of trying to apply them to some chosen historical figure—in this case Hezekiah.[1] The Christian answer to this type of claim may follow one of two similar, but distinguishable, lines. On the one hand it may be claimed on direct historical grounds that the application of the words in question to the chosen historical person is impossible. Thus it might have been pointed out that Hezekiah was already nine years old at the time of Ahaz coming to the throne, and the words are therefore inapplicable to him. Such a line of discussion might have tended to promote serious historical research, but it is perhaps significant that the instance given is drawn from a twentieth century rather than a second century writer.[2] This directly historical line of argument was in fact only employed in the simplest cases, where direct application of the words (once the Christian sense of them has been agreed) is palpably absurd. There are two examples of this kind of discussion in embryo in the New Testament itself. In Acts 2.25-31 and 13.35-37, it is shown to be absurd to apply Ps. 16.10 in a resurrection sense to David, and in Heb. 3.7-4.11, assuming the Davidic authorship of Ps. 95, it is shown to be absurd to apply a rest which is spoken of as future to the entry into the promised land under Joshua.[3] More often, however, the argument does not turn upon the direct historical suitability of the crucial words themselves, but on the applicability of the whole context. Thus the main line of Christian argument in defence of their interpretation of the Isaianic passage as referring to a virgin birth is that it is the fact that the birth is to take place without sexual intercourse that constitutes the sign; if the birth is not intended to be a virgin birth then there is no sign and the whole passage loses its point. This sort of discussion does therefore have the healthy result of moving attention away from the particular words under immediate con-

[1] *Dial. Trypho.* 68.7. [2] A. Lukyn Williams, *Christian Evidences*, p. 189.

[3] It is interesting to note that according to Origen, psalms 89-100 were attributed by the Jews to Moses, in which case the argument of Hebrews falls to the ground (*P.G.* XII, 1056 B-1057 C).

sideration to the wider context of the passage as a whole. Professor Dodd has argued in his *According to the Scriptures* that the appeal in the New Testament is to whole contexts rather than to particular proof texts. It seems possible that he has over-stated his case, but that would take us beyond the scope of the present article. In any event he admits that the proof-text kind of argument 'was freely used by Christian apologists at a somewhat later period'.[1] If the argument of his book be accepted, the result of these discussions as forcing the consideration of whole contexts represents a healthy reversion to the truth of primitive Christian insights. But the appeal to the context as a whole was, of course, made not only in the Christian but also in the Jewish interest, so that our second and third types of discussion on occasions coalesce as thrust and counterthrust of a single argument. This may be further illustrated from the passage already under discussion. Thus the following two arguments are brought forward by Jewish controversialists. Jesus, whether virgin-born or not, was not called Immanuel nor was He a warrior despoiling the kingdom of the Assyrians. To the first objection, Christian writers pointed out that Immanuel, if not Christ's name, is in its meaning of 'God with us' an excellent expression of Christian faith in Christ. The second objection is met by pointing out that the spoiling of Assyria is apparently to be accomplished by an infant, and can therefore hardly be intended to be interpreted literally. It therefore has its fulfilment in the offerings of the Magi. At a later stage this interpretation is regarded not merely as a support for the Christian interpretation of Isa. 7.14, but as providing an independent testimony in its own right for use against the Jews.[2] Two results, then, of this type of discussion are an ever increasing range of new testimonies and a widening use of figurative interpretations. Christians therefore adopted the position that some prophecies were intended literally and others figuratively, a position which allowed them a conveniently free hand in discussion. Isa. 7.14 and 8.4 are quoted by Tertullian as illustrations of literal and figurative prophecies respectively.[3] The drawing of the line between the two varies with different writers. Thus in the passage just quoted Tertullian insists that 'very many of the words can only be taken in a

[1] op. cit., p. 127. [2] Athanasius, *De. Inc.* 33.44. [3] *De. Res. Carn.* 20.

pure and simple signification, and free from all allegorical obscurity', whereas Origen is more inclined to regard the literal prophecy as the exception.[1] The difference is one of degree only and characteristic of the two writers.

An interesting example of the extent to which a Christian interpreter may adopt the figurative interpretation under pressure of Jewish objections to the more usual literal interpretation is provided by Origen's treatment of the Zech. 9.9 prophecy. Origen, of course, never needs much pressure in order to adopt figurative interpretations. None the less the argument he uses in this case is of interest. Those, he claims, who think that Zechariah's prophecy of the ass and its fulfilment in Matthew are to be understood in a purely literal sense, lay themselves open to the contemptuous objections of Jews, who then have a perfect right to ask how Jesus fulfilled the cutting off of the chariot from Ephraim and the horse from Jerusalem, of which the following verse speaks. Origen apparently would not be content to accept the answer that verse 9 is to be interpreted literally and verse 10 figuratively; if verse 10 is to be understood figuratively, the whole passage must be capable of a consistent figurative interpretation. He would not, however, regard such a consistent figurative interpretation as excluding the literal; the same passage may have more than one interpretation, but alternation of the manner of exegesis from verse to verse is inadmissible and dangerous apologetically.[2] The position here adopted by Origen that there is a figurative and a literal interpretation of the same passage was primarily determined by and employed in the general work of exegesis. But he clearly felt it also to be of value in covering up some of the weaknesses of the traditional Christian position in controversy with Jews. On the other hand the traditional appeal was far more direct and likely to be effective in argument, and Origen is perfectly prepared to use it. Thus in answer to a taunt of Celsus' Jew about Jesus' drinking of the vinegar, Origen claims that the real explanation of the event lies in its particular allegorical interpretation, but that for the present purpose he will answer it at a simpler level. He then employs the traditional method of asking to what historical figure other than Christ the words of Ps. 69 can be applied.[3]

[1] *Con. Cel.* 1.50. [2] Or., *Com. Jn.* 10.17. [3] *Con. Cel.* 2.37.

In the long run, however, the recognition of various levels of interpretation, all of which are admissible, was bound to blunt the cutting edge of this aspect of Christian apologetic. The original Christian argument was: 'this cannot refer to David or Solomon, it does refer to Christ.' In its later form, it becomes: 'this has an immediate historical reference to David or Solomon, but that does not exhaust its meaning or its purpose in the dispensation of the Holy Spirit; its fulfilment at the deepest level is to be found in Christ.' This is no doubt a more satisfactory statement to our modern susceptibilities, but it is not likely to be so effective a one in public controversy. There is a real difference between the two approaches, but the later does represent a development rather than a reversal of the earlier. Thus it was often because of the idealistic note present, for example, in the kingly psalms that they were felt to be inapplicable to any particular king. Then when a historical reference is admitted it is this same element which is felt to require a deeper fulfilment. In so far as such psalms may have been originally designed to picture the ideal king, this aspect of the Christian argument, even in its earliest form, has a comparatively sound basis.

The fourth type of discussion needs little comment. It was obvious that Jewish controversialists should claim that the humility of Christ corresponded very feebly with the grandeur depicted by Old Testament prophecy. It was equally obvious that this objection should be met by the Christian claim that the prophecies speak of two distinct advents of Christ. Tertullian, in fact, regards the failure of Jews to recognise the foretelling of the two advents as the fundamental source of their going astray, and other writers ascribe an almost equal importance to this failure.[1] The attempts by Christian writers to find clear Old Testament evidence for two distinct advents are far-fetched and unconvincing. Texts, which by virtue of their content, were naturally ascribed to the second advent are in no way clearly distinguishable from those applicable to the first advent. This fact is even claimed by one writer as showing the excellency of prophecy and its superiority to the reasoned conjectures of wise men about the future.[2] It is also inevitable

[1] Tert., *Adv. Jud.* 14; *Apologetic*, 21. Cf. Or., *Con. Cel.* 1.56, 2.29, Lact., *Div. Inst.* 4.16. [2] *Rec. Clem.* 1.49.

that there are some texts which Christians were uncertain whether to apply to the first or second advent of Christ.[1] Thus the Christian appeal to the second advent was an effective weapon in controversy, but unsatisfactory in the detail of its application. The evidence, however, does not suggest that the belief was invented or maintained either solely or primarily for the sake of its use in apologetic. There were sufficient clear statements of the belief within the New Testament itself to assure its prevalence irrespective of its use for this purpose.

So far, we have been trying to see the typical form of argument or discussion employed in controversy with Jews, and the examples that have been chosen have been selected not so much as being representative of the main issues discussed but rather as exhibiting most clearly the underlying form of the discussions. It would take too long to set out the content of the discussions in all the main subjects of controversy. It is, however, of interest to note those subjects which appear to have been regarded of most importance from the Jewish side. There are few clear traces in Jewish sources of these controversies during the early centuries of the Christian era. Such evidence as there is shows virtually no trace of the discussion of such particular topics as the virgin birth, the crucifixion and the resurrection. The main issues at stake appear to have been the divinity of Jesus and the Christian claim to be the true Israel of God. Even the divinity of Jesus seems to have been countered indirectly by a strong assertion of the unity of God, rather than met with a direct refutation. Christian attempts to find the divinity of Jesus and even a full trinitarian doctrine in the Old Testament were many and varied; the use of the plural form for the title of God, of the plural form for adjectives or verbs applied to God, of repetitions of the word Lord in a single context were all pressed into service; the theophanies of the Old Testament stories were understood of Christ and interpreted as pre-incarnate visitations of the Son of God to the world. The most frequently repeated text, the test case of

[1] This is true within the New Testament itself e.g. Zech. 12.10 in John 19.37 and Rev. 1.7. Cf. also Dan. 7.13, which is normally used as a testimony of the second advent, but is used also (Lact., *Div. Inst.* 4.21) as a testimony of the ascension. There also appears to have been a certain hesitancy as to whether Elijah was to be forerunner of the first or second advent; the answer of the fathers is that there was to be a forerunner of the first advent in the spirit and power of Elijah and of the second in the person of Elijah (Justin, *Dial. Trypho.* 49).

the whole discussion was Gen. 1.26 with its plural form 'Let us make man after our own image'. The Jewish answer (as so often in these controversies) appealed to the context, pointing to the use of the singular verb in verse 27 and suggested its own interpretation in terms of God addressing the angels. But for the most part the Jews were content to rest their case with a massive simplicity upon the unity of God, as expressed, for example, in Isa. 44.6. As a result, Jewish exegesis was the more satisfactory on the whole, despite the difficulty presented by the theophanies for an uncompromisingly monotheistic interpretation of the Old Testament. But while being the more satisfactory exegesis, it fell short of an adequate answer to the Christian claims at their best; in so far as Christian exegetes were genuinely trinitarian rather than tritheistic, the Jewish answer countered only their weaker arguments and left their fundamental position intact. But the arguments, though countered were not destroyed; they remained in use and exercised an immense influence on later Old Testament exegesis.[1]

The person of Jesus then may be regarded as the most important topic during the period under review. At first the issue takes the form of whether Jesus is Messiah; then it develops into a consideration of the divinity of Jesus, until in its finally developed form the issue at stake is the doctrine of the Trinity itself. The root subject is the same throughout, the precise form that it takes keeping pace with the development of Christian theology. Thus in the *Apologeticus*, Tertullian declares that Christians are in agreement with the Jews concerning God, but differ from them about the Messiahship and divinity of Jesus, while elsewhere he declares that the substance of the Jewish faith as over against the Christian is so to believe in one God as to exclude the Son and the Spirit.[2] Although in one case the difference is treated formally outside the doctrine

[1] e.g. The Trinitarian interpretation of Gen. 1.26 is wholeheartedly accepted by Wordsworth in his Commentary in loc. (1866). For more recent writers, cf. Wilhelm Vischer on Jacob's wrestling 'without the slightest contradiction this man was not an angel, but our Lord Jesus, who is the eternal God and yet was to become a man whom the Jews would crucify' (cited by H. H. Rowley, *Unity of the Bible*, p. 19, n.). Also Knight, *A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity*, p. 28: 'It was the Holy Spirit that led the Hebrews to think in terms of angels, even if angels are but a parable of the truth that lies behind them; for the truth that lies behind them is that God is indeed a communion within Himself, an organism, a Trinity.'

[2] Tert., *Apologetic.* 21, *Adv. Prax.* 31.

of God and in the other case inside, there is no material difference between the two statements. Both place the root of the difference in differing beliefs about the person of Jesus—an assessment which we have seen to be borne out by the evidence of the subjects discussed.

This then was the main issue, and the second follows from it and is of almost equal prominence and significance. If Jesus be the true Messiah, rejected by the Jews but accepted by the Christians, then the Christians are by that fact constituted the true Israel of God. It is from there but a small step to regard the Christian church as the heirs of all who have played a creditable part in the history of the preparation for the coming of the Messiah, and the Jews as the heirs of all those who have opposed that preparation at any stage. This process is thrown back as far as Cain and Abel[3]; the traditional motif of the goodness of the younger son in contrast to the elder lent itself easily to interpretation in terms of the superiority of the 'younger' religion of Christianity as against Judaism. The concept of youth or novelty, however, was not one to recommend a religion either to Roman or to Jew, so that the argument is more often turned to show that the Christian is the true inheritor of Jewish history and the ancient Jewish scriptures. The importance of the issue from the Jewish angle may be illustrated by the development of the concept of the oral law as the distinguishing mark of Israel, which appears to be one way in which this Christian claim was met.

The fruits of this type of argument in Christian exegesis have once again to be regarded as unfortunate. Dr Parkes describes it as representing a complete falsification of Jewish history, and this is hardly too strong a description of the extremer forms of its application.[4] By interpreting all the denunciations of the Old Testament as applying to the Jews as a race, it helped to keep the fires of anti-Jewish prejudice burning in the centuries after the first and inevitably bitter clash was over. Furthermore by providing a scapegoat, to whom all such passages could be applied, it would tend to hold Christians back from the salutary process of making such application to themselves. Origen gets over this difficulty to some degree by his readiness to give several interpretations of a single passage, but his works

[1] Tert., *Adv. Jud.* 5. [2] *Conflict of Church and Synagogue*, pp. 96 ff.

show clearly that there was a difficulty to be got over. Thus in commenting on Gen. 25.23, which is the key text of this line of argument, he accepts the application to synagogue and church but does not discuss it as it is 'valde omnibus trita'; he then continues rather tentatively 'Illud, si placeat, addamus, quod unumquemque nostrum, qui haec audit, aedificare et instruere queat. Ego puto, quod et de singulis nobis hoc dici potest, quia duae gentes et duo populi intra nos sunt.'[1]

We have seen throughout this study how texts first pressed into service in the cause of anti-Jewish controversy then proceed to spill over into and to become formative of normal exegesis. The climax of this process may be seen in the way in which these same testimony texts were employed in the determination of Christian doctrine. The testimonies are not regarded as rough analogies or dim foreshadowings of the truths exemplified in Christ, but as precise descriptions so that the exact form of the prophecy is legitimate evidence of the exact form of the fulfilment. The transition was easily made, because precise forms of doctrinal belief were worked out in the process of controversy with heretical beliefs; and those deviations, which we regard as Christian heresies, were not always regarded as a completely different category from the errors of Judaism. Thus the controversies with the heretics and the controversies with the Jews can be regarded in a very loose sense as two parts of a single battle for the truth. It is true that the New Testament is normally regarded as the more conclusive weapon in this phase of the struggle, but the use made of the Old Testament is still considerable. Many of the commonest testimony texts are used in this way. Thus Gen. 1.26, 19.24; Ps. 2.7, 8, 110.1 and Isa. 45.1 are quoted as evidence of the 'secondariness' of the Son[2]; Gen. 49.11 of the relation of the two natures in Christ[3]; Ps. 45.7 of the preexistence of the human soul of Christ[4]; Isa. 7.14 of Christ's birth being of the substance of the virgin Mary.[5] All these texts are in the first rank as stock testimonies. But the extent to which the principle of this kind of use of the Old Testament is accepted may best be illustrated from the Arian controversy. Prov. 8.22, a well-established testimony text, was one of the

[1] *Hom. in Gen.* 12.1. [2] *Nov. De Trin.* 26. [3] *Nov. De Trin.* 21.
[4] Or., *De Princ.* II. 6.4, 6: IV. 1.31. [5] Tert., *De Carn. Christ.* 21.

corner stones of the Arian system. Athanasius goes to great length to show that Arius has misinterpreted the text, but it never occurs to him to suggest that the text is irrelevant to the determination of the issue at stake. Although it is a text that clearly fits the Arian system better than his own, he accepts it as a legitimate test and indulges in the most complex, and at times inconsistent, exegesis to avoid the Arian implications.[1] On the positive side, he finds support for his own cause not only in the immediate context where the wording of Prov. 8.25 is kinder to his Christology, but also in the counter-use of well established testimony texts, such as Ps. 2.7, 45.1 and 110.3, which last text plays a part in his own Christology almost comparable to that played by Prov. 8.22 in the Christology of Arius. So firmly indeed did this method of exegesis lay hold upon the Christian mind that in the middle of the fourth century, a council meeting for the determination of Christological doctrine goes to the length of pronouncing specific anathemas on those who do not accept the standard Christological interpretation of certain well-established testimony texts.[2]

In summary, it seems clear that anti-Jewish controversy was a considerable stimulus to the study of the Old Testament. Unfortunately the particular direction imparted by that stimulus cannot be regarded as having been healthy either for the life or the theology of the Church.[3] Nor is its legacy yet departed from us.

[1] Ath. Or., *Adv. Ar.* 2.18-82; for his inconsistency compare sections 44 and 78.

[2] Council of Sirmium: Anathemas 14-17. The texts in question are Gen. 1.26, the appearance to Abraham Gen. 18 , the wrestling with Jacob (Gen. 32) and Gen. 19.24.

[3] Cf. the judgment of Dr Parkes in: H. Loewe, *Judaism and Christianity*, p. 142. He allows to this stimulus one good result—a more accurate knowledge of the text than would in all probability have been our lot without it.

THE DARK AGES AND TWENTIETH CENTURY AFRICA

A Comparison in Churchmanship

by The Rev. W. V. STONE

I

Bishop Stephen Neill, in his Survey of the Training of the Ministry in Africa, writes as follows: 'I could not but feel profound sympathy with the African student who remarked: "It seems to me that missionaries are much too hard in their judgments on the African Churches. Did you never have a period of struggle in your own Churches?" Indeed we did. In that moment I suddenly saw that, for the African Churches in their contemporary struggle, the most important period is the one that ordinarily we never teach them in detail, the Dark Ages. . . . They wrestle with precisely the same difficulties and are called to find anew the way out of the twilight of the coexistence of the old and new into a more genuinely Christian life and social order.'

Is Bishop Neill right? Is the Church in Africa faced with 'precisely the same difficulties' as the Church of the Dark Ages? There are wide local divergencies in the situation, both in the Dark Ages and in the Africa of today. But we may claim that in sixth century Gaul we find represented very characteristically what we understand by the 'Dark Ages', and that underneath all the divergencies in Africa there lie the same problems. And there are striking similarities in the two situations.

When Gregory of Tours wrote the *History of the Franks*, which forms the basis for our conclusions, Gaul had been under the domination of the Franks for about 75 years. They had been originally heathen, but in 496 their king Clovis was baptised, together with 'of his army more than 3000'. He seems to have exerted no pressure on his people to follow his example: nonetheless one gains the impression that by Gregory's time

Christianity had won absolute ascendancy among the Frankish nobility. On the other hand one gathers from one or two passages that deep in the countryside some of the original inhabitants were still worshipping heathen gods and practising heathen rites. There seem to have been spots to which the Church had not yet penetrated. In addition the Christianity of the large majority amounted to no more than a renunciation of their old gods in favour of the Trinity: it had no influence on their morals, and even their relationship with the spiritual continued to follow the pattern of superstition and magic.

To this situation there are striking parallels in the Central Africa of today. Christianity first burst on those parts 50 to 80 years ago. After initial difficulties it quickly established itself as the one true religion. In the Mission Field which I know best it now has no serious rival either at the chief's court or among the people; though it must be admitted that because of the Church's insistence on monogamy and total abstinence from alcohol nearly all the rulers and their hereditary counsellors are technically outside the fold. But there are survivals of rank heathenism, not so much in pockets as in the outlying areas which have been less thoroughly evangelised. In addition the belief in witchcraft and magic holds almost undisputed sway over the whole area.

But there is one factor in the African situation which has no parallel in the sixth century: the position of the white man. He belongs to a totally different and far superior civilisation, which he is in process of imposing on Africa, thereby radically altering the social, economic, political and cultural environment in which the African lives. It might be thought that such a tremendous development might by itself invalidate any parallel with the sixth century. But we must remember the great strength of African conservatism. What matters primarily for the purposes of this study are the thought-forms, the unspoken assumptions by which people live: and these, one feels, will not be affected by European civilisation nearly as quickly as the Africans' outward lives. But just in this respect there is one important difference between the sixth century *Church* and present-day Africa: Gregory and his colleagues shared in all essentials the background and the outlook on life of their flock.

The modern missionary in Africa does not. His way of thinking is radically different from that of the African. As a result the African Church must be described as an amalgam. Its leaders look Janus-like in two directions at once: they look back to the traditions of the missionary's home Church as interpreted to them by the missionary; and they also look back into the African past, so thoroughly understood, but so little help on the narrow steep upward road. And this African background is, as we have seen, in some ways strikingly similar to that of the sixth century.

II

Let us now examine how the Church in Gregory's time responded to the challenge of its surroundings.

Its greatest weakness was due to the anarchic conditions in the country: it was unable to exercise any proper discipline over its members. Gregory's pages are full of accounts of adultery, violence, even murder, against which the Church was powerless to take any action. This weakness was the direct outcome of sixth century social conditions, where every crime could be compounded for, and only those without means felt the terrible harshness of such law as was administered. Such lawlessness was bound to bring in its train a deficient sense of sin: and indeed there is practically no reference in Gregory's pages to repentance as opposed to formal 'penitence'.

As one watches Gregory's struggle for the higher things of life against such fearful odds one realises that there must have been mighty forces upholding him, and preventing his sliding into the morass. In the first place we may notice the position of the Church in society: 'Above the low structure of Merovingian society the Church rose as the mass of a great ecclesiastical building dominates a straggling town. It stood as a symbol of order and stability, the one fabric claiming foundation upon the rock, the one institution to which all men looked for support when other props of civilisation seemed to be giving way around them.'[1] Gregory knew himself to be a member of the Una Sancta, the company of the faithful of all ages. He was deeply conscious of the tradition which was handed down

[1] O. M. Dalton, Introduction to Gregory of Tours' *History of the Franks*, p. 260 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1927).

from the Fathers, particularly through the 'Holy Martin', bishop of Tours, of whom he was the unworthy heir. This tradition was embodied in the continuity of the One Catholic Church, and of the Christian faith. For Gregory the faith was part of the tradition. It was the body of doctrine handed down once for all by the Apostles and fathers, whose preservation intact was vital for the continuity of the Church. Gregory did not understand faith in its New Testament sense of a relationship with God: it had become for him a set of doctrines guaranteeing, so to speak, the intellectual framework of his Church. The acceptance of this framework linked the sixth century Church to its glorious past and ensured its preservation for the future. For this reason nothing roused Gregory's wrath as much as heresy and schism. He who records without comment the grossest breaches of the moral law never missed an opportunity of engaging in quarrelsome arguments with Arians. The sixth century Church also rendered important and much appreciated social service. It fed the hungry and looked after the widows and the fatherless as far as it could: particularly it attempted to protect the poor against their oppressors. To be employed by the Church or even just to live on its land was liable to bring a man important privileges.

All that we have mentioned so far would not, in Gregory's eyes, constitute the real strength of his Church. Nor would his lawless contemporaries have held the Church in almost superstitious awe because of it. There was in the sixth century Church another element, by which alone it authenticated itself to its age as an invincible, awe-inspiring society: it was the medium of supernatural events. Gregory's pages abound with stories of miracles of one kind or another, and if we are to understand the Church of the Dark Ages we must try and see their significance. Nearly all of them followed a certain pattern. They occurred to or through persons of a certain type, i.e. saints, living or dead. The most frequently recorded miracles are acts of healing. Of every saintly person whose death Gregory records he writes, as of Patroclus, 'often he would heal by prayer persons suffering from fever, pustules or other affections'. But the well-known dead saint was even more likely to effect cures. Gregory on a certain occasion records as a matter of course of St. Martin of Tours that 'his power had

but the day before made crippled limbs straight'. Such examples could be multiplied from Gregory's book *ad infinitum*. But they do not exhaust the miracles recorded. Should a man get into trouble with the law, for example, then a 'man magnificent in holiness' would often, if necessary with supernatural sanction, bring about the deliverance of the prisoner. In the same manner saints' Churches provided a sanctuary for the criminal and the enemy, which was very rarely violated; any violation was regarded with horror, and supernatural retribution was always quickly apparent, to Gregory at any rate. Finally the Church in those days acquired, through bequests to its saints, much landed property, which it could never have preserved against the rapacious nobles, had it not been generally believed that saints departed this life had supernatural powers which they exercised in the present.

Who then were the saints? It is apparent from Gregory's pages that they were men and women who in response to a call from the Lord 'abandoned the world's service' and passed through a stern self-denying discipline of prayer, fasting and a study of the Scriptures. If they persevered on this course long enough they became the bearers of the Lord's power and His irrefutable witnesses in the ways we have described.

As one reflects on this, to my mind, crucially important aspect of that Church's life, one is left with two impressions. One is the awareness of the danger of corruption. Even in Gregory's day the activities of the saints seem to have pushed into the background any appreciation of the work of Christ. For example, while Gregory is orthodox in stating of Aredius that 'the Lord wrought miracles by his hands', he goes on to add 'through the power of the blessed martyr Julian and the blessed confessor Martin'.[1] The Church was in fact in danger of losing sight of its Lord. God once more became remote, and His place was increasingly usurped in the popular imagination by those who were but His instruments.

But the other impression is far stronger: it is that in the activities and events here recorded we are in truth face to face with the power of God. The Church lived in an uncivilised and superstitious age. It shared its background and beliefs. *But it baptised those beliefs.* Therein lies the decisive significance

[1] *History of the Franks*, 10.28.

of the saints. Their activities became the focal points for the awe of the supernatural which is so profound a characteristic of unsophisticated man: and their activities were known to take place within the framework of the Church, and to stem from their special relationship with the Lord of the Church.

III

Before we study the reaction of the Church in Central Africa to its somewhat similar surroundings let us remind ourselves of the complicating factor in the situation: that the Church is an amalgam. It has a double background: the Protestantism of the European missionary, and the heathen past of its members. In addition the twentieth century is separated from the sixth by the Reformation: the tradition handed down to today's African Minister is different from that of his sixth century predecessor. Thus we must give some account, however insufficient, of the change in thought and outlook that the Reformation brought about. It repudiated much of the development in the preceding centuries and rediscovered some of the greatest Gospel truths. It stressed again that Jesus Christ is the only Mediator between God and man, and that man, without further mediation by either Mother Church or 'blessed martyrs and confessors', is justified by faith alone in Him. And faith meant once again the response of trust and humility to God's initiative. Thus the characteristic Protestant witness to the power of God takes the form of response to His offer of salvation, by laying hold of, or rather being apprehended by, His grace for both justification and sanctification and for the 'good works which God hath ordained that we should walk in them' (Eph. 2.10). And the Reformation asserted that this way was for everyman, that no special 'higher way' was needed to find salvation and eternal life. Hand in hand with these great gains we must record one grievous loss. In his titanic struggle with the papacy Luther attacked the importance of the visible Church. He held that 'a spiritual unity . . . is of itself sufficient to make a Church',[1] so that those who accepted the Reformation were not aware of gross sin when they failed to reorganise the reformed Church into a visible unity: and thus the Gospel has been taken across the seas by representatives of

[1] See Lesslie Newbigin, *The Household of God*, pp. 55 ff.

different Protestant organisations disagreeing with one another on one or two points of doctrine and on Church order, and incapable of teaching the full meaning of unity in Christ because of unrepented sin in their midst. The situation is of course further complicated by the activities of Roman Catholic missions: but this problem cannot be touched on in this article.

One other factor must be taken into account: along with the Gospel message Protestant missionaries proclaimed the virtues of 'Christian, Western education and medicine, of the whole Western way of life. Consciously or unconsciously they came as apostles of a whole civilisation. But neither this civilisation nor education and scientific medicine, divinely-ordained good works though these are, are in themselves witnesses to the power of God. Thus stress laid on them often means loss of emphasis on the divine initiative. There is thus often in the 'Western background' of the African Churchman of today a lack of appreciation of the supernatural.

On the other side his fellow-countrymen are largely illiterate. Their religious ideas are primitive, their moral standards are prescribed for them by tribal custom and are therefore not seen to be valid beyond the tribe. There is in their vocabulary no distinction between 'mistake' and 'sin'. He has shared with them from childhood a belief in all sorts of principalities and powers, particularly the deceased ancestors of the tribe and the evil powers of magic conveyed by spells and charms. What can he make of it all?

1. It would be surprising if the Churches brought into being as a result of Protestant Missions really reflected the outlook of their mother Churches: and indeed this is not so. Instead we find some quite striking resemblances to the attitude of the sixth century Church. Thus tradition is again held to be of the greatest importance, both in doctrine and in Church government. And we must note that many have no more profound grasp of the great doctrines of the Reformation than Gregory had of St. Paul's. In addition there is now, alas, no longer a Una Sancta to look to and preserve, but a multiplicity of Protestant Churches. The results are sometimes regrettable. Thus all the conviction and earnestness that made Gregory so uncompromising an opponent of the Arians are sometimes

poured into discussions with a Church that is less rigorously teetotal, or that just has a different form of Church government. Differences in practice which by now are regarded as trivial by most missionaries tend to be strenuously upheld by African Churches. And behind this denominationalism there lies a more sinister influence: the boundaries of a denominational Church tend to coincide with those of a tribe, so that there is grave danger of the old African tribalism reasserting itself through the multiplicity of Protestant Churches. This danger is most clearly seen where different traditions (and tribes) meet, as in the Copperbelt or on the Rand. On the other hand we must note the real strength and stability imparted to a Church through 'tradition', i.e. its connexion with an old-established Western Church. It ensures that the Church remains within the main stream of Christianity, and is furnished with weapons in its ceaseless fight with sub-Christian and heretical movements. The other great weapon of today's African Church is one that was lost in the sixth century: discipline. The Church can enforce a standard of behaviour on its members—at least in those parts of Africa that I am acquainted with. True, this standard does not go much beyond monogamy and abstinence from alcohol, but it does mark the Church off from the surrounding pagan community and thus enable it to become the vehicle of a higher way of life. The Church also holds an honoured place in the community on account of its association with all the social service that the Missions render. It is seen to be in the vanguard of African progress, and can connect such progress with the Christian qualities it values, particularly sobriety. Thus it would seem that, apart from its unhappy divisions, the African Church is if anything in a stronger position than Gregory's to lead the way out of the 'twilight' into a more genuinely Christian life and social order.

But we saw that the sixth century Church could have achieved nothing whatever had it not borne incontrovertible proofs of the power of God. I am convinced that in the Africa of today, with its primitive background and its enormous strains and stresses, nothing less will endure. By only one question can the life of the Church be truly assessed: *Does it convey to men a sense of the presence and the power of God?*

Let us first note that a sense of the supernatural is nothing

new to the African. 'Far from being a materialist, the largest and most powerful realities in his life are those of the spirit. The Bantu world is full of the things that are spirit.'[1] To give just one example: 'spiritual' factors are considered much more relevant than physical in the causation of disease. The most developed spiritual presences in the African's life were his deceased ancestors, who used to be consulted as though they were still living, who were held to keep a watchful eye on the life of the present members of the tribe and to express their disapproval by the sending of calamities. All the African tribes had a word for God, but according to Dr Hetherwick they did 'not in any way associate the idea of personality with their conception of God'.[2] Finally we must remember that the 'spiritual' in the shape of omens, dreams, and the hidden magical properties of almost anything presses in on the African from every side.

Where the Church is strong the chief effect of Christianity on the spiritual world of the African seems to be the removal of all outward signs of communication with the ancestors. This result is due, not only to the Church's teaching, but to the impact of the whole of Western civilisation. 'The ancestral spirits and their cults have dwindled away in the City, driven out by the new spirits of secularism, industrialism and Western individualism' writes Dr Sundkler of South Africa.[3]

On the positive side God has become more personal. An African Minister once said to me: 'I can still point out to you the tree where God spoke to me.' It was actually a senior Minister who had at the place presented to him the call to the Ministry, but this man realised that it was indeed God who was calling him. This is the clearest example of a consciousness of God's presence that I have come across. In addition dreams, always regarded by the Africans as signals from the spirit world, sometimes take on a somewhat Christian connotation. One man in my acquaintance was warned in a dream against entering into polygamy; and I know of several who dreamt of themselves receiving some exalted position, a dream which they considered fulfilled when years afterwards they were

[1] Hetherwick, *The Gospel and the African*, p. 72 (T. & T. Clark, 1932).
[2] ibid., p. 70.
[3] *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, p. 261 (Lutterworth Press, 1948).

elected elders of the Church. The significance of such dreams lies in the fact that in the consciousness of the dreamer the unseen world begins to be grouped round the Church—though not, be it noted, round the Lord of the Church.

Over against these encouraging features I must record that it seems to me that the deepest powers and influences in the lives of practically all Africans, Christians included, are the still quite unbaptised demonic powers that work through witchcraft and magic. Time and again they prove stronger than such Christian faith as may be held. This has to my knowledge been the case even with Christian leaders of high standing and great earnestness.

One cannot help feeling that in this most vital field the sixth century Church was in a much stronger position: and as one searches for reasons one is inevitably led to ask whether the 'dual parentage' of the African Church may not be in some measure responsible for its comparative impotence. There is nothing in the European background corresponding to the African spirit world. On the contrary, our minds are conditioned by an implicit belief in the possibility of rational, scientific explanation of everything that occurs. Thus most of us missionaries have to admit that we face the African spirit world with incomprehension, with disdain and often with anger. But the African Minister is fully convinced of its reality. Yet he does not know how in Christ's name to deal with it; and often he is afraid of consulting with the missionary about it, for fear—fear both of the vengeance of the spirits, and of an uncomprehending rebuff by the missionary. So he leaves it alone, to flourish and to dominate African society, including, as often as not, himself.

2. If the 'dual parentage' is partly responsible for this weakness, then it must be highly instructive to study a Church in which the Western 'brake' on belief in the spirit world has been removed. Fortunately we are able to conduct such a study, thanks to Dr Sundkler's invaluable research into the activities of the Bantu separatist Churches in South Africa. And true enough, we find in those Churches two of the most characteristic features of Gregory's times mirrored in the twentieth century: acts of healing, and special carriers of spiritual power corres-

ponding to the saints but now called 'prophets'. Healing has become the most prominent feature of separatist Churches of the Zionist type. 'Prayer for the sick is not just a detail of Zionist Church services, but is their most important feature.'[1] However, prayer alone is often held not to be efficacious, and is strengthened by laying on of hands, and 'more tangible methods. The violent shaking of the patient while shouting "Phuma, dimone!" (Depart, demon!) is common, often accompanied by beating the patient with holy sticks.'[2] Other efficacious agencies are clothes belonging to the 'prophet' (cf. passages in Acts and saints' relics in Gregory's time); the wearing of certain uniforms, possibly revealed in dreams; water, i.e. a form of baptism which is more properly described as a syncretistic purification rite and may be frequently renewed; ashes, which may be applied externally but more are frequently forced down the patient's throat, thus causing vomiting which is itself regarded as a great purgative. Confession of sins is an inescapable concomitant of healing. According to H. Webster in primitive belief 'confession acts as a real purgation, an elimination of evil matter in the patient's body'. It is difficult to resist the impression that in this respect the African Zionist is wiser and more Biblical than the scientific Westerner. We in the West are only now beginning to recover the Biblical insight that spirit and body are indissolubly linked. Secondly, the separatist Churches have their outstanding personalities, 'the prophets', who correspond to the saints of Gregory's day. However, as one reads through the sketches of the prophets' lives which Dr Sundkler gives[3] one is struck by the great distance between them and the saints. Indeed the beginning of the careers of both are similar: in each case there is a supernatural call. But there the similarity ends. While the saints went on in an arduous course of prayer, fasting and a study of the Scriptures, all this is not of first importance in the case of the prophet. He is required to continue to have revelations, supposedly of the Holy Spirit, and a power to heal. The revelations seldom have any worth-while content. They are frequently on sheer externals, and sometimes immoral, e.g. when a prophet dreamt that he was to take a second wife. In addition the prophet's so-called healing functions often corres-

[1] Sundkler, op. cit., p. 228. [2] ibid., p. 232. [3] ibid., pp. 109 ff.

pond exactly to those of the heathen diviner: he points out the evil-doer responsible for sickness or other calamity.

As one thinks over these phenomena, and compares them with Gregory's record, one is quickly forced to the conclusion that in spite of a similar situation, and similar developments to meet it, the outcome is greatly different. In the sixth century a Church strong in the rich heritage of its tradition met heathen-inspired superstition with unquestionably genuine healings. Its saints trod a well-known hallowed path within the Church polity, which led them to the throne of grace. In South Africa today there is no Church polity. Instead there is a bewildering multiplicity of Churches, with the result that practically every 'prophet' starts up his own Church, having no more than a fortuitous connexion with any Christian tradition, and valuing his own direct revelations higher than even the words of the Bible. The spirits are not 'tried' (1 John 4.1), and the separatist Zionist Churches are in permanent danger of being entirely dominated by the old pagan spirits. And the nature of the healings recorded, their general reliance on drastic methods and visible actions, suggests the absence rather than the presence of divine power. Thus one is forced to the conclusion that an African Church which deprives itself of a share in the heritage of the Church Universal through its association with European missionaries, is not strong enough successfully to combat the pagan forces round about it. It cannot find the way out of the twilight. That does not mean, however, that what it attempts has no significance for us. Particularly would I plead that its search for divine healing be pondered, not just intellectually but at the throne of grace, and in the light of what is happening in Scotland today.

3. It follows from our study so far that three conditions must be fulfilled if the Church in Africa is to be as effective as it was in the sixth century: it must be controlled by the tradition of the Universal Church, it must be able to identify itself with the people in their most strongly held beliefs, and it must be able to bring its faith in the power of God to bear on these beliefs. This is no easy task. But I am convinced that there are parts of Africa in which the Church has in fact responded to this call of its Lord, and in which it now faces the world with an over-

whelming testimony as to Him whose it is and Whom it serves. And this development has come about because Africans, with all their heritage of primitive superstition, have, under God, discovered for themselves the deepest truths in the Protestant tradition as transmitted to them by their missionaries, and have themselves entered into that living relationship of penitence and faith in their Lord which is the most glorious rediscovery of the Reformation. I refer, of course, to the Revival of the Church in East Africa. Let us trace its development as described by Max Warren: 'The patient laying of spiritual foundations over the years, the day in and day out ministry of the Word of God, through teaching and preaching, through service and through Sacrament',[1] came to bear fruit when African men and women began to feel dissatisfied with themselves and with their Church. 'Quite spontaneously those who were hungry for fellowship turned to Bible study and prayer. Often this was in the solitude, each by himself, but in some cases, friends, in some cases brothers wrestled together, claiming from God what they believed He had for them. And it is on record that such men were prepared to pay the price. For some it meant selling all that they had in strictly material terms. For others, less endowed with this world's goods, it involved a no less costly surrender of the subtler riches.'[2] Note that here is the element of sacrifice, which was so outstanding a feature of the life of the sixth century saints. Then 'the Holy Spirit came in convicting power upon an ever growing number of men and women. A witness has described the impact of this conviction in the following words: "they had one and all been through the valley of humiliation to a deep and even agonising sense of sin; they had been driven to painful and costly repentance, often with its exacting demands of open confession and restitution; and they had seen and found cleansing in the precious blood of Christ, and victory over sin through His indwelling Spirit. They were marked men; joy shone in their faces and everywhere they went they had a testimony." ' Canon Warren goes on: 'What is important to be understood is that this was a moving of the Spirit *within* the Church. . . . All the while the spiritual life of the Church as a whole was deepening.'[3]

Here, then, there is a twentieth century African Church that

[1] *Revival, an enquiry* (S.C.M. Press, 1954), p. 58. [2] ibid., p. 41. [3] ibid., p.60.

can in every respect bear comparison with the sixth. It stands four-square on its tradition: but now the tradition is one of a realisation of God's judgment and grace in Jesus Christ and of the enabling power of His Holy Spirit; it is identified with the people: Canon Warren writes of 'the enormous significance for East Africa that there a spiritual movement giving full scope to African initiative has from the first been in and of the Church[1]; and it bears witness to its supernatural origin just as surely as the sixth century Church, though in different ways. To the most costly part of this witness let us now turn: the stand against Mau Mau. Canon Warren writes: 'Mau Mau served as a rude awakening to the Church. Almost overnight, in some areas, a large nominal membership faded away, became in very truth invisible. But not all. . . . It is no secret that . . . when the real day of testing came, with blood and flame and sword, it was the men and women of the Revival Fellowship who saved the Church. That is literally true and needs no allowance for exaggeration.'[2] The significance of this victory of Christ over Mau Mau in the hearts of the faithful cannot be exaggerated. For, whatever the exact origins and aims of Mau Mau, there can be no doubt that the whole demonic background of Africa is in it, exercising over every African both that supernatural terror which paralyses resistance and the fearful attraction of evil. That 'revived' Christians—and some others inspired by their example—should have stood firm against it, facing willingly and gladly even the supreme sacrifice, is the clearest demonstration that could be given of the power of God present in their midst, stronger than the strongest powers of evil, and triumphing over them as Jesus triumphed on the Cross. Here is more than the sixth century: here is a glorious page being added to the history of God's people on earth.

We cannot pass from this section without stating explicitly that the attack of Mau Mau is an acid test. We have recorded the triumph of the Church in so far as it was 'revived': we must not slur over the wholesale failure of the Church apart from the Revival. Canon Warren solemnly records that 'in some areas a large nominal membership faded away', and again that it was the 'Revival Fellowship' that 'saved the Church'. I think

[1] *Revival, an enquiry*, p. 54. [2] ibid., pp. 55, 57-8.

that the events in Kenya confirm my contention that the ordinary Church in Africa, as we know it over most of the Continent, is powerless against the unbaptised demons of the old Africa.

Thus we can now return an answer to the question with which we started. There is a sense in which the sixth century Church can be regarded as an example to the African Church of our day. But it is not in the actual way that it manifested the power of God, in miracles performed by saints. A similar way in South Africa we have found to be largely devoid of specific Christian content. It is rather in the unity in which it held its apostolic tradition, the spiritual background of its surroundings, and a dynamic faith. We have found the same unity in the revived Church in East Africa, and have seen how under the testing conditions of the Mau Mau onslaught it was able to demonstrate the power of God in a way that the unrevived Church was not.

I cannot conclude without recording my conviction that Revival is the Lord's desire for His Church in all Africa. Admittedly the times are in His hand, and we have our duty of the 'day in and day out ministry of the Word of God': but we have another duty also, to watch and to pray for the morning that shall chase away the twilight that hangs over our Churches, in repentance and expectancy ourselves, so that when the Lord calls we may be found ready and faithful.

THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS OF MEDICINE

by The Rev. JOHN WILKINSON

'I SWEAR by Apollo the healer, by Aesculapius, by Health and all the powers of healing, and call to witness all the gods and goddesses that I may keep this Oath and Promise to the best of my ability and judgment.'[1] These words form the opening sentence of the Hippocratic Oath and they bear eloquent testimony to the theological basis of medicine in Ancient Greece. This close association of theology and medicine characterised the thought and practice of all peoples until the Renaissance, and it still appears most natural to the inhabitants of Africa and Asia who have not been influenced by Western thought. But with Western thought the Renaissance marked the dividing point between theology and medicine so that today medicine is suspicious of theology and jealously resists any approach from the side of theology. The result is that medicine has come more and more to deal with concrete situations and particular problems, and the doctor by his training is unfitted to discuss general principles for he is given no guidance during his training since, in most cases, his teachers have little guidance to give.[2]

The modern fragmentation of knowledge and the rise of autonomous specialist subjects is being deplored, even though it is thought to be necessary for progress in research. It is making very obvious the lack of a unifying and integrating principle in medicine. Science, whose lead medicine has followed to a large extent, is beginning to realise that it cannot live unto itself. The atom bomb and artificial insemination

[1] *The Medical Works of Hippocrates*, translated by John Chadwick and W. N. Mann, (Blackwell, 1950), p. 9.

[2] See for example the letter from the Professor of Medicine at Manchester University in the *Lancet* of 5 Nov. 1949 (*Lancet*, 1949, ii, 862). The letter was in reply to an address given to medical students at Birmingham by Dr Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury and published in the *Lancet* of the previous week (*Lancet*, 1949, ii, 775). Professor Platt rejects the doctrine while accepting the ethic of Christianity, and concludes his objections to Christian doctrine by saying that 'we prefer agnosticism to unacceptable hypothesis'.

have made it conscious of the relevance of ethics, to quote only two examples. Formerly, science disowned any philosophy and thereby opened the way to the unconscious and uncritical acceptance of any idea which appeared congenial, and so there came into being an incoherent scientific pseudo-philosophy, which while universally followed was not always explicitly acknowledged. Science must have a philosophy in order to integrate its discoveries and to give guidance for its future research. What that philosophy will be depends on the individual scientist, but it must be one which will promote, and not hamper research.[1] If he is not guided by such a philosophy the scientist becomes a mere technician.

The modern tendency in medicine is for the doctor to become a mere technician. This tendency is contrary to the traditional status of the doctor and the popular conception of his person and work. This is well expressed in the following quotation from a recent medical text-book: 'It is only in comparatively recent times that the doctor has attempted to assume a purely technical role in the diagnosis and treatment of disease. His traditional role was much more that of a psychotherapist. In primitive societies, as the medicine-man, he was invested with magical powers which allowed him to exercise powerful therapeutic effects by suggestion; as the priest-physician through prayer and the exorcism of guilt he was able likewise to relieve his patients of mental distress and so contribute to their

[1] A good illustration of how a philosophy can hamper research is afforded by the Lysenko controversy in the U.S.S.R. T. D. Lysenko, a Russian biologist of doubtful ability, in 1948 persuaded the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. to declare that Soviet biology rejected the orthodox Mendelian genetics, and that in future Soviet genetics and biology would follow the teaching of I. V. Michurin, a Tsarist biologist. Orthodox Mendelians were dismissed and dishonoured and their laboratories closed. A statement issued by the Praesidium of the Academy of Sciences in the U.S.S.R. included the following paragraph: 'Michurin's materialist direction in biology is the only acceptable form of science because it is based on dialectical materialism and on the revolutionary principle of changing Nature for the benefit of the people. Weismannite-Morganist idealist teaching is pseudo-scientific, because it is founded on the notion of the divine origin of the world and assumes eternal and unalterable scientific laws. The struggle between the two ideas has taken the form of the ideological class-struggle between socialism and capitalism on the international scale, and between the majority of Soviet scientists and a few remaining Russian scientists who have retained traces of bourgeois ideology, on a smaller scale. There is no place for compromise. Michurinism and Morgano-Weismannism cannot be reconciled.' Julian Huxley comments on the reports of this controversy that they 'constitute a melancholy landmark in the history of science'. The whole controversy is summarised with relevant quotations by Julian Huxley in *Nature*, 1949, 163, 935 and 974, and in his book, *Soviet Genetics and World Science* (Chatto & Windus, 1949).

recovery. The doctor still retains much of this traditional status, but in his newer more competent technical role he sometimes finds it irksome to be regarded irrationally as a purveyor of magic or to be burdened with confidences and intimacies which often seem irrelevant to his task and which he would gladly see his patients take elsewhere. He has recently done his best to shed his magic symbolic role; he has doffed the top-hat and the dignified professional garb, he has made his surgery businesslike and he has often adopted a brisk manner intended to discourage intimacy. Unreasonably, his prestige persists . . . still intact and certainly as powerful as ever to sway the emotions of his patients.'[1] It is unfortunate that the Welfare State and the National Health Service it has created in Britain tends to encourage the emergence of the medical technician. There are signs, however, that patients are not satisfied with the newer type of medical practitioner. They prefer the older type who was much more than a technician for he combined with his medical practice a philosophy of life and disease (not always Christian, but usually theistic) which meant that he was able to help his patients with problems other than the purely physical ones of disease processes.

It is in medicine, perhaps more than in any other practical subject, that the loss of a philosophy or theology has been most tragic. In medicine we deal with the lives and souls of men as well as with their bodies, and so good technology is not enough. It must be accompanied by good philosophy and good theology to enable us to help those of our patients whose trouble is more spiritual than physical. We cannot remain just medical technicians, but must have some theory of life and disease to guide our practice, and so we must, in some measure at least, become philosophers and theologians.[2] This article is an attempt to find a basis for medicine in Christian theology on which the Christian doctor can base his daily thought and practice.

[1] T. F. Rodger in *Textbook of Medical Treatment*, edited by Dunlop, Davidson and McNee, sixth edition (Livingstone, 1953), p. 884. Dr Rodger is Professor of Psychological Medicine at Glasgow University.

[2] 'To say that a theology of medicine is needed may sound pretentious, but something like it is necessary if Christian doctors are to understand their duty clearly'—Daniel Jenkins (Editor), *The Doctor's Profession* (S.C.M. Press, 1949), p. 16. Dr Clement Chesterman criticised this statement in his review of the book for this journal (*S.J.T.*, 4, 105). He did so on the ground that to introduce theology into the troubles of the sick room was to cause 'inevitable controversy', but this is to take a narrow view of the function and content of theology.

A Theological Basis

The basic question of medicine is: 'Why need we do anything about suffering?' Our answer to that question will reveal the true basis of our medical practice, whether it be mere philanthropy or true theology. The Christian answer to that question is: 'Because God did in Jesus Christ.' The Christian does not despise mere philanthropy, but he believes that philanthropy alone is not enough for it too needs a basis. The reason why we love our fellow men is that God does, and desires that we do too.

What did God do about suffering? To this question there tend to be two answers. The first emphasises the Incarnation, and the second the Atonement. Emphasis on the Incarnation has characterised the theology of the Eastern Church from early times, and this emphasis has passed over into modern Anglican theology and also influenced certain sections of the Church of Scotland. From this point of view it is a sufficient answer to our question to say that God became flesh in the person of Jesus Christ and so experienced our human situation with its limitations and frustrations. The Reformers, however, rejected this emphasis and 'preferred to regard the Incarnation from the point of view of Satisfaction'.[1] It is true that there could have been no Atonement without the Incarnation, but 'the Incarnation as such is not the pivotal point of the Biblical Revelation, but rather the *work* of the Redeemer. Jesus Christ did not come merely to come, but He came to redeem.'[2] The Incarnation alone did not effect the salvation of man, and so it is not surprising to find that 'the New Testament knows nothing of an Incarnation which can be defined apart from its relation to atonement'.[3] Thus the Incarnation is not the ultimate fact on which our salvation is based, but the Atonement wrought for man by the death of Christ on the Cross. It is in the Cross therefore that we must seek the theological basis of medicine rather than in the Incarnation.

There can be no doubt that the Cross lies at the heart of the Gospel, and this fact has immediate relevance to our subject

[1] Emil Brunner, *The Mediator* (Lutterworth Press, 1934), p. 403 n. Cp. John Calvin, *Institutes*, Book 2, chap. 12, paras. 5-7.
[2] Emil Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter* (S.C.M. Press, 1944), p. 102.
[3] James Denney, *The Death of Christ* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1903), p. 325.

for the Cross involved suffering. The Christian Faith thus provides a basis for medical practice, because at its heart lies just such an experience of suffering as that with which medicine is often called upon to deal. The Cross involved, on its human and physical side, the pain of scourging and the agonies of a slow lingering death. So far as we know, our Lord never suffered from any disease or sustained any injury while He was on earth, although He knew physical weariness, hunger and thirst. But on the Cross He suffered and died, and His suffering and death not only mean that now He can understand human suffering, but also that human suffering has a new meaning. It is true that He taught men how to suffer by His example,[1] but it is also true that by His death he did more to solve the problem of suffering than medicine could ever do.

Let us turn to a concrete situation for a moment and suppose that we have a patient who is suffering from an incurable and painful disease. What are we to tell him is the message of the Christian Faith for such a case as his? From the Incarnation we can derive a message of the divine sympathy, for God became man in the person of His Son and so knew the limitations of our humanity. Sympathy can be an inspiring thing, especially if it is divine sympathy, but we can offer our patient more than this. We can speak of an Incarnation which found its occasion and motive in the Atonement, and this Atonement involved the suffering and death of the Son of God. Jesus Christ died to solve once for all the problem of evil, of which disease and suffering are a part. This did not mean that evil and its consequences were at once removed from the world, but it did mean that evil was doomed and its sting removed. It could no longer keep us from God, for Christ had died to bring us to God. Suffering was still the lot of man, but man could take up a new attitude to it in the light of the Cross. The message of the Christian Faith to those who suffer is summarised in these words of a recent Warrack Lecturer addressed to those who preach: 'Preach the Cross in the context of the world's

[1] Pet. 2.21. The word translated 'example' occurs only here in the New Testament. It is the word *ὑπογραμμός* which means either the top line of letters provided for copying in a child's copy-book, or an architectural outline or artist's sketch left to be coloured or filled in by others. See Selwyn in loc., and compare George Macdonald: 'The Son of God suffered unto the death, not that men might not suffer, but that their sufferings might be like his.' (*Unspoken Sermons*, First Series.)

suffering, and men will learn, not only that Christ is with them in the dark valley, God "afflicted in all their afflictions", gathering up their distress and desolation into His own eternal heart—not only that, though that indeed, even if there were no more to be said, would be a mighty reinforcement: they will learn this other great thing, that God in His sovereign love still leads captivity captive, still transforms the wrecking circumstances of life into means of grace, the dark places into a Holy of Holies, and the thorns that pierce into a crown of glory. For the Cross means that even when things are at their worst, even when life does not bear thinking about, God is master of the situation still, and nothing can spoil His final pattern or defeat His purpose of love.'[1]

The most adequate theological basis for our practice of medicine is to be found in the Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. In His Death He suffered for us, and by His Resurrection we know that the Father accepted His sufferings on our behalf, and now the power that raised Him from the dead is available for us to sustain us in pain and in suffering. We venture to claim that no more adequate or satisfying basis for medical practice can be found, nor ever will be found, than this.

The Basic Principles of Medical Practice

In the last section we have sought to establish the theology of medicine on the fact of the Death of Christ on the Cross. From this basic fact we can derive certain principles to guide us in our practice of medicine. These principles are in reality but aspects of the Christian doctrines of Man, Sin, God and the Last Things, aspects which are particularly relevant to our present subject.

1. *The Preciousness of Human Life*

If Jesus Christ died on the Cross for all men, then all are precious in His sight. If God was willing that His Son should die for men, then we must spare no effort to preserve their lives when they come to us with disease. The ultimate decision of life or death is not ours, and we can never know it, and so we may never take it upon ourselves to destroy human life, but must always seek to preserve it. If a man dies under our care

[1] J. S. Stewart, *Heralds of God* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1946), p. 78.

it must be in spite of our efforts, and not because of them. The sentiment expressed in Clough's couplet can never be a Christian one:

> Thou shalt not kill; but need'st not strive
> Officiously to keep alive.[1]

We have spoken of the preciousness of human life, rather than its sacredness, for sacredness is too absolute a word and, as the late William Temple pointed out, 'the notion that life is absolutely sacred is Hindu or Buddhist, not Christian'.[2] If life was absolutely sacred then martyrdom would be sin and the Christian martyrs would have been mistaken in offering their lives for the sake of the Name as they did so nobly. Sacredness belongs not to life, but to the cause to which it is dedicated and in which it is spent. Life is precious, and like other precious things may be sacrificed for the sake of something higher. Life is a precious thing, and we must regard it as a great trust. Our attitude before it must be one of reverence, for it is a Divine mystery, and of caring and responsibility because this mystery is entrusted to us.

On this principle of the preciousness of human life is based the medical work of the Church. The Church no longer has its own hospitals in Britain as it once had, but on the mission-field medical work is still a vital part of the Church's work. In Christian mission hospitals non-Christians are often made to realise for the first time that, in Von Hügel's phrase, Christianity taught us to care.[3] Herein lies the great difference between the theology of Hippocratic medicine, and that on which our Christian practice of medicine is based. The gods of paganism do not care for men, and never can care, but the God and Father of Jesus Christ does care, for to Him the life of every one of His creatures is precious. Because men are precious to God, we too must care for them, and a vital and practical part of our care and concern for them can be expressed in our practice of medicine.

If human life is precious, then we must be concerned about human personality and must resist the current tendency to depersonalise human relationships. Patients must never be

[1] Arthur Hugh Clough, *The Latest Decalogue.*
[2] William Temple, *Thoughts in War Time* (Macmillan, 1940), p. 31.
[3] Quoted by Phyllis Garlick, *The Wholeness of Man* (Highway Press, 1943), p. 69.

regarded merely as interesting specimens of pathology for that is to allow the doctor-patient relationship to degenerate into an I-It relation, whereas it should be an I-Thou relation. The Christian doctor can make a great contribution to medicine along the lines of personal relationships, and this was never more needed than today in the early years of the new National Health Service.

From this principle of the preciousness of human life comes too, the stimulus to medical research in all its departments. We must continue the search for ever new and more effective drugs for the treatment of disease, and endeavour to understand the processes of disease more perfectly in order that we may be able to control disease and, where possible, prevent its occurrence and the suffering it may involve.

The patient's confidence in his doctor is based on this principle, on the knowledge that his doctor holds his life as a precious trust and therefore will do all in his power to preserve it. The problem of Euthanasia inevitably arises here and we must face it in the light of this principle of the preciousness of human life. A discussion of this problem is not relevant to our present subject and no good purpose would be served by digression, but reference may be made to two recent discussions of the question which are readily available.[1]

2. *The Reality of Disease*

If Jesus Christ went to His death to deal with the problem of evil, of which the existence of disease is one aspect, then evil and disease are realities. We may not follow Mary Baker Eddy in her denial of their reality, but we must accept them as real entities as God does.

We must therefore be practical and realistic in our approach to the practice of medicine. We may not deny the existence of suffering or regard pain as an illusion. We must accept the existence of suffering and seek by patient study and research to find out more about the processes of disease and how they can be influenced and controlled. Also, we must never lose sight of the larger whole of which they are but a part, the fact

[1] One discussion will be found in Willard L. Sperry, *The Ethical Basis of Medical Practice* (Cassell, 1951), chs. 11 and 12, and the other discussion is in *Theology Today*, 8, 194-212 (July 1951). In both discussions the two sides of the question are presented.

of sin and its influence on man and the world. If man had not fallen we would not have had all the parasitism that there is in the world, nor all the disease which has resulted from it. The Christian Faith is the only religion which takes a realistic view of sin and disease. It does not deny their existence, nor does it believe that they belong to the ultimate order of things. At the same time as it acknowledges their existence, it proclaims what God has done about them in Jesus Christ. By His death the power of evil has been broken and in the restoration of the natural order of things evil and disease have no place. Until that time disease and death will hold sway on the earth, and are realities with which we must reckon.

3. *The Action of God*

When faced with sin and suffering God acted and sent His Son into the world. As P. T. Forsyth has pointed out God could suffer, though He could not sin. He came to suffer in the person of His Son and 'His transfiguration of suffering on the Cross, is also His conquest of sin'.[1] During His earthly ministry Jesus always acted in the face of disease and no sufferer ever went from His presence unhealed. In His healing He showed His sympathy and compassion for those who were diseased and He used His power to heal them. He did something, and that something cost Him strength and power.[2] But He did more than this for He gave His life to deliver men from the fear of death and He destroyed him that had the power of death and solved the problem of evil for all mankind.

God acted in the face of evil and because of this we must act too in the face of physical evil which is disease. We must not be passive and say that nothing more can be done, for there is always something that we can do. A paragraph in a recent medical text-book is headed, 'On what to do when there is little to be done'.[3] The Christian doctor can always do far more than administer the opiate which is prescribed in that paragraph. During the last war an Army Nursing Sister said to her Medical Officer at the close of the ward round, 'I would trust my life to you because you would always do something'.

[1] P. T. Forsyth, *The Justification of God* (Duckworth, 1916), p. 139.
[2] Mark 5.30; Luke 8.46.
[3] Allan Birch (Editor), *Emergencies in Medical Practice*, third edition (Livingstone, 1952), p. 454.

That Medical Officer was a Christian, and that remark was one which should be true of any Christian doctor.

Our activity in the face of disease must, of course, be an informed activity confidently based on our knowledge and experience. This means that we have a Christian responsibility to our patients to keep our medical knowledge abreast of the most recent developments, so that we can give of our best in their service. The Christian, in whatsoever profession or trade he may be, has the greatest of all incentives to give of his best and to be the best that he can be, because God gave His best for our redemption.

4. *The Temporariness of Disease*

The Cross means that the end of evil is certain, and with it the end of disease and death. Physical death and disease do not endure for ever. They do not belong to the natural order of things and will pass away with the former things. This is one of the great facts of the Christian Faith, and one with which we can reassure our patients. Death is still 'the Shadow fear'd of man'[1] and this fear is a very real one, though often unexpressed, for many of our patients. To them we can say that death has no more dominion over us for the death of Christ removed the sin which was the sting of death. The Cross robbed death of its finality and fear. To those that are in Christ death is but a sleep from which they will be roused to fellowship with God.[2] 'The grave becomes the robing room for life eternal. . . . Death is enlisted in the service of Christ's people, and by destroying flesh and blood, it enables this mortal to put on immortality. The blow which threatens to crush and annihilate all life breaks but the shell and lets the imprisoned spirit free to a larger life. Death is swallowed up in victory, and itself ministers to the final triumph of man.'[3]

While it is true that the sting has been removed from pain, and the terror taken from death, the Christian doctrine of pain does not warrant the conclusion that therefore all suffering for the individual will cease. This will only be so with the coming

[1] Alfred, Lord Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, xxii, 3.

[2] See H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1904), p. 267 f. In connexion with this idea it is worth recalling that our English word 'cemetery' is by derivation a dormitory or sleeping place.

[3] Marcus Dods in the Expositor's Bible on First Corinthians, p. 384.

of the new heaven and the new earth when 'there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away'.[1] Though our citizenship is in heaven, we continue to live in a disordered and diseased world, and we must never regard disease as a light or temporary thing. We must face it, and so far as we are able, deal with it as the serious and often terrible thing it is. We must never relax our efforts against it, for although we know that a term has been set to its dominion, we know not the time of its end.

There are many who believe that the progress of medicine will eventually lead to the conquest and disappearance of disease, and they hail every new discovery as a step nearer that goal. Thus the task of medicine is to put itself out of business by removing the occasion of its existence. On this view we have no need of the Christian Faith to tell us that disease is only a temporary phenomenon. But this view is too optimistic. The task of medicine is to control disease, but to control disease is not to eradicate it from the world of men. There are many diseases which medicine knows how to control, but which still take their annual toll of human life. Also we often succeed in controlling one group of diseases only to find that another group has arisen to take its place. It is true that medicine has progressed and has controlled human diseases, but to regard it as able to banish all disease from the face of the earth is to credit it with powers it does not possess, and to regard disease as a physico-chemical problem unrelated to the spiritual disorder of the world in which it occurs. It is not because of man's control over nature, but because of Jesus Christ's victory over sin that we can look forward with sure confidence to the day when sin and disease, death and dying will be no more.

Conclusion

Medicine is one of the lost provinces of religion, but that does not mean that religion has therefore no say in the provincial government. Though the Christian Faith has no longer the primary place as the philosophy of medicine that it had before the Renaissance, there have been Christian doctors in all ages. Through them and through the influence of Christian

[1] Rev. 21.4.

traditions which have continued to guide medical thinking even when it was not conscious of such guidance, we have today a fine Christian heritage in medicine. But medicine in Britain today is living on an overdrawn account of Christian tradition. If medicine is to survive in its best and noblest form, then we must rediscover the Christian theological basis on which it is built and which has become obscured and forgotten. The basic ethical principles which guide us in our daily practice of medicine are Christian in origin and derivation or, at least, if they were first adumbrated in Greek medicine they have received a new and powerful sanction in Christ.

It has been said that we have had few real philosophers of medicine since Sir Thomas Browne whose *Religio Medici* was published in 1624. If this is true then we have much philosophical leeway to make up. The rediscovery by medicine of its theological basis will not come by the emergence of some brilliant Christian philosopher of medicine, but by the patient work and witness of Christian doctors in their ordinary medical practice. In our modern society doctors are busy people and they do not have the time necessary to sit down and work out this problem from first principles. They will need guidance, especially from those who have thought about a theology of medicine from the point of view of theology. This matter is vital for if Christian doctors are not the soul in the body of medicine and are not able to see clearly the principles of their vocation, then medicine will fall into materialistic hands, and will be guided by no higher principles than those of utility and expediency.

There is very little literature available on the subject of this article, though much of the literature of medical missions contains material which is relevant to a theology of medicine.[1]

[1] The following books are relevant to our topic and they appear to represent almost the whole range of literature available apart from that dealing specifically with medical missions:

Phyllis L. Garlick, *The Wholeness of Man* (Highway Press, 1943);
—— *Man's Search for Health* (Highway Press, 1953);
Daniel Jenkins (Ed.), *The Doctor's Profession* (S.C.M. Press, 1949);
André Schlemmer, *The Crisis in the World of Thought* (I.V.F., 1940);
H. J. Seddon, *The Christian Heritage in Medicine* (Published for the Christian Medical Fellowship by the I.V.F., 1952), and
Paul Tournier, *Bible et Médicine* (Delachaux et Niestlé, Neuchâtel, 1952).

We have not seen the work of Dr Tournier, but we understand that he is the leader of a group of Swiss, French and German doctors who have given a great deal of thought to what the Bible has to say to a medical practitioner about his work. He has published three previous books, *Médicine de la Personne* (now in its tenth edition),

In this subject there is a challenge to the Christian doctor to examine his medical practice. How far is our practice governed and guided by assumptions and principles which are non-Christian or even anti-Christian in origin and inspiration? Does the fact that we are Christians make any difference to the quality of our medical thought and practice, or would they be the same if we were atheists? We have a fine Christian heritage and tradition in medicine which we are in danger of losing. Let us strive to preserve and consolidate it, and by prayerful thought and thoughtful application seek to make clear to ourselves and to others the basis of medicine in Christian faith. So shall we enrich our own lives and practice, and save medicine from a materialistic and utilitarian fate.

Technique et Foi, and *Désharmonie de la Vie Moderne*. The book given above, *Bible et Médicine*, is said to provide in its most mature form what is most valuable in the previous studies.

THE USE OF *KYRIOS* IN THE BOOK OF ACTS

by The Rev. J. C. O'NEILL

Dr Cullmann, in his recent discussion of NT origins has again drawn attention to the hypothesis that the Lordship of Christ is the key to the understanding of the primitive Gospel.[1] The task of this paper is to examine the meaning of the word κύριος in Acts.[2] We must first discover whether or not the very use of the word 'lord' tells us about its origin, date and meaning.

It is well known that the word was ambiguous in the LXX. Although some early manuscripts preserved the Hebrew characters for YHWH in the middle of the Greek text—Jerome had even heard ignorant readers pronounce this as 'Pipi'[3]—, κύριος was regularly substituted for the Divine Name, and readers could only decide from the context whether it referred to YHWH or some other earthly lord.

The position is more complicated when we examine Aramaic usage, and scholars like Dalman and Bousset[4] have argued that there is really no Aramaic equivalent for *(ὁ)* κύριος either as a 'secular' designation, or as a 'divine' designation. When we find Jesus called *(ὁ)* κύριος, we are reading something which evolved later in a Hellenistic sphere.

However, Dalman admits that מָרִי, i.e. 'my lord', with the personal pronoun, is a term which is used for both God and man. 'Considering that מָרִי can likewise be used in speaking of and to God', he writes after a discussion of secular uses of the term, '. . . we conclude that this is a term of deferential

[1] *The Earliest Christian Confessions*, E.T. (London, 1949).

[2] Foerster in Kittel's *TWzNT* Band III (1938) states a position with which we agree, but devotes little attention to Acts. His conclusion is: 'Drückte κύριος dies aus, dann konnten die LXX-Stellen, die vom κύριος sprachen, auf Jesus bezogen werden: in ihm handelt Gott so, wie es das AT vom κύριος aussagt' (p. 1094).

[3] W.-G. Waddell, Note in *J.T.S.*, Vol. XLV, No. 179-80, pp. 158-161: 'The Tetragrammaton in the LXX.'

[4] G. Dalman, *The Words of Jesus*, E.T. (Edinburgh, 1902); cf. A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The NT Doctrine of the Christ* (London, 1926), pp. 231-7 and R. Bultmann, *Theology of the NT*, I (1948, E.T., London, 1952) p. 51.

homage, the scope of which can vary widely according to the position of the person addressed' (p. 326).

The crux of the argument is that the Aramaic word was not used *without* a personal pronoun when referring to YHWH, and such usage was a Hellenistic Jewish development (pp. 179-180). Now, if מר without a pronoun could be used for earthly lords, we might have to concede that *(ὁ) κύριος* without a pronoun, as applied to Jesus, pointed to a specifically earthly use of the title having little more significance than 'Master' in the original Aramaic context. But, as Dalman shows (p. 326), a 'pronominal suffix is . . . indispensable' in secular cases too.

The only argument left is that whenever we read *(ὁ) κύριος* without a pronoun we must rule out an Aramaic original, and that this is so whether it is YHWH, Jesus or an earthly lord who is being referred to.

The argument does not hold. As Harford[1] has shown, the LXX use of *(ὁ) κύριος* for the Tetragrammaton is a development independent of, and parallel to, the use of אדני in reading the Hebrew text of the OT. We would expect, then, that Greek translators of Aramaic references to YHWH would follow the example of the LXX and drop the pronominal suffix. It is tempting to say that when the translators saw מָרִי referring to Jesus they likewise dropped the suffix because they believed He was YHWH, but the more probable explanation is that the suffix would go awkwardly into Greek, and would be dropped simply for that reason. Luke in the Gospel and the Acts almost never uses the suffix with *κύριος*, while Paul uses it quite often, and this probably reflects Luke's Greek, and Paul's Hebrew, background. So Greek passages with just *(ὁ) κύριος* may be accurate, if idiomatic, translations of Aramaic originals.

In both Greek speaking and Aramaic speaking worlds the word 'lord' was ambiguous, and only from the context could anyone tell whether an earthly lord or the LORD God of Israel was meant. When Jesus was called 'Lord' there were two possible connotations. (1) *κύριος* was an honorific title of uncertain value. It might have been used to mean anything from 'Sir' to 'King'. (2) *κύριος* was the title used hitherto only in

[1] J. B. Harford, *Studies in the Book of Ezekiel* (Cambridge, 1935), Excursus II, The divine names in Ezekiel, pp. 102-60.

place of the unknown Name of God, but now in some way applied to Jesus.

For reasons which will be discussed later, some scholars have found (1) too 'low' and (2) too 'high' in connotation, and have looked to Hellenistic cults for a third connotation. So: (3) κύριος was a divine title, paralleled in the Hellenistic worlds, the bearer of which was (perhaps) slightly inferior to God.

The context, and not linguistic forms, will help us decide between these connotations. Nor can we use linguistic arguments to prove or disprove that the title was employed by the Church from the very beginning.

I

Moulton and Geden's Concordance lists 110 cases of the use of κύριος in Acts. There are at least 31 other instances that should be considered in a 'maximum' list.[1] Omitting the ob-

[1] This list is compiled from ℵ A B C D 81, plus the readings at the places where J. H. Ropes (*The Beginnings of Christianity*, ed. F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, Vol. III) goes outside these limits in search of a Western text where D fails. Only *additional*, not different, appearances of κύριος are recorded—i.e. appearances not noted in Moulton and Geden. Each verse is listed only once, opposite its best authority.

D	(i) additional appearances against remaining codices.	2.38, 5.42 (with C), 6.8, 7.30, 55, 10.48 (with 81), 13.33, 14.2, 10 (cf. C), 15.18 (with A), 16.4, 40, 18.4, 5, 8.
	(ii) reading κυριος for θεος in the remaining codices.	2.17, 6.7, 13.5, 16.10, 32 (with AC ℵ^{c}81 against ℵB, and thus noted in the Concordance), 21.20.
ℵ:		8.12, 14.25 (with AC 81), 19.13.
C:		3.9, 7.42, 16.7.
81:		10.2, 27.23.
Non-Bezan Western:		9.5 (HLPS (Ψ) minn.), 9.27 (A 1522^{corr}minn.), 9.34 (A minn.).
D	(iii) reading θεος for κυριος in the remaining codices:	10.33, 12.24 (with ℵA 81), 15.17, 16.15, 21.14.
	(iv) occurrences in class. (i) of mere 'insertions' of κυριος before Ιησους (6/15):	2.38, 5.42, 7.55, 10.48, 13.33, 18.5.

The appended information about Codex Bezae may contribute to the discussion on the reliability of that text. Throughout the paper each case is decided on its own merits. In general we agree that D is more 'pietistic', though whether the 'straight' or the 'pietistic' text was the original or not, is another question. (C.S.C. Williams, *Alterations to the Text of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts* (Oxford, 1951) pp. 36 ff *et passim*.) D tends to be more careless in copying individual words, though B is not free from blame (cf. their readings at 6.7 and 12.24, and see Column IV in the final table of this paper), but such a judgment about the carelessness of the copyist can be distinguished from a judgment about the quality of the original text.

vious secular uses of the word[1] we are left with 137 instances.

We shall divide them into two broad categories according to their occurrence in direct speech or in the narrative (and/or editorial[2]) parts of the work. In each case the verses containing the word will be tabulated under the headings shown below, leaving for discussion some passages where it appears that the exact (new) meaning is being defined.

These are the headings under which each occurrence of *κύριος* will be classified when the immediate context, as defined by the Westcott and Hort paragraph to which it belongs, makes it reasonably plain:

I. Behind the title *κύριος* stands YHWH, the name of the God of Israel.
   A: In OT quotations, or where OT quotations are introduced.
   B: In visions and dreams, and where an angel is sent from the LORD.
   C: In references to the Spirit of the LORD.
   X: The other references.

II. With or behind the title *κύριος* stands the name 'Jesus'.
   A: The phrase *ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς*.
   X: The other references.

[1] 16.16, 19, 30 and 25.26. It is interesting that Paul in chapters 24 and 25, when defending himself before Romans, never mentions the word. Thus it is unlikely that the confession 'Jesus is Lord' *originated* as a direct answer to the claim that Caesar was Lord, for, if that were so, Paul could hardly have excused himself from using it then. On the other hand, his silence shows that he was aware of the danger of using the word before loyal servants of the Emperor.

[2] Usage in direct speech may also be due to the editor, but the ruling presumption is against that, especially in the *kerygmata*. On the other hand, some of the narrative may not be the editor's work, but we shall assume that he would have been more likely to have written narrative freely, than to have changed men's speeches. All these assumptions are open to grave doubt, but the best way to test them is to assume they are true.

Accepting the evidence assembled and adduced by W. L. Knox in *The Acts of the Apostles* (Cambridge, 1948), we shall further assume (1) that Luke wrote the book, (2) that he came from Antioch (Eusebius, *H.E.*, III.4, Jerome, *de vir. illus.*), and (3) that he used various local traditions, whether written or oral, especially in writing the first part of the book. Further supporting evidence is supplied by the fact that the phrase 'the word of God', a phrase almost peculiar to the narrative sections (otherwise only found at 6.2 and 13.46), is particularly frequent in chapter 13, which may well be an Antiochine saga. (Frequency of the occurrence of 'the word of God' in the editorial-narrative sections of the whole of Acts: chapters 4 to 11, 5 times (4.31, 6.7, 8.14, 11.1, 12.24); chapter 13, 4 times (13.5, 7, 43 (D), 48); chapters 16 to 18, 3 times (16.32, 17.13, 18.11, rejecting 16.6 (D)).

III. *Κύριος* is used as a title of religious significance, but there seems no way of deciding to whom it applies, except that it must be either to Jesus or YHWH or both together.

Peter used the word 22 times, and they may be allotted as follows:

I. A: 3.22
B: 10.14, 11.8, 12.11
C: 5.9
X: 3.20 (EVV, 19)

II. A: 1.21, 9.34 (Western: A minn), 11.17, 15.11
X: 11.16

III. 8.22,

leaving 2.17 (D), 20, 21, 25, 34 bis, 36, 38 (D), 39 and 10.36 for discussion.

In 2.36 and 10.36, the crucial verses, at first sight there seems to be a mechanical solution for our problem, depending on the fact that *κύριος* is often used anarthrously in the LXX in place of *adonai* (YHWH). But taking the simple references to the Lord God of Israel (those we shall place in Column I of the final Table, p. 171), we find that Luke probably preferred in these cases to write *κύριος* with the article.[1] So although

1	ALL MSS READ KYRIOS			NOT ALL MSS READ KYRIOS	
	Agree		Disagree		
	anart	article		anart	article
Genetive	2.20=LXX 5.19 8.26, 39 11.21a 12.7, 23 13.11	3.20 10.33 (81, an)	2.21 (B, an =LXX D, art) 5.9 (B etc., an; D, art)	7.30 (D)	8.12 (X)
Other grammatical forms	2.39 (א. ο θεος) 3.22=LXX 7.49=LXX 15.17b=LXX	2.25=LXX 2.47 4.26=LXX 12.17 13.47 (א, an) 16.14	2.34a (אBD an=LXX^{R} AC81=LXXא) 12.11 (אAD81, an; B, art)	2.17 (D) 16.40 (D)	15.17a (B, etc.)

The various readings at 7.31, 33 have been left out of the table. Luke rarely omits the article, except when following the LXX.

these are the only two undisputed references to Jesus which lack the article, we can draw no dogmatic conclusion from that fact.[1]

Peter's use of Ps. 110 in Acts 2 seems to leave us in much the same undecided position on the question of the precise significance of the title κύριος, as Jesus left His hearers when He quoted the same Psalm (Mark 12.35-7 and parallels). 'Lord' was too exalted a title to be given by David to one who depended on his Davidic descent alone for honour, but *how much more* exalted it was than that, we are not told.[2]

However, on close examination, it seems we can find further meaning in the title κύριος as Peter used it in Acts 2. The meaning is dominated by the κύριος of v. 21, in the final words of the quotation from Joel[3]: 'And it shall be, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved.'

The manifestation of the Spirit at Pentecost confronted all Jews with a problem which Peter was quick to exploit. Rabbinic teaching said quite explicitly that the return and outpouring of the Spirit on all Israel would accompany the Messianic Age, as the quotation from Numbers Rabba shows: 'The Holy One, blessed be He, said: In this world individuals were given prophetic power, but in the world to come all Israel will be made prophets, as it is said,' in Joel 2.28 (the passage which Peter quoted).[4]

Peter affirmed that the last days had come, the Spirit had been poured forth on His servants, the sun *was* darkened[5] and those that called on the name of the LORD would be saved. Here is the crux of the problem for the Jewish audience. It is fairly plain that their hopes of the last days had been carried out in the group for whom Peter was speaking, but *they* were not included in this community as had been expected, and

[1] Disputed anarthrous readings referring to Jesus are found in B (18.25, τὴν ὁδὸν κυρίου) and D (19.5, 13.17, τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου). V. Taylor in *The Names of Jesus* (London, 1953), p. 44, n. 5, gives a simple grammatical explanation for the anarthrous readings at 2.36 and 10.36.

[2] To the listeners the second 'Lord' might or might not have been the divine title: there would not necessarily be an audible distinction between the words used for either 'Lord'. See Dalman, op. cit., p. 329.

[3] So F. F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles*, 2nd Ed. (London, 1952), loc. cit.

[4] Numbers Rabba 15.25, qu. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, 2nd Series, p. 127, cit. W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (London, 1948), p. 216 in chapter 8, q.v.

[5] Taking D's reading of the present as the original; B with LXX reads the future. This change in the Testimonium may have occurred by reference to the darkness at the Crucifixion, Mark 15.33, Luke 44.45, Matt. 27.45.

thus it was for them a day of judgment. Their only hope was to call on the name of the LORD.

Peter went on to establish from the Resurrection that Jesus was David's Messiah (2.22-32), and then that Jesus' Ascension showed that He was David's Lord (2.33-35). The first part of Peter's proof has obvious point, because there could be no new age without the Messiah, but the point of the proof of Lordship is not so obvious. Knox[1] argues that the gift of the Spirit and Jesus' Ascension are linked, in verse 33, with Moses' ascension and winning of the Law by means of Rabbinic exegesis of the Pentecost Psalm 68. This is convincing, but it still does not explain the use of Psalm 110. The situation remains unaltered for Jews on whom the Spirit has not descended. They are still outside Israel, and still ignorant of the LORD's Name. If they understood the Rabbinic exegesis of the ascension of Moses, they would see that the new Torah had come to a New Israel; a new covenant from which they were excluded had been made in the last days.

In verses 34 and 35 Peter reaches the climax. He reminds his audience that the one who ascended on high is the one David called 'Lord'. This stage in the speech can have no added relevance to an audience which understood from Peter's words the situation they were in—indeed, it is only an added taunt—if it does not provide them with a way of salvation in the last days which have come. If there is to be any hope for the audience, Peter must mean that the title Jesus has been given is the LORD God of Israel's own title. God has bestowed this title on the bearer of the name men must call on to be saved. Jesus is LORD, and Name of the LORD is no longer the exclusive property of the High Priest, but revealed for men's salvation in the end. Peter's call to repentance in verses 38 and 39 follows logically from this. (Note that the Codex Bezae reads 'be baptised . . . in the name of the *Lord* Jesus Christ. . . .')

The next two chapters in Acts corroborate our interpretation. It is the *name* of Jesus, whose name is the *only one* wherein we must be saved (4.12), which provides the key to the series of events recorded there (though not until after the break at 4.31-2 is Jesus again given the corresponding title 'Lord'; but

[1] W. L. Knox, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 85.

note the 'glorification' in 3.13, and the title used in 3.14, cf. Jer. 23.6).

The second place for discussion is the abrupt statement in 10.36: 'He is Lord of all.' It has been taken to go with τὸν λόγον; Torrey re-translates it with the subject of ἀπέστειλεν (God), and its position has lent weight to the theory that it refers to Jesus and is 'an ejaculatory parenthesis'.[1] The last theory fits best both the sense of the passage as a whole, and the hypothesis of an Aramaic original, in which language there is little apparatus for the connexion of phrases except by juxtaposition.

If this interpretation is accepted, the problem still remains of the connotation of κύριος. Without needing to assume that this *kerygma* is 'of a piece' with the story of Cornelius' conversion, the internal evidence of the οἴδατε (v. 37), makes it fairly certain that it was one of the traditional proclamations to a Palestinian audience, that is, to an audience that already worshipped the Lord (*adonai*, YHWH) or was familiar with such worship. Thus the very abruptness of the identification, and the lack of explanation, makes a case for saying that Jesus was preached as the Lord whom the Jews worshipped. Those who heard would know that there was a Lord of all: Peter proclaimed the fact that Jesus was that Lord.

This interpretation is strengthened by a consideration of v. 43, which affirms that the prophets witnessed to Jesus' Name as the medium of forgiveness. Now the prophets knew only one Name in which forgiveness dwelt: the Name behind the title Lord (YHWH, e.g. Jer. 31.34, where knowing the Lord is specifically linked with forgiveness in 'that day'). The new revelation is that 'Jesus' is the Name in which lies forgiveness. Jesus is this Lord of whom the prophets spoke. Even if the οὗτος of v. 36 does not refer to Jesus, this reading of v. 43 stands.

The seven times Stephen used κύριος may be classified as follows:

I.	A:	7.31, 33, 42 (C), 49
	B:	7.30 (D)
II.	A:	7.59
III.		7.60.

[1] *Beginnings*, Vol. IV, p. 120 and Vol. V, p. 361.

For vv. 55-6, the OT allusion is Dan. 7.13-4, and for v. 59, Ps. 31.1-5. But their Dominical inspiration is probable.

The uses of κύριος by Paul in Acts may be classified thus:

I. A: 13.47
B: ?27.23 (cod. 81)
X: 13.10, 11 (?III), 17.24 (?), 20.28 (ACD: if Moulton's interpretation of ιδιου be accepted, and his reading of θεος be rejected)[1]

II. A: 13.33 (D), 14.10 (D, cf. C under III), 16.31, 20.21, 24, 35, 21.13
X: 20.19, 20.28 (ACD, rejecting Moulton's interpretation)[2]

III. 14.10 (C, cf. D), 15.36, 20.32 (B),

leaving the conversion stories (9.5a,[2] 22.8, 10 bis, 19, 26.15 bis) for discussion.

The three accounts of Paul's conversion agree that when he was asked: 'Why do you persecute me?' he replied with the question: 'Who are you, Lord?' *Κύριος* here may be either 'Sir' or LORD (*adonai*, YHWH), and it seems that the first possibility must be rejected, as we cannot expect Paul to have misunderstood the significance of the Voice, or the Glory that shone around him.[3] If this is so, Paul's question becomes ridiculous: why ask the identity of the LORD he has just recognised? The difficulty is cleared away once we realise the significance of the question 'Who are you?' for a Jew. It is a question about the *name* of the person addressed, a question about the 'soul in its entirety'.[4] Naomi asked it of Ruth when Ruth returned from Boaz' threshing-floor (Ruth 3.16), and Paul was now compelled to ask it of the LORD whom he believed he knew, and whom he believed he was actively engaged in serving. The answer was clear: the LORD's Name was Jesus. The LORD had fulfilled His promise that in the day of redemption His people should know His Name (Isa. 52.6 and Jer. 31.34).[5]

[1] *Beginnings*, Vol. III, pp. 197 ff.

[2] We shall use the notation 'a, b' after a reference to refer to the first and second occurrences of κύριος, not necessarily to the first and second parts of the verse.

[3] W. D. Davies, op. cit., pp. 183-5.

[4] Johs. Pedersen, *Israel: its Life and Culture*, I-II (London, 1926), pp. 245 ff. In common English we can ask this question of strangers, but we do not think it appropriate to ask in this form when the person is known to us. Naomi's question was 'Who are you, my daughter?'

[5] Similar queries about the name were made by Moses (Exod. 3.13), Manoah

Ananias used *κύριος* only three times, in 9.10b, 13 and 17, though the narrative echoes his use in vv. 10a, 11 and 15.

In v. 17 he said to Saul: *ὁ κύριος ἀπέσταλκέν με, Ἰησοῦς ὁ ὀφθείς σοι ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ. . . .* On the basis of our interpretation of Paul's encounter, we might immediately affirm that in the same way Ananias, a worshipper of the LORD of Israel, had found that His Name was Jesus, and that he showed this by using the parenthetic phrase. However, we must be cautious, as this passage has been taken to be a later Hellenistic account paralleling the more original one in chapter 22.[1] On that interpretation, Jesus is a Hellenistic-type 'Lord'.

But a close examination of this account raises the problem which must repeatedly confront the Hellenistic 'school'. The whole passage is controlled by OT thought-forms and OT images. To maintain their thesis, the exponents of that school are forced to set up the hypothesis that titles and dogmas which were drawn from Hellenistic religions were later written into passages, or written up as passages which could not be understood apart from the OT—not an impossible hypothesis, but certainly a difficult one.[2]

Ananias objected strongly to the task the Lord gave him. His argument was met by a surprising account of the mission set for Paul, an account controlled in particular by one passage from Isaiah, as well as by numerous other parts of the OT.

From early times God had chosen Israel to make a Name for Himself (e.g. Exod. 9.16; 2 Sam. 7.23). During the Second Exile Israel recognised that their rebellion had lost them the Name, and they cried to God to restore its benefits to them (Isa. 63.7 to 64.12, especially 63.12, 19). But their hope was that He would also make it known to their enemies, so that the nations would tremble at His presence (Isa. 64.2, cf. 1 Kings 8.42). God's word to Ananias was concerned with the fact that

(Judges 13.17 מִי שְׁמֶךָ), Jesus (Luke 8.30—see M. Black, *Aramaic Approach*, p. 219) and, in reverse, by Jesus when He asked the Disciples at Caesarea Philippi 'But who do you say that I am?' (Mark 8.29). Some of these may be just requests for further *titles*, but even this for a Jew would be a request for greater knowledge of the soul and its workings. These points were drawn to my attention by the Rev. A. L. Burns, Lecturer in Church History, Ormond College Theological Hall, Melbourne, to whom this paper owes much else.

[1] So *Beginnings*, Vol. IV, p. 104.

[2] See F. C. Grant, *An Introduction to NT Thought* (N.Y., 1950), pp. 134-6.

'the day' had arrived, and His Name was now being made known (Isa. 52.6).

Paul's mission of making known the Name was set out in the injunctions given by the Lord to the Servant in Isaiah 49. Thus Paul (Acts 9.15) was chosen (Isa. 49.7: 'the Holy One of Israel . . . hath chosen thee'); he was to bear the LORD's Name among the Gentiles (49.6: ' . . . a light to the Gentiles'), to the Kings (49.7: 'Kings shall see and arise . . . ') as well as to the children of Israel (49.6: 'It is too light a thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved (LXX: diaspora) of Israel: I will also give thee . . . ').[1] Finally, Paul must be told the great suffering that would come to him because of the LORD's Name (cf. Ps. 22, especially vv. 22 and 27).

Thus it was the LORD God of Israel (or God in Christ) who spoke to Ananias, and not Jesus conceived of as a Hellenistic Lord. If this be so, we can with confidence deduce that when Ananias said 'The Lord sent me, Jesus . . . ' he implied that the LORD's Name was Jesus. Such an interpretation is strengthened by an examination of his expostulation with the Lord in v. 13, in which he said that Paul had authority to bind *πάντας τοὺς ἐπικαλουμένους τὸ ὄνομά σου*. It has been shown that Ananias was addressing the LORD God of the OT, and thus, if we may assume that calling on the Name of Jesus was precisely what distinguished the men Saul was persecuting, it follows that Jesus was the LORD God's Name.[2]

The remaining instances of *κύριος* in direct speech may be classified as follows:

I. A: 4.26, 15.17a (D *θεον*), b, 18 (AD).
X: 4.29, 10.4[3], 33 (D *θεου*), 21.14 (cf. II X) (D *θεου*).

[1] See further p. 164 and p. 167, n. 1, on the Suffering Servant in Acts. The use of the Isaianic Servant in this way in a passage concerned with Ananias, the man from Damascus, may help solve the problem of his antecedents (see *Beginnings*, Vol. IV, p. 102). He may have belonged to that Sect described in the Dead Sea Scrolls, which identified their Council with the Isaianic Servant. See M. Black, *Servant of the Lord and Son of Man*, in *S.J.T.*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1953, pp. 7 ff.

[2] Paul's own account of what Ananias said to him (22.12-16) does not make specific use of the word *κύριος*, but it might be argued that the mention of the Righteous One in v. 14, and of the Name in v. 16, in the context of the prior vision and the words about knowing the will and hearing the voice, amount to what is said in Chap. 9. This parallels the difficulty noticed before, that Peter does not use the word *κύριος* in Chs. 3 and 4.

[3] Here an angel is called 'Lord', (cf. 12.7, 17). For OT parallels see G. A. F. Knight, *From Moses to Paul* (London, 1949), pp. 56 ff.

II. A: 1.6, 15.26, 19.13b (ℵ).
X: 21.14 (cf. v. 13, but D *θεου*).
III. 1.24, 8.24 (D *θεου*), 16.15 (D *θεῳ*).

The narrative and/or editorial parts of Acts give little scope for clear decisions about the connotation of *κύριος*. This is to be expected, as the book was meant for people who would either be quite clear about what was meant, or else would be in much the same situation as Christians today who can talk about 'the Lord' without specifying any one Person of the Trinity. This surface confusion fits a situation where Jesus is known as LORD.

These uses may be classified:

I. B: 5.19, 8.26, 8.39 (A 322 323: Western reading), 9.10a, 11, 15 (but see on Ananias), 12.7, 17, 23, 16.10 (D), 18.9, 23.11.
C: 8.39 (cf. Western reading, IB), 16.7 (C, doubtful).
X: 2.47 (if parallels 2.39, otherwise III), 8.12 (ℵ)[1], 10.2 (81, doubtful).

II. A: 4.33, 5.42 (DC), 6.8 (D), 7.55 (D; only case of order *Ἰησοῦν τὸν κύριον*[2]), 8.16, 9.27b (Western), 10.48 (D), 11.20, 16.4 (D), 18.4 (D), 8b (D), 19.5, 13a, 17, 28.31.
X: 9.1, 5b (Western), 27a, 28, 35, 42, 18.5 (D), 8a, 25.

III. 2.47 (cf. IX), 3.9 (C, doubtful), 5.14, 6.7 (D), 8.25, 9.31, 11.21 bis, 23, 24 (ℵA81D), 12.24 (B), 13.2, 5 (D), 12, 44 (B *θεου*), 48 (BD *θεου*), 49, 14.2 (D), 3, 23, 25 (ℵAC81), 15.35, 40, 16.14, 32 (AC81D), 40 (D), 19.10, 20, 21.20 (D).

[1] There is an interesting use of the word *κύριος* in 8.12 according to the Codex Sinaiticus, which reads *ὅτε δὲ ἐπίστευσαν τοῦ Φιλιπποῦ εὐαγγελιζομενοῦ περὶ τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ κυρίου καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ . . .*, replacing the *θεου* read by BAC ℵ 81D with *κυριου*. As the 'kingdom of the Lord' is a rare phrase, found elsewhere in the NT only at 2 Pet. 1.11 and Rev. 11.15, the Sinaiticus reading is harder, and probably should be accepted. The connexion between the two things Philip preached to the Samaritans now becomes clearer: it is the Name of Jesus Christ, which, as He is *κύριος*, has become the key to the LORD's kingdom. The Peshitta and the Egyptian Sahidic versions also make some explicit connexion between the two phrases. The former says that Philip preached about the kingdom of God *in Jesus' name*, and the latter, that he preached about *the kingdom and the name* of Jesus, omitting any *θέος*.

[2] Apart from 4.33 ℵ A against BD.

II

If the meaning of the word κύριος is to be found in the context of its former use for YHWH, we may, with the caution still necessary when working with much of the unidentified material in Acts, give a more certain connotation to the references classified in the tables above.

In section I it may now be possible to regard some of groups A, B and C as references to Jesus or to the Godhead, but there does not seem to be any sure way of deciding.

In Group I. X there are only two undisputed references, both from passages where Jesus also is mentioned (3.20, 4.29). On our hypothesis they are difficult, for Jesus the παῖς is set over against the LORD. However, in the *kerygma* of chapter 2, as well as in Philippians 2, Jesus does not receive Name or title until His ascension. Here the Church was turning its eyes to the time of Jesus' humiliation, and such usage does not entail that there were early Christians who did not call Him LORD. They acknowledged that their faith rested upon Jesus the exalted LORD, but until the last day they could only share his exalted glory in hope. In this world they were fellow servants of Jesus, the Servant (4.27, 29).[1]

Most of the instances in section III occur in the narrative parts of the book, but there are eight occurrences in direct speech, which we shall examine first. 14.10, only included on the possibility (1) of the C reading better than the D, and (2) of the word then not referring to Jesus, need not be considered further. If the Codex Bezae did not read θέος in 16.15, there would be little doubt that the primary reference made by a new convert who already worshipped God, would be to the Lord Jesus. There are two cases where Paul's use of the word seems to be ambiguous (15.36 and 20.32 (B)). As 'the word of the Lord' is a rare Pauline phrase (Col. 3.16; 1 Thess. 1.8,

[1] Paul's position is similar, and corresponds with what the Lord revealed to Ananias concerning him. He identifies not only Jesus (Rom. 4.25, 10.16, 15.21), but also the Church (Rom. 8.33 f; 2 Cor. 6.2; 2 Thess. 1.10 and Acts 13.47) with the Isaianic Servant. He may have gone further still, and seen himself alone as the Servant (Gal. 1.15; (?) Phil. 2.16, and see Acts 13.47), which would be another example of how the Apostles in particular were charged with Jesus' mission. But it is certain that he believed the Church was the Servant with Christ. (T. W. Manson, *The Church's Ministry* (London, 1948), espec. ch. 2, O. Cullmann, *Scripture and Tradition, S.J.T.*, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1953, pp. 113 ff, and C. H. Dodd, *According to the Scriptures* (London, 1952), p. 96 *et passim*.)

4.15; 2 Thess. 3.1, where κύριος is always Jesus), and as it is very common in the editorial sections of Acts, 15.36 probably should be assigned to the editor. But in any case ὁ κύριος is Jesus (see below). In 20.32 the Codex Vaticanus reading may be the original, the other texts having been harmonised with 20.24, but it is more probable that it was itself harmonised with 14.3, the only other NT example of 'the word of his grace', and 14.23.

We are left with four ambiguous uses of the word in direct speech (1.24, 7.60, 8.22, 24). They all refer to prayer. In two of the cases (1.24 and 7.60) it could be argued that the Lord Jesus was the object of the prayer, but that is not certain.[1] The remaining cases seem to be completely ambiguous for us.

Conventional phrases such as 'angel of the Lord', which were previously quite clear, have become, by our research, ambiguous. But the discovery of similar conventional phrases, and an examination of the context in which they appear, might produce the opposite result, and enable us to fix the precise meaning. Thus we shall try to unearth conventional phrases among the remaining instances in section III, all of which appear in the narrative or editorial sections for which we have assumed a common authorship.

The phrase 'the word of the Lord' occurs possibly thirteen times: (6.7 (D), 8.25, 12.24 (B), 13.5 (D), 13.44 (ℵA81), 13.48 (ℵAC81), 13.49, 14.25 (ℵAC81), 15.35, (36), 16.32 (AC81(D)), 19.10 (B cf. D), 19.20 (BℵAC81).)

Θέος should be preferred to κύριος on the weight of textual evidence in these cases: 6.7, 12.24, 13.5, 13.44, 13.48, and 16.32, and for the same reason κύριος should be omitted in 14.25. In 19.20 D offers a much harder reading, which the other mss. seem to have re-written according to the pattern of 6.7 and 12.24. But even if the B reading is accepted, it is doubtful whether it should be translated 'the word of the Lord'.

The problem remains of what was the meaning of the phrase. The possibilities are (1) 'the word of the Lord (God)', an equivalent of 'the word of (belonging to) God', (2) 'the word of (belonging to) the Lord (Jesus)', or (3), 'the word concerning the Lord (Jesus)', or even 'the word, i.e. the Lord', as in the

[1] See *Beginnings*, Vol. IV on 1.24.

phrases ὁ λόγος τοῦ εὐαγγελίου (15.7), and ὁ λόγος τῆς χάριτος (14.3, 20.32).

The interpretation that 'the Lord' here is Jesus is to be preferred, not because a crucial case can be produced which compels us to do so, but only on the basis of the following demonstrations that it fits all the examples very well, though not so well as to exclude the possibility that 'the Lord' is God the Father.

General support comes from Luke's Gospel. The phrase 'the word of the Lord' does not occur in the Synoptics except at Luke 22.61, where Jesus' word is meant, but Luke uses the phrase 'the word of God' once where it does not appear in the parallel passage in Mark (Luke 8.11 Mark 4.14), and three times where there are no Synoptic parallels (5.1, 8.21, 11.28). Otherwise the phrase is only found once in the Synoptics, on the lips of Jesus (Mark 7.13 Matt. 15.6). Thus it is unlikely that Luke would use 'the word of the Lord' as an equivalent of 'the word of God', as there are many opportunities, but no cases, in the Gospel.

In 8.25 the Apostles' special visit to Samaria to inspect and approve the first Church outside the boundaries of Judaism is summed up as their διαμαρτυράμενοι καὶ λαλήσαντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ κυρίου. In the light of Cullmann's thesis in his article on '*KYRIOS* as the designation for the oral tradition concerning Jesus',[1] we may take this to be a description of the apostolic function of speaking the word of Jesus the Lord in new situations.

In 13.49 λόγος probably means 'message' or 'fame', as in 1.22 (cf. Luke 7.17, etc.). It could be said that fame διέφερετο, whereas ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ηὔξανεν, like a seed or a child (Acts 6.7, 12.24, cf. Mark. 4.8; Luke 1.80, 13.19), though this distinction should not be exaggerated.

In 15.35 (36) τὸν λόγον τοῦ κυριοῦ is the substance of what was being taught and preached. As the substance of both διδαχή and κήρυγμα is Jesus Christ Himself, the 'Lord' here is probably Jesus, and He is the word. This hypothesis is confirmed by other examples of *logos* Christology recently observed in Acts and other non-Johannine writings.[2]

[1] In *S.J.T.*, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1950, p. 180.

[2] The late Professor J. D. A. Macnicol, *Word and Deed in the NT*, *S.J.T.*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Sept. 1952, p. 237, reprinted from the *Australian Biblical Review* (Melbourne), Vol. 1-2.

In 19.10 the harder D reading should be accepted (cf. 20.35): the initial *kerygma* was followed by the teaching of τοὺς λόγους τοῦ κυρίου (cf. 18.11, 11.16 and 20.35).

Another group of phrases may be distinguished, where Luke speaks of men being added to, turning to, and believing in, the Lord (5.14, 11.21b, 11.23, 11.24, 14.23). But we have already included phrases about turning to the Lord and believing in Him, in section II (9.35, 42, 18.8a). As these occurred in accounts of the proclamation to Jews, the Lord cannot be the one they already worshipped, but Jesus Christ. If, then, the hypothesis that Luke used κύριος with the same meaning in all such similar phrases remains firm, the problem is solved: ὁ κύριος in such phrases is Jesus.

There is yet another group of phrases having to do with conversion, but in them 'the Lord' is active, as, for example, 'the Lord added . . . those that were being saved' or 'Lydia, . . . whose heart the Lord opened'. (2.47, 11.21a, 14.2 (D), 16.14, 16.40 (D).)

14.2 (D) probably should be rejected as an attempt to avoid a difficulty in the continuity of the original text,[1] while 16.40 (D) can be retained.[2]

The crucial passage is 11.21: καὶ ἦν χεὶρ κυρίου μετ' αὐτῶν, πολύς τε ἀριθμὸς ὁ πιστεύσας ἐπέστρεψεν ἐπὶ τὸν κύριον. The introduction of κύριος twice is very awkward,[3] and this awkwardness can only be explained on the assumption that the word in each case has a different connotation. We have already decided that the second κύριος probably refers to Jesus, so the first must apply to the God of Israel, a hypothesis strengthened by the fact that 'the hand of the Lord' is a standard OT phrase (cf. Luke 1.66).[4] Luke seems to have introduced the phrase here, awkward as it is, to emphasise that the conversion of the Gentiles at Antioch was the work of the Lord God of Israel. He showed the same care in 18.8 (D) where he said simply of Crispus, already a worshipper of the God of Israel, that he believed in the Lord (Jesus), while of the Corinthians at large, many of them doubtless Gentiles, he wrote at length that they believed τῷ θεῷ διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

[1] *Beginnings*, Vol. III, pp. 128 ff.
[2] ibid., Vol. IV, p. 201.
[3] ibid., Vol. IV, p. 129.
[4] Paul uses this phrase at 13.11, and so 'the Lord' here might also be taken to mean the God of Israel.

Each set of square brackets encloses a passage which Luke culled from some source (whether written or oral), or which he wrote himself as a 'link', 'stop' or 'summary'. The 'we' sections are in angle brackets. Those references which are only patent of explanation by some correlation between columns I and II are marked with an asterisk. The textual authority from the range ℵ A C D 81 (and Western) is recorded when our word does not appear in B. Passages not in direct speech are in *italics*.

Chapter in Acts	I *Lord God of Israel*	II *Lord Jesus*	III *Lord God (Godhead) or Indefinable*	IV *Rejected Readings*
One		[6], [21, ?24]		
Two	[17 (D), 20, 21*, 25, 34a, 39, [*47*]	34b, 36*, 38 (D)]		
Three	[20, 22]			*9* (C)
Four	[26, 29]	[*33*]		
Five	[?9]	[*14*]		
	[?*19*	*42* (CD)]		
Six		[*8* (D)		*7* (D)
Seven	30 (D), 31, 33, 49	*55* (D), 59, ?60]		42 (C)
Eight	[*12* (ℵ)*	*16*,	22, 24]	
	[?*26*, ?*39*]	[*25*]		
Nine	[5a*,	*1*, *5b* (& others: Wn.)* *10a**, b*, *11**, 13*, *15** 17*, *27a**, *b* (A & Wn.), *28**], [?*31*] [34 (A), *35*, *42*]		
Ten	[4, 33	[36*], [*48* (D)]	?14*],	*2* (81)
Eleven	[*21a*	[16, 17 *20*, *21b*, *23*, *24* (ℵA81D)]	?8*],	
Twelve	[?7, ?*11*, ?17] [?*23*]			*24* (B)
Thirteen	[?11	*2*, *12*, *44* (D),	?10	*5* (D), *44* (ℵA81)
	[47]	[33 (D)], *49*		*48* (ℵAC81)
Fourteen		*3*, 10 (CD), *23*]		*2* (D), *25* (ℵAC81)
Fifteen	[17a, b, 18 (AD)	11, 26] [*35*, 36, *40*		
Sixteen		*4* (D)	<?*10* (D)	*7* (C),
	14, *40* (D)	15 (D *θεῳ*)>, 31,		*32* (AC81 (D))
Seventeen			24	
Eighteen		*4* (D), *5* (D), *8a*, *8b* (D), *9**, [*25*]		
Nineteen		*5*, *10*, *13a*, b (ℵ), *17*		*20* (BℵAC81)
Twenty		<19, 21, 24, 28 (ACD), 35		32 (B)
Twenty-one		13, 14 (D *θεου*)>		*20* (D)
Twenty-two	8*,	10a*, b*, 19*		
Twenty-three		*11**		
Twenty-six	15a*,	15b*		
Twenty-seven				23 (81)
Twenty-eight		*31*].		

To call on the name of the Lord Jesus was to worship the God of Israel.

The other passages in this class, where the activity of the Lord God is spoken about, are not quite the same as 11.20a. However, they are very similar, and there is another piece of evidence which would tend to confirm the hypothesis that it is the Lord God of Israel whom Luke meant here. In 2.47 Luke is probably echoing Peter's words at 2.39, where 'the Lord' is the God of Israel. (For a similar echo compare 4.31 with 4.29.)

If, then, the passages listed do form a class, we may say that the connotation is fixed, and in these cases at least, Luke, like Peter, can talk about two Lords.

Of the remaining cases from section III and in indirect speech, we may reject 21.20 (D) on textual grounds (cf. 11.18), and assume that *κύριος* in all the following cases refers to Jesus, on the ground of parallel passages which are noted in brackets: 13.2 (20.19), 13.12 (18.11, 19.10), 14.3 (9.27, 28), and 15.40 (14.3). I would hazard that 9.31 also refers to Jesus.

The Table on page 171 summarises our results.

III

The title *κύριος* also was shown to have new content and significance in the Psalm, Philippians 2.5-11, which ought to be considered with the passages we have pointed out in Acts. What, then, is the general conclusion that can be drawn about the statement *κύριος Ἰησοῦς*?

At first sight there are differences in the way the title is regarded. For instance, in Acts 2 Jesus is given the *title* *κύριος*, while in Phil. 2 He is given the unknown *name* YHWH, which is acknowledged by the confession of the title 'Lord'. The latter is more like the view revealed to Paul on the Damascus road, and held also by Ananias: that the Lord's name is 'Jesus' (cf. also Peter in Acts 10.43). However, as the Lord's Name (YHWH) was unknown to all but the High Priest, the differing views: that Jesus had been given the title Lord (Peter), that Jesus was to be acknowledged as Lord because He had been given the divine Name (Phil. 2), or that the divine Name was 'Jesus' (Paul and Ananias), issue in the same practical result. To the question 'Who is the Lord?' the answer for all is 'Jesus'.

In Paul's case another practical result would seem to follow. As the name that lies behind the title LORD is now 'Jesus', it is inappropriate, except in polemic or apologetic situations (e.g. Acts 7.24), to apply the title to anyone but Christ representing the Godhead. This seems to be the case in the Epistles. Particularly striking are the quotations of, or allusions to, Ps. 110.1, when the first 'Lord' is always rendered 'God' (Rom. 8.34; 1 Cor. 15.24 f; Col. 3.1; Eph. 1.20, cf. Heb. 8.1 f).

The later codifications of the doctrine of the Trinity which sought to preserve the distinctness of Christ's Person without dividing the substance of the Godhead, seem to have rendered quite accurately into technical objective language the meaning conveyed by the men whose words are recorded in Acts, and who spoke experimentally.

We hesitate to say, on the basis of this study, what were the actual words of the earliest confession of faith, but if they were *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς (Χρίστος)*, this is immediately, and not by any sort of derivation, a fully Trinitarian confession. So far it is the relationship between the Father and the Son we have been exploring, but it is clear that at each crucial point in Acts the Spirit is at work. He created the 'kerygmatic' situation at Pentecost in which Jesus was proclaimed as Lord, and He was the one who pulled Saul up on the Damascus road,[1] and who thereafter stood behind Paul's mission (e.g. 20.23). Thus the confession *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς* depends for initiation, propagation and continuation, on the Spirit (cf. 1 Cor. 12.3), and is a confession that Jesus is LORD, the power of God's Name.

It remains to notice briefly the current theories which contradict this position.

Bousset's book *Kyrios Christos* seems to have been the most influential work in the field, and his theory is currently expounded by Rudolph Bultmann.[2] The theory is that *κύριος* was a Hellenistic title applied to Jesus with the current Hellenistic connotation of deity.[3] Later it gained LXX associations, which increased its significance in content and weight. Bousset

[1] W. D. Davies, op. cit., p. 185 and note.

[2] *Theology of the NT*, I (1948, E.T., London, 1952), pp. 51 and 121 ff, especially p. 124.

[3] Perhaps less than the Supreme Deity. Loisy, *Birth of the Christian Religion* (E.T., London, 1948), p. 222, and S. G. F. Brandon, *Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church* (London, 1951), p. 83.

has been taken to task by English scholars,[1] among others, who have shown that Jesus was called κύριος from the Resurrection onwards, and have denied that the title as applied to Jesus had its origin in Hellenistic spheres. However, they have hesitated to say that the full divine significance was attached to the word from the beginning, and have said, curiously enough, that some influence from Hellenistic religions helped to fix the later meaning.

These scholars have effectively questioned the hypothesis that Christianity developed into a Christ-'cult' from other beginnings, but a second assumption, which they share with their opponents, may well be questioned too. This assumption is perhaps based on the dilemma clearly expressed in the statement that 'it is very difficult to understand how Jewish Christians, trained in the strict monotheism of Judaism, ever came . . . to give Jesus Christ the title "Lord" '.[2] If our argument is correct, the concepts of God in this Judaism were the very ones used to proclaim the significance of Jesus' Incarnation, Death, Resurrection and Ascension. These events could only be set forth adequately by calling Him LORD, the title hitherto belonging to YHWH. There was a problem for monotheistic Jewish Christians, but it was no greater than the problem that has faced monotheistic Christians ever since.

We have shown (1) that the proclamation of Jesus as LORD is integral to several lengthy portions of Acts, and (2) that while there is no suggestion that the connotation of the word κύριος is affected by any religion other than that of the Jews (itself already touched by Hellenism, of course), there is a significant number of places where the connotation of the word is that of the Hebrew *adonai*, behind which lies the Name YHWH. In view of these two facts, it is unlikely that the word κύριος as applied to Jesus either originated outside Palestine or drew its meaning from any Gentile religion.

[1] F. C. Burkitt, *Christian Beginnings* (London, 1924), pp. 49 ff; A. E. J. Rawlinson, *NT Doctrines of Christ* (London, 1926), pp. 78 and 231 ff; C. H. Dodd, *Apostolic Preaching and its Developments* (London, 2nd edition, 1944), p. 15; V. Taylor, *The Names of Jesus* (London, 1953), pp. 38 ff. Dr Taylor goes no further than Rawlinson in holding that a recognition of His Deity is only *implicit* in the ascription of the title 'Lord' to Jesus.

[2] J. Y. Campbell, article on 'Lord' in *Theological Word Book of the Bible*, ed. A. Richardson (London, 1950), p. 131; also F. C. Grant, op. cit., p. 133 f. G. A. F. Knight, op. cit., challenges this supposition, see especially Ch. 12.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT: A SURVEY OF BARTH'S *KIRCHLICHE DOGMATIK* IV.1

by The Rev. Dr G. W. Bromiley

With the fourth volume of his *Church Dogmatics* Karl Barth has now moved on to the central dogma of the Christian faith, the doctrine of the atonement. He gives to this theme a rather wider sweep than most dogmaticians, for within it he treats not only the atonement in the strict sense but also the doctrine of sin, the doctrines of justification, sanctification and calling, and even the doctrine of the Church and the individual salvation of the Christian. In the part-volume now published (1953) the whole of this tremendous field is surveyed from the first of three independent but complementary standpoints.

First of all some general observations. The volume impresses, of course, by its sheer size, nearly nine hundred pages which cover only one third of the total projected material. But this is something which we have learned to expect from Barth. What is more remarkable is that in this vast bulk there is so little discussion of the historical theories of the atonement. The volume is not lacking in valuable criticisms of historical movements, notably the Federal theology, the Roman Catholic doctrine of grace, and certain aspects of the Reformation doctrine of justification, but apart from a short note on Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction the traditional theories are left severely alone. Instead, there is a tremendous concentration on direct Biblical exegesis, especially the Psalms, Romans, Galatians and such basic texts as John 3.16 and 2 Corinthians 5.19. On the whole this is probably a gain, for while we cannot afford to ignore the work of the past, constructive thinking on the atonement is often crowded out by a hackneyed historical survey.

At one point Barth seems to have been affected strongly by current movements, as he himself acknowledges in the preface. This is in relation to the de-mythologisation crusade of Bultmann. In tacit reply to Bultmann, Barth lays a tremendous emphasis upon the objective reality of the atonement as accomplished in and through Jesus Christ. But his treatment of the subjective application is correspondingly weakened, especially in the final and rather disappointing section on the individual faith of the Christian. By and large, however, he has worked out his doctrine with a refreshing

independence and originality. And on the foundation of the threefold confession of Jesus Christ as very God, very Man and the God-Man, he has projected a dogmatic structure which is outstanding both for the breadth of its conception and depth of its detailed treatment.

As is only to be expected, the first part-volume opens with an introductory chapter (13) in which Barth considers the subject-matter and the problems of the doctrine in two sections. The first of these (57) is entitled 'The Work of God the Reconciler', and it is itself divided into three sub-sections. In the first of these Barth gives us a general description of the atonement under the divine name Immanuel, in which he points out that the primary accent must be upon God. From this title, which in the Old Testament and also in the New is the sign both of salvation and judgment, he deduces (1) that we have to do with an act; (2) that this act is the *telos* of all God's other acts; (3) that it is an act of redemption; (4) that it is the fulfilment of the prior purpose of God to which we have no conceivable claim; (5) that this purpose has been compromised by our attempt at self-fulfilment; (6) that it is not an arbitrary act, but God Himself becoming true man to take our penalty and fulfil our calling; and (7) that it carries with it the possibility of a We with God. But the name Immanuel is the name of Jesus Christ, who is not merely an epistemological principle or a myth or a special instance, but the One in whom all this has actually taken place.

In the second sub-section the doctrine of the atonement is firmly linked with the supralapsarian teaching of Barth as the restoration of a broken covenant-fellowship. The Old Testament covenant is discussed here, and it is shown to be a basic and inviolable covenant of grace, dictated by God but also agreed by Israel and with a scope which is ultimately universal. This covenant is taken up and revealed in Jesus Christ, in whom we see the original will and purpose of God in the light of which the sin of man and even the atonement have an episodic character, although in the latter case only in respect of form and not of contents. By the covenant of grace in Jesus Christ we see that God is for man from the very first, for Jesus Christ is the eternal Word with God. As this Word He meets the sin of man from the very first, so that the atonement is not really contingent or relative, but a faithful fulfilment of the covenant will of God. But Jesus Christ is the incarnate Logos whom we know as *Deus pro nobis*. As the promise and command of the covenant which precedes all things, He is God's Word to us and God's work for us. This historical character of His person and work is our only safeguard against speculation and relativism. The Federal theologians

did something to give to the work of Christ its covenant setting, but they obscured the real truth by their 'historicising' of the Biblical message, their 'psychologising' of the atonement in terms of particular redemption, and their 'rationalising' of the whole doctrine by distinguishing between a natural covenant of law or works and the special covenant of grace.

The third sub-section is a short discussion of the fulfilment of the covenant, which in view of the sin of man necessarily took the form of atonement. Barth emphasises, of course, that sin or no sin it would still have been fulfilled as a covenant of grace. But in this connexion the question arises whether grace is not more free and glorious in this form. That may be so, but it is not sin which earns more grace. Therefore it is too much to say *felix culpa*, or to regard sin as excused. To do this is to make Christianity mythology and to confuse good and evil. The fulfilment itself is expounded in terms of John 3.16 and 2 Cor. 5.19. In both of these we have to do with an event in which God is Subject and the world object. This event takes place in the Son. It involves the Self-giving of God. It has as its purpose and result the salvation of the world and the calling of believers to the work of witness, the ministry of reconciliation.

The second section (58) of the first and introductory chapter consists of a survey in four parts of the whole doctrine of the atonement. Until the whole of Barth's work is available this is in a sense the most important section of all, for it enables us to see the first part-volume in perspective and to enter to some extent into Barth's understanding of the whole. The first part of it is devoted to a discussion of the grace of God in the work of atonement, in which Barth stresses (1) that it is grace; (2) that it is not part of a higher dialectic; (3) that it cannot be deduced; (4) that it is sovereign and unilateral; and (5) that it has to be accepted as a fact in Jesus Christ. He cannot agree to the complicated Roman Catholic analysis of grace which negates its unity. But sovereign grace does not mean 'God everything' and 'man nothing', for God has introduced a new man of whom too much cannot be said or asked.

This new being of man is the subject of the second sub-section. It is seen in Christians as representatives of the race, and it consists in faith, which accepts the divine verdict that man is not a sinner but accepted (justification), love which accepts the divine direction to the freedom of God's Kingdom (sanctification), and hope, which accepts the divine promise to advance to eternal life and to the lesser fulfilments of temporal life (calling). The verdict, the direction and the promise are all found in Jesus Christ, and in a third sub-section He is discussed as the Mediator or middle point between a reconciling God and reconciled man, the One in whom as very

God, very Man and the God-Man the whole event of atonement took place. In this respect Barth criticises strongly the customary isolation of Christology from the subjective application, and the no less customary separation between the person of Christ and His work.

Finally, in the fourth sub-section, he gathers these threads together into the three forms of the doctrine as determined christologically. The first form which is the main subject of the present half-volume starts with Christ as very God. As such He becomes a Servant (His priestly work). The second takes Christ as very Man, and as such He is exalted (His kingly work). It will be observed that Barth reverses the usual equation: Godhead-exaltation, Manhood-humiliation, which misses the whole point of God's saving action. The third form treats Christ as the God-Man, and as such He is the actuality, Mediator and Guarantor of the atonement (His prophetic work). Under all these aspects Christ faces the corresponding sin of man, which as a negation and opposition, with no right of its own, can be known only Christologically, not anthropologically, by the Gospel and not by the Law. The very God who became a Servant is confronted by the pride of man, and in Him God gives as an answer the verdict which means justification. The very Man who is exalted is confronted by the sloth of man, and in Him God gives as an answer His direction which means sanctification. The God-Man who is the Guarantor is confronted by the falsehood of man, and in Him God gives as an answer His promise which means calling. As applied by the Holy Spirit, these three answers carry with them the awakening and gathering, the life-giving and upbuilding, the enlightening and sending of the community (which in contradistinction to traditional dogmatics comes first), and then the faith, love and hope of individual Christians.

Having completed his introductory survey, Barth devotes his next chapter (14) and the rest of this part-volume, to a detailed presentation of the first form of the doctrine. He gives to it the general Christological title, 'Jesus Christ, the Lord as Servant', and he divides it into five main sections, the obedience of the Son, the sin of man in the form of pride, the justification of man, the gathering of the community, and the faith of the individual Christian. To each of these we must now turn in greater detail.

In the section on the obedience of the Son (59) Barth begins by emphasising that the atonement is history, the history of God's condescension. Jesus Christ is a Man, but is recognised to be the Lord. This is not just a value-judgment or a conferred title, but a fact. Yet the lordship of Christ does not lie in His majesty, but in His obedience, which means His humiliation. He identifies Him-

self with sinful man, and especially with the disobedient and condemned son Israel (which fixes His historical particularity). This condescension is the heart of God's action on behalf of man. It does not involve a ceasing to be God, but a decision of Deity not to be in the form of God only, but in an alien form. (At this point Barth introduces a useful discussion of seventeenth and nineteenth century *kenosis* doctrines.) Yet this decision raises the question of possibility: *Quo iure Deus homo?* It cannot be an act of Self-contradiction or paradox, but, as Barth sees it, the Self-humiliation is an act of God's love, a possibility of His being, and therefore the true revelation of His omnipotence, omnipresence and glory. As we see from Phil. 2, this is in fact God's way: and it is just as natural and glorious for Him to be lowly as to be exalted. But in God, in Jesus Christ, Self-humiliation means obedience, and this raises Trinitarian difficulties, which cannot be solved either by subordinationism or modalism. The cross shows us that there is obedience in God, which does not mean inferiority. The answer is in a true Trinitarian doctrine, which finds in the Virgin Birth not a beginning but a sign of the Sonship of Christ, to whom it is therefore just as free and natural to obey as it is to the Father to rule.

Having established the possibility of Self-humiliation, Barth turns in the next sub-section to its purpose: *Cur Deus homo?* The general answer is, for His own glory, and (without any necessity) for our salvation. It is God's Self-identification with us, His Self-exposure to our peril, for our sake. He comes as the Judge, to do justice and to pass sentence. But as the Judge He also pardons by Himself accepting the judgment. This comes out in the Gospels, where Christ is first active as the Judge, then passive as the judged. He does this 'for us', which means 'in the place of'—a definite replacement of us. (1) He is Judge for us: our false judgment is brought to an end. (2) He is judged for us: our condemnation is literally borne by Him. Barth sees that the Gospels and the Gospel involve inescapably a strict and very literal doctrine of exchange or substitution. This means that it is in Him that we can know our human case, that by taking our place He answers for our sin, and we are forgiven, and that by dying for sin He leaves us no more future or freedom as sinners but only as those who are renewed in Him. This work of the Son, which is reflected in the Christian ethic of sacrifice and forgiveness, was accomplished (3) in the judgment of His passion, which from God's point of view is really an action in which Jesus Christ is Subject, not object. The real point of the passion is in the One who suffers it, God Himself bearing away sin. Its content is the act itself, not its significance for us. Its meaning is God's reconciling of us by accepting death as the consequence of our sin,

not so much to spare us, but to destroy us as sinners in Christ. In this sense it is satisfactory, or sufficient, i.e. to overcome sin. But only because (4) Jesus Christ, the Judge who was judged and in that way executed judgment, was Himself just, and was ready willingly and obediently to affirm and accept the judgment. In this respect Barth points out that the aim of the temptations in the wilderness and the final temptation in Gethsemane was to force Him off this way of identification with sinners (1) by saving His life instead of fasting; (2) by setting up a kingdom on the presupposition of the lordship of evil; (3) by trusting God blindly at the wrong time and in the wrong way; and (4) by preventing the triumph of Satan and all the forces of evil at the cross. But Jesus remained obedient, and therefore the triumphant will of God was carried through even as Satan was allowed to do his will. The sub-section closes with a suggested restatement of the same points in cultic rather than legal terms.

The third sub-section, on the verdict of the Father, contains an important discussion in which Barth makes the transition from objective fact to subjective application. He emphasises that the transition is not merely from possibility in the former to actuality in the latter. Nor is the difficulty of the transition only one of time and space, as in Lessing's famous dictum. This is merely a technical problem of thought. The theological problem is that of the distance between Christ and the sinner, from which the technical problem of historical distance is no more than an escape. The technical problem is solved by the fact that Christ is present, but this solution gives us the real problem: When He is present we are judged and annihilated in Him and therefore a subjective application is out of the question. Barth seriously considers the negative possibility that God might have made a final end of us in Christ. He sees that in a sense this is true, and if there is to be a positive 'beyond' it can be only on five conditions: (1) that it is no less sovereign than the death in Christ; (2) that it is a new act; (3) that it corresponds to the first act; (4) that it is in history; and (5) that it is in relation to the same Christ. He finds these conditions fulfilled in the resurrection. It is (1) a sovereign act in which there is no component of human participation. It is (2) an affirmation of the justice of God, the answer to the cry of dereliction. It is (3) the grace of the Father corresponding to the obedience of the Son and taking Him up, with His life and death, into eternal being and therefore contemporaneity. This is the true transition to subjective application: not history or tradition, but the knowledge of the living Christ and His living history as accomplished for us all. Between a first direct manifestation of the Risen Christ in the forty days, and a future direct

manifestation in the second coming, there is the time of His living presence by the Spirit, the time of the community which is different from His time but related to it in faith and hope. This is the time of the real but provisional application, and therefore of the interposition of the human problems of sin, justification, the Church and the believer. The resurrection (4) is not myth but history. It cannot be proved by historicist methods, but it is an act. Nor is it the act which consists in the genesis of faith in the disciples but the act which underlies their faith. Its real attestation is not the empty tomb but the living Christ. It is (5) one event with the death, but in a definite sequence, so that the One who died is now risen. In view of this sequence crucifixes and an exclusive concentration on the cross are illegitimate. The No of God and the Yes of God are spoken and affirmed together.

In the next main section (60) Barth turns to consider sinful man in the light of the saving action of the obedient Son of God. The first part of the section is a defence of this novel order of treatment. The knowledge of sin is only by the knowledge of God. And not merely by a general knowledge of God, or the knowledge of God in the Law, but by the one God and the one Word of God, which is Jesus Christ. An abstract natural law can give only a knowledge of limitation. Even if taken from the Bible it is inadequate (as in Calvin), it tends to be supplemented from philosophy (as in seventeenth-century dogmatics), and finally it leads right away from the Bible and the Gospel (as in nineteenth-century Neo-protestantism). Only in Jesus Christ can we see the man of sin and his condemnation: for (1) the attitude of men to Him shows us the nature of sin as rebellion against God, fratricide and self-destruction; (2) Jesus Christ as Judge shows evil to be evil; (3) He tears away all excuses and mitigations by accepting solidarity with all sinners and taking up their case as a unity; (4) by His judgment He shows that sin is not part of a great design but something which has to be suppressed, which can be overcome only as it is suppressed and destroyed in Him.

The second sub-section is a study of the sin of man in the form of the pride which is the antithesis of the work of God in Jesus Christ. Barth is not contending that pride is the root sin, but that it is a concrete form of the disobedience and unbelief of man. It can be seen at four main points. Against the fact that God became a Man, (1) man wanted to be as God, which is impossible, although the desire carries with it certain very definite results. Against the fact that the Lord became a Servant; (2) man the servant wanted to be lord, which is impossible, but again the ambition has real consequences. Against the fact that the Judge was judged for us; (3) man wanted to be his own judge, which is impossible, but the delusion

involves a tragic conflict of human ideas, opinions and standards. Against the fact the Christ submitted to impotence in death, awaiting the divine help of the resurrection; (4) man wanted to be his own helper, which is impossible, although the attempt is real enough and has a very real and disastrous outcome. In relation to each of these points Barth discusses the nature of the temptation as we find it in the narrative of Genesis 3. He points out that in each case the sin rests on a mistaken view both of man and God, and also in an act of opposition to God. Finally he gives a detailed illustration of each form from the Old Testament: (1) the making of the golden calf; (2) the failure of Saul; (3) the seizure of Naboth's vineyard; and (4) the final end of the Jewish kingdom at the time of Jeremiah.

The third sub-section is devoted to a discussion of the fall in which Barth asks concerning the man of sin. Again he stresses that we must learn to know him, not from ourselves, but from Jesus Christ. For even the man of sin has not fallen out of the hand of God (cf. Ps. 139), but is defined in relation to creation and the covenant. From Jesus Christ we learn that (1) man is a hopeless debtor, so hopeless that any attempt to pay means fresh sin, and the only remedy is free forgiveness. We learn further (2) that since Jesus Christ died totally, the sin of man is total; from the heart outwards. This is not a denial of the good nature of man. It means that that good nature is set in the service of evil. The quantitative idea of a 'relic' is firmly resisted, as are all humanistic and Roman Catholic compromises, but in insisting on total sin Barth suggests the term *Ursünde* as an alternative for *Erbsünde*, which carries with it the unsatisfactory suggestion of an inherited defect or disease. Finally, we learn from Jesus Christ (3) that all are concluded in disobedience, a concluding which is the dead past of all men in view of the work of the cross. This concluding has reference to all mankind and all history as summed up in Adam, the unknown beginner and representative of a sinful race. We know Adam in this way from the second Adam, the Head of the new race, of whom the first Adam is not a parallel but a reflection.

The knowledge of sin clears the way for the critical doctrine of justification which is the theme of section 61. Against the negative side of God's work, His wrathful rejection of the Elect, in which He is true to Himself, we have to set the positive, His gracious election of the rejected, in which He is true to man. This is justification. It is the fact that the No is behind, the Yes before. It is the way from the one to the other. But this involves the problem: How can man be in the right when he is in the wrong? How can God be just and acquit? This is a basic matter, but we cannot make it central as in some dogmatic schemes. Sometimes it has to be central in polemics,

e.g. against Pelagians, Romanists and Liberals, but it is not the exclusive Word of the Gospel; cf. Paul, Calvin, and even Luther.

In answer to the problem of justification we begin with the divine judgment, which does not point us to a new righteousness of God against sin, but to the supreme and consistent right of God in which He fulfils His own will and election. This right is opposed by the wrong of man, but it is still maintained as God's right over man and to man, and it is the exercise of it which involves a judgment of man's wrong. The judgment is still grace (chastisement), but to natural man, who refuses a gracious God, it necessarily has the aspect of wrath. The gracious right of God inevitably cuts across the wrong of man and therefore cuts his existence in total judgment, and total pardon. In other words man is replaced. There is no dualism (e.g. between empirical and ideal man), but the one man has a whence and a whither, a yesterday and a today. This is incomprehensible in relation to ourselves, but it is a fact in Jesus Christ, who is both the electing God and elected Man, who takes the place of man, who moves for him from wrong and death to right and life. In Christ the man of sin is the man whose wrong has been cut across, who is judged, condemned, put to death, past. In Christ the new man has been brought in, who is pardoned, raised from the dead, future. The two parts are bound together and are irreversible, but they are true of us only in Jesus Christ. Primarily, this is a Self-justification of God, (1) as Creator, beating down sin; (2) as the God of the covenant, not abandoning His will to be gracious; (3) as the Son, vindicated in His readiness to obey; and (4) as the Father, vindicated in the grace and wisdom and omnipotence which asked this of the Son. Barth agrees that this Self-justification was not obligatory upon God, but he sees no reason to question it as a divine possibility. The just God is the God who justifies Himself in the justification of man.

If justification means the judgment of God, it also means the pardon of man, that a division has been made between wrong and the wrong-doer on the one hand and man as the elect of God on the other. This pardon can be only from God and only known from God, but it is total and absolute, as we see from the confidence of the Psalmists. Yet it is always a present thing, our present transition from here to there. Man is always a sinner, always pardoned. It is a *creatio*, not *ex nihilo*, but *ex opposito*. As we see from the Penitential Psalms and Romans 7 man is at one and the same time both the old and the new: both a sinner and justified, the latter having the precedence. Three points are to be noted: (1) as a sinner man always needs forgiveness, but the past is over, the new created, and in this sense there is a 'realised' eschatology; (2) man has

been instituted to a new right as a child in the Father's house; and (3) man is placed in a state of hope, the hope of a final consummation when there is no more sin and an entry into the divine inheritance.

Finally in a fourth sub-section Barth takes up the question of justification by faith alone. He begins by asking concerning the reality of the justified man, against which the facts seem to protest in every age. The answer is not that this man is an ideal, but that he is self-demonstrated in acceptance. This involves faith, an ability which when used knows that it is not an ability. In faith a man sees the justified man in himself, and prospectively in all men. But faith is a gift of God. It is not a ground, not an alternative to works, not a matter of choice, not a means of self-justification. As these things it would be a supreme form of pride. But as the human act corresponding to justification it is an abnegation of proud man, not in a self-chosen or enforced pessimism, but in the humility of obedience, in a comforted despair. Faith is, negatively, a rejection of all works; in this the Reformers understood and applied Paul rightly, as opposed to their antagonists. Faith is therefore an empty hand, a vacuum. And it is required because it is the only appropriate response to the self-demonstration of the justified man in Jesus Christ Himself. Everything is complete in Him: we have only to receive. At bottom, the exclusiveness of faith means the exclusiveness of Christ: *sola fides*, because *solus Christus*. But because Christ is the object, faith is not merely negative, but positive. It is a positive assurance that Christ is for us and for all men, and as such it works itself out subjectively in an *imitatio Christi*: a humble obedience of the Christian which is analogous to that of Christ and which underlies Christian ethics and sanctification. That Christ is the ontic and noetic principle, the actuality, of both justification and faith is shown by a detailed analysis of Galatians.

In section 62, the Holy Spirit and the gathering of the Christian community, Barth takes up his final problem, that of the subjective realisation of the atonement. He treats it first of all in relation to the community rather than the individual, but by way of introduction he has a sub-section on the work of the Holy Spirit which applies equally well to both aspects. He stresses that the subjective appropriation is not the real kernel of the doctrine, and that it must be related strictly to the objective work in Christ. Yet it is a new, and not a self-evident, thing, although within the purpose of God from the very first. It is still part of the Creed as the work of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is not the spirit of the Church or individual Christians, but the third person of the Trinity, whose office is to attest Jesus Christ. He is the awakening power in which believers

exist. But He is the sovereign Spirit, so that it is impossible to describe the 'How' of His work.

The first sphere of the Spirit's operation is the community, the being of which Barth now considers. He points out that the Church is the event of its gathering. This involves a visible, historical, human action. The power of the Spirit is in terms of flesh, so that there can be no ecclesiastical docetism. But the Church is three dimensional, and its real truth and visibility are known only to believers. Hence the danger of accepting a purely historical estimate, as in Schleiermacher. The Church's great sin is to be worldly. Its true being, known in faith, is as the earthly historical form of Christ, His body. At this point there is a valuable note on the New Testament use of the term 'body'. Barth then discusses the four predicates of the Church. (1) It is one. Within the unity there are the legitimate distinctions of visible and invisible, militant and triumphant, Israel and the Church, the churches and the Church. Other divisions are illegitimate. But we cannot ignore them, or solve them either by a flight to the invisible or a purely external union. We must begin with them. Our gathering to the Church is to our own denomination. It is our duty to follow out its doctrine and life, keeping it where it can be kept for Christ's sake, letting Christ speak to us in our own tradition, knowing His real presence in it in whatever form it comes. (2) The Church is holy, set apart. This again, like its unity, has to be believed as the work of the Holy Spirit reflecting the holiness of Christ. Individuals are holy only as the Church is holy: therefore, although there may be salvation outside the Church (not outside Christ), there are no Christian individuals. As holy in Christ, the Church is indestructible; it cannot fail. Thus it is a big thing to criticise it. The holiness is not in a special activity, but as Christ is in it, as there is the true working of the Spirit. This raises the problem of 'real' as opposed to nominal Christians. We cannot deny that there are nominal Christians, but we cannot judge in particular cases. We can only begin with ourselves as sinners, obediently accepting our calling to be the earthly historical form of Christ's existence. (3) The Church is catholic. It is one and the same Church in all places, in all cultures and in all times (not as old or new, but as *ecclesia semper reformanda*). It is not the sum of individuals and their beliefs, but the general Church to which all belong and the faith of which they confess, although there is of course a constant threat to become something different, a-catholic. Neither the bigness nor the littleness of a group is the real test of its catholicity, which is realised only in faith in the *veritas catholica*, Christ Himself. (4) The Church is apostolic, a concrete, historical, but spiritual test to distinguish the true Church

from the false, and therefore the only real 'note'. Apostolic does not denote a static relationship (as in the 'succession') but a living and active relationship. The Apostles were the medium of Christ's Self-manifestation, and have therefore normative significance. But they have this as servants: to follow them means service. It also means to follow the Bible, for the Apostles are linked with the Old Testament and testify through the New. The apostolic Church is the Church which hears the living Christ Himself in its reading and hearing of Scripture.

In a third and smaller sub-section Barth turns from the being of the community to a fuller discussion of its time, the time between the *parousia* of the forty days and the last *parousia*. He considers this time first as the strength of the Church, then as its weakness. It is its strength because it starts from Easter and moves to the final consummation. It is its weakness because at the moment it is at neither the one nor the other, and seems to be so weak in relation to both. He then asks why it is that this time is given. In a sense history came to an end at the cross, and there was no need for this interval. But the interval is given by the grace of God as the special time of the community, the time for its mission, the time for the response of man to the work of God. That God allows this time shows us that His work is real grace, not merely an act of power.

Finally, in section 63, Barth comes to the work of the Holy Spirit in relation to the faith of the individual. He begins by setting faith in a firm relationship to its object, rejecting outright those theologies which make the phenomenon of faith a starting-point and basis for discussion. Faith is the subjectivisation of a *res* which precedes it, the *res* which is a person, Jesus Christ. Faith is an orientation on Jesus Christ to the exclusion of everything else, including self. It is not a human possibility, but a necessity, and therefore the only actuality in the work of Christ and the power of the Spirit. This involves a contribution of the Christian subject, a personal acknowledgment, recognition and confession which only the new man can make. It is primarily cognitive, but has a certain creative character as his self-affirmation as a witness of Jesus Christ. The new man perceives and confesses that Jesus Christ and all His work is also for me, just for me. This means that there is a proper place for individual faith and piety, even I-hymns, but the important thing is that it is Jesus Christ who is for me.

The concluding sub-section is devoted to an analysis of the human act of faith as the great act of the Christian life. In it Barth takes up again the three moments which he mentioned in the previous part. Faith is first acknowledgment: we have to accept even before we recognise. For this reason Barth is strongly critical of the traditional

schema: *notitia*, *assensus*, *fiducia*. But the acknowledgment is of Jesus Christ, not of creeds or propositions or dogmas. Second, faith is recognition, which is included in the acknowledgment. We accept Jesus Christ as attested in Scripture, concretely. The account we give may vary—His form is so rich—but there is a definite aspect of knowing. And it includes a knowledge that we are the ones for whom He is and acts. Faith involves therefore an 'existential' disturbance, which is an act of God but not the great ultimate and absolute act as we have it in Jesus Christ. At this point Barth rebuts sharply the existential extreme of an enactment of Christ's work, or a re-presentation or repetition of it, in the believer, which he compares to the Romanist doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass, and which in his view reduces Christianity to a genuine mythology. What happens in faith is that there is an analogy to the work of Christ, in the overcoming of pride (*mortificatio*) and the acceptance of a new right and life (*vivificatio*). Finally, faith is confession, a giving as well as a receiving of knowledge. Our very existence in the community and in the world at large means that we have to confess. Barth reserves his analysis of what this involves, but at its simplest confession is not a special task, but just to be what we are. By his very nature, the believer cannot be anything other than 'a confessing Christian in the confessing community'.

G. W. Bromiley

BOOK REVIEWS

The Parables of Jesus. By Joachim Jeremias. Student Christian Movement Press, 1954. Pp. 178. 16s. net.

The publication in 1947 of a major work on the parables by the distinguished Göttingen scholar Dr Joachim Jeremias constituted a considerable landmark in Synoptic interpretation. Five years later a revised and enlarged edition appeared; and now Dr S. H. Hooke of the University of London has translated *Die Gleichnisse Jesu* into English. Let it be said at once that this is an admirable translation, fluent and idiomatic without any sacrifice of accuracy. Would that all renderings of German theological works were as satisfyingly free from the uncouthnesses of 'translation English' as this one is!

It is rather an odd fact that, whereas British and American theologians have always considered it a duty to acquaint themselves with the writings of their fellow-workers on the Continent, this *Verkehr* has often been in the nature of one-way traffic. One can think of not a few important books by distinguished European authors which have evinced an almost total neglect of the work of British and American scholarship in the same field, and of immense bibliographies in which not one English work was listed. But Jeremias is entirely free from this reproach. His is a truly international and ecumenical spirit, and repeatedly he acknowledges dependence on scholars and expositors of other lands. To take but one notable instance: the Foreword speaks of 'the extent to which the work is indebted for stimulus and instruction to C. H. Dodd's fundamentally important book' which 'has opened a new era in the study of the parables'. It is safe to predict that if a history of the interpretation of the Gospel parables should come to be written, three names would stand out preeminently: Jülicher, Dodds, Jeremias.

It was Jülicher's insight, in *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*, which established the fundamental distinction between parable and allegory. Throughout the centuries a process of uninhibited allegorising had played upon the imagery of our Lord's parabolic teaching until the essential message had become blurred and obscured or even dangerously distorted. Let us distinguish, said Jülicher in effect, between the picturesque detail of the parables and their central truth, between the external scaffolding and the edifice itself; do

not let us force upon the vivid imagery a weight it was never intended to bear; liberate the Galilean teaching from the fantastic exegesis to which it has been subjected, and it will speak for itself and make a highway into the hearts of men. No doubt Jülicher pushed his case too far: it would be unwise to insist that never at any time can the *māshāl*, as Jesus used it, have passed over into allegory. 'Great teachers', as Dr Vincent Taylor reminds us, 'refuse to be true to type, even their own type'. But Jülicher's central thesis was sound, and the principle he enunciated almost seventy years ago has not lost its cogency today. For arbitrary exegesis is still endemic in certain circles, and wields the same strange fascination as in the days of Philo or Jerome.

This, then, was the strength of Jülicher's work. But it had its weakness too. He saw that each parable was concerned to convey one particular aspect of truth. What Jülicher failed to see was the essential nexus between the message of the parables and the crises of the Messianic ministry. Not to be a preacher of general religious truths did Jesus come to earth, nor was the Word made flesh to buttress the platitudes of a prudential ethic. Take, for example, the parable of the Treasure Finder. That it is wise to sacrifice a lower good to a higher is, no doubt, a truth worth knowing; but this was no more than every decent Jew knew perfectly well already, and it did not require the abysmal descent of the Incarnation and the vast agony of Gethsemane and Calvary to make this generalisation plain. Something totally different was the message of the Master when He told such stories—something much more dramatic and eschatological, something which placed and still places the hearers in an urgent crisis of decision. It was the great service of C. H. Dodd's book that it corrected Jülicher so radically at this point. Now Jeremias has carried a stage further the effort to see the parables in the context of the mystery of the Kingdom enshrined in Jesus' person, and to hear again His authentic voice.

Every student of the parables has to come to terms with one *crux interpretum*, Mark 4.10-12 (and parallels). Many a commentator has dismissed as incredible the idea that Jesus can ever have said what the Greek of this passage represents. It is possible to resolve the stumbling-block of the ἵνα in various ways: to regard it as representing merely 'the irony of baffled love' (George Adam Smith); or to hold that ἵνα has here lost all its final or telic force; or to accept the Targum version of Isaiah as the essential clue; or to dismiss the whole section as unauthentic, the construction of later apostolic apologetic or dogmatic. In the end, one wonders whether the words which some Synoptic exegetes can only call preposterous and incredible and unhistorical may not be part of the scandal of

the Gospel itself, a Gospel which comes at once with mercy and with judgment, 'a savour of life unto life or a savour of death unto death' (2 Cor. 2.16). Jeremias' own solution is deeply interesting. He regards the passage as an authentic *logion*, dealing not primarily with parables at all (this, he thinks, was Mark's mistake) but with Jesus' preaching in general. More specifically, it may belong to the post-Caesarea Philippi period of the secret teaching of Jesus; and παραβολή is here to be understood, as of course *māshāl* could quite well be understood, simply as 'riddle' or 'enigma'. The meaning thus becomes—'To you has God given the secret of the Kingdom' —the recognition of its present irruption—'but to those who are without everything is obscure, in order that they (as it is written) may "see and yet not see, may hear and yet not understand, unless they turn and God will forgive them".'

There are two main divisions of the book, the first enunciating seven concrete principles for the recovery of the original setting and significance of the parables in the life of Jesus, the second containing an exposition of the parables classified into eight main groups.

Jeremias shows that during the period of the formation of the Gospel tradition many of the parables had already undergone a certain amount of reinterpretation, through their setting in the life and thought of the primitive Church. Therefore before we can be sure that we are in touch with their original meaning, such modifications have to be detected and removed. To this quest the author brings analytical skill and acute historical insight of a high order. Every page provides flashes of illumination and penetrating judgments. But perhaps it is the second main section, dealing with the message of the parables, which will earn the widest gratitude. Someone asked the present reviewer the other day, 'Will Jeremias' book help a preacher?' It is not an irrelevant question. Indeed, it would be salutary for theological writing if this kind of question were asked far more often. The trouble with so much New Testament scholarship has been, not that it has made devoted and patient use of the microscope of exegesis (for this is a truly indispensable service and the basis of all Biblical theology), but that it has become microscope-minded, as though the quest of truth could be concentrated in this intent perpetual downward look and could dispense with the telescope of faith. The most thoroughly unsatisfactory solution would be to departmentalise the two disciplines, with one set of investigators skilled in the technique of the microscope and little concerned about anything else, and with quite a different group reporting the discoveries of the telescope. Such a segregation of tasks would in the long run promote neither a reputable Biblical scholarship nor a dynamic missionary Church. So my inquirer

was fully justified with his question. In this case the answer is clear. Here is a book which will put at the preacher's disposal new treasures of understanding. Jeremias explicitly avows his concern with the preacher's task. His main object, he declares, is to seek to 'rediscover behind the veil the features of the Son of Man'; and he adds, 'To meet with Him can alone give power to our preaching'.

Two questions suggest themselves. One concerns the 'laws of transformation' to whose operation Jeremias traces the altered emphasis of many parables in the *Sitz im Leben* of the early Church. He notes that parables which originally must have been addressed by Jesus to opponents or to the crowd are now connected with the disciples, and thus made to apply to the Christian community; and that along with this there has occurred a frequent shifting of emphasis from the eschatological to the hortatory. In this connexion, employing careful source-criticism, he works backwards through secondary layers of tradition to the primary form, and amasses an impressive body of evidence to prove his point. The query I would raise is this: Granting the operation of this principle, is there not a risk of pushing it too far? May there not come a point where its application begins to blur the element of divine inclusiveness in Jesus' teaching? Is it not at least possible that when the early Church took to itself parables originally addressed to an entirely different audience it was not in fact shifting the emphasis or importing alien significances, but simply discovering overtones which Jesus from the first had intended to be present in His words? To put it otherwise, has recent theology not carried too far the distinction between *kerygma* and *didache*, as though the two things could never overlap? Might not a too rigid separation be precisely the most damaging thing that could happen to the vitality of the Church? When our Lord spoke parables vibrant with the urgency of judgment, summoning the unconverted to decision, is it beyond the bounds of possibility that He Himself intended His words to speak also to His own followers and go on speaking—when the *Parousia* appeared delayed—in the lengthening perspective of the Church? Are we to suppose that when the Word is preached to the unconverted it has no relevant message for the faithful, or that the eschatological cannot yield up the hortatory without a process of adaptation that does violence to the original intention? A shift of emphasis as between earlier and later sources may frequently be discernible: but may not both forms sometimes run back to Jesus Himself, and represent His burning concern alike for the conversion of those outside and for the conduct and direction of the community He was calling into being?

The other question has to do with the parables of growth. Here

Jeremias tends to disallow any significance except the eschatological. Everything centres in the ultimate harvest. It is only the final stage of the process with which Jesus compares the Kingdom of God. It is not the purpose of such parables to describe a developing process at all: that would be to read modern western ideas into them. This position of Jeremias represents the characteristic rejoinder of Continental theology to the utopianism of fifty years ago which had practically naturalised the teaching of Jesus into a doctrine of humanitarian inevitablism, the secular gospel of progress proclaimed with a Galilean accent, the view that the momentum of the Christian centuries would by itself transform the desert of the world into the garden of the Lord. Certainly Jeremias has right on his side in this matter. But I sometimes wonder whether we are justified in eliminating as radically as we tend to do today the idea of growth from our Lord's teaching on the Kingdom. If there is indeed no place for it, then most of the great missionary hymns of the Church are dangerously misleading. If there is no place for it, why should Paul bid the Colossians watch the Gospel penetrating into all the world, 'bearing fruit and increasing'? Remembering that in a sense we may still be only at the beginning of the Christian era, are we wrong to look for triumphs of Jesus within history far surpassing in range and sweep and splendour anything that the past has held? Are there any limits that can be assigned to the reach and penetration of the Cross, or any end to the power of the Resurrection? Must not an incarnational faith look out even upon this present world with a great and steadfast hope? Paul himself refused to believe that the historic rejection of Israel could be final: once the Gentile mission had been fulfilled, the insensibility afflicting the chosen people would have run its temporary course and all Israel would be saved. It was no mood of extravagant phantasy that the men of the New Testament were indulging who foresaw the ends of the earth crowding in to Christ's allegiance. For buttressing their hope like a towering rock stood the prophetic word of the Johannine Christ—'I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Me.'

James S. Stewart

L'Évangile et les Évangiles. By J. Huby, S.J. *Verbum Salutis* XI. Beauchesne et ses fils. Pp. 1-304.

It is a pleasure to commend this brief but admirably clear and succinct introduction to the study of the Gospels from a Roman Catholic source. It represents a thorough revision by Fr. Xavier Léon-Dufour of a standard work published twenty-five years earlier.

The work begins with an account of the Oral Tradition, its place in the Apostolic Church and the formal poetical structure of much of the Teaching of Jesus, with a useful note on the influence of Aramaic and of 'translation Greek' on the Gospels. It passes to a defence of the framework of the Gospel Tradition in which the 'formative character' of the Church is asserted but its creativity reasonably enough denied. With an eye to the exaggerated claims made by many Form Critics for the Apostolic *Sitz im Leben*, the book passes to a careful account of the manifold activities of the Primitive Christian Community. The probable existence of small written collections of Gospel material is fully admitted. Here, apart from the usual Roman Catholic confusion between the priority of the Church over the Gospels in order of composition and the priority of the Church to the Gospels in matters of doctrine and a somewhat overpressed argument from the 'structured character' of the Apostolic Community there is little that will be strange to readers of Dodd or Vincent Taylor.

When, however, the author passes to questions of Source-Criticism, he is unlikely to carry the majority of his British readers with him. At the same time his work is of value in assessing the extent to which the best Roman Catholic scholarship can go to meet the critical positions which have best stood the test of critical debate among us. The problems of the Priority of Mark, the Q hypothesis and the Proto-Luke theory are fairly discussed with full reference to standard works as well as full loyalty to his own confessional position. The solution which the author puts forward bears a certain family likeness to that recently defended by Abbot Butler. There is first an Aramaic catechesis composed by St. Matthew (shades of Papias!) utilised by St. Mark in combination with the catechesis of St. Peter. St. Luke is indebted to the same document, used St. Mark and added material peculiar to himself. The Proto-Luke hypothesis receives an honourable mention. If it is incapable of strict demonstration (few among its advocates would claim as much for it), its champions believe that it gives a certain 'solidity of basis' to the Lucan record of Our Lord. Our present first Gospel is a *traduction refente* of the Aramaic Matthew with additional material. A non-Roman Catholic scholar may be pardoned for thinking that this hypothesis makes the worst of both worlds. For a hypothetical Q is substituted a hypothetical Aramaic Matthew. And the author does not appear to notice a certain inconsistency in his treatment. He dismisses the argument from the 'picturesque' nature of the Marcan record as evidence for an early date but applies this criterion readily enough when it is a matter of St. Luke's use of St. Mark. The closeness of the Lucan

order of events with that of St. Mark apparently points one way, the similar phenomenon in St. Matthew is not brought into account. He honestly quotes several pages of Synoptic parallels without apparently seeing the direction to which they point.

By far the greater part of the book is devoted to a study of the characteristics of each of the Four Gospels prefaced in each case by an account of what is known of the author. There is little here to cause surprise. The special features of each Gospel are well brought out, and special mention must be made of his treatment of the Fourth Gospel. While full Zebedean authorship is naturally maintained, a slight adjustment of the argument in places would lead to the normal theory of mediate Apostolic authorship.

Scholars will find little that is new, though the full references to current French literature are of special value. The general reader will find a useful and normally reliable summary given with typical French clarity and unobtrusive learning. Dodd and Vincent Taylor are described throughout as 'Anglican scholars'. The reviewer would be proud and happy to claim them both, and certainly if a new category of 'Honorary Anglican' were ever invented, he is sure that both would be included *nemine contradicente*!

H. E. W. Turner

Le temps de la Parole. By Edmond Ortigues. (*Cahiers théologiques* 34.) Fr. 3.60. Pp. 1-55. Delachaux et Niestlé.

For one who is neither a Calvinist in theology nor an Existentialist in philosophy to review this book is a terrifying experience, somewhat akin to being thrown into the deep end of a bathing pool with only a rudimentary knowledge of swimming for consolation. The work is full of good things thrown out *en passant*, highly allusive and written in brilliant, fast-moving and often extremely idiomatic French.

The author is concerned with the problem how the Mediation of Jesus Christ actualises itself in accordance with the declarative categories of the Sovereignty of God over history. His method is a combination of exegetical theology and philosophy. The difficulty which his essay presents is the transition from the one to the other. On the one hand is the contrast between the *Deus absconditus* and the *Deus revelatus*, a deep apprehension of the meaning of Justification by Faith and the impossibility of any bridge between God and Man on the basis of works, on the other an insistence upon the *ipseitas* of God, *l'être auto-justificatif* and a profound sense, proper to an Existentialist, of the autonomy of consciousness. The bridge of causality in any Thomist sense is ruthlessly declared unfit for human traffic

and our attention is focused upon the Mediation of the Word. The Incarnation is an 'auto-limitation' which can be defined as a manifestation but not as a goal. 'Between the God who speaks and existence in the world, there is a No! violent, jealous and radical.' To this the only possible response is faith.

M. Ortigues is the deadly enemy of 'moral illuminism' and of a Mysticism which, like philosophy itself, must be broken by the Cross of Christ in order to be 'recapitulated' within the Kingdom.

It is difficult to feel satisfied that he has established a satisfactory bridge in the place of those which he throws down. There is something in his own approach akin to the Mysticism which he seeks to overthrow. There is room for the fear that he has fallen into the old trap of viewing priorities as contraries. And the reconciliation between his noble acceptance of the Sovereignty of God and his ruthless treatment of this-worldly causality and his equally burning acceptance of an existentialist doctrine of the self does not plainly emerge.

The book is certainly brilliant but is it possible that it is mistaken in its premises? A longer work with the jargon either explained or removed and the problems worked out in a less lapidary fashion would certainly have been more intelligible and perhaps more rewarding.

H. E. W. Turner

Luthers Geistige Welt. By Heinrich Bornkamm. Gütersloh, 1953. (2nd Edition.) Pp. 350. DM. 14.

Heinrich Bornkamm's *Luthers Geistige Welt* is a collection of articles and essays (first published Luneberg 1947) written with a view to popularise Luther's thinking. The intent of the book is to present a comprehensive grouping of some of the more important aspects of Luther's theology. The book makes no claim to offer anything new to Luther scholarship, but it does offer reflections of a Luther scholar on the influence of Luther in Germany in matters not only theological and religious, but also social and cultural.

Luther's development from the monk to the Reformer, his theology (e.g. Faith, Sacraments, the Church and Sin), his attitude to history and its interpretation, nature, the problems of society, and the translation of the New Testament are the sort of essays that the book contains. There are also articles of a pastoral interest on conscience and death.

All of these essays serve both to clarify Luther's understanding of these matters, and also to bring out the meaning and significance of Lutheran thinking in Germany's history in a manner especially

relevant for Germans today. The author's work is sound, and often very discerning and refreshing. He shows a deep penetration into Luther, and his work on the Sacraments is both valuable and interesting, as were also his articles on the Church, Faith, and the account of Luther's development. The author's judgments on Luther's attitude to the State, to Capitalism, to Mass Movements, to the Peasants' War and to some social problems may surprise some Germans, but what he says really needs saying (particularly by a German to Germans). Bornkamm shows a truly pastoral insight in his handling of conscience, sin and death. The book concludes with an interesting section on Luther's legacy to posterity.

To readers whose mother tongue is English, the style of the book may prove a little difficult, for the author deploys a wide vocabulary and writes in a vivid, colourful, rhetorical style, rich in imagery. Doubtless this makes pleasant reading for a German, but for others it makes the task of eliciting meaning less easy than it might have been. The book tends to be of a general nature, and although the author furnishes some references, (and in addition titles and dates of the several sources in the volumes of the Weimarer Ausgabe), the Luther student would look for and require many more references. Bornkamm has made a unity of the diverse essays that go to make his book, but the work repeats itself in places, a common failing of collections of articles written over a period of years. The work seems not to take cognisance of the valuable Luther research of the Scandinavians. As the author is writing as a German theologian to make Luther the German more vital for modern Germans, this may have been a deliberate self-limitation, but the work is less solid on that account. If the purpose is to gain insight into Luther, most English speaking readers will find much more help in the valuable works of Gordon Rupp and Philip Watson.

The book is beautifully printed and bound, and by no means expensive.

James Atkinson

Instruction in Faith. By John Calvin. Lutterworth Press. 7s. 6d.

Was the Reformer, John Calvin, one of the greatest theologians and leaders of the Christian Church in any age? Or was he a prophet of gloom, who gravely misunderstood the nature and implications of the Gospel; a revolutionary within the Church, who attacked the Catholicism of his time with embittered and fanatical fury?

If we in the Anglican Church would only lay aside our prejudices against the Reformers, and take the trouble to read some of Calvin's

voluminous writings—his commentaries on the Bible, his Sermons, and that immortal work, the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, we should, I think, have to admit that the Genevese Reformer was indeed one of the most inspired and devoted of all Christian teachers.

In a small but profoundly Christian book, entitled *Instruction in Faith*, which was first published in the year 1537, we now have in English dress the very heart of Calvin's conception of the Gospel. This little book was written while the Reformer was still quite a young man, with all a young man's optimism and faith. It shows us Calvin at his best, a Christian with a deep sense of God's love, and a real compassion for his fellow men. In some thirty-three brief sections he here covers great Christian doctrines, and the entire book is a striking witness to his knowledge of Holy Scripture, which was both wide and deep.

It would, of course, be impossible for a loyal Anglican to accept every detail of Calvin's theology. We are not Calvinists, and our very conception of the nature and activity of Divine Grace, of the Church, and the Sacraments, is, in some important respects, different to that of the Reformers and their modern disciples. But whether the ingrained Anglican suspicion of Reformation theology, and of Calvin's theology in particular, is justified or not is another question. In the present reviewer's opinion, the Anglican Church would gain great benefit if she took Calvin's theology more seriously.

At any rate, as we read this beautiful *Instruction in Faith*, we find ourselves confronted with the pure and living Word of the Gospel. Thus we may well be thankful that, in the life and labours of John Calvin, the Church was inspired and strengthened by a most faithful servant of God at a critical period of her history.

JOHN A. POWELL

Vom Geheimnis der Christlichen Gestaltung. By RUDOLF GROB. Johannes Stauda-Verlag zu Kassel. Pp. 223. Kart. DM. 7.50. Hebl. DM. 9.50

THIS book outlines a doctrine of the shaping of Christian patterns of living. Herr Grob sees the need for such a book in the threat that modern machine and mass techniques will impose an outward pattern on human society with consequent impoverishment of personal and community life. He also thinks that new gnostic interpretations of man and nature will have to be faced and challenged by Christians.

According to Herr Grob, Christian forms of living are fashioned

as Christ takes shape in human lives and communities. The pattern of life is not to be derived from patterns immanent in nature or history but is essentially a new creation of the unseen Christ working in and through lives surrendered to Him. It is the invisible image of Christ that has to take concrete shape in human lives and communities. This is to be conceived not as the imposition of form on matter, but as the overcoming of sin by grace which therefore involves discontinuity and new creation.

The book is full of illuminating references to many aspects of modern life and thought and enriched by many stimulating interpretations and applications of Dominical and Scriptural sayings. It ends on a note of hope in the power of Christ in the present crisis to refashion men's lives and fellowships after His own image. The Church also needs to undergo this transformation. Only so can it bring new life to the world. The argument is made easier to follow by a table at the beginning setting forth the theses supported in the course of the book, and much thought is concentrated within its brief compass.

J. C. Campbell

The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. By M. de Jonge. Van Gorcum and Co., Assen. 1953. Pp. 171. 18s.

This is a very careful and detailed doctoral thesis, for which part of the work was done in Manchester under Professor T. W. Manson. Let it be said at once that it is of the first importance, even if the conclusions are regarded as debatable. Dr de Jonge points out that although J. E. Grabe, the first editor of the Greek text of the *Testaments* (1698), held the work to be Jewish with Christian interpolations, this theory was not accepted until nearly two centuries later by F. Schnapp (1884), but that until then the work was universally regarded as Christian. The regnant view has followed R. H. Charles, according to whom the *Testaments* are a Jewish work written to glorify the Hasmoneans during the last years of John Hyrcanus (109-106 B.C.), but containing Jewish interpolations attacking the later Maccabees (*c.* 63 B.C.) as well as Christian interpolations. In the first chapter we have a thorough re-examination of the textual problem, and a challenge to the theories of Charles and Bousset, the purpose of which is to demonstrate the impossibility of maintaining a theory of Christian interpolations on textual grounds. In the second chapter a detailed study of important passages and an analysis of the composition of the *Testaments* leads also to rejection of interpolation theories on literary grounds. The third chapter gives the conclusions to which, in the author's view,

the evidence points. The *Testaments* are a Christian production written to teach the Christian way of life 'illustrated with the lives of the sons of Jacob' (p. 119), and are to be dated about A.D. 200. The writer utilised older Jewish material, including Jewish Testaments of Levi and Naphtali. On this view the *Testaments* still indeed retain their importance, but as a witness not to Jewish beliefs in the second century B.C., but to Christian beliefs in the late second century. They cease to be a possible source for Jewish beliefs, for example, in a suffering Messiah or in a priestly Messiah from the tribe of Levi. These are important matters which need reinvestigation, for Dr de Jonge would not claim to have said the last word, especially in view of the subsequent reported discovery of Aramaic fragments of the *Testaments* near the Dead Sea.

A. J. B. Higgins

Christian Faith and Higher Education. By Nels F. S. Ferré. Harper and Brothers. $3

Higher Education in the context of this American book means University education. Its theme is therefore similar to that of Sir Walter Moberley's *The Crisis in the University*. The right relationship between the two books is established by Dr Ferré himself—'This book was written because several people felt the need for a theological orientation that Sir Walter's book lacked' (p. 123).

It is the virtue of this book that its author seeks to deal with this problem of education at the deepest level. Many modern books on education devote a chapter to religious education but the relation of this to their main theme is very often not clear. Dr Ferré's approach is wholly different. 'Our main task is to propose a relation between education and religion in terms of the Christian faith that protects the integrity of both, while also joining them organically for mutual discipline and service' (p. 10).

Dr Ferré begins by asking three questions, 'What is Education?' 'What is Religion?' 'What is Christianity?'. He defines Education as 'the assisting of seekers for more truth and a better life to appropriate for themselves what is real, important, useful, and satisfying' (p. 15). Christianity is of vital importance for this task because 'Education is ideally lifted by the Christian faith into an absolute perspective wherein truth becomes high and holy and the student of infinite importance, but teacher and student are both lifted beyond themselves. The eternal truth gives significance to the immediate subject: God's will gives meaning to the life that teaches and the life that studies. Within the will of God is freedom for the self: freedom for community, freedom for truth, and freedom for creative life.

Education becomes a means to the better life, but a means penetrated and saturated with the eternal end of truth' (p. 74).

The approach to educational method is typical of the thoroughgoing theological outlook. Dr Ferré discusses how God uses nature, history, and experience pedagogically in order to achieve his purpose of Christian community, and concludes that the divine methods of education are marked by indirectness and vicariousness, permissiveness and punishment, decision and growth, educating the many through the few. These principles are then used as a basis for definite suggestions about method, such as substituting the case method for lectures as the 'backbone' of the teaching system, leaving the students to find from books what books can teach, and as offering guidance on college discipline and the right place of worship in college life. These principles appear again when consideration is given to the teaching of particular disciplines, especially Art and Literature.

Perhaps the least satisfying part of the book is the chapter on 'Community and Communication', partly because some of the problems faced in it are of less general interest (although the problem of 'hamperingly conservative colleges' is not confined to America), and partly because Dr Ferré's description of his ideal Christian college needs the counterbalance of his own sane thinking on 'Human Nature and Education'. Sir Walter Moberley said of the educator, that 'if Christian-minded, he will be conscious of his own mixed motives and recurrent self-deception, and he will indulge in no Utopian expectation'.

To those whose background for Christian education is the First Book of Discipline and for whom content and method suggest first the Bible and Shorter Catechism, this book may not seem to give enough space to the teaching of the Bible and Christian doctrine. This defect is more apparent than real, and Dr Ferré would have his own answer for such criticism. Indeed his whole approach may serve to make some see the danger of over-intellectualising the process of Religious education, which is an abuse of the Reformers' method because it substitutes a part for the whole. The vital concern shown for memorisation and the insistence on its close linking with meditation may, however, suggest a method whereby the 'Principles' which 'ought and must be learned in the Youthhead' can profitably be taught today. His last chapter, too, shows a real Reformed concern that the Universities should produce men and women to the 'Profite of the Kirk and Commonwealth'.

It is impossible in a short review to do justice to the close knit theological argument, and the good sense of the practical proposals, which are made to depend upon it. One remarkable feature of the

book is the writer's ability to crystallise a provocative truth into a single phrase: 'God does not teach by code and creed'; 'Art has seldom flourished within evangelical gardens'; 'Kindergarten and backwoods religion cannot cope with the growth of modern knowledge'; 'The Function of the University in the world is to be its mind'; 'Education cannot bypass the realism of Jesus who knows that man is sinful and must be born again'.

Sir Walter Moberley's book, as some may remember, represented a personal writing up of group thinking and discussion by Christians about the bearing of their faith on university education. The present book is bound to further such thinking for those who are interested in religious education at any level, and who seek a constructive, theological approach to it.

JOHN GRAY

The Church and the Jewish People. Edited by Göte Hedenquist. Edinburgh House Press. 10s. 6d.

THIS is a handsomely produced book, at a remarkably cheap price. The editor, a minister of the Church of Sweden, and Director of the International Missionary Council's Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews, assembles ten papers from the pen of writers who have for long been acknowledged as having very special knowledge of aspects of this difficult and anxious field. For the most part, the volume is clear, earnest and informative. Being dedicated to the promotion of better understanding between Christians and Jews, 'it is projected under Christian auspices and one of its chief purposes is to bring home to Christians their continuing responsibility in relation to the Jewish people today'. Accordingly it is to the good that two Jewish writers as well as eight Christian contribute to the volume.

Probably the best place at which to start the study of this book is the analysis of the Jewish population in the world today which appears as Appendix II. These figures have a dreadful significance. The total number of Jews is 11,600,000—which is 6,400,000 fewer than before 1939. In other words, over six million Jews have been exterminated in recent times. In Germany there are only 20,000 Jews, compared with 600,000 before the war; and in Poland the Jewish population of over 3,000,000 has been reduced to 35,000. On the other hand, fully half the Jews today are in the Americas, principally the United States. Nearly half a million are in Great Britain, half of the total number in Western Europe.

The historic fact which looms large in this book is the setting up of the State of Israel. The political and religious significance of that

event is examined with detail, insight, and honesty. In the last five years the Jewish population of Israel has increased more than 100 per cent to the figure of almost a million and a half, members of a State which is not yet recognised as an independent State by its neighbours. 'Palestine today contains far more Jews than lived in it in the great days of Solomon. For the first time for centuries Jews in large numbers are living on the land and making the desert blossom as the rose.' All this has not, of course, brought to an end the Jewish Dispersion among the nations; they are still distributed in 97 different countries; and the long-standing tensions are still there. The best Jews regard the setting up of the national State of Israel as 'a centre from which Jewish spiritual life will reap new harvests and give the world's Jewry new nourishment', and therefore they deplore the evidences, referred to in several portions of this book, of the dangers to Jewry and to mankind which reside in 'secularised Zionism'.

The return of the Jews to Palestine is often associated in the minds of a certain type of Christian with false ideas relating to the end of the world of which it is taken to be a sure sign. One of the merits of this book is that such notions wither before its deep understanding and its wide vision. For the Christian Church, the teaching of Paul in Romans 9 to 11 is definitive and decisive, and the hope expressed there is founded on the words of Jesus Himself and 'a correct understanding of Romans 9 to 11 is vital to a balanced Christian theology'. Although the task is admittedly hard, the Church can never relax its sincere and worthy efforts to secure the conversion of the Jews. In Israel, where the Christian minority is only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the population, there is probably least room of all for optimism.

It is fully a quarter of a century since the publication of a similar volume entitled *The Christian Approach to the Jew*, and several excellent smaller books have appeared in the interim. Despite the vast changes which are chronicled here, the essential problem has not changed. The Jews still remain a very separate people; they have never been good mixers, and so they are not easily assimilated. Their roots go further back than any other people of the modern world, and it is their religion especially which has made them what they are. Anti-Semitism is vigorous enough yet, even if only in the form which this book calls 'an unanalysable dislike'. In cruder forms it is still manifest, e.g. when Jewish children have shouted at them 'Who killed Christ?' by people who themselves have little knowledge of or love for Him.

A careful reading of this book will convince us that it is almost inevitable that Christianity and Judaism should remain problems

for each other. Taking the long view, however, the rate of conversion is remarkable. It is pointed out that in the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century the proclamation of the gospel in the Jewish field has been as successful as in any field and more successful than in some. 'If all the Jews who have embraced Christianity had remained a distinct people instead of being absorbed by the nations among whom they dwelt, their descendants would now be counted in millions.' Although the orthodox and devout Jew has a religion which is the next best to Christianity, the evangelising of the Jews remains a necessary part of the Church's programme; and there may be some danger of this being overlooked in the wide sweep of the ecumenical movement. We read in these pages some account of why converted Jews are often suspected by other Christians. On the other hand, the efforts of the Hebrew Christian Alliance and the project of a Hebrew Christian Church are examined in the light of their avowed purpose to retain something distinctive of Judaism in the faith and practice of the converted Jew.

There is more evidence in this book of active co-operation between Christian and Jew over the last thirty years than most readers would realise or expect, and there is a wise and encouraging study of the factors making for common effort and the sound basis on which it can rest. On the ground of the Old Testament revelation there is much that can be done together; although even here the new State of Israel poses fresh problems. It is not possible, however, to stop at this point. For the world-wide task of the Church, it is essential to preserve in Christian theology the characteristically Hebraic forms of thought. The insights of the Old Testament into such themes as election and redemption are necessary for full faith everywhere. The historic mission of the Jews is best understood in terms of suffering and sacrifice, and so also is the mission of the Church. It is of vital interest for the Church to take full account of modern Jewish work on Biblical research and on the philosophy of religion; and the interpreters of present day Judaism have much to say on the doctrine of God and man and a universal ethic to which the world ought ever to listen. World-Jewry itself unfortunately needs to recapture much of this, for it is itself divided deeply against the diverse backgrounds of living in many lands, and a good deal of the internal problem of the State of Israel takes its origin here. In many ways it is 'a godless State', with deep, strong tensions. There is as yet no revival of the Sanhedrim; the practical problems of keeping the Sabbath law in modern conditions raise many a dilemma and as yet no prophet has emerged to point the way to the achievement of unity.

No volume which is a symposium is ever able to avoid different levels of thought, inequalities of literary expression, and some degree of repetition and inconsistency; but in this case all that appears only in the minimum degree. The chapter on 'Questions asked of the Church from the Jewish point of view' is probably the vaguest; and we are left wondering a little as to what is really demanded of the Church in recognising that Judaism has 'its missionary task' and 'a future of its own'. With all tolerance and persuasion, and acknowledging to the full its debt to the Old Testament, and making all allowance for 'whatever fables used to go the round of the Church', the Church can never relinquish its conviction that the Jewish people erred most grievously in the rejection of Jesus of Nazareth, that the Christian interpretation of Him is either absolutely true or absolutely false, and that there is no middle way in regard to His Messiahship and unique Divinity.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Authority and Freedom. By ROBERT H. THOULESS. Hodder and Stoughton. 8s. 6d.

THIS book, from the clear mind and the incisive pen of the Reader in Educational Psychology in the University of Cambridge, deserves widespread attention, especially in student circles where the perennial problem of faith and reason, of a religious outlook which can be held without grave violation of intellectual honesty, is very much alive today. Dr Thouless has already put many readers in his debt by earlier books, notably *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* and, even more, *Straight and Crooked Thinking*. Now, in these Hulsean Lectures for 1952, he writes as a layman on theological issues, but as a loyal member of the Church of England. It is altogether an advantage that he has trespassed against what he describes as 'the governing principle of the psychological study of religion—the exclusion of transcendance'—otherwise such a study as this would be partial and truncated. In its brief compass, the book reveals a full, balanced knowledge of the history of Christian doctrine; and it penetrates through, with a kind of engaging, gentle candour, to wise judgments on the place of dogma in religion.

The scope and the substance of the book can be grasped from the fact that the writer announces at the start that he is to give an affirmative answer to the three main problems with which he is concerned:

1. Is there now a decline in religious conviction?
2. Is it possible for a reasonable modern man to accept a religious system of thought?

3. Are there respects in which religious ideas are presented to the modern man which unnecessarily increase his difficulty of acceptance?

Dr Thouless believes that falling Church membership is a reliable indication of declining religious faith, and his first chapter is a well-balanced assessment of the main causes for this situation, though it may not take sufficient account of more encouraging features, e.g. the interest in Christian doctrine among students which is unprecedented within the last three decades. It is significant that he does not mention psychology itself as one of the factors contributing to the decline in religion; nor is there enough emphasis on the hesitation of the Church in respect of the necessary social implications of the faith. He is surely right in claiming that firmer foundations are required for the twentieth century, for the educated and the simple alike; and in stressing that the great issue is the *truth* of religion, not the probable benefits of it, e.g. for delinquent or neurotic types—which is important but secondary.

Five chapters are then given to various aspects of the crucial question—is there too much dogma? is it expressed in unacceptable forms? He would agree that things may grow old, and yet not be out of date, because in substance they are unalterably true. The difficulties of the language employed in the formulation of doctrine are carefully examined. He recognises that the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical use of language is not a modern discovery, but he also believes that modern science, to which the language of metaphor is not natural, has given us 'a new literalism', and so intensified this difficulty. The question of a technical theological vocabulary as a means of getting over our difficulties, a 'jargon' which people could learn as they learn other jargons, is also looked at; and the wise safeguard is made that, whatever the terms which clothe the beliefs may be, essential and ultimate mystery must remain.

Dr Thouless is in no doubt that the Church has a function as guardian of the faith, and that the aim and goal is the Christian way of living in community; and in this connexion he quotes the cynical remark attributed to Pascal that 'Christendom is a society of people who with the help of certain sacraments evade the duty of loving God'. He sees the danger of 'substitute goals', and orthodoxy may be one of them, when it confuses 'peripheral religious matters' with the central core. But what is the central core? Is it in John 3.16 or Acts 4.12? And do not both of these involve the profoundest theology? The dark story of intolerance and persecution, in the long effort to secure a uniformity and correctness of belief necessary for salvation, is told with earnestness and under-

standing. The supreme question is: 'What are essential, obligatory beliefs, and what deviations may be allowed?' There is a classification of beliefs into obligatory, prohibited, permitted, indifferent; and to these he would add a new category, 'orthodox, non-essential beliefs'. What all this means in the practical life of the Church is at least glanced at, especially in the Church of England and its Thirty-Nine Articles. The final chapter on 'Intellectual Exploration' is a re-affirmation of what Augustine said on this vital subject—'non uno itinere perveniendum est ad tam grande secretum.' Evidence has to be weighed, the alternatives to belief have to be frankly faced with a view to securing a stronger faith in which the false antithesis between the sacred and the secular will be overcome, in which physical and spiritual alike will reveal the glory of God. Those who are willing to venture out on such a high enterprise will find much assistance in this book, so fair and honest in its criticism, so reverent and patient in its spirit, and so fresh and open-air in its treatment and style.

GEORGE S. GUNN

My Servants the Prophets. By EDWARD J. YOUNG. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Pp. 231. $3.00

THE author of this book is a young American scholar who has already made several quite important contributions to OT study. He stands in the conservative tradition as the following quotation from the book now under review shows: 'For our part we believe most firmly that it [the Bible] is the Word of God and that it is entirely to be trusted in all of its statements . . . ' (p. 126). It is to be hoped that an avowal of this kind will not prejudice unduly the minds of OT scholars in this country towards Professor Young's latest book. It does merit serious study.

The aim of the book is to examine the origin and nature of prophecy in Israel from the standpoint of the OT. The plan that the author follows is simple. Because of his theological position his first main concern is, of course, (*a*) to argue for the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy, and (*b*) to establish that prophecy in Israel was of divine origin, that Moses had 'a unique and unparalleled place' in OT prophecy, and that in consequence all the other prophets occupied a position subservient to that of Moses. This second part is based mainly, though not exclusively, upon Deut. 18.9-22 and Num. 12.1-8, on which he supplies long, careful, exegetical notes. Next comes a discussion of the three terms נָבִיא, רֹאֶה and חֹזֶה. Professor Young then considers the relation of the prophet to the

theocracy (by which he means the monarchy), and to the cult (our author calls it the church). This is followed by a comparison between the false and true prophets. An examination of the prophet's claim to receive revelations, and of the psychological problems which that claim involves, brings the book to a close.

In many ways this is a refreshing book in virtue of the author's attempt to bring an unbiased mind to a factual study of what the OT has to say about the prophets. Whether he has succeeded in this attempt must be left to the reader to judge, but one cannot help feeling that here and there in the two first chapters the writer is having to struggle hard with facts that are too few, and at times unaccommodating; the result is that the style is correspondingly heavy and uninspiring. And his contentions on pp. 80-81, e.g., that it was 'quite probable that such people (who were asking Samuel for a king) would be without knowledge of their law' (as e.g. in Deuteronomy), and that 'there is nothing in the attitude or actions of Samuel which will support the view that the Book of Deuteronomy had not been written', and so on, are not very convincing. But Professor Young has reminded us of the necessity of going to the OT with minds disabused of prejudices and so give the OT a chance to say what it wants to say, and to take seriously what it actually says. Too often the procedure has been to use a theory as a criterion of judgment concerning the OT when to have appointed the OT as judge would have been to follow a surer instinct.

The author's discussion of the term נָבִיא also serves to underline the value of making philology the handmaid of the OT and not vice versa; although in our view he does not utilise sufficiently the light that the OT throws upon the etymology of the terms רֹאֶה and חֹזֶה in his treatment of these words. In this part of the book the author is concerned to prove that there was no essential difference in the OT's use of these three words. In his view they were synonyms used to describe the function of the prophet. In discussing the relation between the prophets and the cult Professor Young supplies a healthy corrective to what has been written on the question of the cultic prophets. He examines carefully a number of OT references which authorities like Professor Aubrey Johnston have used as a basis for their important studies on the cultic prophets, and shows quite convincingly that in a number of instances the advocates of the cultic prophet theory have tended to read into the texts rather more than was justified.

Professor Young's book provides a timely corrective regarding another area of OT studies where much useful work has been done, especially by the Scandinavian scholars. He warns against an over eagerness to postulate of Israel's prophets some of the characteristics

found among the priestly diviners and ecstatics who were such a common feature of the religious cults in Mesopotamia. It is plain that there were features common to both, but these similarities must not be emphasised to the extent that the fundamental differences will be lost sight of which, in the author's view, is what has happened in some of the writings emanating from the Scandinavian school. Here he has Haldar's work especially in view. In this connexion the writer has, doubtless unwittingly, misrepresented Professor Norman Porteous. In referring to the latter's scholarly study entitled, 'The Basis of the Ethical Teaching of the Prophets', included in the latest of the Society for OT Study's publications, *Studies in OT Prophecy*, Professor Young, on p. 104 of his book represents Professor Porteous as saying: 'The Hebrew priests and prophets are, that is to say, to be regarded as essentially species of a widely spread genus and the weight of emphasis is laid on similarity rather than on difference.' In fact Professor Porteous did not *say* this. The sentence in question is part of his summary of Haldar's position which he is discussing; it is not an expression of his own view as is perfectly plain from the discussion that follows.

Professor Young is helpful when he deals with the false and true prophets and shows convincingly that a clear distinction must be drawn between these two categories. So different were they that it would be unsound to impute to the true the characteristics of the false, and thus make the distinction between them one of degree and not of kind. In the author's view they represent two completely different categories.

Amongst other things this book serves to remind us of the importance of one's doctrine of the Word. Professor Young's view of Scripture is such that he accepts the OT's claim that prophecy in Israel had a divine origin, that the prophets were called by God, and that it was from God that they received their revelations, and that these together represented a religious phenomenon that was unique in every sense of the term and constitute for us today part of the Word of God; although many would argue that it would be wrong to infer that one would require to be committed to the view of Scripture held by Professor Young before one could legitimately subscribe to his doctrine of OT prophecy. And Professor Young's book is a reminder not only that one's view of the Word is of vital importance but also (and this is more important still) that one's attitude to the Christian view of God and the world is fundamentally significant.

Several misprints have been overlooked. For 'two' read 'too' (p. 39); for 'ne'eman' read 'ne'eman' (p. 51); for 'in' read 'is' (p. 93) for 'unamed' read 'unnamed' (p. 126); for 'nahbi' read 'nabhi'

(p. 144); for 'when' read 'where' (p. 158); and there is a blemish in printing in the last line of p. 180.

J. G. S. S. Thomson

Schweizer Urspruenge des anglikanischen Staatskirchentums. By Helmut Kressner. (*Schriften des Vereins fuer Reformationsgeschichte*, Nr. 170. Jahrgang 59, Heft I.) Pp. 136. DM. 12.

Under this, at first sight, paradoxical title Dr Kressner investigates a somewhat forgotten influence in English Church History. That of Calvin is well known, but Zürich too was regarded among the Reformed as an oracle whence opinions might be sought on disputed points of doctrine or practice. Zwingli once declared *Urbem christianam nihil quam ecclesiam christianam esse*; and Whitgift in his controversy with Cartwright asserted, 'I make no difference betwixt a Christian commonwealth and the Church of Christ'. What, if any, are the links between these two similar-sounding utterances? Or in other words, how far was Zwingli's ideal of a *Kirchenstaat* the prototype of Whitgift's *Staatskirchentum*? This is Dr Kressner's problem, and the subject of his fascinating and rigorous research.

He begins with a sympathetic account of the genial humanist idealism of Zwingli who, working in the congenial atmosphere of democratic Zuerich and finding no refractory elements in its political set-up, came to see in the State with its laws and magistracy the proper authority not only for the reformation of the Church but also for the ethical advancement of its citizens. Upon the magistrate, guided by the preacher or 'prophet' whose business it was to declare the will of God, devolved the task of making and keeping the republic truly Christian. The Zürich of Zwingli, Bullinger and Gwalter seemed to have attained the ideal relationship of Church and State, where the Church had no need of any separate power or jurisdiction of its own. In Bern, where the City Fathers carried through the Reformation on their own responsibility, the situation was similar except that they kept the government of the Church entirely in their own hands.

Meantime in Geneva the Reformation had been following very different lines. Calvin believed that there was laid down in the New Testament, i.e. *jure divino*, a fixed ecclesiastical constitution and system of Church government separate from and independent of the civil government; and he demanded for his Consistory moral jurisdiction over the citizens *qua* Church-members. When the magistrates hesitated, appeal was made to Zürich. On the advice of Bullinger the opinion was given that Geneva should submit to

Calvin's Discipline, though it differed from that in use in Zürich. Every Church may adopt the 'discipline' which it finds suitable *pro ratione temporum, locorum et personarum*. On these terms Zürich and Geneva maintained amicable relations in spite of a difference in ecclesiological theory.

The divergent views, however, did come into conflict. In 1536 Bern annexed from Savoie the Pays de Vaud and resolved to introduce the Reformation. Naturally reformed preachers had to be sought from French-speaking Geneva, and they, led by Viret, demanded a Church system of a Calvinist pattern. The Bernese government determined to maintain their own, and the dispute waxed violent over many years. Zürich took no part in it, but Musculus, a theologian settled in Bern, in the concluding sections of his *Loci Communes*, written during the controversy, developed the Zwinglian doctrine of *Respublica Christiana* far beyond Zwingli, completely subordinating the Church to the State. Musculus was ostensibly attacking the Romanists and nowhere mentions the Calvinists. But Dr Kressner shows that he wrote with the uncompromising memorandum of Viret in view, and that he goes out of his way to refute its arguments, thus implying that in the matter of Church-State relations Calvinists and Romanists are in the same false position.

The *Loci Communes* were dedicated to Frederick III, the new Protestant Elector Palatine who was urged to establish the Reformation in his dominions. There again, shortly after the death of Musculus, an attempt was made to introduce the Genevan Discipline. Erastus stood forth in opposition, and in his controversy with Beza appealed to Zürich. Again Bullinger and Gwalter remained neutral. They maintained that each Church must have liberty to choose its own order, and that there was no order divinely obligatory upon all Churches. But they refused to condemn the Genevan order or to countenance Erastus, much to the disappointment of the latter.

At this point puritan, i.e. Calvinist, opponents of the Elizabethan Settlement in England began to arrive in Switzerland seeking support. In the vestiarian phase of the controversy Zürich, on the prompting of Beza, did write to influential persons in England in support of the puritans; but when it became clear that the real point at issue concerned Church government, Gwalter turned right about and in his *Homilies on* 1 *Corinthians* (1571) dedicated to the Anglican Episcopate, thoroughly trounced as 'a relic of Papistry' and a danger to the State the idea of a Church Order separate from the civil order and claiming a *jure divino* jurisdiction over the citizens. 'Ministers of the Church may advise magistrates in accordance with

the Word of God, and even severely rebuke them if they deserve it, as the Prophets did formerly, but they may not subject them to their own Consistory unless they want to imitate those who hold Magistrates in contempt.' Dr Kressner shows in detail convincingly the indebtedness of Whitgift to Musculus and Gwalter whom he regards as his theological authorities and whose ideas and arguments he freely uses in his controversy with Cartwright. Here, then, is a Swiss influence on Anglican *Staatskirchentum* in its beginnings; but if it is to be traced to Zwingli, it must be recognised to have undergone a serious change, in that legal and political interests have come to predominate over the more purely ethical.

Dr Kressner's book unfolds an important chapter in inter-Church relations well worth study today. In particular it elucidates the fate of what he calls the *reformatorische Gemeinde-Prinzip*, found first in Oecolampadius and in Bucer, and developed through Zwingli and Gwalter to insignificance in Musculus and Whitgift, but on the other hand through Calvin to its logical conclusion. It has no doubt made good the claim that Zwingli's idea of *Respublica Christiana* was a solution of the problem of Church-State relations as distinct from that of Calvin as from that of Luther—an attractive solution for the modern mind in its recognition of the ethical nature of the State; but a solution full of danger. 'That sad compromise, the Christian nation!' The conclusion to be drawn from the book, though it is not clear that it is the author's, is surely that Calvin was right in maintaining the dualism of Church and State. Only if the Church remains the Church is there hope that *Volkskirche* may become *Bekenntniskirche*, and that the political community will be at least challenged by the idea of *Respublica Christiana*. The Christian values are not always secure in the hands of the *Obrigkeit*.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

Draft Catechism with Notes—authorised by the General Assembly for experimental use—The Church of Scotland Youth Committee: 121 George Street, Edinburgh.

IT is high time that the Catechism was revised, if in the altered conditions of today a catechism can be useful at all. The Longer and Shorter Catechisms date back to an age very different from our own. Their language is archaic; their content is not exactly what we should wish today to include in a statement of the essentials of the Christian faith; and it is safe to say that they have retained their place in virtue of the good judgment of the Church of Scotland in providing 'enabling acts' which, incurring risks and witnessing to an enfeebling diversity of opinion as they do, at least legalise a

certain freedom of thought and conscience. It is solemnising to read on the title page of the Shorter Catechism that it was approved 'to be a Directory for catechising such as are of weaker Capacity', and one can only surmise and admire the spiritual and intellectual stature of those who, fit for the Longer Catechism, could apparently take the Shorter in their stride. The action of the General Assembly of 1954 in commending a 'Draft Catechism with Notes' for experimental use in the Church is both timely and wise.

It is probably rather a thankless task to compile such a draft. Those responsible deliberately expose themselves and their work to criticism, and there will be plenty of people only too happy to go gunning for them. While personal taste and predilection should not find a prominent place in the Catechism, neither should they too largely determine its study and consideration. But it is a little difficult to comply with the request made in the introduction, and to keep consideration of the notes quite distinct from that of the Questions and Answers, since the former occupy so much of the space, and the latter without some kind of amplification would be too exiguous to be of much use. The Draft ought to serve most usefully the purpose for which it is designed. A real attempt is made to present the faith in its fulness and in simple terms. It does not indeed yet possess the lapidary quality which is desirable in a document which will be (one hopes) in constant use; but this may be imparted as a result of careful study by the Church. Some of the notes are perhaps too long and others, especially in the section on 'Teaching on Conduct', a little commonplace. On the other hand, there is some excellent material which illuminates and expounds the faith with real effectiveness.

Perhaps it will be most useful to comment here on one or two apparent defects, to mention some smaller points where improvement may be hoped for, and to transmit (as requested on page 10) a considerable list of minor infelicities to the appropriate quarter.

To begin with, is the order right? Is it from any point of view correct or advisable to start with man and to raise first and foremost a question about the world? A start of this kind not only sacrifices the majesty of the Westminster Catechisms which the draft is designed to replace, but shifts the centre of gravity to where it should not rightly be. The cosmological argument is after all the product of sophistication, and one would have thought that, even if we are to be guided here by pedagogical considerations, the question concerning God should come earlier and with more solitary prominence. The first section is indeed comparatively short, and perhaps indicates

a lack of confidence in this starting point, as the compilers hurry on to what must be regarded as the major task ahead of them.

Secondly, do we find in the soteriology here expressed all that ought to have a place? It may be allowed to pass that Jesus Christ (except as the historical Jesus) plays no part in awakening men to a sense of sin (Q and A 15). But it is more serious to find a lack of objectivity in the answer to Q 16: 'How are we saved from guilt and the power of sin?' Here repentance and faith are mentioned in this order, and repeated in the notes; but there is no mention, in Q, A or notes, of what it is Christ does to effect such salvation and make available its benefits to men. Something vital has here slipped out. The power of God manifested in Christ and the work which Christ does is not really geared into the human situation. An attempt is made to show that to lay hold of Christ is to have forgiveness; but the Draft is silent on the question, which Denney for example pressed with such insistence, concerning the objective effect of the Cross upon the world and man's status in it.

There is a similar defect in objectivity in the treatment of the Word of God (Q 25) and of the Sacraments (Q 26). Is such great and almost exclusive emphasis rightly laid upon the matter of 'assimilation'? Q and A refer to *where* the Word of God is to be found, and to *how* the Word of God is received, but not to *what* the Word of God *is*. The notes to Q 24 help out a little, but it is neither happy, helpful nor very profound to compare the Word of God with oranges. One longs for an echo of the sure-footed objectivity of Amos. So with the Sacraments: here the 'blessings conveyed' should have precedence of the 'vows taken', and the divine appointment and promise take the place of 'acquisition of sacred meaning'. The teaching of the Westminster Confession of Faith on 'efficacy' has not been sufficiently assimilated. And what possible purpose can be served by emphasising the 'fittingness' of the sacramental symbols by references to H_2O and animals when, if sacrament means anything, element and blessing are incommensurable?

It is to be hoped that the section on 'Teaching on the Future' will receive some attention and perhaps revision. One would have thought that memories of the celebrated controversy between Barth and Brunner would have induced a more careful handling of the term 'capacity', and the thought that something in us 'makes it impossible for us to die' is not Biblical. An attempt is made to distinguish the eternal life offered by Christianity from 'survival', but there is no clear affirmation of a doctrine of resurrection as contrasted with immortality. About 'the final destiny of all men', it is on the whole better to advocate suspension of judgment than blandly to declare it to be the 'business of all Christians'—especially if all

the guidance offered is the banal principle that men must be 'true to the highest light they know'. And how does it come about that for the Christian the crucial final question has been transmuted into acceptance or rejection of 'the Christian way of life', when the Bible writes Christ?

As for smaller points where improvement may be hoped for. One wonders whether the mention of natural theology and revelation in QQ 6 and 7 is a deliberate reversion to what may be thought to have been with advantage replaced by general and special revelation. It seems a pity, in a day when ecumenical concerns are important and members of other Churches will look with curiosity and concern especially at what is thought and held about the Church, that no account is given of the credal attributes, holy and apostolic, that the scriptural 'body of Christ' goes unmentioned, and that the importance of denominational differences seem to be if anything depreciated when they are once mentioned (notes to Q 20), because in the judgment of God there is only one Church. Further, one wonders whether it really is Biblical to say glibly (Introductory note to Q 40) that those who defy the commandments 'sooner or later end in destruction', and feels that the reader has a right to be told what is meant by 'sooner or later'. The statement on p. 60 that the problem of war cannot be settled 'largely because most people involved—and today that comprises all nations—are not adherents of the Christian faith' is nonsense, plain, pompous and rather offensive. The expression of Q 61 leaves the meaning, at least for one reader, quite obscure. And finally, some way must no doubt be found by those who attempt to expound the deep things of the faith to overcome almost countless difficulties of expression. One of the most formidable is to get the right terms in which to present what St. Paul presents as our work and God's work (Phil. 2.13)—what D. M. Baillie calls 'the paradox of grace'. Here the spectres of Synergism and Semi-Pelagianism are ready to clank their chains. Whether consciously or not, the Draft deals with the problem on four occasions of its occurrence by using 'as'—AA 16, 33, 34, and 62. Man's part is then connected with God's in undefined correlation. But can the problem be evaded in this way? and of the two, is not the worse risk to open the door to Pelagianism than to run the gauntlet of Predestination?

One must certainly wish a fair and full use of this Draft within the Church to which it is commended, so that something may finally emerge *e consensu fidelium* which will be really worthy of its Westminster precedents. Perhaps the above may contribute to this end.

J. K. S. Reid

The Book of Common Order of 1940 Examined. By THOMAS M. DONN, M.A. The National Church Association.

More Frequent Communion Services in the Church of Scotland? By THOMAS M. DONN.

BOTH the pamphlets named at least raise subjects of importance. The first, however, does not make any valuable contribution to the theme with which it deals. If only a part of the defects which the author alleges were substantially present in the Book of Common Order, it is safe to say that it would long ago have collapsed from sheer internal weakness. Mr Donn espies alarms and dangers round almost every corner, sinister implications in rubric and phrase, and the traces of 'pompous strain and sacerdotal stole' throughout the whole book. It is a pity that he should indulge in so wild an extravaganza of criticism. No one is likely to be entirely satisfied with what was produced in 1940, and everyone must have points where complete approval is withheld. Some of the lunges which Mr Donn makes do really get home, but they fail to reach any vital spot. There must always be a more or less wide permitted area within which people can hold different opinions without being immediately charged with infidelity to tradition or heresy. Anglicans in practice make this area for themselves, often with real regret, by the simple disregard of formal undertakings about adherence to the Prayer Book demanded of them at ordination. The Church of Scotland is in the happier position of being able to authorise a book without requiring its use. It looks as if Mr Donn alone wished to ram certain hard and fast opinions concerning the 'disputables' down other people's throats: he actually deprecates 'any suggestion that free prayer may be entirely omitted at the choice of the minister'.

Mr Donn is not a very reliable interpreter of Scripture (witness his application of Rom. 12.1), of Anglicanism (witness his reference to Benediction or Blessing), of the Reformers (for example with reference to the laying on of hands), of the subordinate standards of the Church of Scotland (when dealing with the real presence and the epiclesis), or of Romanism (for example when referring to the application of the Agnus Dei in the Mass). One has therefore doubts if he can be very reliable when he undertakes to expound 'the spirit of the Scots people' of today.

If Mr Donn occupies a standpoint, it is one that deprecates all catholic elements as such without discrimination or condition. The implication of this is serious. As D. H. C. Read pointed out in this *Journal* (Mar. 1955, pp. 76 ff), there are three factors which should be allowed to influence worship. These are, in order of importance, the catholic or universal, the national or denominational,

and the congregational; and Mr Read's judgment is that too often the right order is precisely reversed. Mr Donn's suggestions seem to favour a third possibility, and to lay chief emphasis on the second factor, so that Christian questions must be settled with the drums of nationalism beating in our ears. The tone of the pamphlet suggests an attempt to rally dissident elements to a standard of revolt, rather than to persuade Christian people of the justice of a case. In this sense, it is an honest piece of 'pamphleteering', complete with the invariable ingredients of tendenciousness and frank malice, and with the slightly antique flavour that writing of this kind now exudes.

There is no doubt about Mr Donn's attitude to more frequent celebration of the Communion. He is against it. His submission is that 'the present position of the Church of Scotland anent frequency of communion has been amply vindicated by the facts of experience and history'. But it is more difficult to be sure of the arguments he brings forward in support of this opinion, whether it be in itself right or wrong, and he leaves room for doubt sometimes of their strength, and sometimes of what they actually are.

Mr Donn's treatment of the New Testament evidence is at least ingenious. Either on the one hand it supports infrequent celebration, and its evidence may then be unconditionally accepted. Mr Donn tries to make this the case by supposing a comparatively late and erroneous identification of the 'purely cultic celebration' or Eucharist and the 'breaking of bread' or Agape. But alas! what kind of exegesis is it that finds from 1 Cor. 11.20-22 that 'it is clear' that St. Paul deprecates the identification of the two rites, and from 1 Cor. 1.17 that 'it is quite clear' that the Communion is quite secondary to the preaching of the Gospel? But even if on the other hand the New Testament evidence supports frequency of celebration, Mr Donn is quite equal to the situation, and, adducing 'quite exceptional' circumstances, declares with unruffled aplomb that the 'Church has "learned by experience" ' that frequency is harmful.

Calvin's advocacy of frequency, stated in the *Institutes*, reiterated in the Articles concerning the Organisation of the Church and of Worship at Geneva (1537), in the Draft Ecclesiastical Ordinances (1541), in the Short Treatise on the Lord's Supper (1541), in the Clear Explanation of Sound Doctrine concerning the True Partaking of the Flesh and Blood of Christ in the Holy Supper (1561), and relinquished in practice only because of the stubborn opposition of the magistrates of Geneva, cannot really be disposed of by the phrase quoted from a tendencious work to the effect that 'longer experience had led him somewhat to modify his views as to the expediency of very frequent communion'. Certainly the rubric

from the Directory of Public Worship, that the 'Supper of the Lord is frequently to be celebrated' destroys the supposition that the Church of Scotland has traditionally held that infrequency is in itself a virtue. And one feels that, *if* 'the vast majority of the members of the Church of Scotland' are against frequency, this is not because they are convinced that Our Lord's intention was an infrequent or annual celebration, but simply because they have never had experience of anything but infrequent celebration.

The argument such as it is seems chiefly to be based on a false assumption. This assumption is that frequent celebration is tied to 'sacramentalism'. In fact, the principle that guided the Reformers at this point was opposition not only to the partial, but also to the infrequent opportunity given by the unreformed Church to ordinary Christians for partaking of the Eucharist. The necessary relation between frequency and superstition is a bogey of which they are almost unaware. So frantic is the opposition offered in this pamphlet to what the author calls the 'sacramental delusion' that with supreme indifference he makes it out to be both cause and consequence of frequent celebration.

Mr Donn's world is peopled by covert Romanists, and there is no doubt that the real object of his attacks are those adhering to what he is pleased to call 'the sacramental Creed', and believing in sacerdotalism. It is perhaps quite a good thing that there should be watchmen in the Church of Scotland on the alert against such dangers. But it looks as if the strategy of defence against them, if they exist, would have to be in other hands. The proper defence is to exalt the true importance of the Sacrament, and not to depreciate it—certainly not to adopt the principle that whatever is is right. The question of frequency of celebration deserves careful and realistic discussion upon this high level—much more careful and realistic discussion than appears here.

J. K. S. Reid

The Canon of the Mass. Its History, Theology and Art. By Jerome Gassner. B. Herder, London, 1949. Pp. 404. 37s. 6d.

The Spirituality of the Mass in the Light of Thomistic Theology. By Adolf Dominic Frenay. B. Herder, London. Pp. 296. 30s.

These two volumes form a useful addition to the already large number of studies on the Roman Liturgy. They approach the subject from different angles, the work of Dr Gassner having the wider reference. His general plan, after some introductory chapters, is to examine in turn the prayers of the Canon, with regard to their origin, significance and interrelations. There is no claim to reach

a final solution of the various problems connected with the Canon, but the discussions are both interesting and informative. The book is not easy reading, partly because of the nature of the subject, but also because the style is often awkward and sometimes obscure. But it is all worth careful study. Among the particularly interesting chapters are those which deal with the 'altar on high', the relation between the heavenly liturgy and the earthly, and the Scriptural background with special reference to the Sanctus. In the section on the Art of the Liturgy, which is all too short, the symmetry of the early mosaics is compared with that of the Canon. The parallelism may be urged too strongly, but the idea is illuminating.

The work of Dr Frenay is more of a devotional nature. He is concerned with the spirituality of the Mass, the purpose being to help the priest to meditate upon and so to understand more fully the whole Eucharistic service. In the course of this he continually adverts to Thomas Aquinas and, we are told, quotes him some two hundred and eighty times. But the book is far more than a mere catena of Thomistic texts. Once again the method is to take the parts of the Mass in turn and consider their theological and spiritual significance. Here is profitable reading not only for the Roman priest, but for clergy of other denominations, who will find that though they cannot accept the whole dogmatic position, the work has a real value both for homiletical purposes and for the deepening of personal religion.

JOHN A. LAMB

Muhammad at Mecca. By W. MONTGOMERY WATT. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953. 18s.

DR WATT here deals with the first part of Muhammad's career up to the Hijra. Muhammad grew up in the trading and financial centre of Mecca in a period when the interests of commerce were cutting across tribal solidarity, and individualism was growing. What united men was their material interests rather than their tribal relationship. The old religion was decaying, and there was no satisfactory adjustment to changing circumstances. Some people had adopted a vague monotheism, and this presumably was Muhammad's outlook also, although he must have looked for some kind of reform in Mecca.

While there may have been no grinding poverty, the gap between rich and poor was widening. Dr Watt points out that in the early days Islam was essentially a movement of young men, its supporters being people about the middle of the social scale who, becoming conscious of the disparity between them and those at the top, were

beginning to feel that they were under-privileged. But he argues that, while Muhammad was aware of the economic, social, political and religious ills, he concentrated on the religious aspect as fundamental, and summoned men to Islam on the religious plane.

Dr Watt very rightly insists on Muhammad's sincerity. The Qur'anic *kerygma*, he holds, was a creative irruption into the Meccan situation. Judaeo-Christian ideas are present in it, but they were not merely borrowed; they were presented in the 'arabised' form in which they were already present in the minds of the more enlightened Meccans. The originality consists in the fact that the Qur'an gave them greater precision and detail, presented them more forcefully, and by varying emphasis made a more or less coherent synthesis of them. Above all it gave them a focus in the person of Muhammad and his special vocation as messenger of God.

In dealing with the Meccan situation where the old nomadic virtues were breaking down, and where tribal solidarity and a sense of the honour of the tribe no longer acted as a force to make the strong show consideration for the weak, the Qur'an introduced the teaching of eschatological rewards and punishment and created a new morality consisting of the revealed commands of God. Over against an increasing lack of a sense of creatureliness it set the power and goodness of God, emphasising that He is the source of the good things men enjoy. He is Creator, Sustainer, and finally Judge.

In this book, which is addressed primarily to the historian, Dr Watt has made good use of his sources. It is a difficult period to deal with, for the sources must be used with caution. But while Dr Watt recognises this, he feels that the material is more reliable than many Western scholars have been prepared to admit, and he displays considerable critical acumen in his use of it. His argument is well reasoned, and he shows an original approach. While the book very properly goes into some matters of detail of more particular interest to specialists, it is one which the general reader will welcome with gratitude. It is a distinguished contribution to an understanding of Muhammad, and we shall look with interest for the second instalment dealing with Muhammad at Medina.

James Robson

Studies in Muslim Ethics. By Dwight M. Donaldson. London: S.P.C.K., 1953. Pp. xi + 304. 27s. 6d.

The primary aim of this book is to give educated Muslims 'a convenient summary in English of the ethical teachings of their own literature', but the author also hopes that it will meet 'the desire of Western residents in Muslim lands, especially those who are

Christian missionaries, to know and to appreciate the best that is to be found of high moral value in the literature of the people with whom they live'. The book is thus a survey of the vast field of Islamic ethics. Nothing comparable has been attempted before, and the author is to be complimented on the large measure of success he has attained in this pioneer work. Experts in part of the field will object at times to his emphasis, and perhaps find errors of detail; but this is inevitable in such a work. There is also an unduly large number of slips and inconsistencies in the proper names and in the transliterated Arabic and Persian words; but these will not seriously disturb the classes of reader for whom the book is intended. For such readers the book gives a balanced survey of the ethical beliefs and theories of Islam. Commencing with the virtues of the pre-Islamic Arabs, and the teaching of the Qur'an and of the Traditions about the words and deeds of Muhammad, it proceeds through the philosophical writers, the ascetics and the mystics to conclude with some modern ethical interpretations of Islam. Numerous quotations, translated by the author or others, bring the reader into direct contact with sources and enable him to some extent to form his own opinion.

Two points should be kept in mind by the reader who is not an expert. The first is that Dr Donaldson, after thirty-three years as a missionary in Persia and India, is more sympathetic to Indo-Persian Islam than to Arabic Islam. He does not go so far as those Indian Muslims who, in order to glorify Muhammad, vilify the pre-Islamic Arabs to an extent that offends the Arab Muslim of today. Indeed, he recognises the moral 'stamina' of Muhammad's race. But he is much more critical of the Arab ethics of pre-Islamic times, of the Qur'an and of the Traditions than he is of the later ethics, which is largely Persian-inspired even when written in Arabic; and only from the Persian side could one write that in the ninth century 'it was a basic conviction in Muslim thought that the highest type of humanity is reached when man attains essential oneness with Allah' (p. 103); in Arabic-speaking lands the conviction that God is transcendent tends to make oneness with God unthinkable. A writer who was primarily an Arabist might have stressed rather the Arabs' manliness, chivalry and nobility of character, and criticised the Persians for their insipid redaction of Greek writings. Clearly, however, Dr Donaldson has chosen the standpoint that would be most helpful to his Persian and Indian Muslim friends.

The second point is that moral ideals may be judged either as ideals of universal application or with reference to the social system in which they are operative. Dr Donaldson has chosen the first standpoint. Thus he regards the blood-feud, for example, as bad;

but when from the other standpoint it is taken as part of the nomadic social system, it is seen to be a way of preventing irresponsible acts of violence, and so a primitive form of justice. Since Islam claims universality for its central ethical teachings, Dr Donaldson is fully justified, but others might hold that even for the missionary the second approach is more fruitful in the long run.

W. Montgomery Watt

The Revelations of Mechthild of Magdeburg (1210-1297) or *The Flowing Light of the Godhead.* Translated by Lucy Menzies. Longmans. 18s. net

If we are indebted to the late Evelyn Underhill for introducing this gem of medieval literature to students of Mysticism, we are no less indebted to Miss Lucy Menzies for putting the book into our hands in English form—a labour of love, no doubt, but requiring much skill and patience.

Though a mystical classic of varied appeal, the 'Revelations' almost defy any attempt to summarise their contents because they lack systematic arrangement. True, they are presented in seven parts, of which Part IV contains autobiographical material, Part V has Repentance as its theme, and Part VI deals with the Practical Christianity of the Cloister, but all are full of the authentic spiritual experiences of the saint and her moving descriptions of the soul's intercourse with God—written, literally, as the Spirit moved her—now in verse, now in prose, now as Soliloquy, now as Dialogue.

The book is best regarded as the inspired effusions of a genuine poet, and typical of the age in which it was written, the age of the minnesinger and of medieval chivalry; not the least part of its charm consisting in the bold use Mechthild makes of the romantic material to her hand in narrating her communion with Christ almost in the manner of the Song of Solomon, often as not against a background of exquisite natural beauty. And when to that consideration we add the author's explanation of the manner in which the book was composed: 'I cannot write, nor do I wish to write, but I see this book with the eyes of my soul, and hear it with the ears of my eternal spirit, and feel in every part of my body the power of the Holy Spirit'—it will not surprise the reader that it cannot be easily fitted into common categories.

These 'Revelations' are in fact the testimony of a devout and singularly pure soul, who beheld God in all lovely things in Heaven and on earth. If there is one theme predominant it is the Love of God, strongly evident for example in the saint's impressive pictures of Heaven and Purgatory and Hell. The typically medieval des-

criptions of the pains and woes of lost souls are characteristically blended with divine love and pity. Even in the dark pit of corruption Mechthild sees some glimmer of God's love seeking and saving the lost. It is no accident that one is constantly reminded of the Divine Comedy, for Dante may well have profited by this book.

Finally, let it be said that Mechthild, like St. Dominic and the Order of Preachers whom she so admires, is herself no mean preacher. By her curious use of numbers ('How God speaks to the soul in three states'; 'When thou art about to die, take leave of ten things', etc.) impressing the memory; by her rich use of symbolism, appealing to man's love of the picturesque; by her lofty flights of imagination and vision (as when she seemed to receive Mass at the hands of St. John the Baptist), stirring more sluggish minds; and by her 'insistence on Reality's overwhelming Actuality', to quote Evelyn Underhill in the Preface, overcoming the unbelief of less gifted spirits.

C. R. WALKER

Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus. By WALTHER VÖLKER. Pp. xxviii + 672. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1952. DM. 39.00

THIS massive work is undoubtedly the most important patristic monograph to appear for many years. Designed as a sequel to the author's masterly studies of Origen (1931) and Philo (1938), it analyses in close detail the spiritual and mystical ideals of Clement of Alexandria. Every page manifests minute acquaintance with the text and exhaustive knowledge of the modern literature that has gathered round it. At each point the author carefully surveys the evidence under his microscope, and in lengthy, scrupulous footnotes records the opinions of previous students, giving generous bouquets of congratulation to those he approves and, perhaps more frequently, kicks of disapprobation to those he does not. So great is the apparatus that there is a danger that Clement himself might be lost to sight, smothered under the minutiae. It is a measure of Dr Völker's achievement that somehow he remains master of his material. His theme is that Clement is a great Christian mystic, whose ideal is of an ascetic training in Christianity by faith and works of love which ascends at last to the deifying vision of God. For the historical understanding of the mystical tradition of the medieval Church and later piety the 700 pages of this book are indispensable reading; and any inclined to suppose that early Christian history is all a sordid tale of dismal heresy-hunts and ecclesiastical power-politics may find here a healthy corrective.

Nevertheless I believe that Dr Völker's sympathy and enthusiasm lead him at the end to exaggeration. He is concerned to argue that Clement's mystical ideals are not importing a pagan, neoplatonic piety into the Christian tradition but, inasmuch as they are throughout determined by *agape* and by the Pauline-Johannine tradition, are authentically Christian. This is a very delicate matter to decide, and at least some case may be made for an alternative view. Sometimes when the point is being urged that Clement's language is 'profoundly Christian', one is tempted to ask if this means more than 'I like it'. Be that as it may, this is a great book, and all students of Christian history will be grateful for it.

H. Chadwick

Saint Augustine's Enchiridion, or Manual to Laurentius Concerning Faith Hope and Charity. Translated from the Benedictine Text with an Introduction and Notes. By Ernest Evans. S.P.C.K. 1953. 146 pp. 15s. net.

The *Enchiridion* is one of the most attractive of the works of the great African Father. In it he expounds non-controversially and with less than his usual prolixity the central truths of the Christian Religion as he had come to understand it. He chose to entitle it 'Concerning Faith Hope and Charity', but in the main it deals with the Catholic Creed, clause by clause, discussing particularly the problem of evil and the necessity for Divine grace, the subjects of long controversy with the Manichees and the Pelagians. Almsgiving is treated at length not under 'Charity' but in connection with the forgiveness of sins. Dr Evans' translation, as we should expect, is both accurate and crisp, clearly conveying the meaning of the text. The Introduction sets forth the outline of the argument and elucidates the points which had been matters of controversy with the above-mentioned heresies. In the notes are brief and lucid paraphrases of some of the more difficult passages, and explanations of some of what may be called technical terms e.g. *Amor*, *Dilectio* and *Caritas; Natura;* and *Massa Damnata* ('not so violent as it sounds'). The Confessions must remain Augustine's most popular work, but for some it might be better to start with the *Enchiridion*, and Dr Evans has now made that work in every way readily accessible.

John H. S. Burleigh

A Diary of Readings. By John Baillie. Oxford University Press. 15s.

Tens of thousands, especially young people, have been deeply in debt to Principal Baillie for *A Diary of Private Prayer*. His new book

is not intended to be a companion volume, for it is on the scale of a year and not a month, and its avowed purpose is 'to engage serious thought'. The two books, however, could profitably be used together; and not a few may find it helpful to use at the same time their Bible, a book of prayers and this book.

These pages, one for each day of the year, are 'gathered from the wisdom of many centuries'. Only a man who has been able to put a vast amount of reading into his life and is equipped with the faculty of acute discernment could have produced such a book. Every selection has rich substance, and some are really difficult. They range over the centuries as far back as St. Augustine, with the majority coming from the last two centuries; and they include philosophy, theology, history, general literature, sermons and poetry. Some readers, like the present reviewer, may be surprised that the poets are represented by less than one in ten pages; but it may be that that is representative enough of contemporary favour. Most of the extracts are from immortal books, some from books that are quite ephemeral. The page headings are well chosen, and many of these in themselves stimulate thought. On page 1 is an extract from Von Hügel which gives the idea of the book—'That daily quarter of an hour, for now forty years or more, I am sure has been one of the greatest sustenances and sources of calm for my life. . . . I need not say that I would not restrict you to only one quarter of an hour a day. You might find two such helpful. But I would not exceed the fifteen minutes *at any one time*; you would sink to ordinary reading, if you did.'

In view of the bulk and the worth of the material provided it is not so expensive a book as it first seems, particularly for readers who will use it regularly and repeatedly.

George S. Gunn

CHRIST IN GOSPEL AND CREED

by The Rev. Professor JAMES BARR

It was not until the fifth Christian century that the Church reached at the council of Chalcedon a definitive statement of its belief concerning the nature of Jesus Christ. This decision was preceded by a long era of controversy, first that in which against the Arians it was affirmed that the Son of God is not a created being but is of the essential nature of God Himself, and secondly that in which there was hammered out the relation between this divine, uncreated nature of the Son of God on one hand and the human nature of the Man Jesus on the other. To this latter question the Chalcedonian formula gave what was for the main body of the Church the nearest approach to an adequate answer, and it reads as follows:

'One and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, inconvertibly, indivisibly, inseparably. . . .'

In other words we have here a two-nature Christology, a picture of Jesus Christ which displays Him as uniting in Himself the two natures of God and of Man; and this with certain limiting qualifications, namely: (1) the two are not fused into a higher unity which is neither God nor man but superhuman and semi-divine; (2) they are not so united that after the union the one nature *becomes* the other, so that what was God *and* man became by the union merely one *or* the other; (3) they are not on the other hand to be divided or separated as if to produce some independent being or action of each nature, God and man, separate from the other. These qualifications exist really to defend against misunderstanding the basic statement that in Jesus Christ the two natures are united. This understanding of the matter was fully accepted in the main streams of Christianity up to quite modern times and still remains the canon of accepted orthodoxy.

And yet the two-nature Christology has seldom passed unchallenged whether from within or from without the Church.

Within Christendom the name of Monophysite is borne by multitudes, while without to both Jew and Moslem the orthodox Christology has always seemed among the most ridiculous of Christian beliefs; while many others who start out with no strong commitment to Christian orthodoxy find it one of the most difficult obstacles to any rational understanding, as anyone knows who has discussed the matter with someone genuinely puzzled by traditional Christian teaching. This might not matter so much in itself, but what does disturb one more seriously is the question which so often follows: 'Do the Scriptures actually speak in this way? Granting the assumption that the Bible is in some way the foundation and criterion of Christian teaching, does it ever clearly indicate that Jesus Christ should be understood as a unity of two natures, of God and of man?' Is not the Church's doctrine of Christ, like its Trinitarianism, a vast superstructure of metaphysical speculation which has no foundation in the New Testament and which crushes with its dead weight the simpler, more direct truth of the Gospels themselves?' And to this we should be inclined to reply, I suppose, that the New Testament does not actually *state* a doctrine of the Trinity or of the two natures but *points towards* such a doctrine; or raises questions which require such a doctrine, in that an alternative or contrary dogmatic development would eventually be found on experiment to do violence to the Biblical material from which we had started.

But we cannot be quite content with this answer. The rise of modern scientific Biblical research made the question more acute. An approach to the Bible in terms of history was difficult or impossible as long as the mind was already fixed by dogmatic influences. For example the term Son of Man in the Gospels could not be understood historically as long as it was taken to be a mere designation of one part, viz. the human, of the two-nature Christ. This is not to say that we can approach the Bible completely without dogmatic presuppositions, but it does mean that we have to allow the historical material of the Bible freedom to criticise our dogma.

Biblical scholars were conscious of the obstacles offered by orthodox formulations and reacted at first perhaps too violently against them. No work of scholarship in this respect has achieved greater fame than Schweitzer's *The Quest of the His*

torical Jesus, in which he reviews the attempts of the nineteenth century to write a historical biography of Jesus. In this great work Trinitarianism and orthodox Christology are slain in the first chapter and the procession of historical investigators tramps unconcernedly over the corpse. As Schweitzer put it, 'This dogma had first to be shattered before men could once more go in quest of the historical Jesus, before they could even grasp the thought of His existence. That the historic Jesus is something different from the Jesus Christ of the Two Natures seems to us now self-evident.' (English ed., pp. 3-4.)

More recent Biblical studies have receded somewhat from this harsh rejection of the Church's traditional interpretation of Christ. It is more and more realised that there is not, and never was, a completely non-theological picture of Christ, a simple Jesus who could be discerned when all dogmatic trammels were removed. It is only too plain that when traditional theology has been discarded it has been replaced not by a pure and unbiased directness of approach but rather by another system of axiomatic prejudices or presuppositions, liberal, rationalistic, or whatever it may be, which has obscured the Biblical material to an equal or greater degree. The search for the simple historical non-theological Jesus has not succeeded, and we have today a Jesus who is an enigma, and for the characterisation of that enigma scholars are feeling it more and more consonant with true humility to accept with some sympathy the help that traditional Church doctrine can give; and some of us may be coming to believe that Biblical exegesis can be assisted by, and cannot be fully integrated without, the use and understanding of later Christological concepts, even perhaps of such recondite technical terms as *anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia*, generation and procession.

And it is by no means the case that a Christology of two natures appeared only as the result of a very long process and after a very wide interval of time from the original events of Jesus' life on earth. Indeed the ink was not yet dry upon some books of our New Testament when Ignatius of Antioch was writing (Eph. 7) *εἷς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικὸς καὶ πνευματικός, γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγεννητός, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεός, . . . καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ*. The words lack the stricter definition of later times, and some of them were later dropped from use, but a two-

nature understanding of Christ is here in embryo. Yet Ignatius was no dry logic-chopper and for all the vividness of his writing he was a naive and simple enough man of faith.

There is also a certain modesty and restraint in classical Christology for which it has not always been given due credit. It has sometimes been suggested that theology has rationalised and explained what the Bible only hinted at and enfolded in the proper veil of mystery. In fact the essential mystery of the Incarnation was not outraged at Chalcedon by an explanation. The council stated its belief in the two natures but did not say how they were united; what it did state in its four great limiting adverbs were several ways in which the unity should not be understood. Truth was mysterious, all that was completely clear was that certain ways of thinking, perhaps by their own clarity, violated the truth. This is perhaps the proper method for Christian thought. It is impossible for us today, and indeed always was impossible, to derive a true theology by simple deduction from the Biblical texts. What we can do is to construct a fence which will mark and limit off certain constructions of thought which will be false to Biblical authority. The right of appeal to the Biblical text, even to the words of a single sentence, will remain, for we may demand assurance that the insights of such a sentence are properly noticed and protected; but this does not mean that from that sentence alone and in itself by a process of deduction we shall be able to derive a general truth.

In spite of all these qualifications it remains true that the Gospels give a presentation of Jesus which differs fundamentally in kind from that of later theology. The difference can be put most clearly in the form of a question. If it is true that Jesus Christ united in Himself the nature of God and the nature of man, why did He not say so? His statements on His relation to God are for the most part indications and hints, broad hints no doubt in places, and yet always hints, never quite completely explicit. Even in His highest claims He never explains Himself fully, and no such formula as *vere deus vere homo*, which might have illuminated the mystery of the whole matter, escapes His lips. We are often ready to cry with the Jews of John 10.24: 'How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly.'

That in a document like Mark's Gospel Jesus never says explicitly that He is Son of God is a very remarkable thing; for Mark himself clearly believed Jesus was the Son of God, in some sense probably not unlike that in which Paul would have used the term. It says much for the purity in which Mark has preserved the early tradition that he has nowhere intruded upon the lips of Jesus a formula which he himself believed, nor has he given any statement which would be a general overriding reason for the absence of such a formula and which might lead us to suspect that he had been controlled by some peculiar doctrinaire twist. We see here the richness of that consciousness of the early Church which in one like Mark could believe in Jesus as Son of God and yet could record and transmit with fidelity a tradition in which Jesus never so spoke.

The designation 'Son of God' and related terms, 'the Son of the Blessed' and so on, do of course occur in Mark and Jesus is frequently so addressed; and the first who so address him, strangely enough, are the demons and unclean spirits. It is they who call him Son of God, never He Himself, not at any rate directly, explicitly and deliberately. If Jesus has a designation for Himself, it is not Son of God but Son of Man, and with this latter term the very opposite happens; it is without exception in the whole Gospel tradition (and the agreement of the Fourth Gospel is particularly significant here) Jesus alone who uses this designation, and the only exception in the whole New Testament tradition is the exclamation of the protomartyr Stephen, the narrative of whose death may be in some respects imitating closely that of the passion of Christ Himself. It is this fact above all others which prevents us from reading a two-nature Christology into the Gospel narrative, because such a reading would require us to take the Son of God and the Son of Man ideas together as the elements of the union, one representing the divine and the other the human nature of Christ. But the evidence, where we find Son of Man used only by Jesus and Son of God almost only by others, does not allow this, any more than if we had a church where some ministers spoke of Christ as pure man and others spoke of Him as pure God we could conclude that such a church had an orthodox two-nature Christology. To repeat, we never in the early Gospel material have on the lips of Jesus or anyone else a plain statement of a

unity of God and man, such as Ignatius' simple ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεός.

The phrases Son of God and Son of Man are not mere designations for two existing elements in Christ's being; on the contrary each of these terms has a long and important history through the Old Testament. The Son of God idea is connected especially through the royal ritual at Jerusalem, expressed in the Psalms, with the Davidic Messianic kingship. It was surely to the king of Israel or Judah that a prophet first spoke the words of Ps. 110, 'The Lord says to my lord, Sit at my right hand.' The Son of Man idea is difficult to trace precisely. Originally it seems to mean no more than 'a man, some human being'. After he had seen four wild beasts typifying four evil kingdoms, tyrannical and oppressive, Daniel saw one like a man or son of man, typifying the kingdom of God's saints, not bestial but human. It is exceedingly doubtful if the phrase 'Son of Man' was a title—only with the doubtful help of the Book of Enoch can we make it so—and very uncertain if the contemporaries of Jesus would so understand it. Perhaps it has a certain ambiguity, a certain ambivalence between humiliation and glory, between man of whom the Psalmist asks 'What is the son of man that thou visitest him?' and man who, the same Psalmist tells us, has been given dominion over all God's works.

Now I am going to suggest that this ambiguity appears in Jesus when He speaks of Himself as Son of Man. In Mark's Gospel there are two great passages, two foci as it were of the whole representation, in which Jesus is addressed as the Christ and answers in terms of the Son of Man. The first is at Peter's great confession in chapter 8. 'Whom do you say that I am?' Peter says 'Thou art the Christ'. And Jesus began to teach them saying that the Son of Man must suffer. Here we see Peter bursting through the barrier of the flesh of Jesus of Nazareth and discerning the heavenly glory hid therein. Light and glory seem to dawn. And at once Jesus teaches of suffering to come, and Peter is offended. The saying of the Son of Man contradicts Peter's understanding of Jesus. Now compare the scene of Jesus before Caiaphas in chapter 14. Here the situation is not of glory but of real suffering and humiliation. Jesus is bound and a prisoner, at the mercy of His enemies. 'Are you the Christ?' asks the high priest with bitter sarcasm. 'I am, and you will see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the

power and coming with the clouds of heaven.' Again the saying of the Son of Man seems to contradict the situation. For Jesus to say here, as He said to Peter, 'The Son of Man must suffer', would be mere resignation. But here in His suffering He speaks of triumph, glory and victory. The comparison of these two situations shows what the Son of Man idea was for Jesus—it was a concept which He used sovereignly, clay in His hands to be moulded as He needed it, not an idea with a fixed connotation for those around Him but one which He and He alone filled with content. 'It is written of the Son of Man that He must suffer much'—but in fact it is nowhere so written—it is Jesus here who declares the content of Scripture, He alone who forms it to His use.

Here we see a hint towards answering a fundamental question—how in fact does Jesus present Himself to men? The answer is, that He presents Himself to men through His word in a context, His word in a situation; His word as in these two examples above, where it seems to contradict the immediate realities of the situation, His word in a particular context of human sin and passion, His word in its intimate connexion with what He was and what He did, in sovereign working of miracles or in simple lowliness of humanity. His word is not a promulgation of universal truth but a statement in a context, a statement that by its own very ambiguity presses upon the heart of man for a decision, a statement that in its context does not provide any ready-made explanation but makes Jesus an enigma, sets a question-mark upon His being and activity, and induces the people to answer that fundamental puzzle: *τίς ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν*; 'Who then is this?' (Mark 4.41).

In this connexion several points are to be observed:

(1) Jesus' being involves a certain hiddenness. He is here to reveal, but also He hides, in fact it is by hiding that He reveals. If the text of Mark 4.22 is to be taken literally (could its original reference have been Christological?) and not conformed to the Matthaean and Lucan versions, all hiddenness is with the purpose of revelation. Anyway Jesus' words are rich in the proclamation that the times are fulfilled and the glories of the last days are here. His words speak to us of that heavenly world which Daniel saw, and tell us of its nearness. But this glory, this wonder of the last things, seems to disappear within Him. We

hear of the arrival of a kingdom but all that really arrives in Galilee is Jesus the carpenter's son. We have the mystery of the kingdom, but the mystery seems to be something essentially connected with the teaching, the not always notably original teaching, of this wandering Rabbi. It is a paradoxical situation: the Kingdom of God is announced by a *man*, who refers it not to some external point but to *himself*; the authority of God is wielded by a man and comes forth from within that man; a man allows the divine coming to be represented by his own coming. The whole scheme of the *eschaton*, of that which is to be in the end of the world, by being focussed in the historical person of Jesus, in His flesh, is hidden.

(2) This hiddenness is not to be overcome by a mere explanation, as we have already seen. This is presumably the reason for that important phenomenon, the Messianic Secret, prominent especially in Mark's Gospel, the fact in other words that when the demons, or even the disciples, discern the truth that Jesus is the Son of God or the Christ, they are strictly told to keep silence and not make Him known. Jesus presented Himself not by explanation but by challenging enigma. A case of the pointing of such an enigma I find in the question about the Son of David—if the Christ is David's Lord, then *how* is he his son? The common scholarly exegesis of this passage, which understands Jesus to be correcting current Messianic ideas or even denying the Davidic descent of the Messiah, is pathetically weak, failing to see the essentially enigmatic character of the saying. Another such is the passage (Mark 11.27-33) 'By what authority doest thou these things?'

(3) The self-presentation of Jesus is then worked out not in any explanation but in the carrying out of the drama of His life and death to its fulfilment. The paradox of His hiddenness, the tension of the enigma of His person and words, are not resolved by any single word or act of explanation but only by the dramatic development of Jesus' work with its climax in His death and ressurection. These facts, and no words, give the fullest and final declaration of what He is.

(4) This helps us to see why the disciples understood Jesus so badly. Why for example are we told of the disciples, after the second prediction by Jesus of His death, that 'they did not understand the saying and were afraid to ask him'? The

reason for their failure lies in the dynamic structure of the Gospel Christology, built up in a moving succession of events in word and deed, so that as John makes explicit, it is only when that moving succession has reached its finality, 'When he was risen from the dead, his disciples remembered that he said' such and such, and believed (John 2.22).

(5) It is very noticeable in Mark's presentation that as soon as the drama comes to its end we have the first statement of Christ's being which bears some similarity to the later Church's theology (15.39). As soon as He died and the veil of the temple is torn, the centurion cries out: *ἀληθῶς οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος υἱὸς ἦν θεοῦ*. What we had before was a dynamic Christology, moving on by stages to an end; now we have a final culminating statement which casts its light over all that has gone before.

(6) We have already seen that a doctrine of Christ cannot be deduced simply from one text or another. If we point to Mark and ask where a Christological text is to be found, the answer is really that the whole book is that text, the book narrating the moving succession of Jesus' dealings with men. But the voice of the centurion is a real, and I think deliberate, culmination and recapitulation of it all.

(7) In general then we may say that the Christology of the Gospels is a dynamic or moving one. Jesus does not stop to explain the truth, but moves forward to do the truth. It is a drama, a moving picture. Later theology with its two-nature doctrine was in fact attempting to produce a still form of that moving picture, something static and fixed which was fully true and equally true at every moment.

(8) The moving or dynamic picture of the Gospels is seen also in Paul in an important sentence from the Romans where he is probably building on earlier tradition. He says that Christ was 'born of the seed of David according to the flesh but declared or appointed Son of God in power according to the spirit of holiness from the resurrection from the dead'. He does not, I think, mean that Jesus was first one and then the other, first man and then God; he means ultimately that He was both; but he does not *say* that He was both, he expresses his Christology dynamically, in terms of the progress of Christ through His life from birth to resurrection, and refuses to make a purely static statement.

(9) This dynamic Christology links the being or person of Christ therefore very closely with His work. As the work was done in time, in the movement of time, so was the presentation of Christ given in the movement of time. The type of statement we find in the Chalcedonian formula has the unfortunate effect that we become able to speak of what Jesus was, in the two natures, while losing sight for the moment of the movement of His work through time to death and life, through fleshly existence to atonement and reconciliation. It is perhaps the greatest need of Christology today that the true insights of orthodoxy be re-interpreted to bring them under the power of the Biblical sense of movement towards atonement and reconciliation.

(10) In the last resort both types of Christological statement are true. The still form of the moving film does represent faithfully what was in fact disclosed only in the temporal movement. In a way this is just to accept the fact that *we* are in a different situation from that in which Jesus Himself stood in His earthly ministry. A mere statement of the facts by Him, in the nature of things, could not suffice or prevail. Word, act and person were interdependent. For the Church, even for the Apostolic Church, the situation was somewhat changed. There was no 'Messianic Secret' after the first Easter. Now that the movement itself was complete and final, a plain and unequivocal statement of the fact that Jesus was the Christ was no longer weak but powerful. To the word of Christ in the early Church, the word of the cross as Paul calls it, was added the power of the Spirit to bring conviction.

On the other hand orthodox Christology possessed an insight which has been lost from sight in much modern Biblical study, the insight namely that the interpretation of Christ must state what He was, not only what He did; it must not be only soteriological but also ontological. Melanchthon was not typical of the best Christian thought, not even of his own best thought, when he wrote the often quoted words, *hoc est Christum cognoscere beneficia eius cognoscere, non (quod isti docent) eius naturas, modos incarnationis contueri.* I cannot accept Dibelius' statement that 'the faith of the early Christians was centred not in what Christ was but rather in what He had done for mankind. The New Testament contains practically nothing about the person of Jesus Christ in His ontological significance, apart from His re-

lations with mankind.' The whole point of traditional patristic and Chalcedonian orthodoxy is that the so-called ontological significance of Jesus Christ *is* His relation with mankind. Ontology and soteriology have to be held completely together. On Dibelius' showing 'Christology' includes the latter but excludes the former. Much of Biblical study today is bemused by his viewpoint, the opinion that the New Testament does not speak of what Jesus was and that it is an improper intrusion of dogmatics if we allow it so to speak.

Let it be observed that the whole *exposé* of the Gospel Christology I have already given seems to be based on and to call for considerations in ontological terms. The whole curious enigmatic nature of Jesus' self-presentation in the Gospels arises not because of indifference to the question who He really was, but out of that concentration of the eschatological glory in Him (in His flesh, ontologically), so that it was hidden in Him. It is hidden not because Jesus was a mystery-monger, or because the Evangelists were, but because of an essential doubleness in the nature of the manifestations dealt with. On the one hand there were the great terms drawn from eschatology, the Kingdom of God, the Advent with power, the μυστήριον, the restoration of Israel, and on the other hand the plain fact of Jesus of Nazareth whose brothers and sisters we know. Their constant reference to Jesus of Nazareth, the constant use of the name Jesus (not Christ), these *are* the ontological statements, and we have them in every paragraph; these *are* the interest of the New Testament in what He *was*, and only because this was so did the Christology have to be developed as it was. When John made his 'ontological' statement that the Word was made flesh he was only recapitulating what cries out from each page of the Synoptic Gospels. I insist that the problem of the Gospel presentation of Christ cannot be understood without the ontological question of what Jesus was; and equally I insist that this is no superimposed mode of interpretation but is the actual interest of the texts themselves.

It would not be so serious if we could really do as Dibelius wants and avoid the question of what Jesus was while retaining our understanding of what Jesus did for men, if we could really abandon 'ontology' and keep soteriology. But in fact a great deal of Biblical scholarship today, having abandoned the interest

in what Jesus was, is interpreting Him not in terms of what He did but of what He thought. Many of the problems of the New Testament are being resolved ultimately by an investigation of the consciousness of Jesus, and it is in this consciousness of His that His sovereign contribution is being found. But here let the text speak for itself. Whatever be the interest of the New Testament in what Jesus *was*, it is certain that its main interest is not in what He thought, nor in the structure of His religious consciousness. Psychological interest is perhaps not entirely lacking in the Gospels, but it is exceedingly thin and secondary. They do not tell us, and clearly do not regard as a first essential, what was in His mind, what His motives were, how His consciousness was made up, but what He said and what He did.

Our view of Jesus is not merely a dogmatic theological problem. I am not here saying that a hermeneutic principle like that of Dibelius is successful historically but insufficient theologically. The historical at this point *is* the theological. But I do not think our scholarship has as yet been successful historically. Of the great scholars who have worked with an axiomatic exclusion of ontology neither Schweitzer nor Dibelius nor Bultmann has succeeded in dealing with the historical material in the Gospels in any probable way, and this is in some respects the final criterion. We have not yet learned the lesson of the curious dilemma into which Schweitzer fell. He was too honest to construct a Jesus who fitted in with our psychology, with the working of our minds; and later scholars like James Moffatt criticised him for counting psychology a cardinal sin. But in the last resort Schweitzer's Jesus was a creature controlled by the deterministic power of ideas, by a great framework of eschatological dogma. Yet for both Moffatt and Schweitzer in the end the centre of interpretation is in a consciousness, the one a creative consciousness, the other a consciousness dominated by an external framework of ideas. Schweitzer was the most honest of us because he read in the Gospels a Jesus in whom he himself did not believe, an inner contradiction into which few of us would wish to enter. That contradiction on the one hand, and the fact that on the other hand few scholars would agree that Schweitzer's Jesus explains the historical material, indicate the weakness of our study when the ontological Jesus, Jesus as what He was, is from the beginning, *a priori*, held to be an

irrelevance. Paradoxically enough, it was through its abandonment of theology that the quest of the historical Jesus failed to be historical; for in fact the historical Jesus *was* the ontological Jesus, and the earliest traditions knew Him to be such. The well-established mode of interpretation which eschews ontology escapes the rigidity of Chalcedon but impresses us with its equally systematic Ebionitic tendency. The relation of the man Jesus to God is not seen as hypostatic, to use the technical term, not a union grasping the totality of the person, but is something expressed through a uniquely profound numinous religious consciousness.

We might sum up the Christological task of the present as follows:

(1) We have to reach a new understanding or a new formulation of the traditional formulae of orthodoxy which will do justice to the dynamic presentation of Christ as we find it in the New Testament.

(2) We have to admit into Biblical study more fully than heretofore the real interest of the creeds, and of the Gospels also, in what Jesus *was*.

SCOTTISH MINISTERIAL ORDERS

by The Rev. G. S. M. WALKER

Presbyterianism has always tended to be a misleading name for the Reformed Church-order. It suggests the absence of any office superior to that which in Anglican and Roman terminology is called the priesthood; and as neither Roman nor Anglican priests possess power of ordination, it further suggests that Presbyterian clergy have never been able to ordain. Their orders are taken to be invalid from the start, and thus its mere name kills a Church. But the usual assumption, that the Scottish parish minister is equivalent (however imperfectly) to the English parish priest, is a distortion of both doctrine and practice in Scotland; and it is the chief purpose of this paper to maintain that when the ecclesiastical idioms of the two countries are translated, the minister must be called, not a parish priest, but a parish bishop.

It is important to remember the peculiar circumstances of the Scottish Reformation. Not only had the vices of the Roman clergy been satirised in Court and market-place, and admitted in the Councils of their Church; but the Roman order also had so far broken down, that of the bishoprics and major benefices about half were probably held by persons canonically unfit. Thus, the Reformation was supported by four of the Roman Bishops: James Hamilton of Argyll, Alexander Gordon of Galloway, Robert Stewart of Caithness and Adam Bothwell of Orkney; but of these four, only Bothwell had undoubtedly been consecrated,[1] while the remainder were either priests or even laymen. Knox was advised[2] by the Archbishop of St. Andrews to retain the Church's ancient polity, and he has often been accused of destroying what was useful and good. The truth is otherwise; far from destroying good order that existed, Knox was obliged to restore order where it was already fallen in decay. Episcopacy in some of its many forms would continue,

[1] See the relevant entries in the *Fasti Eccl. Scot.*
[2] Spottiswoode, *History* (1677 edn.), p. 174.

and would continue to make high claims[1]; but episcopacy in its diocesan or medieval form was already passing away in Scotland, before the Reformation came. Rome had given no dogmatic definition, by which conservative minds might have felt bound. Aquinas[2] denies the episcopate to be a distinct order from the priesthood, except in reference to the secondary functions of the clergy. Peter Lombard (Lib. IV, dist. 4) says that the Apostles left only two orders—elders and deacons. The Archbishop of Spalato[3] holds that the essence of ordination is *missio potestiva*, and that other rites and ceremonies are non-essential. There was little to restrain the Reformers from bold experiment, based on Scripture and suited to the times. In the Scottish Church tradition, the most important strand which they inherited from the Middle Ages was a potent love of conciliarism, such as was shown by their country's delegates at the Council of Basel, and such as was exemplified in the medieval Scottish Church-government by Provincial Council with elected President, until the late erection of the Scottish Archbishoprics in 1472 and 1490. These two points are vital: the old Church-order broken and mangled; a preference for conciliar over hierarchical Church-government.

In politics, Churchmen had been accustomed to take a prominent part, usually as the favourites and supporters of the Crown. Bishops held high office in the realm, formed the first of the three Estates, and had a decisive voice in appointing the Committee of Articles,[4] which managed Parliamentary affairs. All this was abhorrent to the Reformers, who wished to see the Church entirely independent of Crown control, and Churchmen entirely free to pursue their ministerial calling. They quoted ancient canons[5] forbidding clerics to take part in politics; and subsequent disputes over the representation of the Church in Parliament were but one aspect of the overall struggle

[1] Cf. especially Knox's 'Order of Absolution' (in *Works*, VI, p. 460); 'If thou unfeignedly repent thy former iniquity and believe in the Lord Jesus, then I in His Name pronounce and affirm that thy sins are forgiven, not only on earth but also in heaven, according to the promises annexed with the preaching of His Word, and to the power put in the ministry of His Church.'

[2] Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* IIIae Partis Suppl. Quaest. XL, art. 5.

[3] In his *De Rep. Eccl.* (quoted by Gillespie, 'Dispute *v.* English-Popish Ceremonies', in *Presbyterian's Armoury*, I, p. 165).

[4] *Act. Parl. Scot.*, ii, 289.

[5] James Melville, *Autobiography and Diary* (1842 edn.), p. 483; he refers to a 'Canon of Nicaea', but is probably thinking of *Can. Apost.*, LXXXI (LXXX).

between Church and State. Erskine of Dun, though favouring a modified form of diocesan episcopacy, insisted on freedom for the Church, and wrote as follows to the Regent Mar[1]: 'A greater offence or contempt of God and his kirk can no prince doe, than to sett up by his authority men in spiritual offices, as to create bishops and pastors of the kirk; for so to doe is to conclude no kirk of God to be; for the kirk can not be, without it have the owne proper jurisdiction and libertie, with the ministration of such offices as God hath appointed. . . .' In theory, the Scottish Reformers recognised three notes of the true Church: the true preaching of the Word of God, the right administration of the Sacraments, and the upright conduct of ecclesiastical discipline[2]; in practice, they added a fourth: freedom to direct its own affairs. 'Take from us', said Knox,[3] 'the freedom of Assemblies, and take from us the Evangel.' Unlike his great successor Andrew Melville, Knox was not a systematic thinker of the first water, but between them they worked out a practical solution to the problem of dividing the ecclesiastical and civil spheres. Having thrown off the Papalism of Rome, they were unwilling to replace it with the Caesaro-papalism of Tudor and Stewart kings. How absolute were the claims advanced by monarchy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, may be indicated by a few quotations from the writings of King James VI. He urges his son Prince Henry to love God 'for that He made you a little God, to sit on His throne and rule other men'[4]; he tells his first English Parliament: 'I am the Husband and the whole Isle is my lawful Wife, I am the Head and it is my Body'[5]; he informs his Scottish clergy that 'the Bishops must rule the Ministers and the King rule both'.[6] To this State absolutism, the Scottish Reformers opposed not, as is often thought, a clerical absolutism, but a doctrine of limited authority in spheres of co-ordinate jurisdiction. When in 1560 the *First Book of Discipline* failed to receive Parliamentary sanction, the Church proceeded to act as though that sanction was unnecessary, Knox contending that the Church possessed her spiritual powers by inherent right as a *societas perfecta*; the result

[1] The full letter is in Calderwood, *History*, III, pp. 156-62.
[2] *Scots Confession* (1560), art. XVIII. [3] Knox, *History*, IV, chap. 2.
[4] James VI, 'Basilikon Doron' in *Political Works of James I* (ed. C. H. McIlwain, 1918), p. 12.
[5] ibid., p. 272. [6] Spottiswoode, *History*, p. 531.

was to postulate a pluralism of societies, civil and religious, each autonomous, and existing for different purposes with the same members and in the same land.[1] Melville gave the doctrine its classical expression, when he told James VI that 'there are two Kings and two Kingdoms in Scotland. There is Christ Jesus the King, and His Kingdom the Kirk, whose subject King James the Sixth is, and of whose Kingdom not a king, nor a lord, nor a head, but a member. And they whom Christ has called and commanded to watch over His Kirk, and govern His spiritual Kingdom, have sufficient power from Him and authority so to do, both together and severally; the which no Christian King nor Prince should control and discharge, but fortify and assist. . . .'[2] Gillespie[3] distinguishes civil from ecclesiastical power by saying that the former is founded by the King of nations, the latter by the King of saints; and he adds that, while secular authority is derived from the Creator, the Church is authorised by Christ as Mediator. This doctrine of the two kingdoms is an expression, in the political realm, of the *Filioque* clause in the Creed. It is grounded on the belief that, while the powers that be are ordained of God, not all receive their anointing direct from the First Person of the Trinity; powers flow to the State from God the Creator, but powers also flow separately to the Church from God the Redeemer; Christ has a Kingdom and Crown Rights which are not of this world.

It may be worth quoting two comments on these political doctrines of the Scottish Reformers. McCrie[4] remarks that 'the chief divines of the Reformed Church were intimately acquainted with the principles of jurisprudence, and qualified by the course of study which they had pursued to give their advice on questions relating to government and the administration of laws. . . . This was the effect of the late reformation of religion; and at the same time one of the moral forces by which that mighty revolution exerted its influence upon the sentiments of mankind in favour of civil liberty and the amelioration of

[1] Cf. H. J. Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (1917), p. 30.

[2] James Melville, *Autobiography and Diary*, p. 370.

[3] P. Gillespie, 'Aaron's Rod Blossoming' II, chaps. 4 and 7 (in *Presbyterian's Armoury*, II, pp. 86 and 107); cf. the same author's 'Brotherly Examination' (ibid., I, p. 7): 'I suppose he hath seen the co-ordinate governments of a general and of an admiral . . . or of parents over their children . . . he who is subject to one man as his master, is subject to another man as his father'.

[4] T. McCrie, *Life of Andrew Melville* (1819), I, p. 47.

government.' Writing over a century later, Lord MacMillan[1] has the same comment: 'The language of the perfervid religion of Knox and the Covenanters is permeated with legality, and the whole relations of God and man are conceived in terms of legal transactions. . . . It seems to me to be the outcome of one of the most characteristic and one of the most persistent qualities of the Scottish genius, its instinctive love of principle.' It is from this love of principle that the favourite concept of the Covenant arises, as an expression in religious terms of the political concept of a constitution. Samuel Rutherford characteristically held that the best form of civil government is 'monarchy *de iure*, that is lawful and limited monarchy'[2]; Robert Baillie, taking Covenant as constitution, wrote 'if the king . . . be willing to ratify our Covenant, we are all as one man to restore him to all his rights, or die by the way'[3]; and the Scots, after deploring the execution of Charles I, readily proclaimed his son as King, on condition that he signed the Covenants.[4] Contemporaries of the seventeenth century struggle between Presbyterians and Prelatists saw that it was concerned with politics as much as with religion, one of them speaking[5] of the absolute 'monarchical government' of Popes and Prelates, the 'mere democratical government' of Brownists, the 'mixed democratical government' of Independents, and the 'pure aristocratical government' of Presbytery. Each Church, in its form of government, reflected the political opinions of its members. The Independency of Cromwell was a counterpart to his republicanism. The royal preference for Prelacy flowed from a belief in the divine right of kings, and with the constitutional settlement of 1690, Prelacy in Scotland could continue its existence only in dissent. Presbytery in religion stood for a limited monarchy in politics, and its Covenanting fervour represented the theological side of constitutionalism. Such ideas had been foreshadowed in the Scottish Wars of Independence. They were formulated by John Major: *populus liber primo regi dat robur, cuius potestas a toto populo dependet*[6]; by George Buchanan: *mutua regi cum civibus est*

[1] MacMillan, *Law and Other Things* (1937), p. 66.
[2] Rutherford, *Lex Rex* (1642), Quest. 38 (p. 384 in the 1644 edn.).
[3] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, III, p. 18.
[4] J. K. Hewison, *The Covenanters* (1908), II, p. 1.
[5] *Ius Divinum Regiminis Ecclesiastici* (1654 edn.), p. 2; first publ. 1646.
[6] Major, *Historia Maioris Britanniae*, IV, cap. 17.

pactio[1]; by John Knox: 'it is not birth only nor propinquity of blood that makes a king lawfully to reign above a people professing Christ Jesus and His eternal verity, but in his election must the ordinance, which God has established in the election of inferior judges, be observed'[2]; and by Samuel Rutherford: 'there is an oath betwixt the King and his people, laying on by reciprocation of bands mutual civil obligations upon the King to the people and the people to the King'.[3] All this is trite and commonplace today. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it had to be fought for; and when worked out in the field of ecclesiastical polity, constitutionalism provided a thorough-going application of conciliar doctrine, as the one logical alternative to Papacy.

With such ideas—a predilection for conciliar government, a passion for ecclesiastical freedom—and with the order and polity of the old Church already fallen into ruin, the Scottish Reformers turned to their Bibles. They there found one luminous pointer to a solution of current problems.[4] Paul and Barnabas ordained Elders in *every* Church (Acts 14.23); Paul commanded Titus to ordain such in *every* town (Titus 1.5); Philippi had its own particular Bishops (Phil. 1.1); Archippus was the placed Minister of Colossae (Col. 4.17); and in the city of Ephesus, there was a Presbytery, whose members are equally called Elders (Acts 20.17) and Bishops (Acts 20.28). From such texts, the Scriptural solution appeared obvious: continue the episcopal ministry of Word and Sacraments and discipline, but put the parish in place of the diocese as the unit of administration. Only so could an effective pastoral and preaching ministry be undertaken, for thus the Bishop or Minister would have a flock of manageable size. Only so could the Church's freedom be vindicated, for thus Crown nomination of the higher clergy would be replaced by that popular election which had been practised in the early centuries. The ancient threefold order of Bishops, Presbyters and Deacons could be retained on the level of the parish; but above that level, the application of conciliar doctrine would replace a hierarchy of persons with a hierarchy

[1] Buchanan, *De Iure Regni apud Scotos*; see the English edn. (1680), p. 126.
[2] Knox, 'Second Blast of the Trumpet' in *Works*, IV, p. 539.
[3] Rutherford, *Lex Rex*, Quest. 14 (1644 edn., p. 96).
[4] See Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.iii.7.

of Courts, and at the summit[1] a General Assembly, with popular mandate, in open debate, by free speech, as an ecclesiastical Parliament, would guard the freedom of the Church. The result was not to turn the old parish Priests into parish Bishops at once; most of them were unqualified, and had to be content with the office of reader. But as qualified men became available, a new order arose—that of the parish Minister or Bishop; and until a sufficient number of these were available, certain Ministers, in addition to the charge of a particular congregation, were commissioned to superintend the erection and planting of Churches in the vacant areas.[2]

Calvin had drawn from the Scriptural references a system that closely resembles that of the second century.[3] Discussing Eph. 4.11, he finds that of those given by Christ for the work of the ministry, only Pastors and Teachers have an ordinary and perpetual office in the Church; Apostles, Prophets and Evangelists are raised up extraordinarily, for a universal ministry, 'as the necessity of the times requireth' and 'as it hath been done in our time'.[4] To the Apostle (with the Evangelist as his junior colleague) corresponds the Pastor, with this difference that his function is local and perpetual instead of universal and extraordinary; in the same way, the regular and limited mission of the Teacher corresponds to the spasmodic and unlimited mission of the Prophet.[5] At all times, the local and ordinary officers are necessary to continue the Church's life and work; but her foundation is the doctrine of Apostles and Prophets (Eph. 2.20), which being taken away, 'how shall the building stand any longer?'[6]; for Christ's sheep know His voice, but a stranger they will not follow.[7] From this it is deduced that, the Word being the Church's chief corner-stone, the ministry of the Word is the essential ministry; to it, in the case of Pastors but not of Teachers,[8] is joined the administration of the Sacraments and the rule of discipline. And the Minister of Christ, who dispenses

[1] In fact, Presbyterians have never recognised a national Assembly as supreme in the Universal Church; the *Second Book of Discipline* (chap. VII) is careful to leave room for an ecumenical Council at the top.

[2] The *First Book of Discipline* speaks of Superintendents as 'expedient at this time', 'in this present necessity'; cf. Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.iii.7.

[3] Cf. D. C. Lusk in *Scottish Journal of Theology* (March 1955), VIII.i, p. 8.

[4] Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.iii.4 (Norton's translation).

[5] ibid., IV.iii.5. [6] ibid., IV.ii.1.

[7] John 10.4-5; cf. Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.ii.4. [8] ibid., IV.iii.4.

the mysteries of God, is precisely that officer who is called in other places the Bishop.[1] Calvin did not greatly like the title, lest it should derogate from the 'only Bishopric of Christ'[2]; but he frankly admits that 'according to the usage of the Scripture, . . . whosoever do execute the ministry of the Word, to them he giveth the title of Bishops'.[3] He continues: 'Here now it is to be noted that hitherto we have recited none but those offices that stand in the ministry of the Word; neither doth Paul make mention of any other in that fourth chapter (of the Ephesian Epistle) which we have alleged. But in the Epistle to the Romans (12.7-8) and in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12.28) he reckoneth up other offices, as powers, the gift of healing, interpretation, government, caring for the poor. Of the which . . . there are two that do perpetually abide, that is to say, government and care of the poor. Governors I think were the Elders chosen out of the people, that should together with the Bishops have rule of the judgment of manners and the using of discipline. . . . The care of the poor was committed to the Deacons.'[4] In point of jurisdiction, Bishops and Elders are on an equal footing as ministers of discipline, and may both be described as Presbyters[5]; in point of office, Bishops alone are Ministers of the Word, and form a distinct order.[6] Characteristic of Calvin's return to primitive practice is his insistence that the diaconate, instead of being a mere preparation for the priesthood, is a perpetual office in the Church, and an administrative one.[7] The sum of his discussion on the Christian ministry is to confirm its traditional threefold order—of Bishops, Elders and Deacons—with the words[8]: 'As we have declared that there are three sorts of Ministers commended to us in the Scripture; so all the Ministers that the old Church had, it divided into three orders.' These three orders—if Teachers be reckoned separately from Pastors, there are in fact four—are all local and perpetual; and it is 'the ordinance of God Himself'[9] that each particular congregation should possess all three.

[1] John 10.45; cf. Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.iii.6. [2] ibid., IV.ii.6.
[3] ibid., IV.iii.8; disliking the title 'Priest' for similar reasons, Calvin none the less grants a certain sacerdotal power to the Christian ministry: 'this is the priesthood of the Christian pastor, that is, to sacrifice men as it were to God, by bringing them to obey the Gospel' (*Comment. in Rom.*, 15.16).
[4] Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.iii.8-9. [5] Compare Acts 20.17 and 28; and see 1 Pet. 5.1.
[6] The distinction is drawn in 1 Tim. 5.17.
[7] Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.iii.9. [8] ibid., IV.iv.1. [9] ibid., IV.iii.7.

It is characteristic of the Reformed Church-order that every Pastor, or Minister of the Word, should be treated as a Bishop; and that every local congregation should be governed by such a Bishop, with the assistance of a Session of Elders and a Court of Deacons. Upon these two points, the Scottish authorities simply repeat the conclusions of Calvin. In 1575 and again in 1576, Andrew Melville persuaded the General Assembly to declare that the names Pastor, Minister and Bishop are synonymous[1]; in 1576 and again in 1580, it was ordained that all Bishops should take to themselves a particular flock. The *Second Book of Discipline* maintains that 'the whole policy of the Church consists in three things chiefly, in Doctrine, Discipline and Distribution; with Doctrine is annexed the Ministration of the Sacraments. And according to the parts of this division arises a sort of threefold Officers in the Church; to wit, Ministers or Preachers, Elders or Governors, and Deacons or Distributors; and all these may be called by one general word, Ministers of the Church'.[2] Later,distinguishing the Teacher or Doctor from the Pastor, the same authority declares: 'There are four ordinary functions or offices in the Church of God: the office of the Pastor, Minister or Bishop; the Doctor; the Presbyter or Elder; and the Deacon.'[3] Alexander Henderson, writing in 1641, repeats these four as the Church's ordinary officers[4]; and he continues, 'Here there is a superiority without tyranny. . . . Here there is a parity without confusion and disorder, for the Pastors are in order before the Elders, and the Elders before the Deacons; every particular Church is subject to the Presbytery, the Presbytery to the Synod, and the Synod to the National Assembly'.[5] Robert Baillie, writing to the Earl of Loudon in 1639, states that the Scottish Church abjures every form of Bishop, except that commended by St. Paul, which is 'the Pastor of one only congregation'.[6] Similarly, the Englishman Richard Baxter declares that 'the Minister is *episcopus gregis*, a Bishop in his own parish'.[7] The Westminster *Form of Church-government* agrees with the *Second Book of Discipline* in teaching a fourfold division of

[1] *Book of the Universal Kirk* (Bannatyne Club, 1839), I, p. 342.
[2] *Second Book of Discipline*, II.2-3. [3] ibid., II.9.
[4] Henderson, *Government and Order of the Church of Scotland* (1691 edn.), p. 1.
[5] ibid., p. 53.
[6] Baillie, *Letters and Journals* (ed. David Laing), I, p. 182.
[7] Baxter, *The Reformed Pastor*, Preface (1950 edn., p. 61).

orders in the Church; but it has been the cause of some confusion by describing Ministers as 'preaching Presbyters'; and in allowing to Teachers the right of administering the Sacraments, it paves the way for the disappearance of Calvin's second order in his first. The views of extreme Scottish Covenanters are illustrated by a significant incident, when at the Torwood in 1680, a Presbyterian Minister, Donald Cargill, excommunicated Charles II and his leading Officers of State. Cargill acted simply in his capacity as a Minister of the Universal Church; and Shields[1] compares his action to the treatment of Theodosius by Ambrose, claiming that the Presbyterian Minister enjoyed a jurisdiction equal to that of the Bishop of Milan.

In theory, the Scottish Minister is clearly and consistently described as being distinct in office from the Elder, and as occupying the position, not of a Presbyter, but of a Bishop; in practice, he has constantly claimed and exercised those precise powers which are episcopal. Normally, he exercises those powers as a member or moderator of one of the Church's Courts; but in exceptional circumstances, the powers being personal have been exercised individually. Ministers, acting alone, have pronounced sentence of excommunication; and when the regular machinery of the Church Courts could not or would not function,[2] ordination has been validly performed by any orderly association of three Ministers. It is noteworthy that, just as three Bishops are normally required to make a Bishop, so three Ministers must take part in the ordination of a Minister. To ordain an Elder, a single Minister is sufficient, supported by the Elders of his Session; just as a single Bishop, supported by the Presbyters present, is sufficient to ordain a Priest. And as a Bishop confirms first communicants on the recommendation of his Priests, so a Minister, with the assent of his Session, admits baptised persons to communion. In all these ordinances, imposition of hands belongs to Ministers alone. Minor points deserving mention are the following: the adoption by Ministers of the episcopal position, behind the Table, at the administration of the Sacrament; and the jealously-guarded privilege of 'free

[1] Alexander Shields, *A Hind Let Loose*, p. 227.

[2] An example is supplied in the provision made for unsettled times at the conclusion of the Westminster *Form of Church-government*; Scottish instances are the acts of seceding Ministers, and the appointment of 'riding committees' to replace recalcitrant Presbyteries.

prayer', which is simply the ancient and canonical right of every Bishop to compose his own liturgy. In these various ways the Minister performs the functions of the episcopate within his parish.

After the Pastor, Minister or Bishop, there comes in the full Calvinist system, the Teacher or Doctor. This order was encouraged in Scotland as part of the great educational scheme which Knox had envisaged for his country,[1] but is seldom heard of today. If the Westminster divines were right in claiming for the Teacher a power to administer the Sacraments, then his order is now represented only by University Professors who are Ministers of the Church of Scotland. But if Calvin was correct in denying to this Minister of the Word a ministry also of the Sacraments, it may be suggested that the order of Teachers today comprises our licentiates, probationers or assistant Ministers, whose status and duties are similar to those of the Anglican 'preaching Deacon'. These licentiates have the style and dignity of Ministers; they are authorised to conduct public worship and to preach; but they possess no sacramental or judicial powers. Though their status is similar to that of the modern Deacon in some other Churches, they cannot be called Deacons in a Calvinist system of Church-order, for there the diaconate is a perpetual office, entrusted with the Scriptural function of 'serving tables' and administration. It is, however, through the probationary office of a licentiate that men come to the full ministry of Word and Sacraments, just as the diaconate in other systems is treated as a probation for the priesthood; and the Scottish practice of ordaining as Ministers men who have previously been, not Elders, but simply Teachers, may be compared to what Bingham[2] calls 'a general practice and agreeable to canon' of raising Deacons direct to the episcopate in the ancient Church.

The ruling Elder is a figure so characteristic of Scotland that his office needs little description. In Church Courts possessing spiritual jurisdiction, though only a Minister can preside, Elders sit with Ministers in equal numbers, voicing the senti-

[1] See the *First Book of Discipline*, on Schools and Colleges; W. L. Mathieson (*Politics and Religion*, 1902, I, p. 206) is wrong in calling this zeal for education 'almost the sole link of continuity between the old Church and the new'.

[2] See J. Bingham, *Antiquities of the Christian Church* II.x.5, where examples are given.

ments of the laity, and making ecclesiastical discipline a real self-discipline. It is from this institution that Presbyterian authority derives its popular element; but Elders, although representing the laity, are not themselves laymen, being ordained for life to a perpetual office in the Church.

The Deacon was intended by Calvin and Knox to be the administrator of Church finances, and particularly of poor relief. But the full potentialities of the office were never realised in Scotland, where Crown and nobles rifled the bulk of the ancient ecclesiastical endowments; and when the administration of poor relief had been taken over by the State, the office largely lapsed. Some congregations still retain a Deacons' Court; others have as their financial authority a Board of Managers, elected for a terminable period; while in yet others, the Session of Minister and Elders acts as the financial board. It should be added that the last century has seen the formation of an order of Deaconesses, who fulfil a ministry suitable for women.

It is necessary to look at the parish, with its threefold ministry of Pastor, Elders and Deacons, to find on this reduced scale the Calvinist expression of catholic Church-order. But to concentrate only on the parish would be to miss those features which distinguish the Presbyterian system from Congregationalism. The Minister indeed presides as Bishop in the Session of his Elders; but for the oversight of wider fields, he takes one Elder with him to Presbytery, Synod or Assembly. The Reformation had already been completed in Scotland before its most characteristic Court, the Presbytery, had been clearly distinguished from the Session. At first, and particularly in towns, Scotland had followed the Genevan model by placing a number of neighbouring congregations under the government of a Consistory or 'Venerable Company' of Ministers and Elders. Later, as a full-time local ministry was planted throughout the country, each congregation obtained its own Session or 'Bishop's Council' and out of the weekly fraternal meeting or 'Exercise' of Ministers the Presbytery arose. This Court is now fundamental to the Scottish system, and is the body which normally ordains and disciplines the clergy. In geographical extent, it corresponds roughly with a Rural Deanery; in dignity, it resembles rather the Convocation of a Province, for it is a conclave of

Presbyters and Bishops. Like other superior Church Courts, its moderator is annually elected from amongst the ministerial members, and this elective presidency recalls the privilege, which medieval Scotland enjoyed prior to the erection of Archbishoprics, of being governed by a Provincial Council with its president elected from the Bishops. The Synod has oversight of a wider geographical area, and is made up of a Minister and Elder from each constituent parish; it meets seldom, and now functions chiefly as a Court of Appeal. The General Assembly, consisting of commissioners elected by every Presbytery, has final jurisdiction over the entire national Church. This conciliar form of government has its precedent in the institutions of the medieval Scottish Church; but its roots go deeper, and Presbyterian apologists have been fond of appealing to Scripture for its support. Thus Gillespie writes[1]: 'Civil jurisdiction hath been, and is, in the person of one man; but no ecclesiastical jurisdiction is committed to one man, but to an assembly in which two at least must agree in the thing (Matt. 18.19).'

If the Middle Ages contributed a certain pattern to the Church's superior Courts, the parochial episcopate, on the other hand, has a more ancient and catholic foundation. It may easily be deduced from Scripture, and the Scriptural evidence can only with great difficulty be reconciled with any other system. It was the standard institution of the second century, and later still, it partially survived. The venerable Church of Alexandria may have retained it until about the year 250; such at least is the most rational explanation of Jerome's account[2] of how the Partiarch of that Church was anciently ordained. The mysterious order of *chorepiscopi* appears to be a pointer in the same direction. And in some sections of Celtic Christianity, parish Bishops certainly survived; for Bernard of Clairvaux[3] noted that amongst the Irish 'almost every Church must have its own separate Bishop'. There is nothing in Scottish Presbyterianism, considered simply as a system and without reference to the transmission of orders, to conflict with historical precedent or catholic practice.

Calvinists maintain that a mere tactual succession in office is of little moment compared with a ministerial succession in

[1] Gillespie, 'Aaron's Rod Blossoming', II.4 (in *Presbyterian's Armoury*, II, p. 89).
[2] Jerome, *Epist.*, cxlvi.1.
[3] Bernard of Clairvaux, *Vita Malachiae*, x.

Apostolic doctrine.[1] But the Scottish Church has always been careful to do things lawfully and in order—more careful than Rome has sometimes been.[2] Canonical succession was indeed nearly broken in the seventeenth century by misguided attempts to superimpose on the complete Presbyterian system a compromise form of diocesan episcopacy. But the numbers normally taking part in Presbyterian ordinations have provided a great safeguard, and Presbyterian clergy have unfailingly been ordained by Ministers (*i.e.* Pastors or Bishops) themselves entrusted with power to ordain. The crucial point in the line lies at the Reformation. Was regular succession broken by the Reformers? Had it been already lost by Rome? Or was it, under other forms, preserved?

Calvin himself was in no doubt as to the answer[3]: Rome, by falling into heresy, had lost all face and order of a Church, and Baptism was her only ordinance remaining valid; it had therefore been necessary for God to raise up a fresh generation of Apostolic men, to restore the order that was lost. In discussing the separation, without lineal descent, of the Christian Church from the Jewish Synagogue, he points to the patriarchal line of succession in the younger son (Rom. 9.12), and to the doctrine of the faithful remnant. In Calvinism, there has always been an eschatological element, preferring in Kierkegaard's phrase 'contemporaneity with Christ' to remote descent from His Apostles. But amongst Scottish Calvinists, the Reformer's attitude to Rome has not found general acceptance. Gillespie[4] holds Roman ordination to be valid but impure. The author of the *Ius Divinum Regiminis Ecclesiastici* states his position in the following words[5]: 'A ministerial succession should be granted to be drawn through the Church of Rome. . . . For the Church of Rome (setting aside those particular persons among them that maintained damnable errors . . .) continued to be a true Church of Christ until Luther's time . . . before the Church of Rome by the juggling and subtilty of the abominable Council

[1] Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.ii.1-2.

[2] Froude, *Short Studies*, I, pp. 419-20, instances the case of John Smart, Abbot of Wigmore, while engaged at Rome about the year 1530 in negotiations for his mitre and apparently not yet consecrated, himself performing a number of ordinations.

[3] Calvin, *Inst.*, IV.ii.2, 3 and 11; IV.iii.4; IV.v.2.

[4] Gillespie, 'Miscellany Questions', cap. 4 (in *Presbyterian's Armoury*, II, p. 27).

[5] *Ius Divinum Regiminis Ecclesiastici* (1654 edn.), pp. 264 *sq.*

of Trent was so far corrupted as to patronise those errors which before were but personal. . . . The substance of true ordination . . . cannot be annulled . . . no more than the Baptism of the Church of Rome.' It has been the usual practice of the Church of Scotland to admit Roman priests to its ministry without re-ordination. And there is a significant passage in the *First Book of Discipline* which suggests that Knox himself disclaimed any resurgence of Apostolical authority. On the admission of Ministers, he writes: 'albeit the Apostles used imposition of hands, yet seeing the miracle is ceased, the using of the ceremony we judge not necessary.' The use of this ceremony was in fact restored within a very few years, and before the old generation of Roman clergy had died out; but Knox's reason for disliking it provides proof that he claimed no Apostolic power in founding Churches. If then a succession is to be traced through the Roman line, it must be found in Adam Bothwell, Bishop of Orkney, a Roman prelate who supported the Reformation, and who continued that support until his death in 1593. Similarly, Anglicans have traced their own succession through Bishop Barlow; but whereas Bothwell's consecration is certain, that of Barlow has sometimes been held open to doubt.

Until comparatively recent times, Anglicans have found little difficulty in admitting the validity of Scottish Presbyterian orders. Article XXXIV declares in a truly catholic spirit that 'it is not necessary that Traditions and Ceremonies be in all places one, or utterly like. . . . Every particular or national Church hath authority to ordain, change and abolish ceremonies or rites of the Church. . . .' Article XXXVI merely states that the Anglican Ordinal contains nothing 'of itself superstitious and ungodly'. Article XXIII, on the admission of Ministers, maintains that 'those we ought to judge lawfully called and sent, which be chosen and called to this work by men who have publick authority given unto them in the Congregation, to call and send Ministers into the Lord's vineyard.' The wording of this last Article recalls the *Scots Confession* (Art. XXII) on 'lawful Ministers, whom we affirm to be only they that are appointed to the preaching of the Word, into whose mouths God has put some Sermon of exhortation, they being men lawfully chosen thereto by some Kirk'. So close were Anglicans to Presbyterians in the period following the Refor-

mation, that Scottish Ministers were admitted to English cures without re-ordination. In 1581, for example, Archbishop Grindal licensed a Presbyterian preacher, 'called to the ministry by the imposition of hands, according to the laudable form and rite of the Reformed Church of Scotland'.[1] Archbishop Whitgift, founding Church-order wholly on the royal supremacy, wrote[2]: 'If it had pleased Her Majesty to have assigned the imposition of hands to the Deans of every cathedral chapter or some other number of Ministers, which in no sense were Bishops, but as they be Pastors, there had been no wrong done to their persons that I can conceive.' Hooker did not regard Church-government as part of revealed and necessary doctrine—unlike the Presbyterians, who maintained the divine right of Scripture for their system; and he held that 'there may be sometimes very just and sufficient reason to allow ordination made without a Bishop'.[3] Andrewes, referring to the Reformed Churches of the Continent, declared[4]: *Laicus sit qui non videat stantes sine ea* (*i.e.* the diocesan form of episcopacy) *ecclesias . . . Nam et vos rem retinetis sine titulo.* Laud was censured by the University of Oxford for maintaining in his B.D. thesis that there could be no true Church without diocesans.[5] And although the Act of Uniformity in 1662 made episcopal ordination an essential requisite for holding office in the Church of England, no verdict was implied against the validity of other orders; Presbyterians, such as William of Orange, were later freely admitted to communion. But the most important precedent, implying official recognition of the Presbyterian Church by the Anglican, occurred in 1610. James VI had determined to bring the Scottish Church under Crown control by the appointment of diocesan Bishops, and he ordered three of its Ministers South for consecration by the English hierarchy. Andrewes raised the question whether they should not first be ordained to the priesthood; but he was overruled by Bancroft, who accepted the validity of Presbyterian orders on the ground that 'otherwise it might be doubted whether there were any lawful vocation in any of the Reformed

[1] Strype, *Life of Grindal*, VI, cap. 13.
[2] Whitgift, *Life and Acts* (ed. Strype), III, pp. 222-3.
[3] Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, VII.xiv.11.
[4] Andrewes, *Opuscula*, pp. 191 and 211.
[5] Heylin, *Life*, p. 54; Hallam (*Constitutional History*, I, p. 394) says that Laud's plan for the Church was 'just such as low-born and little-minded men, raised to power by fortune's caprice, are ever found to pursue'.

Churches'.[1] The three Ministers were therefore recognised as Priests and at once consecrated Bishops—an illogical compromise, for either they were already Bishops needing no fresh consecration, or else they possessed no valid orders at all. On their return to Scotland, the three consecrated others of their brethren as diocesans, but none of the Presbyterian clergy were re-ordained. The hybrid Church which resulted became an integral part of the Anglican Communion; and it is highly significant of the later change in Anglican opinion that today the Church of South India has been slow to find a like recognition. One is tempted to wonder whether ignorance of the past may be the chief non-theological factor in disunion.[2] The present writer, at least, can find in historic Anglicanism little justification for denying the validity of Presbyterian orders and none for debarring Presbyterians from communion. Episcopacy in some form may well be essential to the Church's standing; but insistence on a particular form of the episcopate —the prelatic or diocesan—so far from being the bond of unity, has in fact proved a perennial source of strife.

It is vitally important to realise that, under a misleading name, Presbyterianism in Scotland has preserved the catholic order of a threefold ministry. To avoid Crown control and nomination of the Bishops, the scope of their ministry was reduced from diocese to parish; and the product of much wrangling and many tears has been an institution unique in Christendom—a national, established Church that is freed entirely from the State. The reason, if not the result, should commend itself to those High Anglicans who, like the Scots, are jealous for the liberties of Holy Church.

[1] Grub, *Ecclesiastical History* (1861), II, p. 296.

[2] Some years ago, when the writer mentioned to a Bishop and a Dean of the Scottish Episcopal Church that in the seventeenth century their predecessors had admitted a Presbyterian ministry as valid, both confessed that they had never heard of the fact.

THE REFORMED DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION

According to Peter Martyr

by The Rev. J. C. McCLELLAND

The doctrine of predestination is commonly regarded as the normative dogma of Reformed or Calvinistic theology —but the contemporary demand for Christocentric theology is held to prove that this norm is not fully Christian. The impressive critical analysis of Karl Barth, for example, shows the Reformed doctrine of predestination, especially as it is worked out in the centuries following the Reformation, to be reduced to 'double predestination'.[1] This unscriptural teaching, Barth argues, derives from the misplacement of the doctrine in Reformed theology, since its proper position (*Stellung*) in dogmatics is in the context of Christology, and 'not directly following the doctrine of God'.[2]

Here let us submit two propositions. First, the normative dogma of Reformed theology—that is, of the theology of the Reformation: is not so much the doctrine of predestination as the doctrine of *union with Christ*. Second, the Reformers' doctrine of predestination was both Scriptural and Christological in its essential pattern, despite the other emphases that developed in the rationale of the sixteenth century polemic. We shall elaborate these propositions by an analysis of the doctrine of predestination of Peter Martyr, one of the original Reformers, whose theology was ranked by contemporaries alongside that of Calvin himself. It is significant that Barth notes two examples of the proper Christological placing of the doctrine of predestination: Calvin's first draft of the *Catechism* of 1537, 'and after him Peter Martyr, in his *Loci Communes* (1576)'.[3] But this

[1] *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik*, II/2.7—cf. p. 16: *Praedestination heisst in Luthers* De servo arbitrio, *in Zwinglis* De providentia, *in den Schriften Calvins unzweideutig doppelte Praedestination: doppelt, in dem Sinn, dass Erwählung und Verwerfung jetzt als die beiden Species des durch 'Praedestination' bezeichneten Genus verstanden werden.*

[2] ibid., p. 83. [3] op. cit., p. 90.

statement is historically misleading, since Martyr died in 1562, and the material which Masonius gathered into the *Loci* of 1576 comes from a period not 'after' Calvin at all. The heart of Martyr's own doctrine of predestination, for instance, lies in his commentaries on *Romans*, published in 1558, one year before the definitive edition of Calvin's *Institutes*.[1] Let us first examine further Peter Martyr's place in the Reformation, before offering his teaching as a valid key to the Reformed doctrine of predestination.

I. Peter Martyr The Reformer

Born in Florence in A.D. 1500, *Pietro Martire Vermigli*—named after a thirteenth century martyr—became a leading figure in the Italian Church, rising to a share in the episcopal oversight of Lucca, until his zeal for reform forced his departure from his native soil. In December 1542 he was appointed Professor of Theology at Strassburg, through the influence of Martin Bucer, and thus began a career of twenty years in which, by teaching, preaching and writing he struggled for the cause of Reformation in the whole of Europe. During this period he resided in three cities which were focal points of the Reformation, Strassburg, Oxford and Zürich. He was a close friend of Bucer, Calvin, Cranmer, Bullinger, Melanchthon and Jewel.

Peter Martyr's place in the Reformation has yet to be properly acknowledged. While at Strassburg he was a central figure in that debate with the extreme Lutheran party which served to form—for good or evil—the decisive Reformed emphases as against the Lutheran[3]; as Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford during the reign of Edward VI he was the leading theologian in England at the very time when doctrine and liturgy were being formed—it was Peter Martyr that Cranmer named as associate to defend the Prayer Book and 'the whole doctrine and religious order established' by Edward VI, in his challenge from Lambeth on 5th September 1553, when the

[1] *Commentaria in Epist. S. Pauli ad Romanos*, 2 *tom.*,—Basil. 1558; (fol. *Tiguri*, 1559; E.T. 'by H.B.', London, 1568).

[2] The debate involved the Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity of the body of Christ as necessary to a proper doctrine of the sacraments, and the Reformed doctrine of the perseverance of the saints as necessary to a proper doctrine of predestination. There is a deep truth contained in each, although perhaps we should ask ourselves whether Martin Bucer was not correct in thinking he could hold both Lutheran and Reformed together in his own faith and doctrine.

cause of Reformation was all but lost by the new régime of Mary[1]; his closing years at Zürich witnessed an increase in the ties which bound him to John Calvin, as well as in his influence over Bullinger and the other successors of Zwingli—this influence alone indicates a basic falsity in the charge of 'Zwinglianism' levelled at the theology of Zürich.

Although Peter Martyr's writings are concerned chiefly with the doctrine of the sacraments, his teaching upon justification and predestination is deserving of study. For this is the man whom Calvin termed *optimus et integerrimus vir*,[2] claiming that the Reformation controversy over a local presence in the Eucharist 'was crowned by Peter Martyr, who has left nothing to be desired'.[3] For his part, Martyr regarded Calvin as 'the most eminent and noble expositor of holy Scripture of our times'.[4] During the Strassburg controversy, he wrote to Calvin[5]:

> I want you to know that this sadly grieves me, along with others, that [the Lutherans] spread against truth and against your name, very foul and false reports concerning the eternal election of God. . . . We here, especially Zanchi and I, defend your part and the truth as far as we can. . . .

During the years 1556-62, Peter Martyr was engaged in two separate debates concerning predestination. One was with his ageing fellow-teacher in Zürich, Theodore Bibliander, and the other was the more important one, his defence of his friend and one-time disciple in Italy, Girolamo Zanchi, against the attack of the Lutherans in Strassburg. We shall present Martyr's teaching in three parts: first, his foundational treatment of the doctrine in his Commentary on Romans, which contains the treatise *De Praedestinatione*; second, his statements in the Bibliander and Zanchi affairs; and third, his doctrine in the context of his whole theology, as a concluding estimate of his significance for historical theology.

II. The Doctrine in the Exegesis of *Romans*

Writing to Henry Bullinger from Strassburg in 1553, Peter Martyr states[6]:

[1] Cf. Burnet's *History of the Reformation of the Church of England*, London, 1681, Vol. II, App. II.8, for text of Cranmer's statement.
[2] Letter to Cranmer—*Epistolae et Responsae Calvini*, 127.
[3] *True Partakind*, etc.—*Tracts*, II, p. 535, Calvin Trans. Soc.
[4] *De Votis Monasticis*, Basil., 1559, 1424D.
[5] From Strassburg, 9th May (1553?)—*Loci Comm., Epist.*
[6] *Original Letters*, 1537-1558 (2), Parker Society, 1847, p. 506.

But whereas I recollect that in a former letter you wrote me somewhat upon predestination, I will now content myself with replying, that in the treatment of that subject I have been especially on my guard lest men should cast all their faults and sins upon God, or derive from the will of God an excuse for their wickedness: and for the rest, I so treat it, as to follow the holy Scriptures as far as possible. But I have neither room nor opportunity to dwell longer upon the subject. You will perceive the nature of what I have taught as soon as I shall have published my commentaries on the Romans, as I shall do this year. I must however candidly confess that I cannot but lament that our Churches are agitated from time to time by new controversies: we have had, I think, quite disputing enough. May God of his goodness grant us all so to feel respecting predestination, that what ought to be the greatest consolation to believers, may not become the painful subject of pernicious contention! As far as I am concerned, I am not of such an obstinate opinion in these matters, as that if an opinion differing from my own were pointed out to me from the sacred writings, I should refuse to yield to the truth.

The *Commentary on Romans* was delayed by the Strassburg turmoil and subsequent removal to Zürich. It appeared in 1558, and in the Epistle Dedicatory Martyr acknowledges modern expositors whom he uses freely, Melanchthon, Bucer, Bullinger and Calvin.

The commentary on 1.16 strikes a chord familiar in Martyr's theology: the Gospel is 'properly' (*proprie*) salvation, but may cause harm through external causes or *per accidens*. This is repeated in 8.2: both Law and Gospel are instruments of death *per accidens*, not *per se* or *proprie*. Introducing the section Chapters 9-11, Peter Martyr indicates their dependence on what has preceded. They take up two questions deriving from Paul's doctrine of justification by faith: the efficacy of the promise made to Abraham's (carnal) seed, answered by Chapter 9, and the legal righteousness of the Jews which ought to be recognised, answered by Chapter 10.

In 9.10 Peter Martyr observes that 'human reason greatly abhors' the doctrine of election, and desires to appoint the ground of salvation rather in the human will. But the distinction between Jacob and Esau, for example, must be 'attributed wholly unto the will and election of God as to a higher ground and principle'. Although attempting no compromise of the doctrine, Martyr reminds us that 'the holy Scriptures everywhere frame themselves to our infirmity', so that Paul's language is an attempt to convey to our creaturely minds 'the

constancy and immutability of God's will'. His will means 'purpose and election'; and in examining this will we dare not go beyond the *scopus* of Paul's doctrine.

The question is this: does the Scriptural 'scope' include within the will of God a genuine hatred as well as love? Writing on 9.13 Martyr notes this problem, and concludes: 'I affirm with the holy Scriptures that God truly and indeed loves and hates, and from this follow the effects we have now mentioned. And since we cannot understand the force and power of the love and hatred of God in themselves, we consider them by the effects: namely, either by His gifts or by His punishments. But the ground of the question is, whether the love comes of our merits, or freely.' This passage reminds us that in the sixteenth century the question of 'double' predestination was not at issue, but rather the subtler problem of the relation of predestination to *foreknowledge* in God. Martyr termed it 'the weightiest matter of all, namely to what we should attribute our salvation and election, to works foreseen or to the free mercy of God'.

The commentary on 9.13 includes an excursus on Patristic teaching, in which Martyr acknowledges himself to be Augustinian in regard to the doctrines of grace, election and free will.[1] He rejects the distinction between a Divine effective will and permissive will as ultimately invalid, because 'I am somewhat doubtful whether it can thus occur in God'. The question here is the origin of evil, and he concludes: 'if we would speak properly and simply, we cannot say that God either wills sin or is its author.'[2] He now turns to his own positive definition:

> First I understand that to love is nothing else than to will a man well. And to hate is nothing else than to will a man ill, or not to will him well. Wherefore God is said to love them to whom He wills eternal salvation, that is, the chief felicity, and those He hates, to whom He wills it not. Now this being so, the controversy is, whether God wills felicity to the elect by works foreseen, or not: and how He wills it not to the reprobate.

In his treatment of the problematic terms, Martyr lays bare a doctrine of predestination which cannot be described as 'double' or 'out of context'. For instance, he groups together

[1] He elsewhere qualifies this by rejecting the doctrine of irresistible grace—*Comm. in Iudicum* 9.25 (*Tig.*, 1561).

[2] Two treatises in his *Comm. in Samuelis Proph. lib. duos* (*Tig.*, 1564) deal with this question at length: I, 2.26 and II, 16.22: *An Deus Sit Author Peccati.*

God's love, election and predestination: 'predestination follows love and election.' Here is the key—he never wavers from this normative meaning of the word 'predestination'—*it refers only to the elect.* Even though he argues analogically from this sequence, 'as love is to election, so hatred is to reprobation', yet he refers reprobation to ἡ εὐδοκία: 'the purpose of God is the pleasure of His will, and is taken as the general word to define predestination and reprobation'. This denial of the generic nature of election and rejection is consistently carried through in the Treatise, as we shall see. On 9.21 Martyr notes that the opposite of election and predestination is not damnation, but simply reprobation.

Does the doctrine of predestination deny 'justice'? On 9.14 Peter Martyr suggests that Christ's parable of the penny wage points to a distinction between 'distribution done from justice and that giving which proceeds from mercy'. But if everything is willed by God, are not men then 'stocks and stones'? This question is answered in the comment on 9.16-19: 'our will is so made by God that it cannot be compelled'; 'He moves things only according to the condition of the nature which each has'; 'man is moved by God according to his nature—namely to work by reason and will, in such a way that his choice or will is not compelled'. Martyr can therefore say: 'Each part is true, both that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and also that Pharaoh himself hardened his heart.' This 'both—and' is Peter Martyr's solution to the problem of Divine election and human choice: no 'violence or coaction' is brought to human will by Divine grace, for 'by a pleasant moving and conversion' the will is altered, 'willing yet so willing that the will thereof comes from God'.[1]

Here is a dynamic view of grace: the selfsame thing is willed by God and man through the operation of the Holy Spirit in the faithful, without confusion and without separation. Although Peter Martyr does not carry his analysis further here, his doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist presents a like problem. There he answers as follows: the Person of Jesus Christ is the architectonic of theology, the archetypal analogue; therefore the 'both Divine and human' of His own Person, the 'without confusion and without separation' of the

[1] *In Iud.* 9.25; *cf. in II Sam.* 16.22.

Chalcedon creed, is reflected analogically in the sacramental relation, and in the relation of faith between the Divine election and the human decision.[1] He deals with the problem of *necessity* against such a background. The necessity which the Divine will involves is not one of compulsion but of infallibility, or as logic phrases it, of the consequence or composite. And at this point Martyr gathers up his material in a clear statement in the treatise *De Praedestinatione*, inserted after Chapter 9. It may be of some significance that all of Martyr's major Treatises, on knowledge of God, justification, resurrection, repentance, are written in the body of his Scriptural commentaries.

The treatise *De Praedestinatione* is divided into four parts[2]: the nature and definition of predestination; its causes; its effects; and a final section on the nature of its necessity. An introductory paragraph acknowledges the opposition to Augustine's doctrine, by 'many of the brethren in France—and not of an inferior sort'. Against this opposition, Martyr suggests two of Augustine's works, *De bono perseverantiae*, especially Chapters 14, 15 and 20, and *De correptione et gratia*, 5 and 14-16.

The primary orientation of the doctrine of predestination is this: it confirms justification by faith. 'Free justification should perish, if we were not rightly taught of predestination.' To teach this doctrine is to give God His due: 'By this doctrine are men brought to glory not in themselves but in the Lord.' It manifests 'the certainty of our salvation' and leads to a proper acknowledgment of God's gifts (§ 3). Many consolations derive from knowledge of this doctrine:

> And let all our speech be directed to this, namely that they that are of Christ ought not to have confidence in their own power and strength, but in God; and that they ought to acknowledge His gifts, and glory in God, and not in themselves, and to be aware of the grace and mercy given them, being freely justified by Christ. Let them also understand that they are predestinate to be made like unto the image of the Son of God, unto the adoption of children, to walk in good works (§ 4).

To conclude: 'there is nothing that more advances the glory of God than does this doctrine'. Predestination is to be sharply distinguished from the pagan *fatum*, since it does not lead to

[1] Cf. particularly his *Disputatio et Tractatio* of Oxford, 1549, and his *Defensio doc. vet. et Apost. de ss. Euch.* (against Gardiner)—*Tig.*, 1559.

[2] The Treatise is also contained in the *Loci*, where it is divided into short sections, whose numeration we shall use (III.1.1-58).

necessity but to freedom. It is to be received because it is part of the Gospel (*pars quaedam Evangelii*) (§ 5).

'Part of the Gospel'—here is the dominant theme of the whole Treatise, echoed most clearly in section 10: 'in this Treatise, under the name of predestination we shall comprehend the saints only'. For this he has historical precedent: 'for that reason I think Augustine entitled his book *de praedestinatione sanctorum*'; 'the Schoolmen also affirm that the elect only, and not the reprobate, are predestinate'. These precedents are significant. Calvin could not have been a precedent in this regard, since as early as his 1539 edition of the *Institutio*, he had written, *quod hominum alii ad salutem, alii ad damnationem praedestinantur* (XIV.1). The scholastic doctrine—to which Karl Barth has also made favourable reference[1]—does indeed treat predestination as *pars providentiae*, yet succeeds in preserving its evangelical nature to a remarkable degree.[2]

In section 14 he further explains his position:

> I separate the reprobate from the predestinate, because the Scriptures nowhere that I know of, call men that shall be damned predestinate.

That this is not merely a linguistic cavil, Martyr shows by his further analysis. God's *praescientia* extends further than His *praedestinatio*—He has knowledge of all creatures, but a *will* only unto the saints.

> We ought also to remember that the love, election and predestination of God are so ordered in themselves that they follow one another in a certain course.

Augustine therefore defined predestination as 'a preparation of grace' and 'a purpose of mercy'. Martyr now gives his own fuller definition:

> I say therefore that predestination is the most wise purpose of God, by which from the beginning He has constantly decreed to call all those whom He has loved in Christ, to the adoption of His children, to justification by faith, and at last to glory through good works, that they may be made like unto the image of the Son of God; and that in them may be declared the glory and mercy of the Creator (§ 11).

Two aspects of the definition should be noted. First, it is *eschatological*: 'predestination has a respect unto things to come'

[1] loc. cit., pp. 16, 47.

[2] e.g. Aquinas' *Summa Theol.*, I.22-23. *Huiusmodi autem est providentia quidem respectu omnium; praedestinatio vero, et reprobatio, et quae ad haec consequuntur, respectu hominum; specialter in ordine ad aeternam salutem.* (Quaest. 22—ed. Lond., 1874).

(§ 11); 'predestination has a regard unto those ends we cannot by nature attain, such as justification, good life, and glorification' (§ 14). Second, it is *Christological*:

> 'Whom He has loved in Christ'—this we add, because whatever God gives, or decrees to give, that He gives and will give through Christ. And as we have often affirmed, Paul says to the Ephesians that we are elected and predestinated in Christ, for He is the prince and head of all the predestinate; yea, none is predestinate, but only to this end, to be made a member of Christ (§ 12).

This statement alone indicates a doctrine of Christ as much more than merely instrumental to the purpose of the Father—and the relevance of the foundational doctrine of union with Christ to the doctrine of predestination is explicit here.

The first main division of the Treatise ends with a definition of reprobation:

> Wherefore reprobation is the most wise purpose of God, by which before all eternity He has constantly decreed, without any injustice, not to have mercy on those whom He has not loved, but has overlooked them, that by their just condemnation He might declare His wrath towards sins, and also His glory (§ 15).

Although in his treatment of reprobation Martyr, like the other Reformers, disappoints us by not dealing with what is surely the basic issue, namely just how Jesus Christ has borne our *rejection* in bearing our sins, yet his consistent use of the negative in relation to reprobation, and his separation of this as a different order from predestination, recall us to his Christological doctrine and context.

The second division of the Treatise, concerning *causes*, begins with a consideration of causality in terms of the Aristotelian distinction of ends. Although the Divine will is its own cause, yet Scripture attributes a final cause of predestination, to show God's power and glory, material causes such as vocation and justification, and a type of efficient cause, the way our minds work and respond. The ambiguity of ends must be before us in this matter: 'It is possible indeed that the effects of predestination may be so compared together, that one may be the cause of the other' (§ 16). A first principle is this, that divine and human election do not share the same ratio (*Electionis divinae atque humanae diversa est ratio*—§ 23).

The problem of the relation between the Death of Christ and

our predestination forms a transition to the third section of the Treatise, since Martyr holds that 'Christ and His death is the first and principal effect of predestination' (§ 25). Christ is given to the elect, He is the road or channel through which God gives us all His gifts (*per hanc viam et quasi canalem*), and is 'the image of our predestination'.

> The first effect, therefore, of predestination is Christ Himself; for the elect can have none of the gifts of God, unless by our Saviour it be given them (§ 37).

Paragraph 39 teaches the perseverance of the predestinate (*Necesse est praedestinati maneant*), and 42 notes that 'outward calling is common to the predestinate and the reprobate'. The next two paragraphs consider the extent of the Atonement:

> that God has now decreed to deliver all men from misery, and through Christ to have them blessed, the Scriptures teach not: wherefore, not without just cause, we say that He has decreed to deliver some, and leave others, and that justly, the causes of which justice are yet not to be sought by our own works, since they are known to God only through His hidden and unspeakable wisdom.

The universal propositions of Scripture are to be read in terms of the two societies, godly and ungodly, which Scripture presupposes (§ 45). God's mercy towards all men is shown by His restraining the Devil and by His providential care (§ 47).

The final division of the Treatise concerns necessity. This is first distinguished into outward and inward, only the former having relevance. A further distinction is that between a 'violent' compulsion (the scholastic *necessitas consequentis*) and a necessity of supposition or *ex hypothesi* (*necessitas consequentiae*). Since the former would refer to objective circumstances in the manner of the pagan Fate, we are left with the latter. Martyr further notes the dialectical distinction of *sensum compositum et divisum*; to this he adds a necessity of 'certainty or infallibility' as against one of 'compulsion'. With the ground thus cleared, he proceeds to the positive statement. Predestination involves a necessity *ex hypothesi*: 'the necessity falls upon the connexion and conjunction of the predestination of God with our works' (§ 50). Scripture attributes to God, he continues, *necessitas consequentiae, seu sensu compositi aut infallibilitatis*. Such necessity therefore means:

In the predestinate it provides that nothing be committed by them which may overthrow their salvation. And in the reprobate He takes away from them no natural power, pertaining to their substance or nature, nor compels them against their will to attempt anything (§ 52).

The final question of the relation of the Divine necessity to the Divine justice is answered as follows:

We have hitherto in this third article seen what necessity comes of the foreknowledge and predestination of God, namely such a necessity as is not an absolute but *ex hypothesi*, which we can term *consequentiae, infallibilitatis et certitudinis*, but in no way *coactionis*. And this being so, it is evident that no injustice is committed by God when He condemns sinners and glorifies the just. For to every man is rendered according to his works. . . . (§ 58).

Second causes may be doubtful, but God's will is certain: His foreknowledge hinders not 'the power of a man's will', and truly 'we obtain liberty through Christ'. The conclusion of the matter is this:

Let no man be offended with the doctrine of predestination, when rather by it are we led to acknowledge the benefits of God, and to give thanks unto Him alone. Let us also learn not to attribute more unto our own strength than we ought: and let us have a sure persuasion of the good will of God towards us, by which He would elect His before the foundations of the world were laid: let us moreover be confirmed in adversities, knowing assuredly that whatever calamity happens, it is done by the counsel and will of God, and shall at last by the government of predestination turn us to good, and to eternal salvation.

III. The Doctrine in Controversy

When Peter Martyr went to Zürich in 1556 as Professor of Hebrew, Bullinger and the other theologians there were engaged in debate about the doctrine of predestination. Bullinger, advising that one should handle 'this great mystery' (*dieses grosse Geheimniss*) with moderation and caution,[1] had renounced Calvin's harsher teaching in the debate with Bolsec, refusing to sign the *Consensus* of 1551 on predestination. Another Züricher, Theodore Bibliander, was a declared adversary of Calvin's doctrine, and as early as 1535 had been accused of teaching free will in the sense of Erasmus. He was restrained by Bullinger from openly attacking Calvin's doctrine. But in June 1557, despite the influence of Bullinger and Martyr, he began to

[1] C. Schmidt, *Peter Martyr Vermigli, Leben und aus. Schriften*, Elberfeld, 1858, p. 215—Schmidt's is the only detailed summary of Martyr's life and theology available.

oppose the doctrine of predestination in his College. At this very time Peter Martyr was lecturing on 1 Samuel, and in connexion with the rejection of Saul, discoursed at length on the assailed teaching. He wrote to Calvin[1]:

> I have read your book (the two works against Castellio) with the greatest delight; God redounded your defence unto honour and to the defence of the orthodox faith—so hold I for my own part, I concur with you in all points. I have begun to treat of predestination, and shall continue with it the whole week. Not only does the inducement of the passage (*Stelle*) move me to declare it, but also because my College, as you know, is widely separate from me in regard to this, and has spoken against the doctrine in lectures the past week.

By this time Bibliander had brought both scorn and pity upon himself, and was excused as an aged and feeble-minded man. He began to ask whether Martyr were really predestined, and in December 1559 challenged him to a duel! In January 1560 Martyr issued a formal statement in defence of the doctrine, and the following month the Council relieved Bibliander of his position, allowing him to retain his salary. Schmidt comments: 'Bibliander was not pensioned off on account of his teaching, but because he was of unsound mind' (*geisteskrank*).[2]

Peter Martyr's statement in this controversy, *De Libero Arbitrio*,[3] advances one main thesis, that the natural man has a certain freedom of the will, which extends to 'knowledge moral, civil and economic', but that in regard to things divine, he is as a dead man. 'The dead have no power to prepare themselves, nor to regenerate themselves.' Conversion is 'utterly ascribed to the Spirit of God, and not to our own strength'.

The necessity of the natural man's sinning, however, is not absolute but the *necessitas suppositi seu consequentiae* of the Treatise. The decisive point is this:

> Wherefore we determine that the will or choice, before regeneration, can do nothing by itself regarding divine and spiritual things, but that the Spirit of God is necessary.

The Spirit works through calling, either the external Word which is common to all men, or the effectual Word which has justification joined to it. The purpose of election is to 'conjoin, justify and bless in Christ', to incorporate the elect in Christ:

[1] Schmidt, op. cit., p. 216. [2] ibid., p. 218.
[3] Included in the 1583 edition of the *Loci*, after Part IV.

sunt Christo insiti. And at this point the Christian doctrine of free will enters:

> unto free will, that is to the will now reformed, no small power must be attributed. Therefore I affirm that the regenerate can know spiritual things, that they also can choose them, and in a way perform them: for they are not now mere men only, but men of God: they are incorporated in Christ, they are His members, and thus partakers of His freedom.

The debate with Bibliander serves to do two things. It shows us something of the sixteenth century climate, which was neither so homogeneous nor so rarefied as we often imagine; and it reflects, in Martyr's case at least, the concern for Christian life, and this as deriving from union with the living Christ, that was the driving force behind all thought and research.

The Strassburg strife, between the Lutheran and Reformed parties over the doctrine of grace, involved Martyr through his friend Zanchi, who had remained in Strassburg after Martyr's removal to Zürich. In the past, Strassburg had lent sympathetic ear to the doctrine of predestination presented by Luther, Bucer and Calvin. But the subsequent 'Supper-strife' introduced differences over the nature of grace, as well as personal bitterness. Zanchi inherited the Reformed cause, and Marbach took up leadership of the Lutheran side. These two engaged in a heated controversy involving the doctrine of ubiquity, the doctrine of predestination—and the matter of certain pictures which Peter Martyr had left in the Church!

Zanchi's position emphasised the doctrine that the state of grace (*Gnadenzustand*) of the regenerate cannot be lost, along with the corresponding doctrine that 'the individual will know his election better *a posteriori* than *a priori*'.[1] Martyr wrote to Peter Sturm in support of Zanchi, saying that he but followed Augustine, Luther and Bucer on this question. Martyr stated that there are two views: one, that election, the Holy Spirit and faith may be lost again; the other, that these could be diminished and lie dormant, but not cease. Both could be supported from Scripture, he contended, but the latter is 'the more probable', and is the teaching of Bucer and Calvin.

Zanchi now visited other centres of theology to confer about the doctrine, and spent eight days with Martyr while in Zürich. He proposed fourteen Theses, which Sturm asked the Magis-

[1] The material in this paragraph is from Schmidt, op. cit., p. 276.

trates of Strassburg to have judged. Meanwhile Bullinger suggested that Martyr draw up 'the Zürich view'. This he did, completing on 29th December 1561, what Hottinger termed the Zürich Confession on Predestination, and of which Schmidt writes: 'a remarkable document for the history of the development of Reformed Church teaching, and a proof of Martyr's dominant influence in his Zürich College.'[1] The document agrees substantially with Zanchi's teaching 'insofar as it shall be interpreted properly'. We shall summarise Zanchi's theses, with Martyr's comments. The first three concern eschatological questions then in dispute, the rest concern predestination.[2]

(1) No one can know the time of the End. *Martyr*: 'agreed.'

(2) Anti-Christ will come, but it is not necessary that the Pope must be he. *Martyr*: 'propable' and certainly not heretical.

(3) Regarding Romans 11.25 f and Luke 18.8: after the reign of Anti-christ a little faith will remain, till Christ conquers all. *Martyr*: here Zanchi has acted as a good teacher, commending rather than condemning in his attempt to resolve two Scriptural passages.

(4) There is a definite number to elect and to reject. *Martyr*: agreed, since without God's will and His gifts of grace, faith and the Spirit, no one can be saved. 'It is then that one thinks He writes a blind and accidental bargain' (*Handeln*).

(5) As the elect unto life cannot be lost, so those not predestinated to life are necessarily damned. *Martyr*: agreed, for none can be saved except Christ draw him. God's decision is always just, but not always revealed. The 'necessity' here is blameless, if we exclude necessity of force and accept only necessity of results. The result is the blessedness of the elect, therefore he who enjoys this, has certainty of salvation.

(6) He who is once elected can never become reprobate. *Martyr*: that God's will is unchangeable requires no discussion, and this is the ground of election. But will Zanchi not allow that he who is seen and judged (as elect) in the Church now can become reprobate?

(7) Two bands are required to join men to Christ and the Church, election and the Holy Spirit with faith—both inward,

[1] op. cit., p. 278.

[2] I have found this document only in Schmidt (pp. 278-81), whose translation may not carry the original sense of Martyr's words, which would be in Latin.

invisible, inexplicable; also two outward, visible, explicable ones in the Church—confession of doctrine and participation in the sacraments. *Martyr*: agreed, for no man can lose the first bands, although the latter two are prone to loss.

(8-9) In this world the elect are given true faith but once, and are conscious of it. *Martyr*: we say that the *einmalige* gift is retained, but allow for increase or decrease. Besides such true faith there is a false and temporary kind, which may vanish and return.

(10) Two men struggle in the regenerate, and sin is the victory of the outward man. *Martyr*: agreed, for when the regenerate sins, it is not whole-heartedly but reluctantly (*widerstrebend*), as Romans 7.15 ff states.

(11-14) The promise of life must be preached to all in general but only the elect are truly reached. *Martyr*: so is it in fact—the promise is preached to all, but becomes effective only in the elect, and yet the servant of the Word knows not the Divine decision.

Peter Martyr sums up his comments as follows: 'In Dr Zanchi's Theses we find no heresies or absurdities; rather we accept part as necessary and part as probable, and none contrary to Scripture. We testify also that he affirms what not only the old Church Fathers but also Luther, Capito, Bucer, Brenz and other most noble pioneers of the evangelical doctrine held.'

The document was signed by the Zürich clergy, and well received at Strassburg. But Marbach was driven into more serious opposition yet, and the situation became worse, until the call of Zanchi to Chiavenna in 1563 relieved the tension. For our part, this debate further indicates the influence of Peter Martyr, and extends the scope of his doctrine to other moot points of dogma. The deeper question of whether the best insights of his Biblical commentaries are modified or even perverted through polemic, is one to which we should return a tentative 'No', although further research on this point in his case and in Calvin's is doubtless required.

IV. Concluding Estimate

In conclusion we ought to note the relationship between the doctrine of predestination and other aspects of Peter Martyr's theology. For instance, a first principle of Martyr's teaching is

that, since the human mind cannot comprehend the infinite, all knowledge of God is the result of a Divine accommodation or humility. The language of Scripture adopts a kind of *anthropopatheia* when seeking to communicate to our minds the properties of God. Such language 'after the condition of men' therefore, will be characterised by a certain 'impropriety'.[1]

This doctrine of the Divine accommodation and its resultant impropriety of theological language has significance for the doctrine of predestination. 'The will of God is both hidden and manifest' states Martyr in commenting on Judges 14.5. Now this familiar distinction has contributed to the error of grounding the doctrine of predestination in the absolute decree of a secret will of God. But Peter Martyr continues, 'But we must follow the will of God expressed by a common rule and sealed by His law—to that will we must direct both life and manners. For the other will we must not have too much care.' The secret will may have separated Jacob from Esau in the womb, but of it we can only 'say with Paul, O the depth of the riches . . . '! His conclusion is the crucial point: 'these two wills are not indeed separated in God, but are one and simple'. The will of God revealed in Jesus Christ is neither qualified nor complemented by another, hidden will; and this will is altogether a will to love.

How then are we to explain the fact of rejection? A concept from Aristotle helps Martyr here—the distinction *per se* and *per accidens*. Properly speaking, revelation is single, *simplex*, the Gospel. To speak *proprie*, God's will for man is altogether gracious—even His law is spiritual, no more 'an instrument of death' than the Gospel.[2] Rejection and death come accidentally—the Divine Will is perhaps final cause, but never efficient cause. In fact, Martyr states, we must speak properly only of an efficient cause within the sinner, or better still of a '*de*ficient cause'.[3]

Against this background we may sketch the positive doctrine that informs all Peter Martyr's theology: *faith means union with Christ*. The living Christ conjoins men to Himself, and this union is a dynamic conjunction of persons: 'and these members

[1] This teaching is found especially in his OT Commentaries, and particularly in a Treatise, *De Visionibus*, in the *Comm. in Iud.* following 6.22.
[2] *Comm. in Rom.*, 8.2. [3] *Comm. in I Sam.*, 16.22.

are so completely joined to the Head, that they are called flesh of His flesh and bone of His bones'.[1] Predestination, therefore, is in order to this union, and its origin in God as well as its outworking in man must be specifically related to this organic miracle. A striking example of this is the way in which Martyr relies upon his doctrine of predestination to expound the doctrine of infant baptism.[2] Since Baptism signifies and seals the rebirth which begins the union with Christ, its efficacy is related not to human decision but to Divine, to predestination. Or again, Martyr makes much of the fact that by His Incarnation Christ united *all* men to Himself, and only on the basis of this universal union with Christ is the inward union of faith possible.

Finally, the question of rejection is not so simple as the opponents of 'double' predestination would have us believe. That some word about a positive rejection must follow from an honest exegesis of Scriptures, especially passages such as I Sam. 15 and Rom. 9-11, will doubtless be granted by all. The mystery of rejection, like the mystery of iniquity itself, can be rationalized as much by rescuing God from all contact with it as by assigning it to His will. But what must save the doctrine of predestination from a logic which perverts the Gospel into the half-will of a rationalized Deity is its Christological context and content: *in Christ* and *into Christ*. And precisely here the distinctive contribution of Peter Martyr to the theology of the Reformation has ultimate relevance, for he was explicit where others were implicit in referring all theology to this Christological touchstone.[3] And in his doctrine of predestination he offers to us not only a truly Reformed doctrine of significance for historical theology, but also a positive guide in our own attempt to work out a Scriptural and Christological doctrine of predestination.

[1] *Comm. in I Cor.*, 1.2.

[2] Cf. Commentaries on Romans and 1 Corinthians.

[3] e.g. in a letter to Martyr of 1555, Calvin replied to Martyr's discussion about union with Christ with basic agreement, concluding 'we feel the very same on all points'—*Epist. et Resp., Ep.* 208.

THE REFORMATION OF WORSHIP

III. The Direction of Contemporary Worship

by The Rev. D. H. C. READ

This title is deliberately ambiguous. The word 'direction' covers both the *trend* of modern worship and its leadership or *conduct*. In the light of our understanding of the nature of Christian worship and of its tradition we must ask both: Where are we going? What movement, if any, is discernible in the pattern of public worship in this generation? and also: What ought we to be doing? What practical steps can be taken today by those who are responsible for the conduct of worship? The first question is a matter of observation about which we may be in general agreement; the second concerns the changes we consider desirable and it is quite certain that no two of us will be in entire agreement on that. This lecture, then, will as it descends from the realm of principle to that of practice become inevitably more controversial, and I ought to say right away that in these matters I represent no movement, organisation, or society, but simply offer you one man's ideas on the subject, with the hope that, however uninspired they may be, they may serve as a starting-point for some useful and necessary discussion in the churches.

Let me begin with one simple observation. The worship of the Reformed Churches (and it is of their worship, not that of the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, or modern sectarian communions that we shall be thinking) has in the life time of many of our older members already undergone a considerable reformation. Anyone, for instance, who was acquainted with the typical worship of a Scottish Church of fifty to seventy years ago and returned to observe its worship today would almost certainly be struck by the changes that had occurred. These changes would be more noticeable in some quarters than others: none have, I believe, affected the fundamental character of Scottish Presbyterian worship; but there

has certainly been movement—and movement in a discernible direction. Those who approve of that direction would call it a movement towards better form and order and the restoration of the arts in the service of God. Those who disapprove speak of ritualism, externalism, and the aping of alien traditions. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the reformation of worship that has occurred has been the cause of bitter controversy. The remarkable feature of the movement has been that on the whole the changes have occurred quietly, and apparently acceptably, although Scotland has never shown itself slow to indulge in vigorous dispute over matters of ecclesiastical order. What has happened has been a gradual reshaping of the forms of worship partly in response to the different mood of a modern congregation, and partly as a result of deliberate stimulation from those who were concerned to restore to the Church a sense of worship which they believed to be lacking.

This reformation of worship, which can be observed in all parts of the Reformed family, is reflected in a variety of practices, none revolutionary by themselves, but indicating together a direction or trend of which it is our duty to be more fully aware. Compared with the clamour of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this is a silent reformation through which we have been living, and while no one would wish to emulate our forefathers in theological strife, it might be asked whether we have not been too inarticulate and too theologically lazy in what one might describe as the 'liturgical drift' of our day. Consider some of the more noticeable changes that have taken place in the last sixty years—the construction of churches of pleasing design, usually with the pulpit at the side, and often with considerable artistic embellishment; the use of a Book of Common Order with consequent increased uniformity of worship; the audible repetition of the Lord's Prayer, and the occasional use of the Creeds; the enhancement of dignity and ceremonial, and the use of a fuller ministerial garb; the relative subordination of the sermon, compared with its previous length and centrality; the development of vocal and instrumental music; the observance of the Christian Year; the frequency of 'special' services; the bringing back of Baptism and Confirmation into the full worship of the congregation; the development of sectional activities in connexion with Sunday School

and youth movements. These, and many more, are symptoms of a very considerable and varied reformation that has been going on, for the most part unquestioned, in our churches during the last sixty years. I list them here neither for commendation nor criticism (although it is only fair to say that for the most part I welcome these changes for reasons which I shall later suggest) but simply to draw attention to the fact that we are in the midst of a very considerable reformation already and to make a plea for a more conscious and responsible attitude to what is happening.

A very great responsibility rests upon those to whom is committed the ordering of public worship in the Reformed Churches —ultimately upon the supreme Courts of the Church, but in practice also on the parish minister and those who advise him. The very fact that we are not bound by any liturgy imposes on us the duty of careful and conscientious use of the heritage that is committed to us. No matter how simple the form of worship to which our congregation may be accustomed it is a tradition —in fact, a ritual, a liturgy, for these are unavoidable in any corporate action—and as such deserves our respectful understanding. It is here that the extreme individualism that has been the curse of the later history of the Reformed Churches has wrought havoc in our worship. However 'free' and non-liturgical the worship we desire to foster, nothing can excuse the attitude of the man who believes he is free to fashion it after the devices and desires of his own heart. That the worship of the Christian community should depend Sunday by Sunday on the passing whims of the man who is leading it is an idea that would have been repugnant to Apostles and Reformers alike. Where the feeling has been allowed to grow that public worship depends in this way on the minister a congregation ceases to be a worshipping community in the true sense of the term, and is simply there to attend a one-man performance. Where there is no conception of a tradition of communal worship to be respected we find that instead of being aware of taking part in the great drama of man's meeting with his God, the people imagine they are attending an ecclesiastical variety-show, in which the minister as compère skilfully mixes song and prayer and Scripture and sermon according to the custom and mood of the day. Our heritage of freedom in public worship was won in the past

against ecclesiastical and political totalitarianism not in order to deliver us into the hands of a totalitarian local minister, making of the worship of the Church what seems to him good. Just as the bare and unadorned Protestant Church ceases to have value when the sense of the Divine Sovereignty is weakened in our midst; just as the exalted pulpit becomes a delusion when the word of man replaces the Word of God; so the tradition of liturgical freedom leads us far astray when we lose the deep doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ.

What this means in practice is that we ought not to be exposed to any merely haphazard reformation of the Church's worship. The various tendencies I have listed from the practice of my own Church in recent years should be neither uncritically accepted nor unthinkingly condemned. We should be asking ourselves some fundamental questions about the meaning of public worship in our modern environment, and the theological implications of all that we do. Above all let us avoid bedevilling this question with meaningless epithets and party-labels, such as 'High Church' and 'Low church', 'Ritualist', 'Formalist', and the like. Even 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' are ambiguous adjectives in this connexion. What matters is not the temperamental bias we may have towards one form of worship or another, still less the suspicions we may harbour of the intentions of our brother, but the common discovery of the forms of worship that are truest both to our heritage and to the present situation of the Church. In order to do this there are certain guiding principles that should help to make us aware of what we are doing, and prevent us from making changes at random or for the wrong reasons.

(1) The first principle must always be that of *Soli Deo Gloria*. If the primary object of worship is to glorify God, then every part of divine service must be subservient to that end, and every change considered in relation to it. Although this principle is accepted in theory almost universally it is doubtful if it has really been operative as the major factor in our modern forms of worship. We are living in an age that is singularly lacking in a sense of God, and for that reason extremely self-conscious and introspective. The churches have not been immune from this climate of thought and have been strongly tempted to make concessions to it both in preaching and in worship.

When I am confronted with a printed Order of Service that shows a remarkable variety of events—introit, anthems, responsive readings, solos, choral amens, postludes, and the like—I am tempted to wonder if there is indeed a theological principle at all behind the Order. It may be that the minister could justify every item and even the total Order as designed to the glory of God, but there is a suspicion left in the mind that much of it has been adopted for other reasons. These are sometimes psychological—the Christian liturgy has been subjected to psychological tests like everything else in this age, and there is no reason to despise the expert advice of those whose business it is to understand human nature, especially in its collective aspects. But we are not entitled to devise our worship with a view to satisfying certain basic human needs, and the last word should remain not with the psychologist but with the theologian. Again the reasons behind the liturgy may be purely æsthetic. Here there is also justification for keeping in mind what can be usefully learned from those who are not primarily concerned with *Soli Deo Gloria*; but æsthetic reasons in themselves are not sufficient to determine the 'shape of the liturgy'. It may well be that from time to time changes are introduced for no definite psychological or æsthetic reason but merely from a vague desire to be abreast with the times and to follow the current ecclesiastical fashion. That is why I would make a special plea for an understanding of what we are doing so that such reformation as takes place in our worship shall be theologically informed and consciously directed to the greater glory of God. An apocryphal story of our Lord is apposite at this point. You remember how it is related that when He found a man breaking the Sabbath Law He said: 'If you know what you are doing you are blessed: if you know not you are a law-breaker and accursed.' When we break the Law—which is what we are doing when we make a change in the traditional pattern of worship—let us be sure that we know what we are doing.

There are many examples of liturgical changes in our day that could illustrate the application, or non-application, of the principle of *Soli Deo Gloria*. When, for example, a minister decides to dispense with the Old Testament lesson and have only one reading of Scripture in the service, what has determined this change? Almost certainly the notion that he thus

makes the service more palatable to the modern worshipper who finds the Old Testament difficult to understand and in any case prefers to have the service shortened. But, of course, he won't have the service shortened, for the space of the Old Testament is sure to be filled by anthem or a children's address—both of which are often designed to minister rather to the passive, concert-hall attitude of the congregation than to their sense of collective worship of Almighty God. (The children's address is a controversial subject in many of our churches: I must confess that seldom does it seem to me to blend with the worship of the day, and too often does it give the impression of a kind of comic relief. I have included one in worship at the request of children: never would I do so at the request of an adult!)

The increased use of symbolic ornament in our churches calls for examination in the light of this principle. Too often the only criterion employed is whether or not we like the effect, or whether or not the symbol arouses emotional prejudices in our minds. Yet here again we ought to be conscious of the relation of the ornaments to the glorifying of God in His sanctuary according to our inherited understanding of the Gospel. This matter of symbolism cannot be settled simply by adopting a fixed position 'for' or 'against'. Symbolism of some kind is inevitable in a Christian Church, as is evidenced by the existence of the sacraments. We ought surely not to be divided into two parties: those who wish to flood our churches with every kind of symbolic ornament and act; and those who would totally exclude them. We have symbols—the church building itself is a symbol—and our duty is to understand them as they minister to *Soli Deo Gloria*. To take the church building as an example: it surely does not minister to the glory of God to worship Him in a dismal rectangle in the midst of acres of brown paint; nor does it to erect a magnificent mock-Gothic cathedral crammed with a symbolism that is foreign to our tradition and understanding. In this realm we all need more careful thought and our congregations much more instruction. (In my first parish I learned that my predecessor, when presented with a pulpit fall, had wished to have on it a simple cross: the congregation objected and they compromised with the letters IHS. Yet the plain cross is specifically a symbol of the

Reformed Church, while IHS certainly is not.) Suppose it is suggested that a red light might be hung suspended above the Communion Table. It is not sufficient that many people think it looks rather well. It is necessary to discover that this is a symbol with theological meaning: it is used in Roman Catholic churches to denote the presence of the Host, implies the doctrine of transubstantiation, is consequently meaningless in a Protestant Church, and cannot by them be used to the glory of God. By all means let us use symbols in our churches, but let them stand for our own, and not some other, understanding of the Gospel.

The whole question of ritual can be seen in perspective only in the light of the principle of *Soli Deo Gloria*. For then it is seen as subservient to the end of all true worship. The so-called 'ritualist' is the man who has allowed the question of ritual to dominate his thoughts on worship. This can happen both positively and negatively: positively, when a man becomes obsessed with the minutiae of word and symbol, so that he is unable to worship when his rules are not observed; and negatively, when a man's mind is so filled with suspicions of procedure different from what he is accustomed to that he would rather disrupt a congregation than violate his prejudices. Both are 'ritualists' —the one because he is thinking primarily of liturgical correctness down the last detail of ecclesiastical haberdashery rather than of the glory of God; and the other because he is similarly prevented from worship by an obsession with the same subject with a different motive. A true reformation of worship can happen only when, recognising that ritual of some kind is involved in every communal act, we are determined that Church ritual shall be theologically significant, expressing the response of a worshipping people to the God of all grace.

That even an elaborate and highly symbolic ritual can still be meaningful and worshipful today was movingly illustrated at the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth. Such a service, and others designed for special occasion in national or ecclesiastical life, have proved that ceremonial, colour, and even pageantry, can be a genuine expression of devotion in this somewhat drab and monochrome era. We have therefore to take seriously a reformation of our worship in this direction. Already most of us have been confronted with situations which seem to call for a

more dramatic expression of worship—for example, the increasingly popular service late on Christmas Eve; and the numerous occasions when a dedication of some official group or movement is taking place. It is surely unwise to ignore the signs that modern men and women are moved to worship by an ordered and colourful ceremonial, yet much thinking has yet to be done on the relationship of such dramatic and æsthetic appeal to the traditional Reformed liturgy of the Word. The question is posed acutely by the arrival of television as a social instrument, of tremendous actual and potential influence. Unless we are to dismiss both television and radio as of no significance for public worship, or to regard them simply as enemies, we must come to terms with both. Radio obviously presents fewer difficulties for our traditional worship, although television has the advantage of drawing the audience right into what is going on, so that he may become an actual worshipper. The real problem for us with television is that our forms of worship are not primarily understood by the eye. Hence an added impetus will probably be given to the trend towards fuller ritual and dramatic expression in Church worship.

The problem, however, remains of relating all such experiments to the chief end of worship—the giving of glory to God. And here we must remember that the Reformed principle of *Soli Deo Gloria* laid calculated and deliberate emphasis on the concept of the Word of God. It is easy to speak of doing this or that to the glory of God, and of the offering of beauty and dramatic ritual as our sacrifice of praise. But the Reformers well understood the Biblical concept of the Word. Word of God and not Vision of God is the typical Scriptural expression, for the Hebrew and Christian idea of giving glory to God involves the element of obedience. A vision can be enjoyed; it can be a passive luxury without influence on the future conduct. For the Bible, and for the Reformers, there is to be no divorce between worship and life. To give God the glory in worship involves hearing His word and making a positive response. Isaiah's experience in the Temple is typical. He saw the vision —the 'Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and His train filled the Temple'—but the worship ended in the Word and its response. 'Whom shall I send, and who will go for us? Then said I, Here am I; send me.' *Soli Deo Gloria* must mean

for us a worship that makes a demand on our common life. Hence we cannot in our tradition be content with a ceremonial or dramatic presentation that is merely an offering of beauty unto God. That is not to be despised: it can at its best be like the breaking of the alabaster box of ointment at the feet of Jesus. But it ought never to be unrelated to our understanding of the Gospel as a call to discipleship. Therefore we do well to proceed carefully in this current liturgical movement towards symbolic ritual and dramatic expression.

At the same time we must be prepared to admit that our tradition of worship has tended to a cold intellectualism. To offer glory to God in the liturgy of the Word does not mean that our worship must be entirely expressed in verbal form. There is even a danger that in making our order of service a series of intelligible concepts (which was the clear desire of the Reformers in protest against the inarticulate mystery-making of medieval worship) we may in fact detract from the glory of God. For there is lacking today the profound sense of the mystery of the Almighty that possessed the Reformers, and our services undoubtedly suffer from an oppressive intellectual familiarity, as if worship consisted in the interchange of certain religious ideas. The most deplorable aspect of most of our Reformed worship today is the lack of a spirit of reverence and adoration. It is difficult to believe that people who chatter up to the opening words of a service, and reach for their hats the moment the Benediction is pronounced, and in between are comfortably seated throughout prayers in an attitude of polite inattention, are really seized with the idea of the presence of the glory of the Eternal. In particular our Presbyterian intellectualism has fostered, when the vivid awareness of the divine sovereignty has grown dim, a type of service more like a kind of celestial committee-meeting than the worship of Almighty God. It may well be that *Soli Deo Gloria* will mean for us in the future not only a reinstatement of the traditional reverence in the presence of the holy, but its reinforcement by liturgical practices designed to appeal to the whole man, and not simply to his mind.

(2) The second principle of worship draws its strength from the first—it is that of *Continuity*. I have already expressed what significance our heritage of worship has for every movement of

reform. We give God the glory not as isolated units of modernity, but as members of the Holy Catholic Church in the communion of the saints. It only remains here to relate this principle to some of the contemporary movements of reform.

Most of us have felt the temptation from time to time to make a complete break with local, denominational, or universal tradition, and devise a form of service suited to our own times. It can be argued that just as the Early Church had its Liturgy of the Catechumens before the Liturgy of the Faithful, so we could divide modern worship, keeping the traditional forms for the instructed and devoted Christians and introducing a totally new form of worship for the men on the frontier of faith. Something of this kind may indeed be necessary, as the cleavage between those to whom our traditional forms are still meaningful and those to whom they have ceased to mean anything grows greater. For the latter we shall surely need to develop experimental ways of worship, such as many are already attempting at a second Sunday service or on the radio. But we discover that it is impossible to disassociate these groups of people in the long run. The man on the frontier is either inevitably drawn into the fuller fellowship of the Church in which case he will participate in the on-going worship of the centuries, or else he finds himself in something that is not the Church but some hidden or acknowledged sect. There have been many examples in recent years of some organisation inside or outside the regular churches offering a modern form of worship with an appeal to the uncommitted, and proving in the end to have weaned them away from the possibility of real Church membership, an *ersatz* worship having led them into an *ersatz* Church. The principle of continuity should remind us of this danger, and make us more patient with the slow adjustment of the regular worship of the Church, and less eager to provide that which may lead to the ultimate impoverishment of those whom we desire to help.

The principle of continuity is also a safeguard against the impulsive imitation of another tradition. The happier ecumenical atmosphere of today has brought at least many of the leaders of the Churches into fruitful inter-communication, and one of the by-products of this discourse is the experience of different traditions of worship. This is sheer gain when it leads

to a realisation of the inner meaning of forms of worship that are strange to us, and a greater charity in our understanding of what our brethren intend. But in our enthusiasm for the new discoveries we have made it is possible to attempt a kind of premature synthesis, and impose strange forms upon those to whom they are totally unaccustomed. It is a paradox of continuity in the Church that it sometimes means the preservation of differences. I am the last person to suggest that we should today be putting the emphasis on the things that separate us rather than those we share together (I believe indeed that the Ecumenical Movement has leaned over backwards in its attempt to make sure that we are all good Methodists, good Anglicans, good Presbyterians, good Baptists, before we come any closer—and the result has been that denominational loyalties and prejudices have often become stronger than ever!) nevertheless we shall not achieve any useful reformation of the worship of our own tradition by the hurried importation of alien forms. Every Army chaplain knows how unsuccessful is an attempt to devise a form of worship that includes elements from the traditions of all present: none are satisfied. Yet we still find idealistic efforts being made at the production of 'ecumenical' Orders which ignore the element of continuity in the living worship of a Church. I must add that this criticism in no way applies to such a service as the Communion Order of the Church of South India, where the ecumenical spirit is obviously more alive among the ordinary worshippers, where the denominational traditions are comparatively recent, and where the greatest care has been taken to represent the common continuity that links us with the Church of all ages.

(3) The third principle I would suggest is that of contemporary *Relevance*. This is a necessary balance to the two preceding. For it is possible to reform our ways of worship according to the highest ideals of giving God alone the glory and yet fail to bring anyone with you to do so. A friend of mine once told me of a conversation with a young minister whose ambition was to discover the perfect service, and who had made continual changes in his form of service towards that end. 'And do you find', said my friend, 'that the people are responding?' 'No,' he replied, 'fewer and fewer are coming, and in fact when I have attained *the* perfect service, I expect to find no one at all!'

The principle of Relevance should protect us against any merely doctrinaire attempts at reformation. For this reason it is essential that movements of reform should be directed more by parish ministers than by theological professors—or chaplains to Universities! No matter how exquisite a form of service may be, how true to the best local, denominational, and universal traditions, how perfect an instrument for the expression on the human adoration of the divine,—if it is not relevant to the minds and needs of a worshipping community then it is as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. For although worship is directed towards God it is an activity of men and it cannot be a significant activity unless they can enter into it with their whole heart and mind. There is an austere majesty, and a valuable symbolism about the conception of a worship that goes on day by day whether there is a congregation there or not; but the Reformers were surely wise in their insistence on the need for a congregation. It is true that a man can offer prayer with and on behalf of the Church even in the absence of a visible community, but such a practice may lead to the attribution of semi-magical qualities to the mere repetition of a form. It is the congregation in their flesh-and-blood reality that helps to maintain a note of relevance in our public worship.

Provided we keep in mind the principle of continuity in public worship there is no more necessary reform in our age than that of making our traditional forms relevant to our situation. A Book of Common Order is, I believe, a necessary instrument of continuity in the Church, but even the best stands in continual need of revision. Every service needs some traditional elements in all its parts—in prayers, as well as in hymns, and in readings, and I do not suggest that we try to achieve relevance by tinkering with familiar words. If we use ancient collects let us be careful to use them entire and not mangle them into our prayers in revised versions. Quite often we shall find that a century-old collect is, in fact, more understandable and relevant to the present situation than the cumbrous circumlocutions that have become traditional in the 'free prayer' of the last hundred years. Everyone who has tried it knows the immense difficulty of expressing in words the prayers of a varied group of people. We walk a tight-rope, liable at any moment to fall over into irrelevant generalisations on the one side or

uncouth familiarities on the other. I should risk, however, saying that on the whole our prayers need point and directness—and very considerable abbreviation. Ministers would probably be shocked to discover how very few of their congregation can follow the traditional long prayer of intercession, and how soporific our adjectival pieties can be. Nearly all the praying of our Reformed services today stands in need of drastic pruning. A prayer is relevant if it expresses as concisely and directly as possible, consistent with dignity, the aspirations and desires of a modern congregation. While not suggesting that our liturgy should follow the current craze for digests or streamlined journalism, I would protest that it need not be framed in the journalistic style of a hundred yesrs ago. Above all our churches need to be delivered from the eloquent address more obviously designed for the congregation than for the Almighty. An extract from a doctrinal sermon does not become a prayer by the use of the prefix: 'O Lord Thou knowest.'

Another area of worship in which a reformation of relevance is desirable is that of our use of the arts. I speak without any expert knowledge in the sphere of music and architecture, but it appears to me that in our Reformed churches we are failing to provide a relevant setting for modern worship through our bourgeois timidity and conservatism. We have neither provided the greatest of the past nor been bold enough to be truly modern. The result is that our music and our architecture are neither gloriously traditional nor confidently modern, but are rather tamely and drably old-fashioned. If we do not possess ancient cathedrals, then let us build in the idiom of today. There seems to me a lack of faith expressed in the mock Gothic and phoney medievalism of so many of our modern buildings. We are not Goths: we are not medievals; and by building in this way we spread the idea that the Christian faith is not so much relevant to present-day life as an escape from it. It was certainly a desirable reformation when we stopped building the ornamented monstrosities of the nineteenth century, but few churches have had the boldness to provide a genuinely contemporary setting for contemporary worship. Perhaps both hymnology and architecture must await a revival of belief before they dare to express the devotions of a modern man.

(4) The last principle I want to suggest for the reformation

of our worship is that of *Participation.* Worship is a communal act. It is therefore an act that involves the active participation of all present. As we think of the typical service we know today can we be satisfied that this is happening?

The history of the direction of Reformed worship in this matter is interesting and instructive. At the time of the Reformation there was an explicit desire to realize the Biblical idea of the ministry of every Christian. As has been pointed out more than once recently the aim of the Reformation was not the abolition of the priesthood but the abolition of the laity. Every Christian was to realise his priesthood: 'Ye are a chosen generation; a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people; that ye should show forth the praises of Him who hath called you out of darkness into His marvellous light.' This is the Biblical conception of worship—an offering of the entire congregation in praise and adoration. The Reformers aimed at restoring this heritage to a people who had become accustomed to being spectators at a ceremonial in a language they did not understand. They therefore insisted on everything being said at worship in a clear and intelligible voice in the language of the common people. They also encouraged the revival of congregational singing and audible participation in the Lord's Prayer and the Apostles' Creed. They restored the practice of regular reception of the Lord's Supper in both elements, and indeed wished to make this the normal weekly worship of the Church.

It is one of the ironies of history that this movement towards a fuller participation of all believers in the acts of worship should have been rapidly perverted in the Reformed Churches. The frequent reception of the bread and wine, which was one of the major reforms of medieval practice was soon changed to 'once a month'; then it became 'once a quarter' or even more infrequent, until today many imagine that one of the marks of a Reformed Church is that its members only very occasionally participate in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. In the same way the position of the minister as the leader of a communal worship has gradually changed until he is often regarded as the sole active participant in the service. Indeed today it is quite common for a congregation to remain completely passive, except for the singing of hymns, from beginning to end of the

service. Nothing could be more sacerdotal than the place a modern congregation concedes to its minister: his alone is the voice to be heard; his attitude and mood determinative of the whole tone of the service.

It is difficult to know how this direction of worship can be reversed, but some reformation is urgently needed. The passive, spectator-attitude is the curse of our modern reformed worship. It is, of course, assisted by some of our recent habits—such as that of sitting through the prayers. It is also pandered to by the prominence given to the minister in the position adopted for worship. It would be helpful if where possible the minister conducted worship from somewhere else than the pulpit, preferably a point where he is as unobtrusive as possible and is clearly leading an actively worshipping congregation rather than declaiming to them from a height. We need to remind our people that preaching is a unique element of worship, the one place where the personality of the minister must necessarily be an instrument of the Word; but that the conduct of worship is another matter where his personality must be as far as possible lost in the worshipping congregation.

We might also do much to encourage our people in the use of silence. There are few more telling ways of realising the meaning of communal worship than the practice of simply being silent together in the presence of God. It has long been my conviction that our modern reformed worship suffers from too many words spoken by one man, and I was delighted to find this judgment confirmed by an almost infallible authority. Quite recently I was conducting a service for a friend in the West of Scotland, and in the congregation was a young man of four years old, attending almost for the first time a full diet of worship. Apart from a few wriggles he remained quiet all the time, but his mother related to me afterwards that half-way through the service he delivered his verdict in three words: 'Too much talk!' How entirely right he was. Too much talk —and talk from one man. This is the justification for the introduction of responsive prayers, however difficult that may sometimes be in the light of the principle of local continuity. But, whatever we may succeed in doing to make the congregation vocal, there is no reason why we should not encourage the use of silence, and also of the Biblical, apostolic, and reformed

practice of saying an audible Amen to the prayers. In my experience it is comparatively easy to teach young people the methods of true participation in worship, and that is why one often finds a much greater sense of reverence and worship when conducting a service with a youth group than when leading the worship of a congregation accustomed to sitting back and letting things happen.

Soli Deo Gloria; Continuity; Relevance; and Participation. It is in the light of these principles that I see the necessity of directing the reformation of worship that is taking place today. My plea is for a recognition of what we are doing and the application of theological principles rather than mere expediency to the changes that we make.

'God is Spirit: and they that worship Him must worship Him in Spirit and in truth.' These words recorded as our Lord's reply to the sectarian argument into which the woman of Samaria was trying to lead Him, have often been used to justify a haphazard and *ex tempore* approach to worship, and to condemn any ordered approach to the subject or consideration of such matters as have been engaging us in these lectures. What they are in fact saying to us is that our worship must be vital, real, and relevant. God the Holy Spirit is God here and now —the contemporary God. Therefore our worship, if it is in Spirit is in living touch with God. And worshipping in truth surely means nothing less than absolutely sincerity. Where we have vitality and sincerity then worship is 'in Spirit and in truth' and no one can say that this or that form is their guarantee. We must begin with the forms we have, respecting the tradition of our fathers. Our reformation will then be a question of so ordering that tradition in the light of our present situation that it can be for all a means of real and sincere participation in the greatest of all human acts—'to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever'.

SPEAKING OF SIN

(Some Interpretative Notes on Romans 1.18–3.20)

by the Rev. Professor MARKUS BARTH

A Gospel of Hopelessness?

The problem with which we have to deal now, is whether or whether not in the initial part of Paul's epistle to the Romans (1.18–3.20) a gospel of everybody's *unrighteousness* explicitly precedes, prepares and finally supports that gospel of righteousness by faith which is announced in 1.16 f and which is developed in 3.21 ff. Many commentaries on Romans agree in the analysis that Paul speaks of the work of God's left hand (the *opus alienum*) in 1.18–3.20 and that he describes the work of God's right hand (the *opus proprium*) only in 3.21 ff.

Two Major Problems

Traditional exegesis of Rom. 1.18–3.20 flows from and keeps alive three different interests. Paul's start (whether from the wrath (1.18) or from the law (3.20) of God) is considered to be an outflow of his pharisaical past. Separation from those that are damned is, in this case, the teaching of Paul. And all too readily it produces Christian Pharisees who believe that they have a better and higher religion than 'those' Gentiles and Jews who are justly struck by God's wrath. We need name no arguments to refute such an interpretation. A second, and the largest group of expositors, finds that *our* sin, whether we are Jews or Gentiles by birth, is described in the whole passage. For Paul himself sums up everything by speaking of '*our* unrighteousness' (3.5) and the judgment over '*me* a sinner' (3.7). In this case not a pharisaical verdict is proclaimed, but a call to repentance is extended to us, the Christians. Most Lutheran commentaries follow this line, and early Methodism is a logical off-spring of this interpretation. A third interpretation discovers in our text a kind of existential analysis of man's situation. Man apart from faith is, according to that interpretation,

first described in his plight and in his misery, in order that later the message of faith might be understood as an answer to man's problems, question, queries. If so, then Paul develops here his anthropology which is, in turn, the indispensable sub-structure of his later soteriology and of it's proper understanding. We recognise Dr Bultmann's contribution to NT exegesis. In view of these three ways of interpretation we have to ask: Which one of them is nearest to the text? And which concept of sin and guilt does Paul proclaim, if only one of these interpretations is true to his intention? This is the first problem that has to be dealt with. But a second lurks behind the door.

Each of the expositions named tries to do justice to the radical, critical, if not negative, substance of Rom. 1–3. All of them may, though in different ways, be brought into harmony with the dogma concerning 'total depravity' of man. For there is no doubt that Paul speaks here, more than anywhere else, about *quanti ponderis sit peccatum*. Yet, not withstanding Paul's intention to prove, and despite his arguments designed to show 'that all are under sin', that 'there is no righteous, not one' (3.9 f), even these same chapters have also been used everywhere (in Rome as well as in Geneva) to assert that there is a natural revelation of God accessible to man's reason, and that there is a natural law in the hearts of some men, if not of all. If 1.18 ff teaches natural religion and if 2.14 f informs us of an unquenchable natural law, of a spark of goodness in man, then Paul himself takes such exception to a radical concept of 'total depravity' that it were better that he had never been declared father or herald of that 'discriminating' doctrine. For man's status is certainly bad when he has offended against both natural religion and natural law, but it is, in that case, not nearly as bad as it would be if he were an enemy of God's revelation, that which was given to the patriarchs and to the prophets and which was summed up in Jesus Christ. The interpreter of Rom. 1–3 is confronted with this alternative: *either* Paul is dependent in the substance of his teaching upon Hellenist Jewish propaganda (*Sap. Sal.* 13–15 is reflected in Rom. 1.18 ff) and upon some pious and thoughtful popular philosophy (cf. Rom. 2.14 f with Chrysippus and Cicero), in which case he proves factually that man's being under sin can not be understood as *total* depravity; *or* Paul wants—even by the

use of language and thought-forms that belonged to his background and to his environment—to 'stop every mouth' (3.19) by showing that there is no man who is righteous, that all are sinners (3.10, 23). Then the contents of 1.18 ff and 2.14 f are certainly *not* an (Indian) reservation for undefiled and uncontested 'human rights'. (Few commentaries—Nygren is an exception—recognise this alternative.) Therefore the second major problem with which we have to deal is just this: Has Paul with his impulsive way of thinking and dictating involved himself in contradictions, so that he teaches at the same time total depravity *and* the existence of a good heart in man? If this were the case, a humanistic idea of Christianity might be as true to Paul as fundamentalist orthodox dogmaticism. But both schools of thought would be guilty of selecting from Paul only what they like. The Jew Paul might be on the orthodox, the Hellenist Paul on the humanist, side of the fence. But where is then, so we ask, the real Paul himself?

Thesis

One of the fundamental hermeneutical principles is that an expositor of Paul has fully to take into account the Jewish and the Hellenistic terms and thought-patterns which Paul uses in this passage. On the other hand, we can still expect Paul to be fully logical in the development of his argument. For belief in his muddleheadedness is certainly *not* a sound hermeneutical principle. I shall try to anticipate the result of literal exegesis by the following statement: *Paul does not refer either to natural religion in ch.* 1, *or to natural law in ch.* 2. *He declares that all men are totally under the realm of sin. Yet what we call* (*or what we abhor as*) '*total depravity*' *has in Paul's own teaching not the character of a pessimistic anthropology, or of an utterance about a Deus absconditus, but is an essential part of the Good News which Paul proclaims in the name of Christ.*

Some Arguments

In 1.18–32 God's wrath is not proclaimed or announced because of man's *immorality*, which falls short of man's basic religious potentiality. God's wrath rather strikes man's *religion*, his alleged religious wisdom (1.22), his images of God (1.23), his worshipful attitudes (1.25). Immorality, perversion, revolt

against fellow men is not the cause, but is result, demonstration, execution of God's wrath ('he gave up to, he delivered . . . ', 1.24, 26, 28). Man's religion is thus condemned and punished because it is 'suppression of (God's v. 25) truth by unrighteousness' (1.18). What was suppressed? The factual knowledge of God. *To gnoston* in v. 19 is explained by vv. 21, 28, 32 not as a knowable *part* of God (Calvin: his being creator, not His virtues; St. Thomas: His existence, not His mysteries), but as knowledge of His 'power and divinity' (v. 21) or of His decree (His righteous will, legal order, righteousness v. 32). Man knew of it by 'revelation' (v. 19, 2 times). It was a given, not an innate knowledge. This revelation was imparted to man 'since the creation, through the deeds of God' (v. 20). While *Sap. Sal.* 13.3, 5, and in its wake Thomas Aquinas and the Vatican Council 1870 speak of a knowledge about God which is acquired by analogy from created *things*, the word *poiemata* in LXX and in the NT actually denotes not things or matters (LXX Isa. 29.16 is the only exception) but *deeds* or *acts*. According to the OT, God revealed Himself not only to Israel but also to all peoples. Israel is but the first-born or the first-fruit of God (Exod. 4.22; Jer. 31.9). All Gentiles are invited to respect and to learn from the revelation that was given to Israel (Exod. 1 ff; Amos 1.3 ff). All that Paul says about the foolishness of those that think themselves to be wise, and of the fabrication of quadripedal idols, he says by allusion to OT sayings. We observe that all sayings to which he alludes treat of the *Jews'* deviation from, and ingratitude to God (Ps. 106. 20; Jer. 2.11 are quoted in Rom. 1.23). We conclude: Paul does not speak of Gentiles only in 1.18 ff, but of 'the Jews first and the Gentiles' (cp. 1.16; 2.9 f). God's wrath against them is displayed in the deviations of their life, because the best which they believe themselves to possess, even their religion, is contempt of (1.23, 28), and lie against (1.25), God's clear revelation 'since the creation'. Therefore not the sin of 'those' pagans, but the sin first of all of Paul's own people, the sin of *us* religious men is struck by God's wrath according to the Gospel.

In 2.14 f the crucial word is *physei* (usually translated: by nature). Paul does not say—as some philosophers do—that all people 'have', know, or are conscious of a 'natural law' (*nomos physeos*; cf. F. Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechtes* I, 1954,

p. 295 ff; *Theol. Ztsch. Basel* 1952, p. 17 ff). The Gentiles of whom Paul speaks here 'have' no law whatsoever (2.14, two times). But they are a law to themselves and do the things of the law. If *physis* here really does refer to a nature, then (with Augustine) we could explain it as the 'divine nature' given to us in the regeneration (2 Pet. 1.4). Actually the meaning of *physei* is not identical with the meaning of *ek physeos* (from nature, cp. 2.27), but it is best translated with 'voluntarily, from themselves, by their own impulse'. This translation is to be recommended if we want to follow not our own imaginations about a natural law, but the interpretation of the word *physei* which Paul himself gives. For in v. 15 the Greek term *physis* is explained by the Semitic term 'heart'. To do *physei* the things of the law, to be a law to oneself, means, as we read it, to 'have the law written into one's heart'. Now in 2.29 Paul's reference to the circumcision of the heart is an allusion to OT promises (Deut. 10.16, 30.6; Jer. 4.4, 9.24); in the same way the statement concerning the law which is 'written into the heart' is a reference to the OT (cf. Jer. 31.33 ff; Ps. 40.8; Deut. 30.14; Ezra 36.26, 11.19). It has, however, been said that Paul sometimes uses OT sayings without any proper regard to their context and their genuine meaning. He is certainly a poor Bible student if he should do so. But *if* he should be a good interpreter—and what dogma can prohibit this assumption? —then the hidden quotation of Jer. 31 in Rom. 2.15 shows that in 2.14 Paul has not spoken of some outstanding philanthropists, of moral philosophers, or of some children in Ethiopia or India, that duly obey their parents when they are told to wash their hands. Much more those 'Gentiles' are the people of the new covenant, even the eschatological people of God in whose hearts the law is written. The 'Gentiles' are then the people who truly obey God and who, like the Ninevites in Matt. 12.41 f, stand up in the last judgment and condemn 'this generation'. Only God's judgment day, and not a philosophy of religion can then reveal their factual obedience. It is unheard of, scandalous news that God will prefer such Gentiles to the self-righteous, self-made judges of Jonah's pattern. Rom. 2.16 supports just this interpretation. This verse was and is a dreadful embarrassment for expositors who had hoped to find in 2.14 f a reservation for natural goodness, at least in some noble men. Even

Moffatt shifts v. 16 away from its present location. As the text stands now, it says clearly that not a human judgment, but exclusively 'God's judgment according to my gospel through Christ Jesus' (2.16), will 'justify' those 'Gentiles' as 'doers of the law' (2.13f). So the self-made judge is not refuted or overcome by a reference to some splendid fellows amongst the heathen, but by information about the unique and surprising way in which God will judge 'through Christ Jesus'.

This means that we have no reason to declare that from 2.1 ff onward Paul speaks only of Jews. The 'judging man' is found among the Gentiles as well as among the Jews. Only from 2.17 onward Paul turns distinctly to the Jews. Nobody, neither Jew nor Gentile, least of all a Christian from either origin, can exempt himself from the judgment that is proclaimed in 1.18–2.16. From the radicality of the judgment of God we have to draw our conclusions in regard to the object of God's wrath: it is the *total* depravity of all men, inclusive of their presumption to be judges of good and evil.

What Paul means by saying that we are, therefore, 'all under sin' (3.9) is in a specific way elucidated by the Scripture quotations with which he finishes his argument.

3.9–18. It is possible that Paul has used a prefabricated collection of sayings concerning sin. However, this observation does not exclude the probability that selection and arrangement of those statements are meaningful. By each of his OT quotations Paul wants to show that his teaching is identical with what God always has revealed. Also by all his Scripture references he acknowledges and proclaims the priority of Israel; Israel was and is and always will be the type of people and of man whom God has elected. Of special importance in the present series of quotations are four facts which deserve, of course, fuller treatment than we can give here. (*a*) In the first quotation (not in the last) it is declared that there is no righteous man—from this it follows that all men that do exist are unrighteous. If the statement about the unrighteousness of man, viz. of the absence of righteous men, *precedes* the statements about man's works, then the criminal deeds of man have to be understood as a consequence of man's unrighteousness and not as the cause of it. (The contrast of Paul's concept of righteousness against Aristotle's teaching is obvious in this arrangement of the quo-

tations. In Paul's teaching righteousness precedes good works; in Aristotle's it is result of righteous works. The same distinction is obvious in his statements about unrighteousness.) (*b*) The foolish and revolting deeds of man are not a natural but a perverse, animal, brutish use of the members of his body. Createdness, life in the body, is as such not identical with life under sin; but sin is misuse and abuse of what was given to man in the creation. (*c*) The Scripture quotations are taken from a context where a suffering man cries for help out of suppression, blood and tears; they are much more a confession of misery than a verdict against others; they are directed to God because from Him righteousness is expected. (*d*) Paul is conscious that in the Psalms these sayings which he quotes might have concerned Gentiles exclusively; but he wants to have them understood as referring to God's own people, 'those under the law' (v. 19a). Therefore he says so explicitly. These four observations exclude, if anything, a pharisaical and an existentialist interpretation of Paul's teaching in Rom. 1–3.

Speaking of Sin—In Gratitude

If only Paul's interpreters had spoken of their own depravity and not of the total corruption of others, their doctrine of sin might somehow have corresponded to Rom. 1–3. To speak of sin is not to pronounce a specific philosophical anthropology or psychology, or to generalise some publicly known or some subconscious crimes of a few people. Speaking of sin has nothing to do with pessimism or cynicism. It can properly be done only in prayer to God (as in the OT quotations Rom. 3.10-18) or in the frame-work and on the basis of the proclamation of God's righteousness (as in Rom. 1.16 ff). This statement is substantiated by the fact that despite the severity of Paul's statements in Rom. 1.18–3.20 no trace of doom, gloom or depression lies over these chapters. Why is Paul 'not ashamed' (1.16) to announce as beginning of the Gospel even the 'wrath' of God in His past, present, and future judgment? There is but one answer: because wrath, sin, law, a pre-evangelical aeon or status as such, are *not* the real topic of Rom. 1.18–3.20. For here God's righteousness is described, not as though it were contrary to God's wrath, but because it triumphs even *in* His wrath. God's juridical action against all unrighteousness and

the necessary humiliation of man before God's exclusive righteousness are proclaimed with a ring of triumph.

1.18-32 is good news; for like many Psalms in the OT it proclaims that now God has arisen in glowing wrath and that He brings to an end the scoffing, the revolt, the lies of His enemies. Now they are delivered to self-destruction (in the manner in which so many battles are described in the books of Exodus and of the Judges). Now it is revealed that God has delivered them to well-deserved death. We need not wait, mourn, complain, despair any longer by saying: Where is the righteous God? is there a righteous God? For the Gospel reveals that righteousness cannot overcome God; that man cannot live perpetually in unrighteousness; that he can only die as a result of it. God glorifies Himself by showing that nobody can get away with his sin. God Himself does away—by delivering into death—what denies His glory.

2.1–16 is good news; for it reveals why God has reserved exclusively to Himself the right to be judge. Man's judgment over his fellow man is a presumption, an intrusion upon God's own right. Always it turns out to be condemnation of others and an attempt to save oneself (3.3). It is partial because it disregards the decisiveness of actual fulfilment of the law. It cannot impart eternal life. God's standing up as judge and the announcement of His righteousness means that man is relieved from the self-imposed burden of being a moral judge of the world, and from the fear of being condemned by application of human standards of righteousness. When God judges, the self-made critics and their moral evaluations and condemnations vanish. Then 'Gentiles' are revealed as doers of the law. Then people that seem to be—in human eyes—nothing else but sinners, outcasts, outlaws, are 'justified' (2.13) 'through Christ Jesus' (2.16). Because the judgment of God 'establishes righteousness' (*dikaiokrisia*, 2.5), and 'reveals' (2.5) the 'hidden things' (2.16), and since it will be held 'according to Paul's gospel' (2.16), we need call it a gracious, merciful, justifying judgment. The justice of that judgment is peculiarly God's righteousness, a righteousness that *makes* righteous (Augustine, Luther). To announce that righteousness and that judgment means to bring glad tidings.

2.17-29 is good news. For over against all real or alleged

privileges of birth-rights, of learning and of propagating sound doctrine, not to speak of boasting of an instituted sacrament (circumcision, v. 25), the judgment of God reveals the Spirit's freedom and effectiveness. There is fulfilment of the law (2.27), there is a true Israel left over in the midst and despite of all national, ecclesiastical, institutional legalism (2.29). When God is judge, and since He alone is judge, the Spirit's work (the regeneration, the creation of a new heart, and thereby of a new man) will be brought to light from its present hiddeness. That God is judge implies that the work of the sanctifying Spirit will prove decisive—so that every man of every race with every kind of past can hope to be 'praised by God' in the judgment, if only he has received God's Spirit (2.29). Every Church is invited to return to the source of this life; every man is exhorted to drink from this source of life: from the Spirit.

And finally 3.1–20 is good news. For here it is proclaimed that God is always true to Himself. The objections concerning changes within God or in regard to a promotion of evil by God Himself, are angrily brushed aside. For even as the Judge who begins with the judgment of His own house (3.1–4; cp. 1 Pet. 4.17), and who calls the whole world before His judgment throne (3.5–8), God proves His will and His power to establish His own righteousness everywhere and despite all sin. It is good to hear and to know that the Gospel of Christ as well as the Scriptures of the OT inform us about the way to appear before this Judge's throne. There is but one way: the way of repentance and of confession (3.9–20). God is a Judge to whom we can and shall appeal by humble confession. If His own righteousness is our only resort, then we need not be ashamed of the confession that we are all nothing else but sinners, that our depravity is as total as His righteousness. God's righteousness is magnified and praised even by this confession.

Therefore Paul's way of speaking about sin is a decisive and indispensable part of the gospel of God's righteousness. Just as John the Baptist—according to the synoptic Gospels—called everybody to repentance only because he had to announce the coming king, so Paul's chapters, that deal so fiercely with man's unrighteousness, are an evangelistic interpretation of God's kingship over subjects such as we are.

THE SIGN OF THE SON OF MAN

by The Rev. E. J. TINSLEY

In an article published some time ago[1] Dr Vincent Taylor drew attention to the fact that the question raised fifty years ago by Wrede in *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien* had not been satisfactorily answered in all respects, and went on to suggest that the 'Messianic secret' is not, as Wrede supposed, merely a clumsy editorial explanation of a difficult problem, but is derived from and reflects beliefs about the nature and methods of His own Messiahship held by Jesus Himself. The views expressed in this article may be found summarised in the Introduction to Dr Taylor's Commentary on St. Mark[2] where he writes:

> Jesus imposed silence because of the nature of Messiahship as he conceived it to be. To him it was not primarily a matter of status but of action. In his own estimation Jesus is Messiah in his works of healing, his exorcisms, his victory over Satanic powers, his suffering, dying, rising, and coming with the clouds of heaven. Messiahship is a destiny; it is that which he does, that which the Father is pleased to accomplish in him and which he fulfils in filial love. It is for this reason that he silences the demoniacs and commands the disciples to tell no man his secret till after the resurrection.

Dr Taylor's remarks point a way forward to a more satisfactory interpretation of the features of the Gospel narratives with which Wrede was concerned. Is there evidence available which would enable us to clarify any further 'the nature of the Messiahship as Jesus conceived it to be'? This article is written to suggest that some clarification may be found in an examination of the attitude of Jesus to 'signs', and that the phenomena in St. Mark indicate that Jesus believed Himself to be called the 'Sign of the times'.

[1] 'Unsolved New Testament problems: The Messianic secret in Mark', *Expository Times*, LIX, 6 (March 1948).
[2] *The Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. 123.

I

One must first recall the significance of 'signs' in the Old Testament. The words used there ('oth, mopheth) denote clear indications, to the eye of faith and humility, of the purpose of God in history, and of His presence in historical situations. God gives signs which are self-authenticating for those who will to do His will. Pharaoh fails to recognise the signs which are being given to him because his heart is 'hardened'. A drastic humbling of the pride and self-confidence of Pharaoh would be necessary before he could discern the signs being given. All along the Way in which Israel has to go as People of God there are signs, but they are not of such a character that their recognition is inevitable. Israel is in fact rebuked for not recognising them, because this is not a matter of some excusable natural defect, but of a wilful moral turpitude or perversion for which they are accountable: 'And the Lord said to Moses, How long will this people despise me? and how long will they not believe in me, in spite of all the signs which I have wrought among them?' (Num. 14.11). The trouble seems to have been that Israel was willing to derive comfort in a self-regarding way from what were 'miracles' in the modern sense, while wilfully ignoring the moral demands which these events, as 'signs' and not mere 'wonders', made upon them. The sign is a trial or 'temptation' of faith; only in faith will it be seen as a sign making demands and not only a wonder giving satisfaction. Israel was in fact 'hardened of heart', 'stiff-necked', accepting these signs as deserved confirmations of a permanent status, rather than indications of a vocation to obedience. That signs by their very nature constitute trials or temptations for Israel is suggested by the close association in Old Testament usage of 'sign' and 'temptation'. In signs God tests his Israel, and therefore these signs are experienced by Israel as temptations. For man to tempt God in the Old Testament is to seek for more and more satisfying 'proofs' of one's own, rather than to accept in trust those which God in fact gives in his own way. This was Israel's temptation of God at Massah: 'And he called the name of the place Massah and Meribah because of the striving of the children of Israel, and because they tempted the Lord saying, Is the Lord among us or not?' (Exod. 17.7).

Especially instructive for an understanding of the relation between temptation and sign is Deut. 13.1-3:

> If there arise in the midst of you a prophet or a dreamer of dreams, and he gives you a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder which he tells you comes to pass, and if he says, 'Let us go after other gods', which you have not known, 'and let us serve them', you shall not listen to the words of that prophet or to that dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God is testing you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul.

The sign is, in other words, a possible stumbling block! (cf. Isa. 8.15). It may be received and interpreted as a sign of merited approval, and not a gratuitous confirmation of a vocation. The sign which easily and spontaneously satisfies may do these things because it is a trial of obedience, a temptation to turn aside from the hard realities which walking in the Way of the Lord involves. True obedience is the criterion for recognising the signs, whether they be of God or not.

There are two well-known examples in the Old Testament where we find the prophet called to be a sign to his own generation. The first is that of Isaiah who believes that he and his children are called to be a sign for the times:

> Behold I and the children whom the Lord has given me are for signs and wonders in Israel from the Lord of hosts who dwells in Mount Zion. (8.18)

For those who obey and therefore believe (belief and obedience being practically synonymous in the Old Testament) the prophet and those around him will be a sign of perfect trust and waiting upon the Lord—but to others escapist visionaries or the like. More important, particularly for an understanding of Jesus, is the Book of Ezekiel. It is Ezekiel who specially stresses the divine imperative of the prophetic calling which must be obeyed, come what may in the shape of success or failure:

> And go, get you to the exiles, to your people, and say to them, 'Thus says the Lord God'; whether they hear or refuse to hear. (3.11)

> You shall say to them, 'Thus says the Lord God'; he that will hear let him hear; and he that will refuse to hear, let him refuse. (3.27)

The prophet is to go forward in absolute obedience, confident that God will see to it that the signs are efficacious to those who are willing to turn to Him. We are reminded here of the

refrain of Jesus: He who has ears to hear, let him hear. Ezekiel is requested to do certain actions which God will constitute signs to the house of Israel (4.1, 12.6). He is to say 'I am your sign' (12.1):

> Thus shall Ezekiel be to you a sign; according to all that he has done you shall do. When this comes, then you will know that I am the Lord God. (24.24)

The sign is a revelatory event, a mode of knowledge for those who do not cause themselves to 'stumble' through pride, arrogance or self-sufficiency. It is these hindrances which prevent the 'nations' recognising in the life and work of the Servant of Deutero-Isaiah a sign of God's redemptive purpose for the world through Israel (Isa. 53.4-6).

II

To turn now to the Gospel material. All four Gospels give prominence to John the Baptist's movement as a precursor of Jesus. This interpretation of the mission of John the Baptist as a heralding of the near approach of the Kingdom of God was not first the work of the early Church as used to be supposed, but was central to the thought of Jesus Himself. Certainly for Jesus recognition of who He is turns on recognition of who John was: they are both key figures in the coming of the Kingdom for those who know the Scriptures by kinship and not merely by acquaintance, and can therefore make their own identifications. The question: 'By what authority do you do these things?'—a request for direct self-authentication—is returned to the questioners in the form of a demand for identification of John the Baptist! Inability to face the moral demands of John and turn in repentance and thus recognise John's movement as of God means, all the more, inability to recognise and identify the work of Him who succeeds John, because this too is of God, but God's action comes to a head. Inability to perceive the movement of God in its final stages means inevitably inability to see the movement when it has come to fruition. There is in fact considerable evidence in the Gospels that Jesus recognised John as a 'sign' of the Kingdom of God, a sign that the kingly action of God had reached its penultimate stage. To have rejected the mission of John the Baptist, He is to say later, would

have been tantamount to the rejection of the βουλὴ τοῦ θεοῦ for his time and generation (Luke 7.30). Jesus hearkens to the sign, and identifies Himself with John's call to Israel, and is baptised. He explicitly interprets John as a 'sign' in the conversation after the Transfiguration: 'I tell you that Elijah has come' (Mark 9.13). The imprisonment of John the Baptist seems to have been taken as a sign for His own ministry to begin, and perhaps the death of John which is given in such unexpected detail in Mark was accepted as a sign that the final journey to Jerusalem must begin (cf. 2 Kings 2.1-10, 11-18). The 'Elijah' has come, and 'they have done to him whatever they pleased'. How much more likely it is then that a similar fate awaits Him who comes after the Elijah—the Messiah Himself!

At the Baptism Jesus is finally and completely aware that God is Father to Him in a unique intimate sense: 'Thou art my beloved son.' As a vocation in history being Son would suggest being Israel, sonship being the task to which Israel is called in the Old Testament. The Way of Israel is the Way of Sonship, and this means the Way of obedience to the will of the Father of Israel set forth in Torah. Jesus accepts this vocation to Sonship; all that the Father has said He will do. He will be in Himself Israel, and the Way of Israel, especially as it is presented in the Servant-songs, will be His Way, the Way of the Son of Man. This will be the Sign of the times which the Father will make clear. His is the obedience; the Father will vindicate. At the Baptism the Father has given His first sign, and the obedient Son recognises it.

But, as we have seen in connexion with the Old Testament Israel, signs by their very nature involve temptation. As Israel-Son Jesus is tempted to ask signs of His own choosing rather than receive those which in fact the Father has given, and will give, just as the men of His day will be tempted to ask from Him signs to their own liking rather than accept those which He gives—with all the demands they involve. Jesus is tempted to put the Father to the test rather than to trust in Him, just as men are tempted to put Him to the test rather than to follow Him. That Jesus Himself accepted these trials as temptations of God's Israel is indicated by the nature of the replies given in the narrative of the Temptations in the Q

tradition. They are all from that book in the Old Testament where the relationship between signs and temptations is specially prominent—Deuteronomy, and their context is, significantly, the temptation of Israel to depart from the Way which God has set forth in Torah. As with the Israel before Him, Jesus is tempted to ask for immediately satisfying 'proofs' of His own, rather than to undergo in obedience the discipline through which alone the signs which the Father does give will be perceived as signs, and this temptation He puts aside in an act of obedience. As Son of Man—we can say from the evidence as a whole—He will go forward confident in the faith that the Father will remain true to His promises, and that it would be an act of filial disobedience to ask for premature confirmation. He is tempted as Israel was tempted at Massah 'saying, Is the Lord among us or not?' but this Israel does not stop or say 'When?'

This is the fundamental messianic temptation of Jesus which St. Luke especially insists was a continuing one (cf. Luke 4.13 and 22.28). The words of St. Peter rebuking Jesus for His insistence on the necessary rejection and suffering of the Son of Man constitute the same satanic temptation to turn from the path of filial obedience to which He has committed Himself as Israel. To succumb to this would be to reject the things of God (*τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ*). Therefore: 'Get thee behind me Satan' (Mark 8.33).

The temptation also recurs in the request of the Pharisees for 'a sign from heaven'. In the Markan version Jesus answers simply: 'No sign shall be given to this generation'—because the very fact of the request declares that the Pharisees are rendering themselves incapable of seeing the sign which is in fact being given—Jesus Himself. In the Q tradition the reply of Jesus is differently worded: 'An evil and adulterous generation seeks after a sign. There shall no sign be given to it but the sign of Jonah' (Matt. 16.4; Luke 11.30; cf. Mark 8.12). Here the meaning would seem to be that Jonah was indeed an evident sign of the working of God for those who were willing to accept the moral demands of his message and turn in repentance—but not for others who 'not needing any repentance' would therefore not see the sign demanding it. So it is with the Son of Man in this generation: 'The men of Nineveh will arise at

the judgment with this generation and condemn it; for they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and behold, something greater than Jonah is here' (Luke 11.32). St. Matthew (12.40) makes the sign of Jonah a reference to the Resurrection which, although less likely, would make no difference to the point we are considering, nor, incidentally, would the suggestion of some scholars that the 'sign of Jonah' is a misrepresentation of an original 'sign of John (the Baptist)'.

Gethsemane is again best interpreted as an acute return of the same temptation. Here Jesus is tempted once more to turn away from the suffering which the path of filial obedience involves, and now the temptation is finally put aside in an act of perfect committal to the Father.

At the Baptism Jesus gave Himself, in an act of entire self-effacement, to be the Sign of the Kingdom come, to let His light so shine before men that they might see His good works and glorify His Father which is in heaven. The messianic method of Jesus is to be that of the Sign. For those with eyes to see and ears to hear, the words and works of Jesus point to the completion of the Father's purpose for Israel. The nature of the replies which Jesus makes to direct questions about Himself suggests that He regarded such questions as temptations to make the unambiguous verbal self-identification, and thus violate the nature of His works and teaching as a Sign. The Father alone will authenticate them (Matt. 11.25; Luke 10.21). The question of His identity could not be asked as a mere point of information, but had to be faced by the questioner himself as a summons to faith and obedience. In all such questions Jesus is on trial as obedient Son.

To take some examples. Matt. 11.2-6; Luke 7.18-23: The reply to John the Baptist's query takes the characteristic form of a summons to the questioner to make his own reply to his own question. The six specific things which are happening in and around Jesus are signs of the times for those who will to read them as such. These are the blessed ones who take no offence at him. The reply of Jesus is not the supplying of elucidatory information, but a messianic summons to repentance.

Mark 11.27-28. Here 'the chief priests and scribes and elders' confront Jesus again with what amounts to a direct

question about Himself, and once more the procedure is as before. A response in penitence to the summons of John the Baptist would have indicated a moral insight and sincerity which would have enabled them to identify the three tokens just given (Entry, Cleansing, Fig-tree) as evidence of the presence of Israel-Messiah, and thus answer their own question. Unwillingness to say whether John's movement was 'from heaven or from men' means *a fortiori* unwillingness to identify Him. 'Neither tell I you then by what authority I do these things.'

Mark 14.62. This is the crucial passage. Here the usually accepted reading is: 'I am, and you will see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of Power, and coming with the clouds of heaven.' If this reading is accepted we have the problem that such a direct affirmative answer to the high priest's question is strikingly different from His practice elsewhere, a practice which we have maintained was dictated by the vocation to which He had committed Himself. There is however an interesting and quite well-attested variant, given by θ, fam 13, 565, 1071, etc., which gives the reply as : 'Thou sayest that I am.' It is significant that both Matthew and Luke in the parallel passages have similar replies. The reply given in St. Matthew (26.64) is particularly important since on other occasions he has made less explicit words of Jesus about Himself quite unmistakably direct (e.g. Matt. 16.13, 26.2; cf. Mark 8.27, 14.1), and he would not be likely to overlook the direct unambiguous reply given in the majority reading in Mark. That the Jewish authorities were more willing to recognise Jesus as a Sign of the Devil rather than of God is in keeping with what is implied elsewhere (the Beelzebub controversy), and this would explain the high priest's reaction to the reply: 'Thou sayest that I am, and you will see the Son of Man. . . . '

Mark 15.2. The reply to Pilate is in line with the procedure we have noticed previously, and with the dialogue between Jesus and Pilate in St. John. Pilate must answer his own question like everybody else (cf. E. V. Rieu's translation: 'The words are yours' (and I cannot deny them)).

Like Ezekiel, then, Jesus is the Sign for His generation, and it is as Son of Man that He will be this Sign ('Son of Man' is significantly the characteristic title of Ezekiel). The Way of

the Son of Man is, for those with eyes to see and ears to hear, the Sign of the Way of Israel now being followed in the life of Jesus. The life of the Son of Man, expressed in third-personal terms in the teaching of Jesus coincides with the life of the Suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah, and this in turn is a personification of the life of Israel in terms of obedient servanthood. Furthermore, the life of the Son of Man is to be reflected in the life of the disciples who walk in His way. He and they together constitute the Sign. Just as Isaiah could say: 'I and the children whom thou hast given to me are for signs and wonders in Israel', so it is with Jesus and the Twelve. His Way is to be theirs, because their Way is part of His Gospel. They must walk, as He does, in the way of degradation, of ministering, of humility and suffering. In the mission charge to the Twelve, they are bidden to do what He is doing—preach that men should repent, cast out devils, heal the sick (Mark 6.13), and announce that the Kingdom of God has come (Luke 10.9). Their activities on the preaching tour are His 'dynameis', and the places which refuse to receive them are judged in exactly the same way as Chorazin and Bethsaida which refused to receive Him (Luke 10.12). In them, as in Him, the Kingdom of God comes! 'He who receives you receives me, and he who rejects you rejects me.' The blessing of Jesus is given especially to those, who howbeit imperfectly, see in Him the shape of things to come (Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jonah, for flesh and blood have not revealed it unto thee, but my Father . . . Blessed are your eyes for they see and your ears for they hear . . . Blessed are those who find no occasion of stumbling in me). The Kingdom of God when it comes is not perceived in a casual glance: 'Lo, it is here, or Lo, it is there', but it is amongst them (Luke 17.21). 'To him that hath' (faith and humility) 'shall be given' (insight). The 'miracles' and parables are only signs for those who see in them the demands of the Kingdom manifest in Jesus. To see them as mere *τέρατα* is to want more for one's own satisfaction; to see them as signs is to kneel in penitence for forgiveness.

The 'messianic secret' of Wrede is a reference to certain necessary consequences of the vocation of Jesus as He interpreted it. He cannot explain or teach Himself—that the Father will do. 'He had committed Himself to the position of leaving

it to God to make known to others who and what He Himself was.'[1] Deranged demoniacs may with uncanny insight make the right identification, but a mere verbal labelling, however accurate, is not the only or the chief condition of discipleship as the whole ministry after the confession of Peter at Caesarea Phillipi clearly shows. Those captured by the demonic kingdom recognise the sign of the presence of their adversary, and their muzzling is the beginning of deliverance. Direct statements about Himself would constitute a temptation just as much as direct questions. In both cases there must be no attempt to anticipate the ratification which the Father alone will give in His own time. Meanwhile He must be content to be Himself in spite of misunderstanding or rejection, because the Son of Man must go even as it is written of Him.

[1] S. H. Hooke, *The Kingdom of God in the experience of Jesus*, pp. 67-8.

BOOK REVIEWS

God in His World. By CHARLES S. DUTHIE. Independent Press. 8s. 6d.

THIS straightforward title will in itself be reassuring to many in our time who are in serious doubt as to the sense in which it can be claimed that God is indeed in His world as we know it. Actually, the specific theological issues which such a title raises are dealt with very briefly on pages 53 to 55, where the view known as 'panentheism' is favoured, with the implications that man apart from God is out of his element and that accordingly sin becomes very real. But the whole conception of the book is that the faith that God is in His world sets the Church its only, tremendous task.

The two most prominent and encouraging features of the Church's life in our time are the revival of a truly biblical theology and a reawakening of aggressive concern for evangelism. These two belong essentially together, and their relationship is the theme of Principal Duthie's book, the first book from his pen. Its basic conviction is 'that a true Christian evangelism must spring immediately out of a thorough theological understanding of God'. The author is a teacher of theology and has been a well-known leader of student campaigns in recent years, and so he has the two essential qualifications for the task he sets himself.

Each of the ten chapters is prefaced with a text or texts, suggesting that much of the material is sermonic in character—which indeed is no fault. There are often sentences of direct, personal address, as of the preacher to his congregation (pages 16, 42, 165). The practical task of evangelism is never lost sight of, and the writer often breaks away into this, even in such 'meaty' chapters as 2, 3, 4 and 10. Theologically, Dr Duthie owes a special debt to Tillich and Ferré, and he is obviously under the continual influence of Pascal.

Like most books today, it begins with the storm in the world's life; and it is only another way of stating the theme of the book to say that he proceeds immediately to enquire how this disturbance can become discovery, in response to that 'Personal Call from a Long Distance' which is Jesus Christ. The argument begins with the interpretation of the Person of Jesus Christ, and the guiding principle here is that 'only the largest and deepest view of Christ is likely to explain the place He occupies in Christian thought and devotion'.

Many readers will feel that there is more in D. M. Baillie's criticism of the Kenosis than Dr Duthie here allows, ranging himself in this matter in the company of P.T. Forsyth and J. A. Findlay.

As a disciple of Pascal, he is not much taken up with 'the proofs of God'. Emphasising the need for 'glorious thoughts of God', for 'thinking magnificently of God', as Dr Thomas Browne put it, he has some criticism to make of prayer direct to Jesus Christ, gives some really helpful thoughts on the doctrine of the Trinity and on the risk taken by the Creator in creating man with freewill, and he states the safeguards for the conception of a Suffering God.

Much stress is laid on the doctrine of the Church, the importance of its missionary task and of the contemporary ecumenical discussion. The Church has the distinctive marks of a community which is marked off from all other communities because of its special connexion with God. Its task is both to *declare* and *demonstrate* the Gospel, and the latter can only be done by sacrificial love, costly caring. This theme is further expounded in the chapter 'Engagement with the world', examining what Christianity has to offer to this actual situation and the other. No doubt it would require another book to provide the extended examination of this point which most readers will feel to be necessary. This indeed is the central dilemma of all modern evangelism, to state a steadfast view of what it is that the Bible actually teaches as to the coming of the Kingdom on earth, in what sense Christ is the Hope of the world not only at the end of history and beyond history but also in history. This whole field of discussion requires to be broadened beyond the areas and examples dealt with by Dr Duthie, as he recognises on page 116.

The relationship of the Church as experienced fellowship to the Church as organised structure, the Church in the world and yet not of it, the size of congregations, spheres of leadership for the laity—on all these there are wise and beneficial words. In some ways the chapter to which readers will return oftenest is that on Prayer, searching and practical as it is, especially for those who are troubled by the absence of large-scale results from prayer and who know only too well 'the drudgery of prayer'. Giving careful consideration to the teaching and practice of Jesus Himself, Dr Duthie relates the conceptions of withdrawal and involvement in prayer, taking these together to constitute the whole.

A fresh and more encouraging study of Paul at Athens is given on pages 102 to 105, and of the sending out of the Seventy on pages 161 to 166 ('the most neglected passage in the whole of the New Testament'). The chapter on 'From Man to Man' provides excellent material for those who undertake the delicate work of 'counselling' others. In this and in other ways, the book is right 'on the spot' in

view of present discussions and experiments. The projects for a spiritual awakening in the period before us are set forth, and grounded ultimately in the very faith which gives the book its title. The closing chapter on the Holy Spirit looks not only at the difficulties of that doctrine, but stresses the relationship of that dynamic gift to our personal surrender. No better commendation of this book can be given than to say that the Christian minister will find great encouragement in it to do every part of his work with dignity, confidence and joy.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Life in Christ. By THÉO PREISS. S.C.M. Press. 7s.

THE five New Testament Studies which make up this volume of 'Studies in Biblical Theology', have been selected from *La Vie En Christ*, written by the late Théo Preiss, a pastor and professor of the French Reformed Church for whom a great future as a New Testament theologian had been predicted. The translation by Harold Knight is eminently readable.

The varied titles of the essays do not prepare the reader for the unity of thought which holds them together. The author himself remarks that 'the exegete must listen to the texts with a musician's ear in order to preserve not merely the dominant melody but also the underlying polyphony'. This appears to have been his own method, and the result is harmony. While he has at his disposal all the apparatus of critical scholarship (as is specially apparent in his essay on 'Was the Last Supper a Paschal Meal?'), he uses it only as a hearing aid.

His own phrase 'juridical mysticism' would be a useful description of the dominant melody which he hears. 'The Son of Man', he says, 'has taken the place of his brothers, to identify himself unreservedly with their destiny. It is of course a question of juridical substitution which goes as far as identification'. The undertones of this theme he finds in the use of juridical words and ideas, 'the Christ who is sent, witness, judge, judgment, accuse, convince, Paraclete', and the overtones in 'the juridical and eschatological framework of the great debate between God and rebellious humanity'. Each note receives its full value, e.g. the masterly handling of the Spirit-Paraclete as witness and the illuminating approach to social ethics on the basis of Christ's identification with all 'who objectively need help, whatever be their subjective disposition'.

His ear is equally attuned to the sounds of his own time as the following quotations show—'When one no longer believes in the existence of Satan, one inevitably satanises one's opponents. After

having been so stupid as to satanise Hitler we now satanise Stalin or Capitalism'. 'God is more revolutionary than Marx, whom we would be better to reproach with his optimism about the goodness of post-revolutionary man'. 'We do not need to know precisely what we must think of the question of progress. It suffices us to know that because Christ is risen our labour is not in vain in the Lord'. He is not discouraged by these other sounds which he hears. The great question of the *Heidelberg Catechism* 'What comfort is it to thee that Christ shall come again to judge the quick and the dead' would have been a juridical paradox after his own heart.

JOHN GRAY

Apostleship. By K. H. RENGSTORF. (Bible Key-Words from Gerhard Kittel's 'Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament'.)

Translated and edited by J. R. Coates. A. and C. Black. 7s. 6d. THE English-speaking student of the Bible is indeed fortunate that, through the scholarly work of Dr J. R. Coates and the enterprise of the publishing firm of A. and C. Black, there is offered to him in translation a series of highly important articles from the learned volumes of Kittel's massive lexicon. It means that much of the finest Biblical scholarship of the day is made available to him in digestible amounts, at regular intervals, in attractive form, and under the supervision of an editor who has consummate gifts as a translator, and we hope that the six volumes so far published in the series will yet grow into a library. *O fortunati pueri sua si bona norint!*

The present instalment which presents the study of the term Apostle by Professor K. H. Rengstorf of Münster University is timely and valuable as helping to redd the frontiers of a subject which is much discussed but often vaguely and confusedly. Dr Rengstorf examines in succession the Greek, the Jewish, and the Christian usage of the word Apostle and its congeners. In classical and normal Greek speech—where ἀπόστολος, originally adjectival, is applied to subjects so various as a ship, an army, a naval squadron, a body of colonists, a leader of an expedition, or (as in the papyri) an invoice or passport or other document—the connotation is sub-personal. The word has the merely passive sense of 'being sent', the thought of authorisation is absent. In the language, however, of the later Cynic-Stoic philosophy the idea behind the word contracts the sense of a personal consciousness of mission, and one of the freshest parts of Dr Rengstorf's article is concerned with this particular usage. The Cynic-Stoic preacher of ethics and religion had the consciousness of a personal mission and of an individual responsibility to society, and it is to be hoped that the perusal of Dr Rengstorf's pages will direct

the readers to what Epictetus has to say about the philosopher-missionary's calling as he faces the world, even the organised imperial power of Rome, with his message. It is recognised, indeed, that while 'the Cynic-Stoic philosopher . . . is the contemporary figure which stands nearest to that of the New Testament apostle', and while he may be described, or may describe himself as ἀπεσταλμένος, he does not possess the same sense of unconditional constraint being laid upon him, nor has he an objective theology nor a consciousness of divine authoritative revelation. From the Greek world Dr Rengstorf passes to Judaism with its more legal and ecclesiastical conception of the office of the *shaliaḥ*, but it is pointed out that Jewish missionaries—propagandists for Pharisaism—were not designated *sheluḥim*: 'ἀποστέλλειν plays no part in connexion with them'. Their task was personal, but not authoritative.

The sections on the New Testament usage of the term Apostle take us on to more familiar ground, and need not be here analysed. By investigating the Greek and Jewish usages of the term Dr Rengstorf has paved the way to an understanding of the specific nature of the Christian Apostle's vocation, in which the title to speak to men with authority is grounded not on virtuosity but on revelation and grace.

WILLIAM MANSON

The Meaning of the Creative Act. By NICHOLAS BERDYAEV. Gollancz 1955. 18s.

BERDYAEV has played an important role in the shaping of modern theological thought and this is an excellent book through which to take the full force of his insights. It was written in 1914, when he was 40, and though it was translated into German in 1927 it has not previously appeared in English. It is not, as the title might suggest, a treatise on the doctrine of creation. It is an analysis of 'the world-crisis of culture where in every sphere men are passing the canonic boundaries' which have marked good and fruitful humanism. The analysis is not out of date, though its detail, and the central thesis by the light of which it was offered, have been subjected to criticism by theologians and others in the period of Berdyaev's popularity. Yet it still has remarkable power to shake the intelligent reader out of his pedestrian views of the human situation and of the Gospel which has transformed it for faith.

The central thesis is that the world's history must move beyond the epoch of law and the epoch of redemption into an epoch of creativeness where the heaviness and necessity of existence are over-

come by man, revealed for the first time in his proper stature. Romans 8.19 and Ephesians 4.13 ff are the kind of texts which underlie the book; but the thesis does not rest on Scripture in any 'obedient' way. 'If the ways of creativeness were indicated and justified in the Holy Scriptures, then creativeness would be obedience' (p. 97). And Berdyaev is concerned to point the contrast between the new freedom of creativeness and the '*ennui* of adaptation to necessity', or again between true personal love and 'obedience to the results of sin'. On the other hand, however, the power-centre from which thesis and critique spring, is Christ 'not outside us but within us. He is the Absolute Man in us. He is our communion with the Holy Trinity' (p. 260 f).

In the first five chapters the integrity of such a thesis is conveyed to Western readers who often enough have little feeling for that 'oecumenicity of consciousness' known to the Russians as *sobornost*. Then follow the applications to all the key features of human culture —the concern for personal freedom, asceticism, sex, love, beauty, morals, the structure of society and religion. The 'androgyne myth' plays a crucial, and to my mind a misleading role, in many of these analyses. And a crucial issue which is raised all the way through is summed up in the statement that 'to seek the Kingdom of God on earth is to seek a way out of all adaptation to natural necessity: it is a thirst for liberation from the heaviness of the world' (p. 286). Berdyaev writes as though this liberation were an event which man is destined to bring into cosmic history as the outcome of the present crisis in culture. This makes the book intensely exciting but at the same time invests it with an air of unreality and unreliability. And yet this prophesying of an age of the Spirit, an age of man revealed in his creativeness, provides a ferment in theological thinking which is thoroughly necessary. Berydaev stands in the succession of Joachim of Fiore and (for his anthropologic thesis) of Jakob Boehme and Angelus Silesius.

The more sober estimate, which enters increasingly into the later and familiar works, is represented here in the following passage. 'The law cannot be externally repealed for a world which lies in sin, just as science, for example, and the other pre-creative cultural values cannot be done away. But the law must be inwardly lived out and overcome. The law is done away with by creativity through the redemption. . . . Creativity builds a new man and a new cosmos, new communion of man with man, of man with the cosmos' (p. 281). The law must be fulfilled. Redemption must be accomplished. But it is salutary to be reminded that this is not the end, nor even, perhaps, the horizon beyond which man's forward gaze may not pass. We may have doubts about the permissibility of the further vision

which Berdyaev seeks to articulate, but the effort of coming to terms with it is vastly refreshing. This is one of the great books of our time.

To Donald A. Lowrie, the translator, tribute should be paid for producing a version which one forgets is a translation. And it is surely proper to compliment the publisher on issuing a major theological work in such an economical format at a price which rebukes the astronomical pretensions to which we are growing sadly accustomed.

W. A. Whitehouse

Zeit und Geschichte in der Offenbarung des Johannes. By Mathias Rissi. Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 179. 1952. Sw. Fr. 13.50.

This exposition of the Apocalypse is an important contribution to the series of studies in Biblical Theology, edited by Eichrodt and Cullmann. The author admits that his study was inspired by *Christus und die Zeit* and some critics will doubtless say that he has forced the Apocalypse into the pattern of that book's theme. My own impression is that the clues offered by Cullmann do light up St. John's work (Rissi is not prepared to divorce the Apocalypse from the Fourth Gospel and the Epistles) and that this exposition of it will have to be reckoned with by any serious scholar. It is a work of scholarship, hammered out with due attention to the views of other exegetes at every point where the author makes an important decision and therefore lavishly adorned with footnotes. The method of analysis is clear and workmanlike, but so cleverly interlocked in places that one may well regret the lack of some kind of index once the first vivid impression has faded. This clarity of method, together with the vivid impression produced by the whole thesis, makes the book eminently suitable for a wider circle of readers than the technical scholars and I would like to see it in English.

In his first section on the structure of the Apocalypse, Rissi confines himself to patterns which cannot be denied. It may be that he has missed important nuances by not rushing in where Farrer was bold to tread. Thus he eschews any connexion between the sevenfold patterns and the days of creation—and here I think it is a pity that he had evidently not seen Farrer's *Rebirth of Images*; he makes no use of calendars of feasts or of sacred diagrams; he believes, indeed, that the sevenfold pattern is not necessarily (or reliably) to be discerned in the sections where it is not stressed, e.g. 12.1-14.20; and he does not make anything of the parallel between the Babylon-appendix to the vials and the Jerusalem-appendix to the Parousia.

Before I indicate what he does do with the visions, I should note that the time-concepts are analysed in a second section, with some account of the implicit time divisions and a magnificent chapter on the Lord of Time. Briefly his presentation of the subject matter is that the messages, the seals, the trumpets and the visions in 12.1-14.20, refer to the history inaugurated by the Incarnation of Christ and closed at His Parousia. The elaborations of the sixth seal and the sixth trumpet draw the character of this interim history into focus and press home the meaning of it with eschatological urgency. The vials represent the intense closing stage of this history, upon which the Parousia supervenes (19.11). Section three of Rissi's book analyses the features of this epoch as the time when Christ, the hidden Lord of the world, is in conflict with the Antichrist (and the Anti-spirit, the second beast). There is, in fact, a veiled *Antiheilsgeschichte* conducted on earth by a Satanic trinity at whose demonic hands the Church suffers in solidarity with its heavenly Lord. The significance of death in this epoch receives attention and Rissi points out that the ranks of the sealed include more than martyrs. When he comes, in his fourth section, to expound the consummation (19.11 ff), his emphasis on 'times' yields many intriguing and valuable insights. Here the reference is strictly future, but a future in time (or times) so that God's work of *creation* may be brought to its appointed consummation. The Millenium is the last epoch of the Messianic reign, now no longer a secret one. The Last Judgment is a judgment of *the dead*, the first resurrection being confined to those 'in Christ' who reign with Him. The second death is not the absolute end of those creatures subject to it, but is the prelude to the reconciliation of *all* creatures in God's perfect kingdom. The establishment of the New Jerusalem is the fulfilment of the hope of Israel-after-the-flesh and, as Romans 11.15 suggests, this is the immediate prelude to the consummation of a wholly saved creation (Rev. 22.1-5). This last stage in the drama includes the 'second resurrection' which mention of the 'first' (20.6) foreshadows. To make this point, for which there is no support in St. John's text, the author establishes the close parallel between St. Paul's eschatology and St. John's and sheds light on both.

There is no room to do justice to Rissi's exposition of the angelology, of the numbers, of the centrality of the Church's mission in its own self-understanding, or of many other matters. Only at one point (c. 17) does he find the author allowing himself a 'political' allusion and even there it is not with the fierce anti-Romanism which many have attributed to him. Indeed the Christian character of the whole work is manifest in that it takes its rise, not from any immediate political crisis (as did Jewish apocalyptic) but from a pro-

found insight into the critical character of the events which happened once for all in history when the remnant of faithful Israel gave birth to a man child who was caught up into God and unto His throne.

W. A. WHITEHOUSE

The Conception of the Inner Light in Robert Barclay's Theology. By LIEF EEG-OLOFSSON. C. W. K. Gleerup-Lund.

THIS volume is a study of Christianity from the viewpoint of 'light symbolism'. The author finding with Karl Heim that 'different theological theories are connected with different theories of cognition', began seeking for an ideal area for the investigation of 'light symbolism'. As Dr Olofsson himself puts it, 'a good method therefore of examining the Inner Light as a theological term would appear to be to examine its use by a thinker, who both in his philosophical and theological theory of cognition has the Inner Light as a principal term and who has tried to work out the relation between the different spheres' (p. 9). This thinker is Robert Barclay who 'consciously combines a philosophical theory of cognition with rationalistic structure', and who 'attempts to apply it in a theological sphere'. Further, Barclay uses 'the ordinary theological apparatus of ideas' something uncommon in the theology of mysticism.

Dr Olofsson commences his work by tracing Inner Light theology from antiquity to the seventeenth century. Conspicuous gaps occur because the author treats only those individuals and areas from which Barclay specifically quotes. Admitting that R. M. Jones has already done a thorough job here, Dr Olofsson excuses his repetition by saying that Jones' work is based on his 'outstanding liberal theology'. Aside from this, there is no doubt that the treatment of Barclay's use of sources is valuable in itself as well as an excellent introduction to the concentrated material to follow. To assist in understanding this section, the Inner Light is defined as that 'characteristic of a divine disposition in man through which he comes into contact with the Godhead' (p. 19).

Moving to a discussion of 'The Right Knowledge of God', the author in retrospect remarks that Barclay has generally misused his sources in supporting the doctrine of immediate revelation. This criticism is obviously well taken, for Barclay finds the Fathers, Reformers and the Bible with one accord in hearty agreement with his theology and, in fact, actively carrying the idea of the Inner Light in all its ramifications into religious living.

What is the kernel from which all Barclay's thought grows? Dr

Olofsson phrases it as follows: 'There exists a right knowledge of God which is neither of an intellectualistic nor of moralistic kind. It cannot be obtained by the efforts of man but lies entirely in the gift of God' (p. 59). Barclay is not always true to this point of departure and therefore the author takes him to task in succeeding chapters for both intellectualism and moralism.

Herein lies one of Dr Olofsson's chief criticisms of Barclay, for though Barclay says that right knowledge is a gift of God, he is by reason of his intellectualism and moralism, an Inner Light mystic and not a *sola gratia* mystic (pp. 60 and 110). Acknowledging his deep debt to Nygren and Bring (p. 5), Dr Olofsson consistently eulogises the *sola gratia* and *sola fide* in religion. The standard for his critique of Barclay is made plain in his words: 'there is a right knowledge of God, which is given only through the historic Christ and consists in the forgiveness of sins by the mere grace of God, *sola gratia*: when a man receives this knowledge, his deepest destination is fulfilled' (p. 60). It is obvious how the author must react to any suggestion by Barclay of an Inner Light operating in the process of salvation. Leading to the full development of this issue, Barclay's treatment of *imago Dei* is discussed and his mediating position shown. 'On the one hand he turns against the intellectualism and moralism in scholastic theology by supporting the Reformation in its denial of *imago Dei* after the fall. On the other hand, he maintains the necessity of a mystical organ in man and consents to this being a remainder of God's image' (p. 74). This mystical organ or 'seed' does not make man good nor does it make him divine, but being a substance rather than an accidence it is comparable to a medicine 'which when it begins to work makes a man holy' (p. 75). Expressed Christologically, this means that 'Christ dwells in us, yet not immediately but mediately, as he is in that seed which is in us' (quoting Barclay p. 80). This problem of 'Christ for us' and 'Christ in us' (in-esse and unio) and its relation to the reception of divine knowledge and salvation is the major abyss which separates Dr Olofsson and Robert Barclay (p. 105). Both see man utterly separated from God by the fall, both feel man can do nothing to save himself, both find Christ the only mediator; but here the agreement ends. Barclay sees the Inner Light, as worked on by God's grace, rising to co-operate in salvation. Olofsson, as representing Nygren, Bring and Luther, rejects any human interference since it makes God and man subject and subject, rather than God as subject and man as object in salvation.

Dr Olofsson finds Barclay's 'difficulties' with predestination a natural outcome of his Inner Light theology. *Sola fide* mysticism does not, in fact cannot, ask 'Why?', but the rationalism inherent

in Inner Light mysticism makes it only logical that responsibility for salvation or condemnation be fixed either with God or man. Barclay is found to dismiss the Roman Catholic view of justification with the charge of moralism and the Protestant with the equally deadly charge of intellectualism. Barclay's own view 'entails the existence of a knowledge of God—entirely a gift of God' and 'this justification as consisting in a transformation of man, leading him to the final objective, the supreme happiness' (p. 110). In a further analysis, Dr Olofsson concludes that Barclay is actually saying that 'sanctification is the basis of justification' (p. 116), which makes it possible for him to teach the 'Christian's perfection already in this life' (p. 124).

One great danger in Barclay's system, Dr. Olofsson rightly sees, is that it jeopardises 'the distinctive character of Christian mysticism' (p. 101), because it mixes the psychological with the mystical. In Barclay, the author writes, 'the Inner Light is considered in the psychological sense an inner organ that, to the exclusion of everything outer in a psychological sense, gives the inner knowledge in the mystical sense' (p. 100).

The work in hand is obviously the product of much painstaking research. The author has lived long with his subject and has absorbed the marrow of Barclay's theology. In many instances he has crystallised Barclay's more obscure passages; and he shows where Barclay has left loose ends and gives the implications of such omissions.

One is a little disappointed that the author spends so much time comparing his subject with Luther. This is undoubtedly well carried out, but Barclay was English and is best understood against this backdrop. Would not Calvin and Bucer have been as appropriate figures for comparison? However, the author gave fair warning of his intention when he wrote that he would examine 'the light symbol', a term which appears so often in Christian mysticism 'that it can be regarded as the principal term of mysticism, in the same manner—that justification by faith alone can be regarded as that of Lutheranism' (p. 7).

W. N. Kerr

A Scientist of the Invisible. By A. P. Shepherd. Hodder and Stoughton. 12s. 6d.

In 1941, Dr Shepherd published a book entitled '*The Eternity of Time*', of which Dr William Temple said 'it builds a bridge from clock-time to eternity more likely to carry traffic than any other bridge across

that chasm which I have seen'. The first remarkable thing about this book is that it is written by a Christian theologian, probably the very first to commend Anthroposophy, and to do it so enthusiastically; for there is no doubt that Dr Shepherd thinks very highly indeed of Rudolf Steiner. In the preface, Dr Shepherd tells that, when he wrote that first book, he had never heard of Steiner; and he is amazed now that this should have been so. He also quotes Dr Temple as saying shortly before his death that he was 'really going to start on Steiner', and that remark led to further investigation which revealed the fact that 'practically no educated man of my acquaintance knew anything about Steiner'. As a convinced student of Anthroposophy, Dr Shepherd is now satisfied that Steiner is no crank, but that his teaching is of vital importance. The avowed purpose of the book is to break down the barrier of ignorance and prejudice.

We are given the main facts of Steiner's life, on the basis of his autobiography. There seems to have been little, if any, connexion with the regular worship of the Church. Like many other writers, Dr Shepherd sees a vast danger in the modern world of a 'human degeneracy' getting out of control. Science itself has become alarmed, but there is no help in scientific agnosticism. What is needed is 'a scientific explanation of the Universe and of Man which would justify man's instinctive faith in the absolute worth of individual personality'. Steiner is hailed as 'a man with an answer', startling and original; and the main part of the book is given to an exposition of that answer and of its practical applications in various directions—and Steiner's answer is based on his own direct perceptions.

The present reviewer has only read two of Steiner's books, but in the main he found that they were at much lower altitudes than the Scriptures, with an excessive trust in man's thought and a vagueness about the necessity of revelation. True, it can be maintained, as Dr Shepherd does so gallantly, that Steiner stands for the supreme reality of the unseen world laid open to Spirit-perception, that he emphasises the power of Spirit-forces influencing our world, and that his teaching is utterly against all materialistic philosophies. But if we take his teaching on Jesus Christ, on the nature of man, and on the invisible world itself, and test his teaching at these three points by the undiluted teaching of the Bible on these three points, there is a great gap which Dr Shepherd does not succeed in bridging. Nevertheless, Steiner is never likely to receive a more sympathetic exposition than he has received in these easy, flowing, readable pages.

George S. Gunn

Die Theologie des Gottesdienstes bei Luther. By VILMOS VAJTA. Göttingen 1954. Pp. xix 375.

The Righteousness of God: Luther Studies. By GORDON RUPP. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. xiii 375. 25s.

THE significance of the first-named book is that it brings to the problem of the development and nature of worship in the Lutheran Reformation the theological insights and emphases of the current Swedish Luther Research associated with the names of Aulen, Nygren, Bring and Wingren. Previous work on Luther and Worship (e.g. Allwohn, Knolle, Fendt and others) has succeeded in dispelling the prejudices that Luther was uninterested in Liturgy, or that he was biassed or misinformed; but Vajta goes far beyond these works, showing with admirable clarity and thoroughness the mainspring of Luther's liturgics and the close connexion between Luther's theology and his views on worship. In seeking to uncover the connexion between Luther's theology and his liturgical reforms, Vajta maintains that the latter was a theological necessity which arose from the former. The root of misunderstanding the author sees in the tendency for liturgical interest to begin where according to Reformation theology it should end. The author's breadth of outlook and depth of insight saves him from the error of considering Luther's interest as being limited by his doctrine of Justification by Faith alone, and consequently, Vajta sets his book as complementary to the recent research on Luther's doctrine of Redemption, the Church and the Holy Spirit. He rightly seeks a systematic unity, and sets Luther's theology of worship in the centre of his total theological outlook. This he does successfully, for liturgical shape can only take place within the total view of the great themes of evangelical Christianity.

The starting point of the book controls strictly the argument. The issue to Vajta is a matter of God's Work for man and the consequent situation which this Work of God effects. God's Work and Faith are the same activity, and worship is not to be thought of as a synthesis of God and Faith. In worship God is essentially *Deus pro nobis*, but also, Christ Himself is present in Faith. Arising from this distinction, Vajta presents his case, therefore, not on the dualism of God's Work and Man's work, but on the dualism of God and Idol. (This valuable emphasis receives careful treatment in Prenter's *Spiritus Creator.*) The significance of this is that in no circumstances is man released from the worship relationship—he either fulfils it, or turns wrongly to Idolatry. The radical nature of this alternative explains Luther's criticism and reform of the medieval Mass, which he saw as giving effect to Idolatry in so many ways. The evan-

gelical emphasis of this interpretation of worship was irreconcilable with the Roman concept of sacrifice, and necessitated the ruthless revision of the Canon. In this connexion Vajta's analysis of the Mass is noteworthy.

The second part of his book (two thirds of the whole) the author devotes to the elucidation of the fundamental thoughts just indicated, and this he does from a double perspective:

(*a*) Worship as the Work of God.

(*b*) Worship as the Work of Faith.

Worship as the Work of God means to Vajta that the preaching, the administration of the Sacraments and the Church's function are not simply human mediations of God's Work, but in them, and only in them, does the Incarnation (seen as God's Work of salvation), attain its purpose—*Deus pro nobis*. The Word of God, therefore, is not Scripture but a message. The Preaching is the active participation of Christ in the redemptive act of God; it is Christ's present Work, the purpose of which is to make real the victorious Lordship of Christ. In this lies the double nature of the Act of God towards Man, viz. Love and Wrath, and therefore the double intent of the Preaching, viz. Law and Gospel. The content of the sermon is always Christ. Turning to the Communion, Vajta interprets the administration of the Bread and Wine as a function of the ever-living Christ, and therefore as the Work of God in the appropriation by Man of God's redemptive activity. It is not the consecration and localisation of Christ's Body in the Host which guarantees the presence of the Lord, but it is the Presence of the Lord which guarantees the sacramental distribution of the Bread and Wine. The office of the Church as the Dispensation of the Gift of God becoming real 'for others', Vajta develops as the office through which Christ is present in the Word preached and the Sacrament administered. The Church's Office, based on God's Work in Word and Sacrament, can never be supplied or effected by ministerial qualification as such.

The second half of Part Two is devoted to Worship as the Work of Faith. If it is true that Faith is included in God's Work of Salvation, then the part played by the Christian in Worship is to be defined in such a way that in worship all human activity is set within the personal relation to Christ, and included within the objective acts of redemption. Faith rests in the passive reception of hearing and receiving the Word and the Sacrament. Every preparation either for receiving the Sacrament or for hearing the Sermon presumes some correlation of human and divine work, and therefore denies Faith as the Work of God. The place the author assigns to sacrifice is man's negation of himself: man does not sacri-

fice but is sacrificed. Man's praise and thanksgiving are subsumed in the death of Christ, so that praise is the denial of one's own righteousness before God in confession of sin. In this connexion Vajta sees Faith and Love related in worship. Within Luther's theology of worship there arises no separate independent significance in divine ceremonies as such. Worship viewed as the work of Faith theoretically compels freedom from all and every ceremony. Church ceremonies are to be seen not as a function of Faith but of Love of neighbour, and therefore, will always be fluid in form.

At a time when the question of liturgical reform is a very live issue, this work is of special significance. There would have been an added interest had the author seen his way to consider the practical liturgical reforms which Luther did actually effect and which arose from his theological reform, but this limitation serves to bring the reader to an unbiassed objectivity which compels independent further consideration of the problem discussed. Luther's theological alternatives of theolatry or idolatry set the problem so sharply that Luther's views will always be pertinent.

The author might have given more consideration to Luther's doctrine of Atonement and the significance for Luther of the sacrifice of Christ, and, in his treatment of Luther's *Abendmahlslehre*, to Luther's Christological starting point. The function of the Church as viewed within the framework of Luther's *Regimentslehre* should not be overlooked. It is questionable whether Vajta's criticism of Barth is satisfactory in the light of Barth's present position. We can be grateful to Vajta for filling a long acknowledged gap with a work of sustained scholarship which is both positive and pertinent and which is the fruit of deep research and hard thinking. It is written with clarity and vigour, and is easy for a non-German to read. There is a good bibliography, and a useful detailed (though incomplete) list of contents of the *Weimarer Ausgabe*. It is a treasure house of Luther quotations and footnotes, though it lacks a subject index.

While Vajta's book has interest mainly for the specialist, Rupp's book, though of an equal quality academically, has a very wide appeal and is written in his own delightful style. The book comprises the Birkbeck Lectures given at Cambridge in 1947, revised and expanded. In revising and expanding the author has had two aims: to describe and interpret the Luther Research of German and Scandinavian scholars, and to let Luther speak for himself.

The book falls into three parts. Part One (77 pages) describes what the historians have made of Luther. The author discusses the polemical writings of Catholic and Evangelical writers over four centuries, and examines the misconceptions and controversies in

detail. Here he offers an original contribution, not readily found anywhere else in English, both on the subject of the English reaction to Luther and on the present state of Luther research. Part Two, by far the weightiest part of the book (175 pages) examines Luther's theological development by the method of a critical discussion of Luther's vocabulary. Rupp bases his research on: *Dictata super Psalterium* (1513-15), *Romans* (1515-16), *Galatians* (1516-17), *Hebrews* (1517-18), *The Heidelberg Disputation* (1518), *Operationes in Psalmos* (1518-21), and the *Rationis Latomianae Confutatio* (1521). On the basis of these works, Rupp examines the theology of Luther by handling the phrases like *coram Deo*, *Anfechtung* and the Righteousness of God. Rupp shows the significance for Luther of man standing in relation to God, and not in relation to man, our modern emphasis. In his treatment of *Anfechtung* he shows how Luther's thinking is drawn from life and not from doctrine, and how this in turn opens up Luther's conception of Faith, the difference between Law and Gospel, and his doctrine of Justification. Rupp clearly shows Luther's conception of Righteousness not as an outside factor which we apply to a situation, but rather Christ's personal presence in the believer by the Holy Spirit through Faith. The author shows the difference between Luther and the Enthusiasts on the one hand, and Luther and the Scholastics on the other hand. The whole is carefully and convincingly supported by good quotations with references and dates. Part Three (96 pages) consists of a collection of essays designed to round off the whole. The first essay is on Erasmus, and deals with Humanism, the Renascence and the Reformation, as well as Free Will, Providence and Predestination. (The basis of this essay is *De servo arbitrio*.) The other essays consider Luther's teaching both on the Church and the State. The whole is completed by an essay on Luther the man. Although brief, these essays repay study for they deal with the live theological interests of post-war Europe, and are also those very aspects of Luther's theology about which there is prejudice and ignorance, particularly in Britain. It is to be regretted that this section is not given an amount of space commensurate with its importance, and handled in the detailed way of Part Two.

The book is good, and is written in that scholarly and interesting way we expect of Rupp. Not only is his knowledge of the Luther writings together with the secondary sources and recent Luther Research unerring, but his learning is worn with a human touch e.g. his chapter on Biel, his references to Frau Luther, to the death of his infant daughter Magdalena, and Luther's comments on infant mortality. The book has a good bibliography. The author has translated his texts, and enriched the work with copious footnotes

and quotations. There is a register of quotations, an index of subject matter and technical vocabulary, and also a selective index.

JAMES ATKINSON

Rechtfertigungsglaube bei Luther. By PETER BLÄSER. Herz Jesu Missionshaus, Hiltrup. DM 3.30.

THIS study of Luther's teaching on the nature of justifying faith is the work of a Roman Catholic, and aims to further mutual understanding between the Lutheran and Roman communions.

Dr Bläser finds at once that faith for Luther is not mere intellectual acceptance of doctrine, but essentially trust (*fiducia*) in which the believer concerned recognises and embraces the promises of God as valid *for him*. As such it includes the assurance of present righteousness through the non-imputation of sin, of progressive inward renewal to be perfected after death, and of God's electing grace as the ground of the whole process. Dr Bläser maintains that all this is taught plainly (though not yet with complete consistency) as early as the Preface to Romans; for the passages there which may seem to deny the assurance of final salvation or that of election actually deny only a *rational* or *natural* certainty. Yet there is, so he thinks, a certain development in Luther's later thought: and increasing emphasis on imputed righteousness and a tendency to exclude the thought of inward renewal from the concept of justification.

This, indeed, appears to be Dr Bläser's chief problem. Having examined what Luther means by 'works', he shows that on the one hand there is a close connexion between them and faith: faith issues in 'good works' both directly (because it is itself essentially active) and still more indirectly (because it is the organ of the inward working of God, or Christ, or the Spirit). On the other hand, wherever the object of faith is taken to be not 'Christ *in* us' but 'Christ *for* us', everything is made to depend on an 'external union' with Christ in which His righteousness is imputed to the believer who in himself is and remains unrighteous: in this context justifying faith is purely fiducial recognition of that relationship, and not only has it no essential bearing on 'good works', but even the possibility of any real inward renewal on this side of death is frequently denied. Which now of these two views was for Luther the primary one? Dr Bläser admits that a case can be made for the former, but urges that the latter is the characteristically Lutheran position. He considers this the inevitable, logical consequence of Luther's 'fundamental concern' with original sin, and goes on to quote from various contexts examples of his insistence that the believer is still utterly sinful and that human righteousness is not an inward quality or capacity but a relation to

the forgiving grace of God. When, as often, Luther urges the need for 'good works', it seems to be as the expression not of faith but of love. In any case, they are clearly needed only as signs of the presence of faith, or as means of increasing faith or of subduing the body and serving one's neighbour: they are *not* necessary for salvation, which is throughout the work of God alone and does not depend on any human acts or conditions—even faith is not (as for Melanchthon) such a condition but is the purely passively received gift of God. Of the many passages where 'good works' appear to have a meaning for salvation, Dr Bläser offers two explanations: either they are inconsistencies carried over from an earlier period, or the real agent is not man but God, working in and through man without any participation on his part.

The book is interesting in many ways, and well documented. But it contains a distressing number of errors, many of them fundamental. For example, the distinction between 'Christ in us' and 'Christ for us' is misleading, and often results in false contrasts: what matters to Luther is surely not whether the relation to Christ is internal or external, but whether the believer is viewed concretely in that relation or abstractly in himself. Again, it is surely a foreshortening of Luther's teaching to allow nothing beyond a 'purely fiducial' faith, or to play down the human side of the relation between God and man until it becomes merely negative and passive: greater attention to the important doctrine of the Holy Spirit might have saved many misconceptions here. Most disastrous of all, perhaps, is the total disregard of one utterly fundamental fact: for Luther, God's Word is *creative*, and hence there can be no 'merely forensic' judgment, but for God to declare righteous *is* to make righteous—the difference from Augustine being, that the making righteous is neither a precondition of justification nor the result of 'infused grace'.

James W. Leitch

Origen's Doctrine of Tradition. By R. C. P. Hanson. S.P.C.K. Pp. xii + 214. 25s. net.

In his concluding chapter Dr Hanson gathers together in a lucid summary the results of his study, including the following points. (1) For Origen 'the primary and only indispensable source of tradition is the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments' though in neither case was his canon definitively fixed. (2) 'He believed that he was in possession of a tradition of secret teaching designed for the intellectual Christian, and consisting in fact of a number of theological speculations which appealed to his own mind, as well as a system of allegorising Scripture which had been greatly developed,

but not invented, by himself. But he did not profess to derive this tradition from any source except the Bible itself'. (3) 'He allows that the Bible must be interpreted in a way that shall not conflict with the rule of faith of the Church, by which he means the Christian faith as it is preached by the church of his day, in continuity with the preaching of it since the very earliest times. He assumes that the content of this preaching is the same as, though not necessarily identical in form with, the doctrine of the Bible, and that it must appeal to the Bible for proof. He is ready at times to encourage his advanced pupils to ignore the rule of faith, but never to ignore the Bible'. (4) 'He shows signs of knowing of the existence of a creed, but displays no interest in it, and probably regarded it as a mere summary of the rule of faith'. (5) Finally Dr Hanson suggests that 'perhaps the most important' aspect of Origen's doctrine of tradition is the fact that he is the first of the Fathers who 'no longer seriously reckons with the possibility of the survival of oral tradition'.

These quotations will serve to show that this is a study of quite first-rate importance. The conclusions are based on a thorough first-hand investigation of all the evidence, and particularly that of the writings of Origen that have survived in Greek, for, as Dr Hanson has shown conclusively, 'any reference to tradition in a translation by Rufinus or Jerome may very well have been touched up or even interpolated by the translator', who worked for 'pious Latin ears', and at a much later date, when the doctrine of tradition had become more strictly defined. At every point comparison is made with the teaching of Origen's master, Clement of Alexandria. Account is also taken of the abundant recent work of continental scholars on Origen, and many of their views are shown to be in need of modification. Dr Hanson has combined Teutonic thoroughness with Anglo-Saxon verve and freshness, and has produced an elucidation of Origen's teaching with regard to tradition which is as original as it is clear and convincing—convincing, one feels tempted to say, in spite of its clarity. He seems to have read and thought himself into the mind of Origen in a remarkable way, and his book will be a landmark in Origenist studies.

For good measure and by way of introduction Dr Hanson has worked out an elaborate chronology of Origen's life and writings. It seems that scholars are now coming to agree that the Origen mentioned by Porphyry in his *Life of Plotinus* as one of the inner circle and the writer of two apparently philosophical books is none other than the Christian Origen. Dr Hanson accepts this view and thinks the older theory of a 'pagan Origen' a desperate one. He also endeavours to fix the place and time of Origen's association with Plotinus, viz. at Athens sometime between 243 and 245. (For

'Porphyry' should we not read 'Plotinus' near the bottom of p. 6?) But if Origen was so closely connected with the Plotinian circle why should we speak of a 'tradition of secret teaching', unless we are prepared to trace it *via* Plotinus to Ammonius Saccas, which Origen himself never does? In the relevant chapter (V) Dr Hanson points out that, unlike Clement, Origen 'does not claim to know of any line of teachers deriving in continuous succession from the Apostles' or from anyone else. Does not the evidence suggest that his esoteric teaching, cosmological and soteriological, was his own personal construction, which he believed to be not incompatible with acceptance of the Church's Kerygma, and to be in general provable from Scripture by means of allegory?

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

Early Christian Interpretations of History. Being the Bampton Lectures of 1952. By R. L. P. MILBURN. A. and C. Black. Pp. xii + 222. 18s. net.

THIS is a most perplexing book to appraise as a whole. It is replete with erudition and there is a thread of argument running through it all, but it is hard not to feel that the erudition has often overlaid the argument. Certainly there is much which only on a very elastic interpretation of the title can be brought under it. Chapter II, e.g. is appropriately entitled, The Use of History in Early Apologetic. Similarly appropriate is the title of Chapter IV, The Treatment of History in Early Christian Art. But is Origen's allegorising of Scripture to be regarded as interpretation of history? And what is one to make of a chapter of Apocryphal Stories—including those beginning to be told from the 5th century onwards which form the 'historical' basis for the recent dogma of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary? The history of the growth of this legend is given at length in a carefully documented Appendix. These chapters and the Appendix are, of course, valuable in themselves and are full of interesting information, but do not throw much light on the question of the interpretation of history as usually understood.

Other chapters, however, are more in line with what the title of the book would lead us to expect. Eusebius's historical work is admirably appraised and defended against the common criticisms; as are more briefly the works of Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret. Augustine, Orosius and Salvian have their due as interpreters of God's judgment in history in the light of the crisis of the fifth century. Mr Milburn discerns a 'smack of parochialism in the speculations of Augustine', but surely this should be 'classicism', a dying echo of Roma Aeterna of which Augustine is not conscious; and there is a

curious confusion, which may not be intended, on p. 87 where *De Civ. Dei* I.35 seems to be quoted as evidence that Augustine 'realised that the deserved collapse of Rome might lead to the conversion of some who would be enabled to press on into the city of God'. But it is truly pointed out that 'by accepting, with whatever regrets, the possibility that a new political situation might arise when the ancient Empire should have passed away, Orosius helped to disentangle Christianity from the State, and prepared men to accept the idea of the Church as the true empire, claiming a world-wide spiritual authority more powerful than any secular allegiance'.

The clue to the book is to be sought in Chapter I. Discoursing of the Historian's Task Mr Milburn describes—with the aid of many apt observations on history-writing drawn from writers ancient and modern and of all schools of thought (but why not Collingwood?)—the historian's purpose, his methods, and the qualities of mind and heart required to 'preserve the delicate balance that has to be maintained between interpretation and chronicle', particularly when confronted with 'the intractable and bizarre elements in history that result from the incalculable pressure of the Divine on human affairs'. So far as the Early Christian historians proper are concerned—but without admitting that many of those dealt with in this book deserve that appellation—Mr Milburn has indeed shown that 'they deserve credit for an honest attempt to record "what happened" yet without loss of a keen awareness of the mystery and pattern shown forth in events'.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

Studia Paulina in honorem Johannis de Zwaan septuagenarii. Edited by J. N. SEVENSTER and W. C. VAN UNNIK. Haarlem, Bohn, 1953. Pp. 245.

A VOLUME which includes contributions by such scholars as C. K. Barrett, M. Black, R. Bultmann, C. H. Dodd, J. Jeremias and T. W. Manson, could hardly fail to be important; and this *Festschrift*, containing nine essays in English, six in German, two in French and one in Dutch, together with a note on the career of Professor de Zwaan of Leyden and a very impressive bibliography of his works, is, in fact, a most valuable contribution to New Testament studies. With the exception of Professor Black's important contribution on the text of the Peshitta Tetraevangelium all the essays are on Pauline subjects or have special reference to Paul.

One way of indicating the worth of this symposium will be to select one contribution for reasonably extensive survey. For this purpose we choose the essay of Professor van Unnik (Utrecht),

Reisepläne und Amen-sagen, Zusammenhang und Gedankenfolge in 2 Kor. 1.15-24. The difficulty of 2 Col. 1.15-24 is well known. Is there a real sequence of thought here or have we to do with what T. R. Glover called 'illuminative irrelevancies'? What is the connexion in St. Paul's mind between 'Yea and nay' and 'Amen', and what has this to do with his travel plans? Professor van Unnik suggests that the key to the solution of the problem is to realise that the passage is built up on the Semitic root אמן and that Paul is here thinking in terms of legal proceedings between himself and the Corinthians. He shows convincingly that all the key-words of this passage are connected in one way or another with the root אמן. so that what we have here is a characteristic example of Semitic word-play. When this is recognised the verses under consideration cease to be a collection of unconnected sentences and a sequence of thought becomes plain. Noting also that Paul is arguing *a maiore ad minus* and is thinking of himself and the Corinthians as opponents in an imaginary lawsuit, Professor van Unnik proceeds to explain the general movement of the argument. To indicate this briefly, it is: Paul and his two colleagues (making three witnesses) preached in Corinth the fulfilment of God's promises in Jesus, the *Amen* or *Yes* of God to this world (God as witness). The Corinthian Church has received this message—it is in fact the very basis of their life—and they themselves bear witness to it when they say the *Amen* in the liturgy. If such is the truth with regard to the highest matters, then it is folly to suggest that in such small things as travel plans Paul would be continually vacillating between yes and no. Rather must the true explanation be that he refrained from coming because he wanted to spare them pain. To this too God is witness.

Professor van Unnik concludes that this passage, since it is clearly Paul's own formulation and not something that he could have taken over from the Aramaic-speaking Church, is a further piece of evidence that Paul thought (and perhaps also wrote) in a Semitic language. If he is right, then, as he says, 'future Pauline research will have to reckon seriously with the Apostle's use of Aramaic in his thinking'. Professor van Unnik has already argued elsewhere that the common view that Paul was brought up in Tarsus is wrong and that, though born in Tarsus, he spent his youth in Jerusalem.

It is particularly interesting to relate this contribution to that of Professor T. W. Manson, which is a convincing exposition of 2 Cor. 2.14-17 in the light of Rabbinic literature; to that of Mr C. K. Barrett on the language Paul uses in Gal. 2.2, 6, 9 in speaking of the leaders of the Jerusalem Church (one of his two general conclusions is: 'An obscure passage in Paul has been illuminated by being placed in the context not of gnosticism or the mystery religions but of

primitive Christian eschatology'); and to that of Professor J. N. Sevenster on γυμνὸς in 2 Cor. 5.3, in which he shows that a passage where many interpreters have considered that the influence of Greek thought was particularly clear is, as a matter of fact, not to be explained by Greek thought at all.

There are other very important essays, including one on 1 Cor. 9.19-22 by Professor C. H. Dodd and one entitled *Zur Gedankenführung in den Paulinischen Briefen* by Professor Jeremias. We have no hesitation in recommending this *Festschrift* as a valuable and fascinating contribution to New Testament studies. In view of its worth it is a pity that several of the essays are disfigured by rather a large number of misprints.

C. E. B. Cranfield

Religious Education in Schools. The Report of an Inquiry made by the Research Committee of the Institute of Christian Education into the working of the 1944 Education Act. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d.

The Duke of Wellington is reported to have said that education without religion would only succeed in manufacturing so many devils. Conversely, some may have expected the 1944 Education Act to produce from English schools 'non Angli sed Angeli'. Therefore it is most important to have this sane, balanced report, of almost ten years working of an Act of Parliament which sought, as adequately as legislation ever can, to have children at school introduced to the experience of Christian worship and the understanding of Christian faith.

That the Bill was ever passed at all, is an interesting indication of how public opinion changes, and the small number of withdrawals, made under the conscience clause, would suggest that parents do wish their children to be introduced to the Christian faith, unless one is cynical enough to see in this only another sign of indifference to religion. The Christian frontier has certainly been by law established in the school, and, as the report indicates, a new interest and activity in the teaching of religion is present at all stages from the committees, which prepare the Agreed Syllabuses to be the basis of instruction, down to the pupils, who take their own share in preparing for the School Assembly.

Those who fear that only an emasculated Christianity could result from school religious teaching, will be encouraged to know that the Syllabuses, mainly Biblical in content, show increasingly a 'doctrinal primacy of purpose', and that teachers recognise their need to clear their minds on points of doctrine.

Those who have rather irreverent memories of their own school

Assemblies will be heartened to read that generally the standard of worship is rising, and in some schools has reached a high level. Those who thought that a 'school religion' might offer a substitute for Church-going will be reassured to hear that the intention is 'to quicken the desire for membership of the Church as a worshipping community'.

This report will be of most use, as it suggests 'to help teachers and administrators to make the most of the opportunities provided for developing religious instruction'. But all who are engaged in the religious instruction of Youth would benefit, especially from the sections on 'Content of Teaching' and 'Retention of Religious Knowledge'. The Church as well as the school must give heed to what has been discovered of the special difficulties of religious instruction of average and below average ability, in the eleven to fifteen age group.

Scotland, where the legal position is different, and Wales have been excluded from the investigation, so that 'Religious Education in English Schools' would have been a more accurate title. It might have been helpful to have the relevant clauses of the Act printed as an appendix. The Biblical Studies' course at Glasgow University is mentioned in appendix 2, but no mention is made of the similar provision at Edinburgh and Aberdeen.

The report is beautifully printed, and paragraphed and indexed for easy reference. The Institute of Christian Education is to be congratulated on its enterprise.

JOHN GRAY

The Making of the Scottish Prayer Book of 1637. By GORDON DONALDSON. Edinburgh University Press. Pp. 364. 25s.

A CRITICAL study of this famous Scottish Prayer Book has been long overdue. Since the liturgical studies on this period and book of Dr Sprott and Professor Cooper more than a half-century ago, and even since Dr McMillan's more recent work, new documents have come to light, and in particular an important example in the possession of Lord Haddington of the 1637 Prayer Book in the making. This discovery has far-reaching effects on our knowledge of the period, and a reappraisal was therefore badly needed. It is indeed curious that a book which caused so much excitement in its day and became the focal point of a revolution, political and ecclesiastical, should have received so little attention from scholars. Moreover, the book itself possessed great liturgical merit, the Scottish bishops having determined 'to make that book as perfect as they could'.

Now at last the facts and texts are before us, scrupulously arrayed

and edited by Dr Donaldson. The task could hardly have been undertaken by more competent hands or more ecumenically accomplished. Dr Donaldson's exceptional knowledge of the sources enables him to examine and display the contemporary situation with a sure touch, and his disciplined and generous mind allows him to expose impartially the complex controversies which beat like angry seas about this Prayer Book. The writing is clear, cool, and a model of direct English style. Indeed, one's only regret is that the introduction is not longer and even more detailed; but the cost of printing now commands economy of words, and we must gratefully admire the skill with which Dr Donaldson has packed into his narration all that is essential to it. It repays several re-readings, and consultation of his references is rewardingly illuminating.

Dr Donaldson's work falls into six parts:

First, he examines afresh the evidence for the use of the English Prayer Book of 1552 in Scotland, and shows how widely it was used even after 1560. Then he brings out an important point, apt to be obscured by historians not closely acquainted with liturgical practice of the period, that even after the Book of Common Order had generally established itself 'the characteristics of Scottish worship did not differ widely from contemporary Anglican practice as they came to do in later generations'. This fact can only be understood if we are aware of how the Book of Common Order and the Book of Common Prayer were then used, and if we see that on Sundays the worship in both England and Scotland derived from the Eucharist. Further, it is worth remembering that the Scottish reforming party were the 'English' party, that the leading reformers of this time in both England and Scotland had close affinities with Geneva, that responses were not widely used between minister and congregation in England, that metrical (not prose) psalms were sung in both countries, and that even John Knox was derided by Ninian Winzet because he spoke with an English accent: 'awa' wi' your Southernoun', he cried.

After this, Dr Donaldson unravels most patiently the tangled strands of liturgical revision between 1601 and 1625 in a fascinating exposition.

Then he proceeds to the composition of the 1637 book, and discusses the drafts, suggestions and directions which came from the Scottish bishops and clergy, and from King James and King Charles and their advisers in England. It is an odd simplification parodied by the false title 'Laud's Liturgy' (which has stuck so long) to suppose that the book was the work of Laud, for his direct impress upon it was comparatively small and even in England many of the King's advisers on this matter were Scotsmen.

Thereafter Dr Donaldson comments usefully upon the chief controversies of the day, and indicates the many concessions made to Scottish opinion as the book assumed shape, while he also describes those inclusions which were objectionable to the Scots.

He completes his introduction with a description of the various liturgical texts involved, and their relationship to each other.

Finally, he reprints the 1637 book, collating the drafts and directions which went to its making.

Thus, in this careful, dispassionate, scholarly work we at last have a standard study of the subject. Truth will frequently be found, as we see, not to follow the lines congenial to the various legends loved (and often still propagated by many episcopalians and presbyterians, but if both of these have to think again the ultimate result may be rewarding.

One might justly add that the book has been beautifully printed and produced.

WILLIAM D. MAXWELL

The Paschal Mystery. Meditations on the Last Three Days of Holy Week. By LOUIS BOUYER. Translated by Sister Mary Benoît, R.S.M., St. Xavier College, Chicago. Pp. 348. George Allen and Unwin, London. 18s.

PÈRE BOUYER is Professor of Spiritual Theology at the Institut Catholique de Paris, a liturgist and theologian of eminence, and the author of several penetrating books. This is the first to be translated into English, and we may hope that it will serve to introduce him to a larger circle of English readers.

It is well known that the heart of the Roman liturgy is sublimely exposed in the services of Holy Week, and in particular those of the last three days; and that here is to be found concentrated much that is most ancient in the Roman rite. By the recent restoration of the rite of Holy Saturday, the services of these days have been further enriched, but Père Bouyer in this edition has been unable to include it in his study.

While Père Bouyer is pre-eminently a scholar, he writes with great skill for the general educated reader, and he combines his liturgical exposition with theological exposition, drawing not only upon the Fathers, but obviously influenced also by recent expositors, in particular by Masure and de la Taille, whose works on the doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice are of such importance.

No Reformed reader will expect to find himself in agreement with all that is here written, but he will find every page stimulating and often exciting, raising points for reflexion, meditation and prayer

as he solemnly moves with the author through the great actions of atonement and the new creation in Christ. He will find a large number of ultimate questions raised: the meaning of the Cross, of the Eucharist, of the real presence and the eucharistic presence (not wholly unconfused in Bouyer's exposition), of sacrifice, the eternal Priesthood of our Lord, of corporate worship, of the Incarnation, and a host of others. And these questions are treated, not, as we of the Reformed Church too often tend to treat them, as matters of theology and life alone, but in their relation to the worship of the Church, which is an ultimate offering. These are all questions, which in this ecumenical age must be faced afresh in this full setting, together with their full implications; and this book should help us to face them.

The Reformed reader will also be impressed by the Scriptural content of these services and the amazingly skilful and spiritual use of the Psalms and other Scripture in them. Here we see the Old and New Testaments as seen through the eyes of a worshipping, adoring, penitent Church. We shall be greatly aided in our understanding of the exposition if we first provide ourselves with a copy of the Roman services during Holy Week, obtainable easily and inexpensively through any bookseller. Throughout we should be stimulated to re-assess and re-state our position, and to enlarge our sense of worship.

If the translator has not been wholly successful in rendering Bouyer's clear, nervous French into lucid, lively English, she has nevertheless, done her work competently, marred chiefly by such words as 'divinize', 'Pasch', and 'progressive psalms' (for 'graduals').

We may close with a quotation or two, chosen almost at random, to indicate the essence of this notable book: 'According to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers, the Old Testament was above all a divine instruction, preparing man by figures adapted to his weakness, for a violation of spirit and power. . . . The many unwarranted biblical interpretations that have grown out of the acceptance and extravagant application of the principle of allegorical exegesis must not obscure for us the value of this principle'. Again, 'The coming of Christ brought about a permanent transformation in the devotional mystery. A truly saving because truly divine act replaced the simple cosmic phenomenon that had underlain all earlier rites. . . . In the later rites the Word of God made flesh . . . joined the sign to the thing signified. . . . The mirage of primitive magic dissolved at the breath of the creative Word. . . . The more we stress the resemblances between pagan and Christian mysteries, the more the differences stand out'. And again, 'It is not the renewal of the Christian mystery which makes the cross an abiding memorial: it is

the imperishable actuality of the cross which allows the sacramental mystery to be renewed indefinitely. Christ dies no more, but the fact of His cross henceforth affects all history'. It is reminiscent of our own paraphrase: 'And, oft the sacred rite renew, that brings my wondrous love to view'. Finally, 'In no system of metaphysics, and in no system of ethics, is the essence of Christianity directly discoverable, but in that temporal unfolding of a sacred action, i.e., the liturgy, and above all the paschal liturgy. Here, if nowhere else, is Jesus opposed to all teachers of ethics, to all contrivers of metaphysical systems. His mission has not been simply to acquaint us with certain truths about God, the world, and ourselves, although he has effectively revealed to us more of those truths than any sage, or scholar, or moralist. He has come to transform us and the world by a divine action that no created intelligence could have foreseen or even conceived. Since the death of Socrates men may be more enlightened about reality than they were before; but since the death of Jesus, reality itself is wholly transfigured'.

I have quoted at some length; enough, I hope, to indicate that this book deserves both study and possession.

William D. Maxwell

Basic Economic Problems. A Christian Approach. By John F. Sleeman. S.C.M. Press. 10s 6d. net.

This is the kind of book which many people have been longing to find. Its author is a professional economist and he is also a lay theologian, one of that select company who can see the theological implications of their own particular interest. Moreover, he has a pleasant style of writing and from time to time he concentrates his wisdom in memorable sentences, e.g. 'We must recognise that there can be a vocation of acceptance as well as of choice'. 'Though ultimately it is human selfishness which produces perverse institutions, yet at the same time perverse institutions can make men more perverse. Therefore it is important, and worth while, to be concerned with the forms of the economic order, as well as with its motives'.

The author takes as his starting point the Christian doctrine of God as the Source and Sovereign of all life, and he goes on to insist that economic activity is an essential part of human life and has a positive place in God's purpose. It is not simply a regrettable necessity, but a means whereby He may be glorified. This needs to be qualified, however, by an equal insistence that the economic order is in need of redemption. Hence, after chapters on the purpose of the economic order and the criteria of an economic order which

fulfils God's purpose, the author turns to the economic order as we know it—an order of free enterprise modified by planning, i.e. the formulation of definite and conscious aims towards which the whole economy is directed, and the adoption by the State of deliberate measures of economic policy towards these ends. Mr Sleeman holds that 'the Christian doctrine of redemption in Christ can provide the inspiration for a social philosophy which makes both free enterprise and planning meaningful, and also acts as a check on their abuse'. In working out, in thought and action, what are the implications of the redeemed life in terms of economic witness, Christians must avoid the temptation to identify any particular social or economic order with the Kingdom of God. All that they can do is to apply Christian insights, in terms suitable to the needs of a particular epoch, to the outward forms of the economic and social organisation and to the aims which should inspire these.

The only serious criticism which one can make of this book is that, while the Christian approach is excellent, the economic problems in view are not sufficiently basic. The book, in fact, belies its title, inasmuch as it fails to deal adequately with two basic problems of our day, agriculture and finance.

While Mr Sleeman refers several times to the exploiting type of agriculture which results in soil erosion and dust bowls, he seems to take it as almost a matter of course, not recognising that this is perhaps the most serious problem facing human society today. Moreover, the spiritual basis of it is ignored. Exploiting agriculture is only one symptom of that determination to 'conquer Nature' which has been one of the outstanding characteristics of modern man, and that determination, in turn, is only one symptom of that arrogance of man which refuses to admit dependence, even on God. Man needs to learn to look on Nature, not as a mass of stuff to be conquered, but as, like himself, a part of God's creation with ways of its own which must be respected.

Again, while Mr Sleeman does on occasion mention the creation of credits, yet the reader of his section on saving and investment will get the impression that the industrial entrepreneur puts into production what has been provided by individuals who make savings out of their incomes. He almost ignores the fact that much of the money required for new production is credit, or cheque money, newly created by a process which was authoritatively expounded in the Report of the Macmillan Committee. Failure to stress this results in a corresponding failure in the section where the author deals with criticism of the money system. He deals with the cruder assailants of that system, but fails to mention the more fundamental charge that new money required by an expanding economy comes

into existence as a debt to the banks. Apart from the faults in the working of the money system which may be traceable to this, it seems unjust that the private citizen, who practised abstinence and bought War Loan out of savings from his income, should find himself on the same footing, as regards present interest and future repayment, as a financial corporation which practised no abstinence but lent credit which it had created by an almost costless process.

These are problems which seem far more truly basic than the problem of Planning or Free Enterprise which the author discusses with wise discrimination and Christian insight. Nevertheless, the serious reader will find this book—remarkably inexpensive for its size and worth—a pleasure to read, and we trust that many will avail themselves of the opportunity and learn how to make their economic actions more responsible.

S. Mechie

THE UNITY OF THE BIBLE

by The Rev. Professor G. ERNEST WRIGHT

The question of the unity of the Bible's message is one that will never be satisfactorily solved, though it is one which every generation of Christians must seek to solve. We are continually impelled to search for the answer because the unity of the Church's message to the world is at stake.

1. The Problem

Inasmuch as the Bible describes the proclamation and the events which resulted in the establishment of the Church or 'people of God', it is a necessity placed upon us always to look back to the conditions of our origin as we face our present and future. Inasmuch also as the Bible is believed to be revelation of the truth about God and ourselves, a truth not discoverable in general or natural revelation in the world, we must, therefore, study, recall, participate by memory and identification, in the original events in order to hear God's Word, as we look forward in expectation to the future (cf. Barth's *Erwartung* and *Erinnerung* in which he sees the Bible's unity).

Our Christian mentality has certain marks in common with the American mind which seeks to face the present and future by 'getting right' with the Constitution, the Founding Fathers, and Abraham Lincoln. This means that we *expect* our study of the Bible to be theologically fruitful and meaningful, though our danger is always that we reconstruct our biblical heritage to suit present inclination, just as the American politician makes the Constitution, Jefferson and Lincoln mean what he wants them to mean. This is an aspect of human mentality as a whole, for man as man because he possesses memory has a persistent tendency to 'mythologise' his past (cf. Lovejoy and Boaz, *A Documentary History of Primitivism*).

On the other hand, the historical criticism of the Bible, as developed particularly by Protestant scholarship, has been carried on in an atmosphere of respect for objectivity in the search

for truth. No matter what the Church wants of the Bible theologically, if the sacred literature possesses no objectively discoverable unity, then it is assumed that we must confess it openly no matter what the consequences are for the Church's proclamation. During the last century it is an obvious fact that biblical study has both discovered and emphasised the great variety in the Bible's contents to such an extent that the book has become an embarrassment to the Church's theology. As a result, many have sought and are seeking to base their theology on some more solid ground than an ancient historical literature which appears to contain little unity of ideas. The Bible is still used in this type of theology, but only for its illustrative and inspirational values.

Our problem before the Bible is thus the combination of two disparate mentalities: the one which insists that biblical study be theologically interesting and meaningful, and the other which insists that what is discovered in the Bible must be based on what its writers actually intended to say. The tendency of most of the 'younger' schools of biblical scholarship today is to insist that these two must and *can* be held together.

2. Ways of Representing the Unity

Limitation of space and lack of knowledge prevent a discussion of the history of our topic as it should be presented. A good historical survey of it, as far as I am aware, has yet to be written. In one sense the history of doctrine is precisely the history of attempts so to conceive of the Bible's message and unity as to give an answer and a corrective to the church's contemporary need and proclamation.

A. All of us are generally agreed today that while *prophecy and fulfilment* is an important biblical theme, it is not in itself a sufficient clue to the unity of the whole Bible. Furthermore, it is agreed that the conception of prediction and fulfilment as found to some extent even in the Gospel of Matthew can be and has been used so mechanically as to be both theologically uninteresting and offensive to scholarship.

B. Similarly the method of picking and choosing what one likes from the Bible's contents, while the rest is spiritualised or allegorised, is scarcely an adequate methodology. Allegory may be and has been used reasonably and responsibly. It is some-

times quite apt, and sometimes the opposite. In the Church's homiletics it is common practice, even when exegetical theory does not permit it. Where it is theoretically permissible, as in the Catholic tradition, scholarship rarely resorts to it. Spiritualisation of offensive or 'dry' portions of the text may be theologically meaningful, but it is objectionable to scholarship, and the suspicion is always present that the interpreter is discovering only his own theology or that of a particular confession.

C. The New Testament prevents us from discovering the key to Scriptural unity in Law, as a Jew would do. Nevertheless, it has been common practice to interpret the unity in terms of *Law and Gospel.* For Lutheranism one has the impression that Romans 7 and 8 provide the centre of the Bible and the summary of its central contents. For Protestant orthodoxy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Old Testament presented the Law of God, which is His inescapable demand upon us and which leads us to despair before our sin and violation of the Law. But in this despair the New Testament presents the grace of God for salvation to us sinners. The resemblance between the moral law and the ethical insights of paganism has been accounted for traditionally by the assumption that the Law is a gracious republication of natural law, necessary because in paganism God's moral will has been obscured by sin (John T. McNeill, 'Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers', *Journal of Religion*, 26 [1946], pp. 168ff).

Such an interpretation of the Bible's central contents is indeed theologically meaningful, but from the standpoint of scholarship it does violence to the record because it is such a vast oversimplification of the historical situation. I am told that the Reformers differed from both Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy at this point in that they correctly saw that there is Law in both Testaments and that in both it is *preceded* by grace. The primary point about the Law in the Bible is not that it is a republication in clear form of an obscured natural law, but rather that it is a 'revealed order' given to a new community *already* saved and formed by grace.

Recent study of Israelite law in comparison with other ancient law codes (see particularly G. E. Mendenhall, 'Ancient Israelite and Oriental Law', *The Biblical Archaeologist*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, May 1954) indicates that the original Israelite covenant was an

order of freedom, which the prophets struggled to revive, and which the New Testament recovered. God's will was given in apodictic absolutes ('Thou shalt . . . '), but the society was given freedom and responsibility to govern itself within the framework of these absolutes. Many of them are cast in negative form, and this has often been criticised; but, as Mendenhall has properly pointed out, the negative is the only truly universal type of law. A prohibition forbids action in one area, while leaving all other areas free. A positive law limits all action to the one area prescribed, thus preventing freedom of decision and action, unless the law is so general that it provides nothing more than the framework for decision.

On the other hand, the various Israelite 'codes' of law were not compiled originally as constitutional law in the modern sense, any more than were the contemporary and earlier codes of the pagan world. There was at that time neither the vocabulary nor the mentality which would permit or compel the judge to decide a case on the basis of the 'constitution'. There is no extant example of a judge rendering a decision by reference to the Hammurabi Code in Mesopotamia, though there are many examples of decisions contrary to provisions in that code. 'Law' meant 'teaching, instruction', and the Codes were prepared at various times and occasions as *descriptions of legal practice* in particular areas, but no judge felt any compulsion to be bound by them. The Judaism which arose in the post-Exilic period was a comparatively new phenomenon in that it made the old casuistic law into constitutional law, and freedom of decision and action was limited by the host of positive commands. We can only guess at the background which made this 'new thing' possible. Among the items that could be mentioned would be certain tendencies already observable in monarchial Israel and the possible influence of the conception of law among the Persians with its emphasis upon the rigid nature of royal decree.

The New Testament, of course, has no patience whatever with the compulsory nature of casuistic law. It aligns itself with the pre-Exilic prophets in the attempt to revive the charismatic society envisaged in ideal in the original Israelite covenant. Law and gospel is indeed an important biblical theme, but Romans 7 and 8 are not so much a summary of the Bible as an apologetic against Judaism.

D. Among the many other ways employed to present the unity of the Bible, I shall mention finally only the idea of historical development. In this view the Bible has no unity other than that of an evolving process with its progressive discovery of deeper 'truths' and ideals. Such a conception is theologically rather barren because it is scarcely the Christian religion, and no living faith can be founded on a series of evolving ideas. Furthermore, most of the 'younger' school of biblical scholars now believe that considerably more development was discovered by misrepresentation and over-simplification of the historical situation than the facts now warrant. We are all greatly indebted to Wellhausen, his predecessors and successors, for example, but our present knowledge of the history of the ancient world does not permit us to accept his reconstruction of the religious history of Israel. That an evolution of ideas took place is certainly true; but it is scarcely the clue to the Bible's unity because it took place within a 'cultural' or 'conceptual' framework which differentiated the biblical 'people of God' from other social groups.

3. Present Tendency in Biblical Theology

Present tendency in biblical theology is to see the unity of the Bible in God rather than in man, in the divine activity in governing the world which is directed toward the removal of the world's alienation by acts of grace and judgment, rather than in man's ideas or spiritual insights or historical evolution. The acts of God in history are described by means of a great variety of symbols, but the primary and irreducible symbol is that of the *King in warfare* to make of the world His Kingdom, 'The Lord of Hosts' in conflict with the 'nations' or with the 'principalities and powers'; or of the *King as Judge* issuing His judgments from His heavenly assize; or of the *King as Lord, Shepherd and Father* of the new community which He has brought into being and with which He struggles as with His steward or agent. 'Lord', 'judge', 'warrior', 'shepherd', and 'father' are all epithets of kingship in biblical times which depict the functions of the ruler. Of course, God is not a king or *melek* among other kings or *melakim*. Like the great emperors of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Khatti (the Hittite Empire), He is a suzerain who claims sovereignty over the *melakim*; He is the Great King

or the Lord of lords. No other powers are on His level; He has authority over all. Biblical monotheism, however it is defined, must be conceived within the framework of this symbol, and the activity involved or implied in it is the basic subject matter of biblical theology.

Human insight, ideas and ideals are, of course, involved in biblical symbolism. Yet what is meant by such a statement as that of Isa. 45.14: people will say 'Only in you is God; and there is no other' (Hebrew)? In the past, the scholar has been inclined to think of this as one of the first clear statements of monotheism. From that point he might continue by explaining that the peculiar and unique thing about Israel was its idea of God, its special form of God-man relationship, its special religious experience, etc.—thus fixing the conception of the indwelling God almost exclusively on the side of the spiritual in the framework of an evolving set of ideas. Yet in the context the passage is speaking about the humbling and the conversion of the proud heathen, and about the wealth which shall one day flow to Jerusalem—all as part of the redemptive warfare of the divine King. It is difficult to confine this to the realm of religious or spiritual experience. The wonder of the biblical God lies in His gracious presence with His people as Lord, in the revelation of His will, in the promises and gifts of the good things of salvation. These good things include the spiritual gifts, but they also include all things which make for the abundant life and social well-being (*shalom*) of man in society and of society in the earth. This realism excludes a merely pious and spiritualising vocabulary.

The 'biblical mind', trained as it was in the interpretation of all historical experience in terms of the active sovereignty of God, was, of course, uninterested in the unity of ideas. An interpreted history was proclaimed in place of an abstract creed, and in its light inferences were constantly made and fresh interpretations constantly applied to new historical situations. Hence we have to speak, not so much of stability and static uniformity, as of variability and vitality. Israel's *thought-world*, for example, was always secondary to the events encountered along the way and to the saving goods held before her. It must thus be affirmed that Israel did not possess a fixed understanding of the historical gifts with which she was concerned. There was more

of a process of reinterpretation in the light of new events, never a completion but a new struggle with the meaning of past promise. Because God was Lord, each fact and event had a promise and a future implied in it; each held a preview of a saving event which one day would be complete. Thus all is in movement, affairs go on, and from them arises fulfilment or the promise of yet greater things to come. Hence nothing bears the final sense in itself but is the 'earnest' of yet greater wonders (so Gerhard von Rad, 'Typologische Auslegung des A.T.', *Evangelische Theologie*, 1952, Heft 1/2, pp. 17-33).

Now the modern student of God's acts may not necessarily be of interest *theologically*. He may simply depict an idea that he has and simplify the material to make it fit, as we all are inclined to do in handling historical materials. He becomes interesting and meaningful to the Church as he is conditioned by the Bible's unspeculative and experiential attitude, so that he is led himself to participate in historical events and to become involved in their contradictions. He does so in full knowledge that they are meaningful, though the meaning requires a searching struggle, uncertainty and the possibility of error.

Something of this sort is the biblical attitude. Or theologically, one may say that in the Bible history is actualised by God's Spirit and Word, and to read the Old Testament in the light of the New is to be caught up in it.

If so, then the unity of the Bible becomes as static and secondary a question as is the question of the Bible's inerrancy. Theological conversion by the Bible means to be found by God's Word and Spirit in the Bible; it is to know 'God's act upon us as God's objects' (Haroutunian). If pressed, we might say that the unity of the Bible is a by-product of this knowledge. The Spirit works by the insufficiency of men, and God's acts were not infrequently misinterpreted in the Bible itself. Perhaps the central question thrust before us is whether we believe in the Holy Spirit, not whether the Bible possesses an objective unity. If pressed further, we might say that the unity of the Bible is in God and is therefore *eschatological*. We believe the unity is there because we know that God knew what He was doing. Yet we are not entirely clear about it, and we must search, argue, correct and recorrect our viewpoints. Our embarrassment before the Bible is simply one aspect of our embarrassment before

the biblical God —at least there is a definite continuity between the two (Haroutunian again). The God who presents himself in history does so, not by convenient sets of ideas or packages of the spiritual, which we can neatly grasp and tie up into a convenient bundle. He is known, and yet unknown. He reveals Himself and we confess our knowledge by the acknowledgment that we are creatures and by action in our own history. Thus we are found of God, and yet we must search for Him.

4. The Biblical 'Structure' of Faith

Yet we cannot stop at this point because there is more to the Bible than confrontation with God with a resulting existential attitude. My difficulty with Bultmann at this point lies in my understanding of the manner in which knowledge-which-leads-to-action (and this is biblical 'knowledge') is communicated to the human mind. This knowledge comes to us through symbolic forms or structures. These structures are so integral to the knowledge itself that to take away their 'mythological' or symbolical nature is to drain them of all meaning which would convert and reorient my whole personality. The structures do not simply furnish me with new ideas, but also provide *channels* into which the energies, created by both the mental and affective aspects of my total nature, are directed and in which they find worthy expression. I can think of no religion or pseudo-religion which does not have such a meaningful form or structure. To demythologise it is to take away its very being, because the process of demything begins with the structure. In this life we are confronted as we search for meaning, not with the choice of symbolic or of non-symbolic forms, but with a choice between rival symbolic structures. And it is a peculiar fact of life that those who accomplish most are precisely those who are so committed to one structure that they are no longer critical or even aware of its symbolic nature. We are saved from more bigotry than we have in this world only by creaturely feeling, gregarious natures and brotherly love, on the one hand, and by the self-conscious criticism of a small band of intellectuals on the other—both of which may be interpreted as aspects of God's present activity.

The fervour which we see in the Bible and which to some seems almost bigotry is scarcely to be criticised as an uncritical

acceptance of a mythology, when we who make the criticism and are also committed, though it may be to some other symbolic structure which does not appear to us as 'mythical'. The very fact that there is such fervour, however, suggests that the Bible does indeed have within it a form or 'system' of meaning to which a particular society was committed. And it is this form which constitutes the primary clue to the Bible's unity.

The Church has always been aware of this fact, however dimly at times, because it has never lost the sense of its origin or the meaning of its liturgy. The chief tools which have aided modern scholarship in recovering a sense of the biblical structure have been 'form-criticism' or the history of traditions, and comparative religion. An exclusive emphasis on biblical variety has always been embarrassing because biblical faith is simply not identical with the Greek, Canaanite, Egyptian or Mesopotanian religions, and one who faces the fact is forced to explain why. The Wellhausenist assumption was that all had a common background in a second or third millennium animism, but that biblical religion, after its development from that animism in Patriarchal times through the pre-prophetic polytheism, had arrived at a higher stage than its contemporaries. This view is no longer tenable because of the wealth of data we now have regarding the extremely advanced and sophisticated nature of Near Eastern cultures in the Bronze Age. It is now increasingly affirmed both by the biblical scholar and the specialist in the theology of polytheism that biblical monotheism and polytheism are simply two different religions and the former by no empirical means can be shown to be an evolution from the latter.

On the other hand, the various schools in the history of biblical traditions ('form-criticism') have increasingly come to the opinion that the last century's literary criticism is incapable of solving historical problems. The final fixing of a tradition in written form means nothing regarding its age. In biblical times oral tradition was the primary form of transmission, even after the traditions were fixed in writing. Indeed, it can be argued that the invention of writing and its increasing use for literary, as distinct from commercial, purposes was a retrogression in that the faculties of imagination and memory have been increasingly diminished and stereotyped. Biblical literature in

all its forms betrays its close relation to a rich oral tradition, one which makes many of the presumptions of the literary critics no longer valid.

Yet a living oral tradition presupposes a living community which is formed and conditioned by the tradition, while at the same time it is its bearer. The central element in the biblical tradition was the *kerygma* which proclaimed the mighty acts of God that brought the community into being and that bound it to him with ties of gratitude, devotion, loyalty, trust and obligation.

The work of various New Testament scholars, and particularly that of C. H. Dodd in his *Apostolic Preaching and its Development*, is well known. Dodd's thesis is that the Gospels and Epistles all presuppose the Jerusalem *kerygma* and that the elements composing the latter can be discerned in the fragments we have of the earliest Christian preaching. What perhaps is not so well known is that the Apostolic preaching made use of the Old Testament with a sure instinct, referring particularly to the great events from Abraham through the Conquest to David as the setting, the explanation and the promise of God's new work in Christ. Recent work in the Old Testament, particularly by Gerhard von Rad, has stressed the kerygmatic element as constituting the core or theme which binds the literature together. The present Hexateuch represents the elaboration and the heaping up of traditions around the simple kerygmatic theme, the chief premonarchial elements of which can be discerned in old confessions. The historians, the prophets and the psalmists all presuppose this theme; it describes God's choice and guidance of the Fathers, his deliverance from slavery, his formation of the nation at Sinai, and his gift of an 'inheritance' or 'rest'. The literature is saturated with it, and without it there would have been no literature. The recital of such an interpreted history was both a creedal confession which identified God and what he had done and a means of sustaining and renewing community in common worship.

Yet what was the form or structure which controlled the conception of community? It was certainly believed in both Testaments to be a new thing in the earth. Here was a people saved and formed by the direct action of One who to outsiders was the Unknown God. The form in which peoplehood was

conceived was described by a great variety of language, but probably the single most inclusive term was 'covenant', as the Greek Bible correctly saw in labelling the two Testaments, 'The Old and New Covenants'. If so, then much of the primary religious vocabulary would be drawn from the realm of law and legal practice—and this is precisely what happened. (Parenthetically, one might ask whether the loss of any direct relation between our theological vocabulary and community legal practice has anything to do with the weakening of the conception of the Church as a social organism.)

In our situation, however, the word 'covenant' has little warmth of meaning. For its background Old Testament scholars have usually turned to the nomadic covenants of modern bedouin society, particularly as described on the pages of Pedersen's *Israel I-II*. It is certainly true that nomadic and biblical people lived in a social milieu in which covenants governed all of life. Yet while nomadic covenants are well illustrated in the Bible, by the treaty between Jacob and Laban in Gen. 31, for example, they do little to interpret the covenant between Yahweh and Israel because the latter appears to be based on a political anthropomorphism of a king and his subjects. The actual legal background of Israel's covenant has been discovered only recently by George E. Mendenhall through his intensive study of ancient law. We have not the space to go into details here, and I can only refer to his article in *The Biblical Archaeologist*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (Sept. 1954). The precise parallel exists only in the international suzerainty treaties of the second millennium B.C. between an emperor or suzerain (a king of kings) and a vassal. In these treaties the suzerain speaks throughout in the first person, offering the treaty to the vassal. He identifies himself and then describes his benevolent actions toward the vassal, the purpose of which is to secure the vassal's loyalty in terms of affection and trust (cf. the preamble to the Decalogue: 'I am Yahweh thy God who brought thee out of the land of Egypt . . . '). In describing the obligations of the covenant one constant element is a prohibition against relations with any foreign powers; foreign affairs remained in the control of the suzerain (cf. the first commandment: 'Thou shalt have no other gods before me'—i.e. no attention or obedience is to be accorded to other powers). Within the framework of the gen-

eral stipulations the vassal is free to order and direct his own affairs, except that the treaty is to be housed in his sanctuary, read publicly at stated intervals, and renewed with a new generation (precisely what happened in Israel).

The point I would make about the covenant, then, is that it did contain a definite social form and a conception of government. On the one hand, all was personal and the emphasis was on grace and loyalty, which in turn define what is meant by faith and knowledge in the Bible. On the other hand, God is known as the Suzerain who rules and judges. Before the monarchy, as the Albrecht Alt school of Old Testament scholarship in Germany has clearly demonstrated, the people's organisation was that of an association of tribes in sacred compact around a central sanctuary. God ruled directly by charismatic leaders, called and empowered by the Spirit for a specific task. The monarchy instituted drastic changes in conception. Dynastic succession was introduced and this was given theological form by a revival of the Patriarchal type of covenant. In the latter divine promise was not so directly linked with the people's vow of loyalty. All was grace, and the tendency was to interpret God as more of a *melek*, or national deity, than as suzerain. Yet the direct rule of God by the charismatic continued in the office of prophecy, which came into being and reached its height under the monarchy, but quickly diminished in power after the downfall of the state. The prophetic effort was directed toward a revival of the original covenant with its conceptions of grace, loyalty, law and the charismatic rule of God.

The doctrine of the Spirit in the Bible is thus conceived, not in the terms of spiritual experience, but in terms of government, of the rule of God. The Mosaic covenant was the revealed order of society which the future would see established according to the original divine intention. The chief clue to the unity of the New Testament and to its relation to the Old now becomes clear. Rejecting Judaism's interpretation of Mosaism, the New Testament aligns itself with the prophetic conception of law and the relation of God with his people. The new and redeemed society planned of old has now been fulfilled. Government and social order are personal and centred in the charismatic rule of God through Christ. God remains the Suzerain

but He has established Christ as His active *melek* and Head of the community He has redeemed. We now live in loving obedience 'in Christ' while we wait in trust and in hope for the present contradictions between the old and the new to be resolved in the Kingdom, in the new heavens and the new earth.

These lines are shortened and much is omitted.[1] Their purpose is simply to suggest that there is indeed a certain structure or form in the Bible which is the basis of its unity. This form is more than a series of ideas about God and man. It involves a symbolic interpretation of the nature of God in relation to the world and particularly to His special community, the Church. It involves, also, an interpretation of the individual and social life of that community and it provides the channel through which commitment expresses itself in faith, love and hope.

5. Some Conclusions

The preceding paragraphs in Sections III and IV still do not depict that unitary scheme which would fit all elements of biblical literature within it. The chief books which continually defy every attempt to depict unity are the books of Wisdom and the Song of Songs. No scheme, not even that of historical development, can easily account for them. The Wisdom teachers in Israel were one wing of an international movement of great age which was concerned with prudential ethics as character education. Like moral teaching in every generation it could flourish in practically any theological environment when a few shifts in terminology were made. Yet the close relation of Israel's Wisdom to its polytheistic source is to be noted in the fact that its individualistic teachings lack almost completely the great themes described in Section IV of this paper. There is no 'doctrine' of society in the sense of the elect community and no God of history. The emphasis on the individual meant that the grace and judgment of God were interpreted prudentially as providing rewards and punishments for each individual act in this life. It is small wonder, then, that within Israel's theological setting such views would encounter opposition and theological debate. The Books of Job and Ecclesiastes were

[1] If I were to elaborate them, it would be along the lines I presented with the aid of a Chicago group in *The Biblical Doctrine of Man in Society* (Ecumenical Studies No. 2, published for the Study Department of the World Council of Churches by the SCM Press, London, 1954), especially Chap. III.

written by those who were sceptical, though in very different ways, of the whole basis of Wisdom teaching. Yet once the proverbial type of emphasis had been acclimated in the faith through the identification of Wisdom with Word and Law, it occasioned no further difficulty. Proverbs was accepted in the canon, and the authors of Job and Ecclesiastes failed to perpetuate schools of thought.

Hence within the unitary framework of the Bible, a great amount of variety and vitality must be allowed. A dynamic, rather than static, relationship with the environment existed, and there was continuous theological struggle. Yet the New Testament shows us God's intention and enables us to fix our attention on the central themes and movement of the whole.

If one were to summarise some of these themes, he would certainly mention first the active Lord and Ruler, the knowledge of whom is to be found in history and historical revelation. His work in history is dominantly mediate, i.e. by His Spirit and Word through called individuals and through the new community which He has redeemed. The 'doctrine' of society threw great weight on human responsibility and vocation, on love, loyalty, trust and obedience. The gracious activity of God toward the community further meant a conception of the dignity and worth of man who was accorded the responsibility of being king of creation. Yet at the same time his dignity existed only in so far as he was loyal to his Lord. Sin became more than an aberration; it was betrayal of trust, disobedience, rebellion, lack of gratitude and love. It was taken so seriously as a violation of commitment and revealed order that the active Lord was expected to take action against it. This gave a clue to the meaning of earth's crises and horror. It meant that God's action in relation to sin involved blood, struggle, and suffering, whether in the historical or in the sacramental scene. And the grace of God was understood the more vividly precisely because it was God's glory entering this horrible scene as salvation. Regardless, then, of the bleakness of the immediate future God Himself was the hope for the fulfilment of his promises. Meanwhile obedience by faith (trust and loyalty) is still required of us, even though we are forced to enter the bloody arena.

That Christ is the fulfilment of these various themes, and of

others unmentioned, means that the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement are of some complexity and defy simple unitary statements. Life and history are too complicated to be fulfilled in one sentence. There is one aspect of the incarnation, however, that must be mentioned before this paper is concluded. While every fulfilment which God accomplishes in the historical scene is both promised and continuous in and with previous events, it is always at the same time discontinuous with them. This is particularly true of Christ, the New Covenant and the new people. Yet if one popular conception of the incarnation is believed, then as far as I can see there can be no continuity and no unity of the Bible. I was reminded of this fact during the past summer while listening to a Roman Catholic sermon in a small New Hampshire village, a sermon which recalled many conversations which I had had with Protestant students on the subject of the incarnation. The popular idea of the relation of God to Jesus Christ is that in some mysterious way a portion of God's *being* was united with the physical being of Jesus to produce a special God-man. What was seen on the Cross was to the outward eye simply a physical body, though to the eye which possessed the 'truth' God Himself was to be seen hanging there. The Roman Catholic sermon drew the obvious parallel to the transubstantiation of the elements of the Eucharist—which outwardly have the form of bread and wine but which actually are the body and blood of Christ. And indeed the classic definition of the Trinity as three persons but one substance lends itself naturally to such a view.

Yet as is frequently observed today such an interpretation of the incarnation is most difficult to harmonise with biblical ways of thinking. If it is accepted, I can see little but rather formal strands of unity in the Bible, whereas in the climax of the whole there is *basic* discontinuity. To me the very term 'incarnation' is a bad one, and it is certainly unbiblical. God is active and works by His Spirit, but He does not fuse *Himself* in some mysterious way with human flesh. The conceptions of being and substance, in other words of ontology, are no clues to the biblical proclamation or symbolic structure. The Person of Christ instead must be depicted in terms of the divine activity and of the human response

thereto. The combination of God's planned and purposive act with Christ's complete love and obedience in life and in death produced the 'Servant of the Lord', 'the Son of God', 'the Paschal Lamb', and the victorious, risen 'King', stationed 'on the right hand of God'. I myself cannot see why such language and conception fail to do complete justice to the Person of Christ. To me they provide a Christology which is theologically adequate and significant for the modern church. If they are not adequate, then I can see no grounds even for an eschatological hope in the unity of the Bible.

THE IMPASSIBILITY OF GOD

by The Rev. T. E. POLLARD

'It becomes theologians to be cautious in accepting the gifts of the Greeks.'[1] It is the conviction of the present writer that Christian theology as a whole, and the doctrine of God in particular, have suffered because of the lack of caution which theologians in every age have shown in their too ready acceptance of the gifts which the Greeks have brought. Of no age is this more true than of that which witnessed the formalisation and systematisation of the Christian doctrine of the Godhead, namely, the second, third and fourth Christian centuries, during which 'theologising' was for the most part in the hands of men who had been trained in the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic world, and who refused to do intellectually what Justin Martyr had refused to do literally, refused, that is, to doff the academic dress of the philosopher. But it is still true that philosophical theologians today, in their desire to interpret the Christian faith in modern philosophical terms, tend to be too ready to accept as gifts the presuppositions of some modern philosophical school, and in doing so to give away much that is vital to the faith which they are seeking to interpret.

We must admit that the philosophical gifts of the Greeks did not remain unchanged when they were brought into contact with religious ideas which had come from a completely different thought-world; but at the same time, those religious ideas which had sprung out of the Semitic soil of Palestine were so radically transformed by their contact with the philosophy of the Greeks that they became almost unrecognisable. In the conflict which inevitably resulted when the two thought-worlds met the Greeks had the advantage, for their views of God and man and the world were worked out metaphysically and logically, while those of the Hebrews, as reflected in both the OT and NT, were not metaphysical

[1] F. H. Brabant, in *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation* (ed. A. E. J. Rawlinson).

or logical, but religious through and through, and when it comes to speculative argument the metaphysician has it over the man of faith.

The rise, in our generation, of an intensive inquiry into the thought-forms of the Semitic world is an attempt on the part of theologians to rediscover the real nature of the roots from which the Christian faith has sprung, and it is significant that this inquiry should be contemporaneous with the development of a new understanding of personality, an understanding which is, to a large degree, an unconscious return to the concept of personality which is the distinctive feature of Hebrew thought about God and man and about the relationship between them. It is significant, too, that it has been a Jew, Martin Buber, who has led the attempt to discover anew the meaning of personality and personal relationships as they exist between man and man, and between man and God.[1] Of course, the theologians of the early Christian centuries had to use current thought-forms in order to reach the minds and hearts of their hearers, but they allowed the thought-forms of Greek philosophy so to dominate their theological thinking, that much that was distinctive in Christianity was either lost or falsely expressed, and alien elements which they imported into Christian thought have cursed theological thought ever since their time.

Nowhere is this bad influence of Greek philosophical presuppositions on Christian thinking about God more clearly to be seen than in what are commonly known as the traditional attributes of God, and in particular in the attribute of *impassibility*. Brought into the Christian tradition from Greek philosophy, it has brought with it far greater and more serious difficulties than those which it was originally designed to obviate.

It is becoming almost platitudinous, although it is none the less true for that and cannot be emphasised enough, that the God of the OT is the *Living God;* the Hebrews were not interested in speculating about the nature of God as He is in Himself, and their theology, if we must use that term, is an

[1] It is interesting to compare with Buber, Samuel Alexander, whose Jewish antipathy to the Greek cyclical view of history, and his instinct to look for a consummation, led him to think of even God as still awaiting finality. I am indebted to Professor E. P. Dickie for drawing my attention to this comparison.

account of what God has done in creating, saving and sanctifying mankind. To quote the title and sub-title of a recent study by Professor G. E. Wright, God, to the Hebrews, is the 'God Who Acts' and Biblical Theology is the 'Recital' of the mighty acts of God in history 'for us men and our salvation'. If they described God in human terms, it was not because they took an anthropomorphic view of God, but because they took a theomorphic view of themselves. They knew God 'immediately' in a personal relationship, and they knew Him as a 'Person' in whose image and likeness they had been made. For them, and for the early Christians who had inherited the spiritual treasures of the Hebrews, God was the first fact of a living religious experience.

For the Greeks on the other hand God was the last term of a difficult philosophical inquiry; Plato admitted that 'to discover the maker and father of the universe, as well as his work, is difficult indeed; and when discovered, it is impossible to describe him to mankind at large'; to which the Hebrews would have replied that it is not we who discover God, but God who makes Himself known to us in His works, and His works are plain for all who have eyes to see. Plato, however, implied that even though it is difficult to discover God it is nevertheless possible; whereas the Hebrew question, 'Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?' implies the answer, 'Definitely not!'[1] When the Jews of the Diaspora were confronted with Greek philosophy, the process of accepting gifts from the Greeks began, and with it the process of accommodating Hebrew thought to that of the Greeks. The first step was taken by the translators of the LXX who translated God's word of self-revelation to Moses in Exodus 3.13 by ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν, thus bringing 'disastrous and far-reaching results upon the thinking of the diaspora Jews and so upon some sections of the Christian Church' (G. A. F. Knight, *A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity*, p. 7).

As well as this, nowhere in the LXX does a *Name* of God appear; the distinctive Hebrew name of God, Yahweh, is translated by κύριος. God in the LXX has no name; He only

[1] Job 11.7. Of this text, with its implied answer in the negative, A. N. Whitehead, I think, remarks that it is good Hebrew but bad Greek.

has titles. Thus the door was thrown wide open for the introduction of the perverse doctrine of the *Namelessness of God* which plays a prominent part in the theology of Philo Judaeus, and enters the stream of Christian theology through the writings of the Greek Apologists. Justin Martyr, for instance, writes, 'But to the Father of all, who is unbegotten, there is no name given . . . But these words, Father, and God, and Creator, and Lord, and Master, are not names, but appelations derived from His good deeds and functions' (Apology I.vi). The *Name* which, to the orthodox Jew of Philo's time, was too sacred to pronounce, has become, through the influence of Greek Philosophy and the Greek translation of the OT Scriptures, no name at all.

Parallel to this accommodation of Jewish thought to Greek philosophy is the fact that Philo passes very easily from the LXX translation of the Hebrew אהיה (Exodus 3.13) as ὁ ὤν to the neuter τὸ ὄν. The Living God of the Hebrew Scriptures has become the impersonal Absolute, the Real Existent, of the Greek philosophers, although this is only one strand in the tangled skein of Philo's theology. Once such an identification as this had been made, the process had begun of importing into theological thought, particularly in the East, more and more Greek ideas which were incompatible and irreconcilable with the religious ideas of the Old and New Testaments, and which do violence to the distinctive ideas which find their culmination in the Christian Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement.

Among the many Greek philosophical ideas imported into Christian theology, and into Alexandrian Jewish theology before it, is the idea of the *impassible* God (ἀπαθὴς θεός), and this idea furnishes us with a particularly striking illustration of the damage done by the assumption of alien philosophical presuppositions when they are applied to Christian theology. So alien is this idea, so foreign is it to Hebraic-Christian thought, that it makes nonsense of the revelation of God in the Old Testament, it makes the Incarnation no real Incarnation, and it reduces the sufferings and death of Christ to a purely human work. These three points will be taken up at a later stage, but first, it is interesting to see how the idea of divine impassibility is made use of by the Fathers of the Church.

The idea of impassibility appears in some of the earliest post-apostolic writings of the Church, and we shall see that it appears as a presupposition; it is a position which is assumed rather than argued for.[1] At the same time, it is asserted that God suffered in Christ. That is, we see, side by side, the Greek philosophical idea placed in paradoxical juxtaposition with the Apostolic faith that God was in Christ in His sufferings and death reconciling the world to Himself. As examples, let us consider what St. Ignatius and St. Irenaeus say on the subject. In his *Letter to the Romans* (6.3), the former says, 'Let me imitate the Passion of my God'; but in the *Letter to Polycarp* (3.2) he writes, 'Be on the alert for him who is above time, the Timeless, the Unseen, the One who became visible for our sakes, who was beyond touch and passion, yet who for our sakes became subject to suffering, and endured everything for us.' Again in the *Letter to the Ephesians* (7.2), 'There is only one physician—of flesh yet spiritual, born yet unbegotten, God incarnate, genuine life in the midst of death, sprung from Mary as well as God, first subject to suffering then beyond it—Jesus Christ our Lord.' Here the paradox is set forth unmistakably: God is impassible, yet in Christ He suffers. The same is true with Irenaeus, who writes, for example (*Against Heresies*, III, 16.6), 'He (i.e. Christ) took up man into Himself, the invisible becoming visible, the incomprehensible being made comprehensible, the impassible becoming capable of suffering, and the Word being made man, thus summing up all things in Himself.' For both these writers, the divine is essentially impassible, but, becoming incarnate in Jesus Christ, becomes capable of suffering and of human emotions and passions. No attempt is made to explain the paradox thus created by the introduction of the idea of impassibility, which nowhere appears in the NT, into the doctrine of the Incarnation. But the fact that the first Christological heresy which the Church had to face was one which tended to deny the reality of the humanity of the Incarnate Christ forced these early writers to assert the reality of the sufferings and death,

[1] I am indebted to the late Dr D. M. Baillie for this idea of the assumption of, rather than argument for, the divine impassibility in the Apostolic Fathers. It occurs in his lecture notes on the subject, which I have been privileged to read, and my thanks are due to his brother, Principal John Baillie for permission to use the idea here.

and of the human passions of the Saviour even though the impassibility of the divine was an unargued assumption in all their thinking.

The impassibility of the divine is asserted even more strongly, and now at the expense of the other side of the paradox, in Tertullian's conflict with Patripassian Monarchianism. In order to confound the heresy of Praxeas, who taught that the divine element in Christ was the Father, and that while the flesh suffered, the Father suffered *in sympathy* with the suffering of the flesh, Tertullian refused to admit the distinction between suffering (*passio*) and sympathy (*compassio*) and accused Praxeas of 'crucifying the Father' and 'putting the Paraclete to flight' (*Against Praxeas*, Ch. I). He says, 'The Father did not suffer with the Son. . . . If the Father is impassible, then He cannot suffer with another; if He can suffer with another, then He is passible. . . . But the Father is as unable to suffer with another as the Son is unable to suffer in virtue of His divinity' (*Against Praxeas*, ch. XXIX). Tertullian, then is the first to assert the impassibility of the divine in Christ; despite his opposition to philosophy, his unrecognised Stoic presupposition of ἀπάθεια rules his argument against the idea that God, even in Christ, suffered.

Clement of Alexandria is even more explicit, if that is possible, in His denial of the passibility of the divine in Christ. He says (*Stromateis*, VI. 9) that Christ was 'entirely incapable of suffering (ἀπαξαπλῶς ἀπαθὴς ἦν) and inaccessible to any emotion, whether of pleasure or pain.' The paradox has disappeared and the Greek idea of divine impassibility has conquered.

It is interesting to notice that although Origen starts from the Platonist idea of God as 'above and beyond all being' (*Against Celsus*, vi. 64), and passionless in that He is untouched by 'mental disturbance or unreason of any kind', He is, nevertheless, 'not impassible. He has the passion of Love' (*Homily on Ezekiel*, vi. 6, quoted by Charles Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 197). This idea, however, does not seem to have played much part in Origen's theology. Athanasius falls back towards the earlier view in that, retaining the idea of divine impassibility, he asserts that it is the human in Christ which suffers. 'In nature the Word Himself is

impassible, and yet because of the flesh which He put on, these things (i.e. all the wants and sufferings which belong to the flesh) are ascribed to Him, since they are proper to the flesh, and the body itself is proper to the Saviour' (*Against the Arians*, III. xxvi. 34), and he goes on to assert that the Impassible Word 'obliterates and destroys these affections so that men, their passions as if changed in the Impassible, henceforth become themselves also impassible'; and he equates 'passions' with 'sins'.

The movement back towards the paradox of God, the impassible One, suffering in Christ, which is discernible in Athanasius' assertion of the *communicatio idiomatum*, seems to go a step further in Gregory of Nazianzus, who asserts (*Theological Oration*, IV. 5) that 'by the sufferings of Him who could not suffer, we were taken up and saved'; and, if Professor E. R. Hardy's statement[1] is a correct interpretation, the full turn of the circle is fulfilled in some of the supporters of Chalcedon, who, he says, 'accepted the conclusion of some Monophysites that, in the sufferings of Christ, God himself suffered, in his flesh, with us and for us. So out of the tradition of Greek philosophical theology itself comes a repudiation of the philosophical assumption of the utterly impassible deity.' That is to say, it took Christian theology nearly four hundred years to work this one Greek philosophical idea out of its system. It was not to remain outside Christian theology, however, for it was brought back by the Scholastic theology, which, in place of the Platonist presuppositions of the Early Fathers, brought in Aristotelian presuppositions. Ever since, the doctrine of the impassibility of God has been a traditional part of Christian orthodox doctrine, it is only in the last fifty years that there has been a revolt against it, commenced, it would seem by Principal A. M. Fairbairn, and continued by Miss Lily Dougall, who asserts, 'If God suffers not, our Lord is no revelation of Him, nor is it possible to conceive the Creator as having the relation of Father to His creation, nor would it be possible for many of us to remain theists, for if the Creator be faithful to His creatures it must be true that in all their afflictions He is afflicted; if He is not

[1] In his introduction to the volume *Christology of the Later Fathers* (Library of Christian Classics, Vol. III).

faithful, He is not the Christian God' (*Voluntas Dei*, p. 259). Similarly, Emil Brunner, differentiating between the 'metaphysical' attribute of *immutability*, with which impassibility is usually connected, and the 'historical' attribute of *faithfulness*, brings us back to what we have asserted above about the distinction between the Greek philosophical *Absolute* and the Hebraic-Christian *Living God*. Eternal truths are *unchangeable;* an eternal Person is *faithful*.

To come to the points of criticism of the doctrine of divine impassibility mentioned above:

1. If we take seriously the idea that God cannot suffer or experience 'passions', we have either to re-write the Scriptures or treat them as a collection of books embodying primitive anthropomorphic conceptions of God; the Love and Wrath of God, His Mercy, His ardent desire that Israel should worship Him and Him alone, His Justice, and His serious concern for the welfare of His people are meaningless; and a Holiness which cannot react against human sin means nothing, for it removes God so far from the world that the fact of His existence has no relevance to the life of mankind, and no series of intermediaries would be able to bridge the gulf between God and man. G. L. Prestige (*God in Patristic Thought*, p. 8) says that the word 'impassible' expresses the moral transcendence of God, but he is here confusing 'impassible' with 'immutable' which, in some of the Patristic writings can be interpreted to mean 'faithfulness' in the OT sense of the latter term, that is as a moral and not a metaphysical attribute. Dr Prestige, in identifying 'impassible' with 'morally transcendent', does not take into account the fact that in the OT moral transcendence is a large element at least of what is meant by the Holiness of God, and no writer in the OT would deny that God reacts against the sin of mankind; in fact they are unanimous that God *does* react against sin, because He *is* Holy.

The implication of the OT is that God, who must always be conceived in personal terms, cannot be thought of otherwise than in terms of His knowing emotions which are prompted by the response or lack of response of mankind to His self-manifestation and Love. When the OT says that God is a personal God, it does not mean that He is as we are, but that He alone is truly personal, for we, created in His image and

likeness, have fallen from our true state of personal being; and because of the fact that the image of God in us is defaced or lost, we are less than personal.

Dr Prestige (op. cit. p. 9) says that Clement of Alexandria makes the position clear 'by a statement of a principle that is both acute and effective. He expressly denies mental variations to God, such as the emotions of joy or pity or grief (*Strom.*, V.11; 68.1-3); to ascribe such physical passions to the impassible God is inadmissible. On the other hand, deity cannot be described as it really is, but only as human beings, themselves fettered to the flesh, are capable of hearing; the prophets therefore adopted the language of anthropomorphism as a saving concession to the weakness of human understanding.' This reference to Clement gives a clue to the reason why the Greek theologians were so keen to emphasise the impassibility of God; the emotions of joy, grief, etc., belong to man as a fleshly being and not to man as a person. The argument of Clement might be put in logical form thus:

The flesh is the seat of the passions,
God has no flesh,
$\therefore$ God has no passions.

But the fact that man is a fleshly being does not necessarily mean that the flesh is the seat of his passions, nor does it mean that only fleshly beings are passible. The division of man into flesh, soul and spirit, is unbiblical; in biblical thought man (flesh + soul + spirit) is a living soul (Gen. 2.7) a unified being, a person. Faulty Greek psychology has led to faulty theology. The transposition of Hebrew thought into the categories of Greek psychology has resulted in the ascription to God of an attribute which runs counter to the witness of the OT (and the NT) that God is a personal God. The attempt to avoid using 'anthropomorphic' terms, that is, terms descriptive of human personality, in order to emphasise that God is more than personal in the sense in which we are personal, ends inevitably in the use of terms which are not supra-personal but sub-personal.

2. In the second place, when impassibility is ascribed to God, the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ is no real incarnation. If we ask which Person of the Trinity was incarnate, or

whether the whole Godhead was incarnate, we are faced with difficulties which can only be overcome if we avoid the attribute of impassibility. The attributes of God belong to the whole Godhead and not to any one Person of the Godhead in distinction from the other two. If we would keep to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and at the same time maintain the doctrine of impassibility, we must assert that the Triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is impassible, and that the impassible Son is incarnate in Jesus Christ. If we take the impassibility of the Son to its logical conclusion we end in gross Docetism in that we have to deny the reality of the emotions, desires, fatigue, hunger, and sufferings and death of the Incarnate Son. If, on the other hand, still maintaining the orthodox view of the Trinity, we assert that, while it is the Son who is incarnate, the whole Godhead is present in Him, then the assertion of the reality of the sufferings and passions of the Son, leads us to a form of Patripassianism.

Some of the Early Fathers[1] tried to overcome this dilemma by saying that the divine in Christ is impassible, but that the the human is passible; it was His human nature that suffered, not His divine nature. But can there be real incarnation of God in man in such circumstances as these? If, as we have asserted above, it is as a personality, and not as flesh, that man is passible, both in the sense of being capable of emotions and capable of suffering, then the view that Christ suffers in the flesh which He assumed, but, as God, is impassible, leads us not to a two-nature view of the Person of Christ, but to a two-person view, and the fourfold safeguard of the Chalcedonian formula is ignored—'inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably'. In any case, Athanasius' solution of the problem by the *communicatio idiomatum* is dangerously near to and easily leads on to the Apollinarianism of which Canon C. E. Raven accuses him.[2]

The witness of the NT is that it is Jesus Christ, who lived in Palestine, who talked, and walked, and hungered, and was thirsty, and suffered and died on the Cross, who is the Son of God; all that is said of Him there is said of Him not only as

[1] Tertullian, Athanasius, *inter alios*; the same attempted solution is found in Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, 1.8 [2] In *Apollinarianism.*

human but as divine, not only as Son of Man but also as Son of God. To say that the Son of God, as divine, is impassible is to assert that the divine in Christ was unaffected by the human; and therefore that there is no real Incarnation, or if there is an Incarnation, it is meaningless.

3. Finally, and this follows from the discussion of the Incarnation, if the doctrine of divine impassibiltiy is maintained, the Work of Christ is merely a human work, and His death on the Cross is the death of a man and not the death of the Son of God. Even if we disagree with St. Anselm's theory of the Atonement, we must agree with him that the death on the Cross achieves nothing for man, unless it be at one and the same time a *human* and a *divine* act. Our salvation is achieved by Jesus Christ because, on the Cross, He is doing something that man *should* do, but which only God *can* do. If then God is impassible, and the divine impassibility applies to the divine in Jesus Christ, Christ's death on the Cross is the death of a man and no more than that, and we have no salvation through Him.

These are some of the serious problems which the doctrine of divine impassibility raises. Ultimately it leads to the denial of the personality of God in favour of a vague Supreme Being. Before we leave the subject, however, we must notice one recent attempt to rehabilitate the doctrine of divine impassibility. Baron von Hügel,[1] strangely, builds his attempt at rehabilitation on the very distinction which Tertullian demolished in his controversy with Praxeas, the Patripassian, the distinction, that is, between *passio* and *compassio*. He asserts that God does not suffer in Christ, but has sympathy or compassion with men in Christ. He fails to see that, however we may interpret the word 'sympathy' or 'compassion', it must carry with it the idea of 'suffering with', and that if we can ascribe *compassio* to God there is no reason why we should not ascribe *passio* to Him as well. We have more sympathy however, with the motive which leads von Hügel to strive to maintain the idea of impassibility, namely, that God would not be God, and would be of little comfort to us in our sufferings, if He were not Himself perfect blessedness and pure joy, lifted above suffering and sorrow and death. None the

[1] *The Suffering of God*, in *Essays and Addresses*, Series II.

less, the transcendence of God, His perfect moral freedom, and His perfect blessedness and pure joy can be maintained, surely, in some way other than by holding to an idea which is contrary to the distinctive feature of the Hebraic-Christian view of the nature of God as one who, being perfect Person, meets us ever in a personal relationship; without denying the reality of the divine in the earthly life of Christ; and without making the work of Christ a human work which is powerless to achieve our salvation and reconcile us to God. All these truths, so vital to our Christian Faith, can be safeguarded adequately from within the Hebraic-Christian tradition, with its assertion that God, though far above all suffering and fickleness of emotion, has stooped low in Christ to participate in the sufferings and sorrows and disappointments of man, submitting to them as Victim, but rising from them as Victor over sin and suffering and death. God's pure joy and perfect blessedness are the joy and blessedness of the Victor over suffering and the Conqueror over death. What God did not participate in He could not conquer; what God in Christ did not assume He could not redeem.

The late Dr D. M. Baillie sums up what we have been maintaining here in a sentence which goes further than the lecture notes referred to in the footnote above. 'Perhaps', he writes, 'we can conserve both sides of the truth by saying, paradoxically, that while there is suffering (for human sin) in the life of God, it is eternally swallowed up in victory and blessedness, and that is how God "expiates" our sins as only God could do.'[1]

[1] *God Was in Christ*, p. 200.

THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE— 'A LIVE ISSUE'

by The Rev. C. G. W. NICHOLLS

I

The question of sacrifice in the Eucharist has been called by the Ways of Worship Commission of Faith and Order[1] a 'live issue', that is to say a question over which agreement is not right out of sight though considerable and even vehement controversy continues. At Lund, the section considering Ways of Worship reported that they had held a lively and rewarding discussion on the subject, and had been surprised by the degree of agreement revealed; on the other hand it must be admitted that neither the discussion nor the resulting agreement are very apparent from the relevant chapter of the Conference report. This article is an attempt to examine the present state of the question against a background of ecumenical discussion, and to suggest ways of conceiving the Eucharistic Sacrifice which might be more widely acceptable than those commonly put forward by 'catholics' in the past. Its sources, besides a necessarily incomplete study of some of the more influential modern contributions to the discussion, consist mainly in discussions amongst younger theologians and theological students in the ecumenical movement. Whilst this group is not so learned as its elders, and its discussions are seldom recorded in print, its contribution can be a valuable one, because it is most sensitive to the issues which are now live ones, and also because it frequently seems to clear away misunderstandings more effectively and reach greater agreement than more senior groups. The present writer has found such discussions profitable because they have forced him to clarify his own thinking, distinguishing between a doctrine itself and dearly loved but not indispensable formulations of it, and have seemed to bring agreement, at least between representatives

[1] *Ways of Worship* p. 34.

of some of the main traditions represented in the ecumenical movement, within measurable distance.

The importance of an agreement on the Eucharistic Sacrifice, if it could be reached, hardly needs emphasis, especially in its bearing on that 'catholic'-'protestant' cleavage, which if it is not the whole of the ecumenical problem is surely the most important theological issue to be resolved. All 'catholics' would agree that the Eucharist is central to the 'catholic' understanding of Christianity, and that the sacrificial understanding of the Eucharist is so essential to their faith that they could not give it up without ceasing to be 'catholics' altogether. On the other hand, 'catholics' are at present engaged in discussion amongst themselves as to how precisely the Eucharist is to be understood as a sacrifice. If they cannot give up the central core of the doctrine, they are anxious to find a more satisfactory statement of it than is available at present, and it is natural to look for this through ecumenical discussion as well as from solely 'catholic' sources. 'Protestants', on the other hand, although their forefathers emphatically rejected this doctrine in the form in which they met with it, are today being led by the organic development of their own theology and church life, as well as by ecumenical discussion, to re-examine the question, and to consider whether the objections of their forefathers are really valid against the doctrine as it is now presented to them. Signs of this development are to be seen in the work of the Ways of Worship Commission already referred to, and in positive attempts by 'protestants' to develop a doctrine of Eucharistic Sacrifice on the basis of elements which are central to their own theology. The most notable of these appears to be the long and systematic article called 'Eschatology and the Eucharist' contributed by Professor T. F. Torrance to *Intercommunion*, the volume of another commission of Faith and Order.

While some 'protestants' are so significantly beginning to domesticate this key 'catholic' doctrine in their own theology, a few 'catholics' are beginning to consider the relation of their own faith in the Eucharistic Sacrifice to certain key 'protestant' doctrines, notably that of justification by faith. Signs of this, apart from a few important *obiter dicta* in articles on other subjects by Dr A. M. Ramsey, now Bishop of Durham,

are articles by Father A. G. Hebert ('A Root of Difference and of Unity', in *Intercommunion*) and, less explicitly, by the present writer ('The Church's Sacrifice', in *The Student World* for January 1950). Both these articles have been favourably received by a number of 'protestant' friends of the writers. A further development along these lines inside 'catholic' theology might prove to be of equal importance with the growth of 'protestant' views of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. If the Eucharistic Sacrifice is central to catholicism, justification by faith is no doubt equally central to protestantism, and when we find writers on each side beginning to regard *both* these doctrines as points of orientation for their own theology we may not be wrong in concluding that some progress is being made towards the reconciliation of 'catholic' and 'protestant' theologies. If such a reconciliation could be achieved at this key point, it is surely possible that other disagreements might then fall into line, with all that that means for the possibilities of Church union.

The possibility of reconciliation at any point depends on some degree of common understanding on the question of authority and theological method. It is certain that this now exists in the ecumenical movement between all those who practise what is called 'Biblical Theology'. Biblical Theology uses the Bible as its primary doctrinal source, but uses it from within the Church. This necessarily involves the use of tradition as a guide to the interpretation of the Bible, for the life, experience and thinking of the Church at one time need correction from those of other times. This means that when both 'catholics' and 'protestants' are practising Biblical Theology, as at present, they are doing much the same thing, and come much nearer together by that fact alone. This is a gain for 'catholics', who customarily defend the Eucharistic Sacrifice simply from tradition, and make but cursory reference to New Testament theology in their expositions, and also for 'protestants', whose theological exegesis of the Bible is generally guided by an even narrower selection from tradition than that employed by 'catholics'. When the discussion must take place in terms of biblical theology, 'catholics' cannot be content with disentangling the authentic tradition from its perversions, but must show that the tradition

itself is coherent with Scripture, while 'protestants' are led by discussion with 'catholics' to take seriously as possible theological guides authors from areas of tradition which they normally leave quite untouched. Any systematic treatment of the Eucharist today will have to be carried out in terms of biblical theology, and whether 'catholic' or 'protestant', will have to take the whole tradition of the Church into account. An article such as this cannot hope to do that. Its aim is limited to a comparison of some typical modern positions, together with an attempt to use the discussion to throw light on some of the chief theological problems raised by the recognition of a sacrificial element in the Eucharist.

II

It is well-known that the Reformers reserved some of the most violent of their criticisms of the Papal Church for the Mass. We think for example of Luther's celebrated statement that all the blasphemies and adulteries since the beginning of the world had not done more evil than the Mass. This shocking and apparently quite immoderate statement would have been merely accurate if Luther had been right in supposing that the Mass implied an attempt to repeat Calvary and so to impugn its all-sufficiency, or to propitiate God by human works. Protestants have usually followed Luther in making their main charges against the 'catholic' doctrine that the Mass was supposed to be a repetition of Calvary and involved a religion of works. But even if there were theories current in Luther's own time which gave substance to these charges, neither St. Thomas nor earlier tradition give any support to a doctrine open to such radical objections, though the present discussion may well show that their doctrine was unsatisfactory in some less essential respects. It is undeniable that there has been from medieval times to the present day a strain in Western 'catholic' thought which sees the Eucharist as in some sense (however symbolic) a repetition of Calvary, and it has left a deep mark in popular devotion, but it is not the authentic tradition of 'catholic' theology. Now that this tradition is being recovered under the leadership of such scholars as de la Taille, Vonier and Masure, it may be expected to reassert itself in the popular

mind as well as in theology, and it will no longer be possible to charge catholicism with teaching that Calvary can be repeated. Any theory which teaches a repetition of Calvary must be repudiated by 'catholics' as firmly as by 'protestants'. On this point there can be no disagreement.

Present-day 'catholic' theologians follow St. Thomas, St. Augustine and the whole Eastern tradition in maintaining that the sacrifice of the Eucharist is that of Calvary, which is not repeated but 'represented' sacramentally in the Eucharist. There is only one Christian sacrifice, that offered once for all by Jesus Christ, and the Eucharist is the sacrament of it. According to St. Thomas, the Eucharist is the 'image', commemoration, or 'memorial'[1] of the sacrifice of the Cross. This line of thought is developed in various ways by Vonier (*Key to the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*) and Masure (*Le sacrifice du chef*, ET *The Christian Sacrifice*, and *Le sacrifice du corps mystique*, as yet untranslated) while de la Taille (*The Mystery of Faith*) and some Anglican theologians, both independently and under his influence, distinguish between the immolation of Christ on the Cross, with its acceptance by the Father in the Ascension, and His oblation of Himself at the Last Supper, which unlike His immolation can be repeated by the Church as His Body in the Eucharist. Also within Anglicanism Bishop Hicks (*The Fulness of Sacrifice;* cf. a shorter statement of his view in *Ways of Worship*) has contested the view that sacrifice consists essentially in the death of the victim, and mainly on grounds of biblical exegesis has included the heavenly Priesthood of Christ within His sacrifice, and thus the Eucharist also as a manifestation of this. Though his full theory has not been widely followed, present-day Anglican theologians (cf. E. L. Mascall in CQR, January, 1952[2]) have on the whole followed him in not equating sacrifice with death, at least not completely. A more promising line still, on the view of the present writer, is that taken by the late Dom Gregory Dix, who has tried to reconstruct the theology, underlying the primitive liturgies, which apparently sees the Eucharist as the eschatological 're-presentation' or 're-calling' (*anamnesis*) of the sacrifice once offered. The advantage of this view

[1] S.T. III Q83, art. 1; Q73, art. 4; Q73, art. 5 ad 3 m.; Q74, art. 1.
[2] The article is reproduced in *Corpus Christi*, Chap. IV.

is that it can be traced back into the Bible itself, and related to the words of institution much more clearly than some others. All these views have sincerely renounced any attempt to see the Eucharist as a repetition of Calvary, and it is unfortunate that one can still find 'protestant' theologians occupying prominent positions in the ecumenical movement who seem to believe that these theories are simply an attempt to slip in repetition under the counter. If repetition were the only matter in dispute in the controversy between 'catholics' and 'protestants' on the Eucharist (as for example E. L. Mascall, *art. cit.*, apparently supposes), it ought to be possible at once to write *finis* to the controversy.

However, there are other associated objections which 'protestants' continue to urge against the 'catholic' doctrine even when they are satisfied that it does not imply repetition. Lutherans in particular stress that in any case the Eucharist consists essentially in a gift from God to man, and not from man to God, and thus must still be seen as communion and not as sacrifice. This contention is bound up with something very central to Lutheran theology, especially in its modern form, the idea of the divine *agape* for unworthy sinners, the downward movement of God's free grace, pouring out forgiveness and love on man who has nothing in himself to draw it down. We have not the faintest desire to contest the plain fact that *agape* is no invention of Lutheran theologians, but something they have found right in the centre of the faith of the New Testament writers; but when a whole theological system turns exclusively on *agape*, it can become one-sided and fail to do justice to other elements equally fundamental to New Testament theology. From the 'catholic' point of view, it would seem that the discussion of this issue should be carried on at the point where we are thinking about the atonement, and before we ever come to the Eucharist. For since the Eucharist derives any sacrificial character it may have from the work of Christ in atonement, it must first be shown that Christ's work must be understood sacrificially. This hardly needs to be argued, at least for those who profess loyalty to a canon which includes the Epistle to the Hebrews, and to the teaching of St. Paul, who so often speaks of the *Blood* of Christ. *Agape* cannot be made to exclude

such fundamental New Testament ideas. Nor is it incompatible with a sense of the value and importance of the recovery of a 'classic' or Christus-Victor view of the atonement to believe that a full understanding of the work of Christ (so far as that is possible) will demand the use also of sacrificial categories. It is worth noting that the two emphases are brought together (along with much else of value) in L. Bouyer's *Le mystère pascal*, another 'catholic' book of great importance which builds on the work of some of the theologians we have mentioned and uses it in a theological meditation on the Holy Week liturgy. To refuse to go on from the downward movement of God's *agape*, where we must indeed necessarily start, to recognize an answering upward movement in Christ and His Body is to risk evacuating the humanity of Christ of reality. Christ on the cross is more than a symbol of the divine *agape*: He is a completely human being self-offered to the Father. Though in His mission to seek and to save that which was lost He perfectly embodies the divine *agape* for sinners, it remains true that He offered Himself to God by the eternal Spirit, that He is the Lamb of God that takes away the sin of the world. It is too a very precious part of Christian tradition which has seen in the worship and self-offering of the human Christ an analogue of the uncreated worship which He eternally offers as the Son to the Father in the inner life of the Blessed Trinity, where as He is eternally begotten of the Father He eternally gives Himself back to the Father in adoring thanksgiving and love.[1] In fact both the upward and downward movement are perfectly embodied in the one Christ, God and man. We may, however, think that 'catholic' theology has sometimes gone astray in basing its thinking about this upward movement, not upon the firm base already available in Christology, but upon the much more questionable *Eros* movement of humanity in its fallen state, and on ideas of 'sacrifice in general', forgetting what the prophets thought about 'sacrifice in general'. Even Masure does this, and it must inevitably seem to weaken his argument, even if really it does not, to those who have pondered the prophetic critique of sacrifice. Here the Lutheran formula remains useful: even as a sacrifice the Eucharist is not the gift of man to God, but

[1] cf. Bouyer, op. cit. pp. 122-3 for the bearing of this on the Eucharist.

of God to man. God provides the only acceptable Lamb for sacrifice, the one Christ once offered. Even our thanksgiving and worship can only be offered within the one perfect offering. The Eucharist stands in the Church as a perpetual witness against a reversion to pagan ideas of worship, pointing us as it does to the one sacrifice of the New Covenant.

A modern objection which the writer has met with among theologians who would be willing to admit a sacrificial element in the Eucharist, fastens especially on the phrase, traditional in 'catholic' theology, that we offer Christ in the sacrament. Such theologians would be willing to affirm that in the Eucharist Christ's sacrifice is present, and that we are united to it. They would not easily go on to affirm that Christ's sacrifice is present in such a way that we can offer it here and now. This phrase seems to them to imply that we are to treat Christ as an object, whereas in thought or action He must always remain Subject for us. If we offer Him it appears that we are assuming some kind of control over Him, we are manipulating Him and making Him do our will. Such a notion evokes the whole world of magic and superstition with which it has been too easy for 'protestants' to identify catholicism in the past. And if on the other hand no such notions are intended, as of course is the case, then it is claimed that the phrase, and others like it, should not be used, for misunderstanding is occasioned. The 'catholic' language is perhaps overbold here, but like the phrase 'mother of God', of which the same could be said, perfectly defensible in its proper context. There is even an important sense in which Christ did put Himself into the hands of men, that they might do what they would with Him. He left Himself without defences, even moral ones. He did not attempt to safeguard the dignity of His person, as we try to do on His behalf. But that is not the point here, for we must never forget that in this defencelessness is His victory, that the Self-abandonment of the Son of God is omnipotence. No one takes His life from Him: He lays it down of His own accord, for He has power to lay it down and take it again.[1] It is not finally by the will of His murderers that He dies, but by a decision made and renewed many times, ritually embodied in the Last

[1] John 10.17-18.

Supper, and finally and irrevocably accepted at Gethsemane, before it was acted out in deed on Calvary. He is Self-offered, though others kill Him. He is Priest and not suicide, and they are murderers and not (in truth, though they are in office) priests. So too when He comes to us in the Eucharist, He remains Lord, though this time He does not come to suffer anything at our hands. Christ being dead dies no more. He lets us share not in the act of His murderers but in His own act of priestly Self-offering, but His coming beneath the sacramental action has such awful reality that, unless we accept the judgment His sacrifice brings on our sin, we shall indeed share the guilt of murder instead.[1] We cannot now will this death undone, for it is for our salvation, though we must sorrow in time and eternity that our sins made it necessary, indeed brought it about, for only Baptism, repentance and faith can bring us into union with Christ, so that we share the priesthood and not, as by our sins we otherwise would, the murder. We must even, shocking as the thought is, will that this death should be, sharing the will of Him who comes to die according to the Scriptures.[2] Once He has wrought it out, we can accept it in the character which He Himself gave to it, that of a sacrifice for sin. Once that sacrifice has been made by another on our behalf, it can be offered by us. We will that it and not any works of our own should stand for our justification before the Father, that the boundless worship it embodies should be our worship now. In this sense we offer Him today as our sacrifice, after He has once for all offered Himself. But we inflict nothing on Him. The dying is His and done with for ever, though as an eternal sacrifice perpetually new and available for us in our need. It redeems us because it can be ours as well as His.[3]

The discussion in the last paragraph has already raised the issue of the substitutionary character of Christ's sacrifice, which is sometimes also brought forward as an objection against the view that His sacrifice can be offered by us. The problem here is not confined to the critics of Eucharistic Sacrifice: its upholders also find themselves wrestling with

[1] 1 Cor. 11. 27. [2] cf. '*o felix culpa*'.

[3] Thus the contention of T. F. Torrance, in *Intercommunion*, p. 333 n. 31, that this view involves murder, seems to be a misunderstanding.

mysteries beyond their understanding. Perhaps for that reason, I have yet to see an adequate treatment of the problem, and it is with trepidation that I embark on the task of suggesting a solution. The notion of substitutionary sacrifice in the work of Christ has passed through a period of disfavour outside conservative evangelical circles, though it has lately come to the fore again both amongst 'catholics' (especially perhaps in this country under the influence of Charles Williams), and among 'protestants' under that of Karl Barth. The moralising of the atonement by both liberal protestants and liberal catholics, such as Moberly and even Quick[1], which preferred to speak of a representative sacrifice, is seen to cut at the root of any metaphysical justification of the sinner, whereby he is given a new being in Christ before he has brought forth any good works, and so to make the atonement valid for man only in so far as he shares in it by the works of grace. But this he can hardly do until he has been made righteous in Christ—a good tree brings forth good fruit, a corrupt tree corrupt fruit. A merely representative view of Christ's sacrifice may still be acceptable to the majority of Roman Catholic theologians (though not, I venture to think, to the more scriptural among them). But if we are bound by our faith in the primacy of Scripture to include the doctrine of justification in our theology, we shall not find it easy to accept the vast gap near the centre of St. Paul's thought which would be left if we refused to allow justification on its basis in substitutionary sacrifice. It remains indeed one of the chief causes of dissent from Rome that it can continue in its official theology to tolerate this gap. On the other hand, no 'catholic' theologian can be content to abandon the idea of a representative sacrifice, since this would equally rob sanctification of its objective basis; for sanctification is understood by 'catholics' primarily as growth in union with the worshipping Christ. We need both *Christus pro nobis* and *Christus in nobis*, both substitutionary and representative sacrifice. Clearly in both cases the former term is prior and the latter depends upon it: we can only share in Christ's sacrifice because He has done something for us alone, some-

[1] cf. *The Christian Sacraments*, pp. 196 and 203-4; and a slightly different position in *Doctrines of the Creed*, pp. 228ff.

thing that only He could do, without our co-operation and indeed against our will. In bearing by Himself the wrath of God against our sin, so that we should not have to bear it, He has made it possible for us to share His glad worship of the Father. It may well be that discussion has been clouded at times because we have not sufficiently recognised the ambiguity in the idea of sacrifice; for we usually apply the term both to that aspect of Christ's work which was done so that we should not have to share it, and also to that aspect which was done precisely in order that we might be able to share in it. And both these aspects, under the conditions of human sin, involve suffering and even death. Thus we may enter into the sufferings of Christ and fill up that which is lacking in them for the sake of His Body the Church, without impugning the uniqueness and sufficiency of His work. In one sense, then, we cannot have any share at all in the work of redemption; we can only accept it for ourselves. In another sense we can share in the work of redemption, by letting Christ suffer in us, and so permitting the work of redemption to go forward in ourselves and even, by way of intercession (which Charles Williams calls 'the practice of substituted love'), in others. It is this truth which seems to underlie the errors of Roman Catholic theologians when they speak of the merits of man alongside the merits of Christ. It is rather that the merits of Christ are communicated to man, so that man is taken up into them—an evidently Eucharistic exchange. Christ's offering, whether substitutionary or representative, is all-sufficient and cannot be added to. But if we cannot add anything to it, we can be included within it without either it or our own offering losing its reality. In fact, it is only by being included in the offering of Christ that our offering gains any reality at all, for Christ's offering exhausts in its infinity all that we mean by worship and intercession.

This discussion of substitution, inadequate as it is, has an important bearing upon what must now be said about the understanding of the sacrament. As an *anamnesis*, a representative sign really re-calling that which it represents, the sacrament is a means by which Christ is present to us in both aspects of His one atoning sacrifice. In so far as that

sacrifice is substitutionary, it comes to replace any offering or expiatory sacrifice that we might imagine ourselves vainly trying to make in its absence. We cannot share in it, for it is an act of atonement wrought in our place. We cannot contribute to it, for our inability to offer true worship is part of its necessity. We can only offer it to God as the offering of humanity, made by humanity's Head in humanity's place, so that humanity might have an offering for sin, which both takes away guilt and offers adequate worship to the holy God. It was 'done in our place, and as our act',[1] and precisely for that reason can be offered by us, and would not redeem us if it could not. We proclaim it until He come, making the *anamnesis* of what He did. In so far as the sacrifice of Christ which we re-present is something to be shared in, however, He takes us and our answering self-offering up into His own, perfect worship, giving our worship the infinite value of His. The sacrifice of ourselves, our souls and bodies, of our praise and thanksgiving for the atonement wonderfully wrought on our behalf, is united with and included within the Self-offering of the Incarnate Word. The sacrifice of the Body is joined to the sacrifice of the Head, and the total offering is that of the whole Christ, *totius Christi*. But the total of the Head and the Body is no greater than that of the Head, as St. Thomas also reminds us. His worship is already infinite in value without ours, and neither does the addition of ours increase the sum, nor the subtraction of ours leave His impoverished. For the relation of the sacrifice of the Body to the sacrifice of the Head is the same as that of the Body itself to the Head. The Body is not identical with the Head, but the Body of the Head: but neither is it separate from the Head, so as to be something in itself. It must grow up in all things into Him who is the Head.[2] So, too, in order to explain this mysterious relationship, the New Testament has to speak of Christ as the Head and the Church as the Body, and also of the Church as Christ's whole Body, and of being in the Church as being in Christ. Since the sacrifice of the Head is perfect and complete, the sacrifice of the Church is made within it, while retaining its own identity. The mystery of the Eucharist

[1] F. W. Camfield, quoted by T. F. Torrance, *art. cit.*, p. 330.
[2] Eph. 4. 15.

is one of unity and duality. If we stress the duality too strongly, we shall end with two sacrifices, that of Christ and that of the Church, each of finite value, and thus exhibit a Pelagian understanding of both. If on the other hand we stress the unity too strongly we overthrow the nature of a sacrament, and render human action meaningless, because absolutely identical with God's. If we keep in mind the analogy with the two natures of Christ, we shall be enabled to avoid this error. Neither a monophysite transubstantiation of our offering into His, nor a Nestorian receptionism can replace a true understanding of the mystery of the Real Presence, wherein the sacrifice of Christ can be neither confused with nor separated from the Church's sacramental action. The mystery, however, remains a mystery, and we have not explained it when we have invoked the Christological analogy. As we have suggested, the mystery is analogical immediately with the relationship of the members of the Church to the Body of Christ, and hence through that to the relationship of the manhood to the Godhead in Christ, and it is because we are convinced that the term Body of Christ is no mere metaphor that we are so easily led into the error of affirming an identity between our sacrifice and His in the Eucharist. The language of identity has of course its justification in the expression, 'This *is* my Body', but the identity there affirmed is a unique kind of identity, as Vonier so clearly points out. It is what Wilberforce, anticipating him, called 'sacramental identity', that is an identity between two things which really exist, and are linked by our Lord's institution. This is the kind of 'identity'—if the word is really desirable at all—which the Fathers so frequently thought of when they said that one theological reality 'mystically' was another. To give an example of their usage which is most relevant here: when it is said that the celebrant priest mystically is Christ, it is not affirmed that he is annihilated for the duration of the sacramental action, but that he is the sign of the Real Presence of Christ the true celebrant, and no mere deputy for an absentee Christ. However, it must be admitted that all such language leans towards monophysitism (as it may be thought all patristic Eucharistic thought does), and even if this is the right way to lean if we do not fall, it is also necessary

from time to time firmly to distinguish the two natures. One conclusion, however, from the use of the Christological analogy is that when we think of the modern Roman Catholic discussion we are likely to favour de la Taille, who allows a slight duality between the Mass and Calvary, rather than Masure whose stress on transubstantiation renders them identical. Much more might be said on this point, but the danger of violating the mystery ought to lead us to refrain.

We have several times made it clear in what has been said so far that the doctrine of Eucharistic Sacrifice does not imply that we are justified by works. It should indeed be sufficiently clear by now that the opposite is the case, and that we cannot speak of a Eucharistic Sacrifice on any Pelagian understanding of Christianity. In fact, the Eucharistic Sacrifice plays the same part in 'catholic' piety that the doctrine of justification plays in 'protestant' piety, safeguarding theocentric religion and preventing man from supposing that he can approach God in the power of his own righteousness. It might even be said that the Eucharistic Sacrifice and justification by faith are two sides of the same coin. It seems worth while remarking that this no longer holds good where the full doctrine of Eucharistic Sacrifice is watered down into a stress on the offertory, as is common today in some 'protestant' circles which have undergone a certain amount of catholic influence. This stress, so fashionable nowadays in liturgically-minded groups in more than one church, is open to all the strictures of the Reformers against the Mass as a religion of works, and through fear of catholicism loses the evangelical core of the 'catholic' doctrine. We can only safely stress the offertory as the token of our offering of ourselves and our workaday existences to God, if we go on to say that, because of the utter inadequacy of that offering, it must and will be taken into the sacrifice of Christ which is alone acceptable to God. We do no more than provide the material of the sacrament, which is subsequently to be our heavenly food.

III

We have so far been attempting to meet various 'protestant' objections either to the doctrine in itself or to the

'catholic' manner of formulating it. In doing so we have already sketched a positive doctrine which appears to be free from the defects which have given rise to these criticisms. We must now pass on to consider more closely how the Eucharist is a sacrifice, and to relate the broad theological principles already put forward to the rite itself. In doing this we shall from this point on be engaging in discussion rather with 'catholic' views. What we have said so far amounts to this: the Eucharist is a sacrament of Christ's redeeming work, which makes available for the Church in all ages, in all its aspects, both Godward and manward, and in all its fruits, the 'one full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world'. The Eucharist in no sense repeats that sacrifice, nor does it constitute it a sacrifice; it is the sacramental *anamnesis* of the one historic sacrifice. This sacrifice must be thought of as both substitutionary and representative, and the Eucharist manifests both these facets of Christ's work, being both a proclamation of the act of atonement in which by His Self-offering He bore the wrath of God on our sin and overcame the power of the law, death and sin, and also the re-presentation of the supreme act of worship which He offered in perfect holiness in that act of atonement, a worship in which the Church is called to share, both for adoration and intercession. In either case it is right to say that the Church offers Christ's sacrifice, for if she could not offer it, it could not be said that it had been offered for her and therefore she would not have been redeemed by it. The Church offers what has become her own through the mystery of her union with Christ.

The Real Presence is the union of the death and resurrection of Christ with the action of the Church in taking, giving thanks over, blessing and distributing bread and wine, according to the institution of Christ. When we put the doctrine in this way we see at once that the problem of the Real Presence is not so much, as it was thought to be at the Reformation, a problem of space (how can Christ's natural body, which is in heaven, be on our altars?), but rather a problem of time (how can the historic events of the death and resurrection of Christ come to coincide with the event of the Church's sacramental action today and all down the history of the

Church?). How can these events which happened once for all, not happen again, for that is purely impossible, but be present in their original happening? How can the Eucharist, which is repeated over and over again until He come, really contain that which is once and for all? The answer seems to us today to lie in the fact that these original events are *eschatological* events, part of the history of our salvation; or what I believe is the same thing, they are the acts of the Messiah, of one who is personally God. For God is not in time, though time is in Him. We may say that Christ's Lordship over time means that the acts and states of His earthly life are not, as are the events of our own personal history, successive and separate from one another, but 'co-inhere', are in one another. He cannot be present to us now without bringing with Him all the events of our salvation. To say the same thing in another way more closely related to the Epistle to the Hebrews, the events of our salvation have such utter finality and are so conclusive in their efficacy that they endure for ever. They cannot be repeated because they end all acts by which man attempts to gain a relationship with God: they are definitive and therefore perpetual. They are ever new and therefore renew the Church as she is ever and again grounded in them by the sacraments. The sacraments are given as effective signs of these eschatological events in which the being of the Church is grounded. Thus we must regard the Eucharistic *anamnesis* not as a merely psychological memory of the death and resurrection of Christ, but as the objective recalling of events which are not just past to us but really present.[1]

This mystery of the Real Presence is certainly related to the elements. Until we take bread, give thanks over it, bless it, break it and distribute it, and perform the corresponding actions with the cup, in imitation of what our Lord did at the Last Supper, and in obedience to His command, this Real Presence is not manifested to us. No doubt there are other kinds of presence of Christ with His Church, equally 'real'; there is the constant union set up by Baptism; at every service Christ is present throughout as the ground of worship: but these are not the Eucharistic presence, the special presence

[1] cf. T. F. Torrance, *art. cit.*, pp. 306f, 311.

of the death and resurrection which the sacrament promises. Once again, it seems that the best course open to us in the light of Scripture and tradition is to interpret the sacramental identity of 'This is my Body' in terms of the analogy of the union of the two natures of Christ. But we should not interpret the words statically, for Christ did not only say, 'This is . . .' but also, 'Do this . . .'. The bread and wine are not only held up for our contemplation; an action is performed with them—we do the Eucharist, as Dom Gregory Dix has taught Anglicans to say, translating *eucharistoumen*. In the same way, the body and blood are with us, not simply as substances to be adored, but as part of the event of death and resurrection. Indeed, should we not go further and say that in all probability we ought to give the words about body and blood their full Biblical overtones, which without ruling out their literal meaning go beyond it to include a dynamic connotation of sacrifice and offering? If so, there is no question of the separation of body and blood; they are rather two aspects of one sacrificial reality, the Self-offering of Christ in a new covenant, for the founding of the Church.[1] There is really no need to look for the sacrificial element of the sacrament (as the Thomistic tradition does) in some fancied (or even real) resemblance of some part of the rite to the death of the Lord, such as a separate consecration of body and blood, representing our Lord's sacrificial state as one from whom the blood has been drained out. Such views could only arise when the Biblical meaning of the words 'body' and 'blood' had been forgotten, for the words of institution contain all and more than all that is given in such symbolism. E. L. Mascall is no doubt right when he suggests[2] that all such views are vestiges of the idea of the repetition of Calvary in the Mass. But in any case, as Masure reminds us healthily, the sacrament is not the sign of the death of Christ in virtue of any natural resemblance of bread and wine to the crucifixion, but in virtue of our Lord's institution, of the creative word which He then spoke, and which the Church speaks after Him.[3] Our Lord's choice was no doubt appropriate, but the main

[1] cf. A. M. Farrer in *The Parish Communion*, pp. 88-92.
[2] *Church Quarterly Review*, January-March 1952; *Corpus Christi*, Chap. IV.
[3] op, cit. p. 227.

factor conditioning it was surely not the symbolism which it might contain but its place in a Jewish ritual meal, itself pregnant with the history of the people of God, and linked to the Passover if it was not itself a Passover.

The Last Supper was above all a priestly act on the part of our Lord. St. John implies that the institution of the sacrament was set in the context of Jesus' high-priestly prayer of Self-consecration to sacrifice for the sake of the Church. It was the means, the only means, by which He gave significance to the ignominious death that He was to die on the morrow.[1] It was the way in which He turned a judicial murder into a sacrifice for 'you and for many'. In commanding the Church to repeat what He did, He gave the Church an ordinance by which that sacrificial death in its inexhaustible plenitude and newness should perpetually renew it into its true being in Him, until He should come again and ordinances be swallowed up into reality, and we should drink wine with Him new in the Kingdom of God. At the same time He gave the Church a means by which she might offer the sacrifice which He was about to make for her. In repeating the Last Supper the Church would be able to take part with Him and after Him in His one priestly act of offering and consecrating the one unrepeatable sacrifice. Theologians have found in this or that aspect of the rite the method by which we offer the sacrifice; in the Roman Communion, as we have seen, much has been made of the separate consecration of bread and wine, and many theories have been elaborated as to the way in which this effects the sacrifice of the Mass. But with the exception of de la Taille and his followers they have missed the obvious: we cannot repeat Calvary, but we can repeat the Last Supper, and indeed have been commanded to do so. The only way we can now offer Christ's sacrifice is not in any sense to put Him to death again, however symbolically, for this would be blasphemy, but to participate in the priestly act by which He himself offers and consecrates formally His coming death. It is no particular aspect of the rite, but the whole rite that effects the sacrifice. Just as 'This is . . .' gives us the Real Presence, 'Do this . . .' gives

[1] I owe this understanding of the Last Supper to some yet unpublished papers of Professor D.M. MacKinnon, and through him to Bouyer and de la Taille.

us the power to share in His offering by repeating that act of offering He then made. We do not consecrate His death ourselves: the Eucharist plays no part in making Calvary a sacrifice—the weakness of de la Taille's in general most illuminating theory is the suggestion that it does. That is sufficiently done by the Last Supper itself. It is rather that when we do over again in His name what He then did, we mystically renew His act of Self-offering, and as His Body, which we are by Baptism and shall be anew in our reception of His Body in the Eucharist, share in the Self-oblation of the Head, in that double sense we have spoken of above.

Finally, the receiving by the Church of the Body and Blood is of the essence of the sacrament, even when it is considered as a sacrifice. For it is by receiving Him that we are taken up into His sacrifice. Just as by receiving the body we become the body, so by receiving the cup of sacrifice we are made to participate in the sacrifice. 'Ye shall indeed drink of the cup that I drink of.' We cannot offer without communicating, or communicate without offering, as the ancient Church well understood. But to speak of communion at large would take almost as much space as we have already expended, and having said so much, it is better to stop at this point.

There is little in this article that is consciously original, and even that owes much to the fellowship of theologians in the ecumenical movement. It is no attempt to lean over backwards to appease my 'protestant' readers, but a sincere attempt to state how the Eucharistic Sacrifice looks to one 'catholic' in the light of Scripture, what little he knows of tradition and of the modern discussion amongst both 'catholics' and 'protestants'. If the writer is convinced that the doctrine as here expounded is not in conflict with the essential convictions of orthodox 'protestants', especially those of the Calvinist tradition, it is because no criticism that he has yet met with from that quarter has seemed truly to hit the mark against the core of the traditional doctrine, though it has certainly effectively demolished many theological opinions. Could not 'protestants' agree that the doctrine as here stated, however unfamiliar it may be to them, is in fact evangelical

and consonant with a modern understanding of Scripture, and therefore not to be excluded from the faith of the Church, as it is to be handed on to our children and those who come after us? If so, and only constructive criticisms such as Professor Torrance offers in his article (several times referred to) will show whether it is so, one of the greatest barriers to the re-integration of the Church will have been removed.

BAPTISM IN THE CHURCH OF SOUTH INDIA

by The Rev. T. S. GARRETT

Since the first Synod of the Church of South India elected a standing Liturgy Committee and assigned it as its first task the drafting of an order for the Lord's Supper, that committee has never been without work in hand. *SJT* has from time to time given the hospitality of its pages to reports of the committee's progress, the most recent being *Doing Over a Liturgy* by the Rev. J. R. Macphail, which appeared in the issue of December 1954 and gave an account of our revision of *An Order for the Lord's Supper*. This present essay may be regarded as continuing in the same series and reporting on our experimental production of *An Order for Holy Baptism*, which was the task we undertook and completed in 1954. Our intention is to revise it together with *An Order for Reception into Full Membership of the Church or Confirmation* after about five years of use, when we hope to have an adequate body of criticisms to guide us.[1]

The orders of worship in use in the uniting Churches before union are still permissible in the united Church. It is not our intention to impose uniformity in worship, but rather to have unity with variety. Our new liturgical developments represent the impact of the different heritages on each other; but they are more than a mere conflation of traditions. We have preferred radically to criticise the existing forms of worship, and our work represents in large measure a return to the great tradition of the ancient liturgies, submitting this, however, to the insights of the Reformation and of modern liturgical study, while, at the same time, regarding liturgiology as the handmaid, rather than the mistress, of new liturgical construction.

A new order of service, however much it differs from exist-

[1] All these services, together with *Daily Bible Readings* and *Bible Readings and Collects for Sundays and Other Special Days with Proper Prefaces*, are published by the Oxford University Press in India and may be obtained from the same publishers in Great Britain.

ing orders, must in the process of drafting have a starting point and a framework which is likely to be derived, at any rate in part, from one of these orders. In our Order for the Lord's Supper, though much material has been incorporated from other than Anglican sources, it is not difficult to see a family likeness to liturgies of the Anglican Communion. Our Confirmation Service may be said to have been built upon the Service of Admission to Full Membership of the Church of the Methodists and, generally speaking, has most affinities with this service. In the drafting of the Order for Baptism those most concerned with the initial stages had come to the conclusion from pastoral experience, their own and that of others, that the Baptism Services of *The Book of Common Order* provided the most satisfactory framework with which to begin our task. Apart from the formula of Baptism itself and a few other elements, such as the renunciation of the devil, the world and the flesh and the profession of faith in the form of the Apostles' Creed, there is great variety in the traditional baptismal orders, and the material which we had to hand was, therefore, not so firmly fixed by tradition as was the case with the Lord's Supper. This gave us greater freedom to work over this material, transposing and often rewording it so that the origins will not always be easy to detect and separate out. We have also, as in our previous liturgical work, used *pericopae* from a variety of sources. Thus the original starting point in the rites of *The Book of Common Order* is not, perhaps, easy to discern; but it may be of interest to record what it was.

Many may wonder why the Liturgy Committee was asked to undertake the drafting of the Order for Reception into Full Membership of the Church or Confirmation before being commissioned to work on Baptism. The only reason was the practical one that no other service of Confirmation than the Anglican order was available at the time of Union, and, with the widespread acceptance of episcopal Confirmation in many parts of the united Church, an order which would include other heritages than the Anglican was an urgent need. One difficulty that has resulted has been that of defining the relation between the two rites. We hope to remedy this by postponing the revision of the experimental Con-

firmation Service until that of the Baptism Service is also due and then undertaking both together. Even now in the introduction to the newly published Baptism Service there is a recognition that Baptism and Confirmation are closely connected, and provision is made for the receiving of both by adult candidates together with first Communion, if desired, in one continuous rite.

The members of the Liturgy Committee have been conscious that their work has been contemporaneous with other experiments in baptismal revision. They must acknowledge their indebtedness to such fruits of these as have been published and also to individual liturgists who have given them criticism and advice. It may be that they will profit still further from the work of others at the end of the experimental period when these services come before them for reconsideration in the light of experience in their use.

Nor is the concern of those who draft a sacramental order only liturgical: it must be pastoral and theological as well, and it would be difficult to assess the relative importance of these three. We have endeavoured to embody in our order the great tradition of the ancient baptismal rites and to set Baptism on a level with the Eucharist as a major action of the whole congregation. At the same time from the pastoral point of view, we have been aware of the modification of the traditional pattern of the service required in the Church of today, more specifically, as far as we are concerned, by the Church in the Indian scene, a tiny minority in the midst of a vast non-Christian population.

We have been equally concerned with the theological approach; for if a sacramental order is to be right, it must be rooted in a right sacramental theology. There has been much current research into the theology of Baptism and Confirmation, and the debate concerning the meaning of Christian initiation which it has engendered has perhaps made the construction of a baptismal order even more of a theological problem than a liturgical one. At the same time, the error must be avoided of perverting liturgical action and the prayers which accompany it into theological didactic. Not only would this obscure our primary intention to offer an act of worship; it would also tend to make the interpretation

of the sacrament so precise that all variations of meaning would be excluded. Moreover, with the movement of the theological thought this interpretation might well be 'dated' in a few years' time.

Rather theology must be transposed into the language of worship, and such doctrinal statement as there is must be made inclusive of legitimate varieties of interpretation. In general we have adopted the position in our order that Baptism really does confer a spiritual gift and status. This must exclude the concept of the sacrament as only a symbolic declaration of what the candidate already is apart from receiving it. On the other hand, we would dissociate ourselves from the teaching that all unbaptised persons are inevitably children of wrath and destined to eternal damnation and from a presentation which would so stress the divine operation in the sacrament as to give less than due place to the response of faith in making the divine gift effective. But within these bounds there is room for movement and growth in our understanding. The following account of the Order itself may serve to illustrate this theological tendency both with regard to the general sacramental position and also in some other particular points of emphasis.

The Order begins with a declaration of the Word which, as in the Lord's Supper, is parallel to the ministration of the sacrament. There is an element of Old Testament typology in the first prayer, though derived not from the Flood and the Red Sea, as in Lutheran and Anglican rites, but from the Exodus as a whole with its redemption from bondage, establishment of the covenant and entrance into the promised land. Christ's command is heard in the words of Matt. 28.19 and John 3.5, and the teaching of the Apostles in Acts 2.38, Rom. 6.3,4, 1 Cor. 12.13. This last verse is the key to our understanding of the work of the Spirit in Baptism and is echoed again at a later point in the service. There are also allusions in the opening exhortation to Rom. 8.15 (adoption), and to Phil. 1.6 which is the first of several statements of the eschatological reference of Baptism and of its character as a present realisation of an inheritance to be fulfilled hereafter. Infant Baptism, the variations of which from Adult Baptism are printed in parallel columns, has a different exhortation based on the lection Mark 10.13-16.

The baptismal vows follow. In Adult Baptism these consist of the renunciation of the devil, the world and the flesh, the recital of the Apostles' Creed[1] (in which the whole congregation joins) and a promise to 'keep God's holy will and commandments . . .'. If the candidates be husband and wife, they promise to 'obey Christ's teaching concerning marriage, bring their children to be baptised and nurture them in the Christian faith'. This promise is carefully worded to avoid any notion that marriage contracted before baptism is in any way invalid and in need of repetition. Rather married candidates are called upon to sanctify their married life by bringing it into accord with the Christian view of matrimony. The section concludes with an adaptation of the ancient *effeta* in the form of a blessing rather than an exorcism. In Infant Baptism there is no renunciation; but parents (and godparents, if any), having joined in the Apostles' Creed, make a series of promises the substance of which is to bring up their children in the Christian way, after which the whole congregation promises to assist in this and to welcome the children into the Christian fellowship.

In order to associate the congregation more closely with the act of Baptism, there is a period for silent prayer and the baptismal prayers have been given litany form. It is here that we give thanks for Christ's baptism in Jordan and 'the baptism of his suffering and death', and pray, amongst other suffrages, that those being baptised may be 'born anew in the fellowship of thy Church'. Also, adapting an ancient prayer from the *Upanishads*, we pray that they may be led 'from the darkness of ignorance and sin' to 'the light of the Gospel' and 'from death . . . to everlasting life'. Thus the age-long desire of the heart of India is declared to find fulfilment in Baptism.

The act of Baptism follows in the name of the Trinity either by immersion or aspersion. The declaration of reception into the Church, which is a modification of the Anglican formula, may be accompanied by the signing with the cross; but this has been left optional.

[1] There has been an unfortunate omission of 'the communion of saints' in the first edition of the Order which will be corrected in later impressions. The Church of South India, so far from wishing to omit the profession of belief in the communion of saints, earnestly desires the union of all the faithful in one communion and fellowship!

The Aaronic blessing or a hymn may be sung, and a procession made from the place of Baptism into the body of the Church. Also at this point the ceremonies of the putting on of a white garment and the giving of a lighted lamp or taper may take place, if desired. Those who know India will appreciate how ancient Christian tradition and Indian religious sentiment meet at this point. It is hoped that these ceremonies will be valued as dramatic representations of the meaning of the sacrament.

The congregation is then exhorted to thanksgiving in a brief address which speaks of Baptism as 'the life-giving sign of God's mercy and grace' and of 'being sealed by the Holy Spirit unto the day of redemption'. Then all say the Lord's Prayer—for 'we have received the Spirit of adoption whereby we cry, Abba, Father'—and another prayer by all follows, which begins with thanksgiving that 'it has pleased thee to receive *these thy servants* (*children*), for thine own *children* by adoption and to incorporate *them* into thy holy Church,' and leads on to petition that '*they* may more and more show forth in *their* lives that which *they* now are by thy grace . . .'. The proleptic and eschatological reference of Baptism thus again finds expression.

In Infant Baptism there follows a prayer for the homes of the children, and in Adult Baptism a charge, first to the members of the congregation, who respond by promising to fulfil their duties towards the newly baptized and to welcome them into their fellowship; and secondly to the newly baptized themselves, largely in terms derived from Ephesians 5 and Colossians 3. A hymn and a thank-offering follow, and if Baptism is separate from the Lord's Supper or Morning or Evening Prayer, the service concludes with a blessing taken from Eph. 3.16ff.

In place of the opening exhortation and final charge the minister may expound the teaching of Scripture concerning Baptism and the nature of the Christian life in his own words. So also place is given for extempore prayer as an alternative to the litany. Expository additions and adaptations may also be made in the questions put to the candidates. These are a pastoral asset in the case of candidates from backward communities and enable the minister to make sure that

they know in a concrete way what it is that they are promising.

The purpose in general of these permitted variations is firstly to accord to the Church the freedom of the Spirit. This is an obvious necessity in the declaration of the Word which must be related to the varying circumstances of the candidates. It is also a return to the most ancient tradition of sacramental order to allow a measure of fluidity in the prayers of the minister. In this respect we are in accord with the liturgical tradition of those Churches which regard their published orders of worship as guides rather than as rigidly prescribed formulae. Indeed we have inherited this tradition through our union and do not regard it as in conflict with the tradition which prefers to adhere to the printed form of words. In either tradition there are certain basic elements in a sacramental order which must be regarded as invariable.

The second intention of this freedom is to leave the door open for the Indian genius to make its way in worship. Hitherto this genius has had its characteristic manifestation mainly in less formal acts of worship—the cottage prayer meeting, the harvest festival, the musical service with an evangelistic intent. In the new sacramental orders of the Church of South India, Indian inspiration has not been forthcoming to so great an extent, and no more can be claimed for them than that they are variations of a predominantly Western liturgical heritage. Even the Eastern liturgies, of which some use has been made in the Order for the Lord's Supper, are, in relation to India, of the West; though the Liturgy of St. James has from ancient times been naturalised in the Syrian Churches of Malabar. A truly Indian service book is still to come. At present the Indian and European brethren of the Church of South India would not wish to do more than provide interim orders of worship which will prepare the way for its coming.

THE REFORMED MINISTRY IN THE CONTEMPORARY CHURCH

by The Rev. BERNHARD CITRON

The Reformed Minister in the contemporary Church is concerned about his Ministry because he realises that without a doctrine of the Church's ministry, there can't be a true doctrine of the Church. The revived interest in the theology of the Church, has therefore led to a renewed interest in the Reformed doctrine of the Ministry. Among many excellent ministers in Canada and in the United States and among seriously-minded Divinity students in a Southern Presbyterian Seminary, I have frequently noticed uncertainty with regard to the doctrinal basis of the pastoral calling. The Scottish minister has a traditional regard for his vocation which is still shared by the vast majority of the Church people. But he too might sometimes wonder where the Minister really stands, not only in the tradition and practice but in the doctrine of the Church.

(*a*) The Apostolate

In the Church of God are not different ranks but different functions. St. Paul said: 'And God has appointed in the Church first apostles, second prophets, third teachers, then workers of miracles, then healers, helpers, administrators, speakers in various kinds of tongues' (1 Cor. 12.28, RSV). We might apply these different functions to the modern Church, and say God has appointed missionaries, parish ministers, deaconesses, college professors, elders, deacons, Church Treasurers, choir leaders and others. Paul asks: 'Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Do all speak with tongues? Do all interpret?' Some of those who suddenly rose up at a Christian meeting in Corinth and spoke in strange tongues, would have made very poor apostles, and the Apostle Paul for all his wisdom and piety felt quite incapable of interpreting strange tongues. Modern Church Organisation as much as

the oldest Church Order makes allowance for a variety of gifts which are all acceptable in the service of God.

Paul claimed apostleship as his special gift. This word 'apostolos' has two different meanings in the New Testament. In the first instance it designates someone who is sent on a particular mission. Barnabas is called an apostle (Acts 14.14) though he did not belong to the Twelve and unlike Paul never claimed 'apostleship' on the ground of being a spiritual witness of the Resurrection. From the context of Acts 14.14 it is quite obvious that both Paul and Barnabas are called apostles because they are acting as missionaries. The members of the Jerusalem Council, to which Paul and Barnabas appealed, are throughout the 15th chapter of Acts called 'apostles and elders'. James who was not one of the Twelve, is therefore also counted an apostle. His field was Home Mission work in Israel. In the Epistle to the Philippians a member of the Church who delivered money collected in Philippi to Paul, and brought back a message from the Philippians is also called 'apostolos' (Phil. 2.25). In the Book of Revelation we read of false apostles who tried to impose themselves upon the Church in Ephesus (Rev. 2.2). It is impossible that these preachers could have tried to impersonate well-known personalities like Peter, John or Thomas. They simply claimed that they were missionaries who had a special message from God. Not for posing as apostles but for teaching false doctrines these men were denounced. In post-Biblical times when the original Twelve had long passed away, missionaries were still called apostles. Thus in the Didache we read: 'Let every apostle that comes to you, be received as the Lord'(Ch. 11). Make the missionary welcome—that is the definite meaning of the passage. In this specific sense the modern missionary continues the tradition of the Church by acting as Christ's apostle to those who have not yet heard the word and those who require to be confirmed in the faith.

In most New Testament passages, however, the word 'apostle' is used in a different sense. It is applied to the Twelve and Paul. Professor T. W. Manson has pointed out (*The Church's Ministry*, Philadelphia, 1948, p. 28) that the Hebrew word 'shaliac' which is rendered 'apostolos' in Greek, designates a special envoy whose commission is limited to a

definite task and whose office cannot be transferred to another person. We must therefore conclude that in the case of the original apostolate the commission fell back to Christ Himself who has therefore commissioned the whole Church. This is the basis of our belief in the Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. Out of the Church He calls those who are entrusted to continue the apostolic mission in the wider sense of the word, the ministers of the Gospel.

The great Swiss Reformed scholar of the last century, F. Godet, wrote in his commentary on St. Luke, Ch. 21.41-48 (French edition, 1867) that the Christian ministry is '*une émanation de l'apostolat*'. He argues that the ministry is derived not from the Church, but from the apostolate. This statement does not contradict the fact that the *Church* is called 'apostolic'. The Christian minister exercises the apostolic office by order of the King and Head of the Church but within the Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. Dr James Moffat, who calls Godet's view 'sound Presbyterian doctrine' (*The Presbyterian Churches*, London, 1928, p. 22) further comments that this view is 'as old as George Gillespie' who in 1642 proved from the text 'Who then is that faithful and wise steward, whom his Lord shall make ruler over his household, to give them their portion in due season?' (Luke 12.42) that the Christian pastor is such a steward constituted and appointed for the purpose of distributing spiritual food.

The twofold meaning of the word apostle, that of missionary and that of Christian minister in general who stands in the apostolic succession of the Spirit, might be seen from the list of ecclesiastical offices, as contained in Ephesians 4.11. 'Some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers.' The difference between this passage and 1 Cor. 12.28 can be very simply explained. 1 Corinthians is addressed to a particular congregation in which not only apostles, prophets and teachers serve, but also miracle workers, healers, administrators and those gifted with the speaking in tongues. The Epistle to the Ephesians, on the other hand, was intended for wider circulation than that of the congregation in Ephesus. This letter does not deal with local problems but with the basic doctrines of the Church. Miracle workers and faith healers were found only in some Christian congregations

but preachers, local evangelists, pastors and teachers were known everywhere. It is also noteworthy that all the offices mentioned in Ephesians are spiritual, which forces us to the conclusion that not only the apostles (missionaries) in the literal sense but the prophets, evangelists, pastors and teachers exercise a ministry that emanates from the apostolate.

(*b*) The Presbyterate

By the time the Pastoral Epistles were writtten, a definite Church Order can be distinguished—and this Order is Presbyterian. Thus it says in an early book of Discipline: 'Let the elders who rule well be considered of double honour, especially those who labour in preaching and teaching' (1 Tim. 5.17, RSV). Bishop Lightfoot in his essay on 'The Christian Ministry' which can still be considered as a standard work, states: 'It is clear then at the close of the apostolic age the two lower orders of the threefold ministry (he refers to the triad of the episcopalian ministry Bishop-Presbyter-Deacon) were firmly and widely established; but traces of the third and highest order, the episcopate properly so called are few and indistinct' (*St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians*, etc., London, 1873, p. 193). As Presbyterians we take exception to the terms 'higher' and 'lower', but we can trust this great scholar that the presbyterian offices of ruling and preaching elder were created in New Testament times, and that the preaching elder enjoyed a position of eminence not on account of his rank but of the sacred function he exercised. The assumption that those who were first called apostles were later designated as bishops is regarded by Lightfoot himself as baseless (ibid., p. 194).

Lightfoot has also pointed out that the names Presbyter and Bishop which are used interchangeably in the New Testament, are derived from a Hebrew and Gentile title respectively. The Jewish Christians were familiar with the institution of elders through the synagogue, while the Gentile Christians conferred the title overseer or 'episcopos', by which directors of social and religious clubs were known among the heathen, to the leading men in the Church. It must be admitted that Lightfoot himself considered the evidence for this primitive use of the word 'episcopos' as slight, but it has been recently

pointed out (*Theologisches Wörterbuch*, vol. 2, p. 612) that the 'presbyteroi' of the Church of Ephesus (Acts 20.17) are addressed by Paul as 'episcopoi' (20.28). In other words all the elders of the Ephesian Church are called bishops. These men have a definite commission. 'This commission implies, as the context of the passage shows, the vigilant and caretaking leadership of the Church (both meanings are contained in the word "episcopein") on the ground of the redemptive work of Christ to whom alone the congregation owes its existence' (*Wörterbuch*, ibid.). It is also to be noted that in Titus 1.5 and 1.7 the terms 'presbyteros' and 'episcopos' are used interchangeably. These men called by Christians of Jewish descent 'elders', by those of Gentile origin 'overseers' and by Paul who used both Jewish and Gentile designations, sometimes elders and sometimes overseers, are therefore comparable with the presbyters of the Reformation Church. In the original Presbyterian Order which is based on a Church Order already formed by the end of the first century the bishop is not the pastor in charge of a congregation, far less a ministerial superintendent, but simply a presbyter.

Some of these presbyters or bishops were set apart by the whole Church as preachers and teachers. As we saw from 1 Tim. 5.17, their office was surrounded with great dignity and the presbyter who 'laboured in the word and doctrine' was thus regarded as the bishop par excellence, but this does not imply that other elders cease to be bishops. The argument sometimes used by Presbyterians in conversation with Episcopalians that in the Presbyterian Church every minister is a bishop, does not hold true of the original Presbyterian Order. It would be more correct to say that every presbyter is a bishop.

The Presbyterian division which goes back to the early Church is therefore not between presbyter and bishop, but between ruling and preaching elder. The distinction between these two officers of the Church is not only related to their separate functions but to their different placement. The ruling elder is always ordained in a particular congregation even if he might later be charged with important duties in Presbytery, Synod or General Assembly. Though the old Scottish rule 'once an elder always an elder' is also recognised

in the Presbyterian Churches of the United States, term of office in those Churches is limited so that the membership in the Session rotates among the ordained elders. The preaching elder, however, can be ordained for work in the mission field, in the armed forces, in colleges, in hospitals and more recently in industry. Just, as every physician, whether he later specialises in any particular field of medicine or works as general practitioner, undergoes the same basic training in anatomy, physiology, therapeutics, etc., and just as every lawyer, whether he later becomes barrister, judge or attorney general, must attend the same law school, so the minister, whether he serves at home or abroad, whether he follows a military or an academic career, must have the same basic training in Greek, Hebrew, Systematic Theology, Church History, Homiletics and above all in Bible knowledge.

Since every minister, whether engaged in parochial or extraparochial work, is member of a Presbytery, he might be regarded as the presbyter par excellence, in the same way as in the ancient Church the preaching elder or bishop was regarded as the bishop par excellence.

(*c*) The Minister

(1) *Minister of the Word*

First and foremost the Christian pastor is minister of the Word. In the Swiss Reformed Church which still adheres to many traditions of the Reformation, the designation of a minister is contained in three letters behind his name—D.V.M. (Divini Verbi Minister). There is no higher title in Christendom than this, servant of the Word of God. 'Anyone entrusted with the ministry of the Word', says Luther, 'receives the highest ministry in Christianity and after receiving it he may baptise, celebrate Mass and have the cure of souls.' (Quoted from Luther's Doctrine of the Ministry by the Rev. D. Gösta Hök, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol. 7, p. 17.) Thus the Reformation re-established the ministry of the Word which is derived from our Lord's commission to His disciples: 'Go ye therefore, and teach all nations baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.' The ministry of the Word is the prophetic function of the pastorate. The Old Testament prophets

transmitted and interpreted God's Word to the congregation of Israel. If the prophet had received the message he was called to deliver, not orally but in writing, then he 'read in the book of the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense and caused them to understand the reading' (Neh. 8.8). In the Christian Church as much as in the Jewish Synagogue the reading of Scripture forms an essential part of worship. The Presbyterian Fathers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries considered the reading of Scripture as one of the duties of the ministers. 'Reading of the word in the congregation, being part of the public worship of God . . . and one mean sanctified by Him for the edifying of His people, is to be performed by the pastors and teachers' (*The Directory for the Publik Worship of God*, 1645). This part of His prophetic ministry should still be taken seriously by the Reformed pastor. I can recall moments in my own ministry when I felt that my preaching was very poor, but that at least the Word of God, as revealed in the Scriptures of both the Old and the New Testament, was read. The reading of Scripture can stir in the hearts and minds of both minister and congregation such deep emotion that it becomes one of the great spiritual experiences in worship. It is interesting to notice how in different countries the form of worship as practised in one of the numerically stronger denominations, influences the form adopted by the smaller ones. I noticed in one of the larger Methodist Churches in Scotland that the form of worship was almost indistinguishable from Presbyterian worship, while in some part of America the form of worship has been strongly influenced by Methodist, and Baptist practices. Even in Presbyterian churches in the United States the reading of Scripture is seldom a central act of worship, but frequently just a brief introduction to the sermon. But the Book of Church Order of the Presbyterian Church in the United States mentions reading beside preaching and expounding of the Word among the duties of the minister. Stuart R. Oglesby in his widely used exposition of the Book of Church Order (*Presbyterianism in Action*, Richmond Va., p. 111) lists these duties as the 'Prophetic functions'. The younger generation of ministers in America seems to be conscious of the need of giving the reading of the Word a central place in worship again.

However, preaching is still the strength of Presbyterianism throughout the world. In Britain, in Canada and in the United States I have again and again heard ministers and laymen of other denominations praising the high intellectual and spiritual standard of sermons preached in Presbyterian Churches. (This includes, of course, the United Church of Canada with its wonderful blend of Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregationalists traditions.) The reason for this high quality of Presbyterian preaching lies in the emphasis on the Word of God as 'the whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith and life' (*Confession of Faith*, I.VI). Objectively, the work of the preacher might be divided into the proclamation and the exposition of the Word. Both proclamation and exposition are normally contained in the same sermon. But sometimes the preacher may deliver sermons which are chiefly exegetical—a very good discipline for himself as well as for the congregation—and sometimes he may wish to give a simple evangelical message to stir up his own faith and that of the congregation. But even the exegetical sermon must have a message and the plain evangelical message ought to be based on sound exegesis of Scripture, so that proclamation and exposition are in all cases two aspects of the same prophetic ministry.

Subjectively, the ministry of the Word is also twofold. According to Professor T. W. Manson it is the prophetic function of the ministry 'to proclaim the Kingdom to those who are still outside and to manifest the Kingdom in its own community life; to declare Christ to the world and to show the Lord's life and death and risen life within its own borders: to convert the non-Christian and to edify the Christian (*The Church's Ministry*, pp. 58ff). By 'edifying' Professor Manson means 'building him into the structure of the Church'. These two subjective aspects of the prophetic ministry are inseparable from one another. Every preacher must strive to convince his congregation of the mission of the Church, and every missionary, at home and abroad, must try to integrate his hearers into the structure of the Church.

From this task the preacher must never shrink. If a hostile or patronising state orders him to preach another gospel than that of Jesus Christ, he must obey God rather than man;

if a congregation prefers to hear more pleasant news than that of human depravity, the need of salvation and the Christian responsibility towards the fellow man, he must continue to proclaim the Gospel; if those who are only on the fringe of the Church prefer to remain 'mission people', he ought to tell them gently but firmly that to be a member of Christ means also to be members one with another. 'Necessity is laid upon me, yea woe is unto me, if I preach not the gospel' (1 Cor. 9.16). The prophetic ministry means suffering—but suffering with joy.

The Reformers took a very high view of the prophetic function of the ministry. 'God has so arranged it among his people', writes Zwingli, 'that the prophet's office, that is, the heavenly teaching, shall always continue.' (Quoted from J. L. Ainslie, *The Doctrines of Ministerial Order in the Reformed Churches of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, *Edinburgh*, 1940, p. 7.) The responsibility laid upon those who are called to preach the Word of God as prophets is tremendous.

I have known experienced ministers who every Sunday went into the pulpit with deep apprehension because they knew that they were called to speak in God's name and such task is the hardest in the world. A high view of the prophetic office is also expressed in the *Genevan Confession* of 1537, one of the earliest documents of Reformed Church Order: 'Thus we receive the true ministers of the Word of God as messengers and ambassadors of God, to whom it is required to hearken as to Himself, and we consider their ministry is a commission from God necessary to the Church' (Ainslie, p. 8). No Roman priest can speak with an authority as high as that conferred upon a Presbyterian minister. It used to be said in Scotland 'the lower the Church, the higher the pulpit'. In the former United Presbyterian Church the pulpit was usually so high that a young preacher might have taken a dizzy turn when he went up for the first time. However, the high pulpit was a symbol of the high regard in which the prophetic ministry was held in an apparently 'low Church'. Not a Scottish Presbyterian, but an English Methodist, A. E. Whitham wrote: 'In Scotland the office of the ministry in its greatest days was accepted as supernatural and the rebuke of the pulpit was the rebuke of God' (*Discipline and Culture of the Spiritual Life*,

London, 1939, p. 102). No wonder that the ministers of those days spent many hours in sermon preparation and prayer. It is a humbling experience to be God's spokesman. The occasion for which Richard Baxter's work *The Reformed Pastor* was written was 'a day of humiliation' held by the ministers of the county of Worcester on the 4th December 1655. (A tricentenary which should not be overlooked!) Whenever Reformed ministers survey their tasks, it will be a day of humiliation.

In the exercise of his prophetic function as preacher—and only in this function—the minister is beyond the praise and the blame of the congregation. 'Above is the office of the proclamation of the Word', writes Dietrich Bonhoeffer (*Ethik*. München, 1949, p. 227), 'below is the listening congregation. The preacher is not the exponent of the congregation, but—if this expression might be used—he is the exponent of God towards the congregation . . . . This office is established by Jesus Christ Himself, it receives its authorisation not by the will of the congregation, but by the will of Jesus Christ. It is established in the congregation, not by the congregation.'

Can any human being fill that place? As long as the preacher remains self-conscious, as long as he thinks of his own position, of the effects and defects of his oratory, he cannot speak as God's servant but if after careful preparation he can so forget himself that God speaks through him, then he shall receive the power of the Spirit to proclaim the Word.

(2) *Minister of the Church*

In his prophetic function as minister of the Word, the Presbyterian pastor is more exalted than the Roman priest. In Presbyterian Churches the pulpit used to be central, while in the Roman Church the pulpit was normally in the nave among the people. (It is remarkable that change in Church architecture seems to express a compromise between the Roman and the Reformed position. In modern Roman Catholic Churches the pulpit has been moved up to a place where it traditionally stands in Anglican Churches, while in modern Presbyterian Churches the pulpit has been moved down and stands now in a parallel line with the communion rail or chancel steps.) In his priestly function, how-

ever, the Presbyterian minister always remains the agent and mouthpiece of the people. Is the expression 'priestly function' (Oglesby, op. cit., p. 110) applicable at all to the Reformed pastor and can it be reconciled with the evangelical doctrine of the priesthood of believers? In the Old Testament, 'the whole community', writes Lightfoot, 'is regarded as a kingdom of priests while the nation deputes to a single tribe the priestly functions which belonged properly to itself as a whole. The Christian idea (of the priesthood of believers) therefore was the restitution of the immediate and direct relation with God which was partly suspended but not abolished by the appointment of a sacerdotal tribe' (Lightfoot, op. cit., p. 180). In Judaism the offices of Cohen and Levite which were reserved to members of the Levitical tribe have been defunct ever since the destruction of the temple, though a quaint reminder of these ancient functions can still be seen in Jewish cemeteries. The blessing hands carved on a tombstone indicate that this is the resting place of one who descended from a priestly family, while the water-jug on other stones recalls a tradition which goes back to the service of the Levites in the temple. In the Christian Church every member is potentially a priest, but certain persons who have received a call from God and are ordained by the Church exercise priestly functions on behalf of the whole royal priesthood. In performing these functions on behalf of the Israel of God the pastor is a minister of the Church.

It is therefore the privilege and the duty of all the faithful who belong to the priesthood of believers to offer spiritual sacrifices to God, but it belongs to the ministry of the Christian pastor to present the living sacrifices of the whole congregation to God. The minister exercises the priestly function when in the Communion Service, he addresses the Heavenly Father on behalf of the people, saying: 'Here we offer and present ourselves, our souls and bodies, to be a holy, reasonable and living sacrifice.' The pastoral prayer for and with the people always constitutes a holy, reasonable and living sacrifice. Paul has defined his ministry to the Gentiles as the task of 'ministering the gospel of God, that the offering up of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being sanctified by the Holy Ghost' (Rom. 15.16). John Calvin infers from this

passage that the Apostle had laid down the priestly function of the ministry. 'Doubtless this is the priesthood of the Christian pastor, that is to sacrifice men, as it were, to God, and not as the Papists have hitherto haughtily vaunted, by offering up Christ to reconcile men to God. He does not, however, give here the name of priests to the pastors of the Church, simply as a perpetual title but intending to command the honour and power of the ministry. Paul availed himself of the opportunity of using this metaphor. Let then the preachers of the gospel have this end in view while discharging their office, even to offer up to God souls purified by faith.' (John Calvin, *Commentary on Romans*, 15.16.)

Every minister, exercising the priestly function of offering souls to God, belongs to the whole Church of God. Some time ago, I took a Communion Service in a Church in Texas which had no regular minister. After the service in the Church I visited six invalids in their homes and administered the Sacrament to them. I am not a minister of that congregation. I am not even a minister of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, and I would never have presumed to exercise priestly functions in that congregation if there had been a regular minister. But just as a doctor would render medical assistance in an emergency to any patient, so the minister of the Church at large renders spiritual assistance in a spiritual emergency.

The principle, that the Christian pastor is a minister of the whole Church, holds true also of his relation to his own congregation. It is only natural that congregations are sometimes more enthusiastic about their own schemes than about the work of the whole Church. They might be more anxious to provide the best educational facilities for the children of the congregation than to start a boys club for the children in the parish whose parents have no Christian affiliation. The congregation might work hard to raise funds for a new organ, but be reluctant to support Foreign Missions adequately. They would gladly help with a campaign to win new members for the local Church, but they are only theoretically concerned with the world-wide Church. All this is very understandable, but the minister of the parish church should also stimulate the congregation's interest in the people of the neighbourhood,

the 'paroikia'. Let the parish minister say (with due apology to the late John Wesley), 'The parish is my world.'

The Presbyterian minister is always the minister of a national Church. He must watch that the missionary enterprise has its proper place not only in the congregational budgets but also in the hearts of the members. The Presbyterian minister is also conscious of the fact that his Church is a member of the World Council. He has a great opportunity of making the members of his Church familiar with the ecumenical movement.

It is so much easier for the pastor who works from the Church as his centre to get acquainted with the neighbourhood than for members of the congregation who, as it is usually the case in American cities, once or twice a week drive from their distant residences to the Church. It is much easier for the pastor who receives missionary pamphlets and hears reports of Mission Committees in the courts of the Church to be informed about the work of Foreign Missions than for the average member of the congregation who relies on his minister or mission representative for information. It is so much easier for the pastor whose theological studies have enabled him to learn about the early councils of the Church, and whose fellowship with brother ministers from other denominations have helped him to understand the opportunities and the difficulties of Ecumenical co-operation, to appreciate the problems of the world-wide Church than for the layman whose only Christian contact is within his own congregation. The minister who has all these sources of information has therefore the duty to uphold the parochial, missionary, and ecumenical character of the Church.

(3) *Minister of the Congregation*

Finally he is the minister of a particular congregation. As minister of the congregation the pastor exercises 'paternal functions'. According to the Presbyterian Order the elders are the fathers of the congregation. Just as parents delegate their parental functions to the teacher of their children, so the elders delegate part of the parental functions, but by no means all of them, to the minister. The administration, the discipline, the domestic arrangements, the teaching of

the young and even part of the pastoral care still remains the responsibility of the Session.

The question has been raised in America whether the minister is the servant of the congregation or only serves in the congregation. The answer to the vexed question is this: The minister should serve his congregation as if he were its servant, but he should be treated as if he were its father. Our Lord who took upon Himself the form of a servant, gave us the supreme example of personal service. The minister can't be the servant of the Word and of the Church as a whole, unless he is also willing to serve the least of God's children. God has placed the minister in a congregation so that he can render personal, humble service to young and old, to rich and poor, to the intellectuals and to the simple-minded, to the healthy and to the sick, to those who are grounded in the faith and to those who are troubled by doubts. He should serve them all—and not only some of them—as a father serves his children or as a teacher serves his scholars. This service can be so humble that the minister really acts like a servant. Nevertheless the minister is not under the discipline of the Session or of the Congregation but of the Presbytery. It is the pastor's duty not only towards the whole Church which he represents in the congregation, but towards the congregation itself which he fathers, to uphold the authority and the dignity of the ministry. Whether he cuts the lawn or moves furniture for one of his parishioners who needs a helping hand, whether he carries food to a sick person or straightens his bed, whether he plays with the children or entertains the old folk, he always does it as the Minister, exercising thereby his paternal functions.

I can't think of any task which would be too mean for a minister to perform in the interest of his congregation or of some individual member, neither can I think of any title high enough to signify the unique position of the minister in the congregation, but that of father.

To exercise prophetic functions by speaking to the people in behalf of God, priestly functions by speaking to God in behalf of the people, and paternal functions by serving His people as a fatherly friend, is the challenge and the privilege of the Reformed Ministry.

THE SHEPHERD-RULER CONCEPT IN THE OT AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE NT

by The Rev. J. G. S. S. THOMSON

I

It was inevitable, amongst a pastoral community such as the Hebrews, that the vocabulary and occupational habits of the shepherd should colour their language and help to formulate their way of looking at life. This was particularly true in the sphere of religion. The rich imagery of the pastoral life of Palestine has been one of the creative elements in the language and religious thought—forms of the OT, especially where Israel's relationships with Jahweh were concerned. Undoubtedly the OT conception of God, of divine providence, and of man's relations with God owe much of their profound insight and simple dignity to the metaphors current among the shepherds who lived among the Judaean hills and on the plains of Samaria.

The extent to which this was true may be gauged from one particular way in which the OT handles the well-known Hebrew root רעה. It means to pasture or tend sheep, but in the OT it is also applied to the relations between a ruler (at the national or provincial level) and his people. The ruler was the shepherd of his people. That this Shepherd-Ruler concept was shared by other Semitic peoples (it was also current among the Greeks; see e.g. *Odyssey* IV. 532; *Iliad* 1.263, 11.243)[1] is clear from its occurrence in their literature, and reference will be made to these sources in the discussion that follows. It is the purpose of this Paper to elucidate the use in the OT of this figure of speech and then to show how it was taken up and applied by the NT writers. In the OT the Shepherd-Ruler metaphor is applied to Jahweh, to particular national leaders in Israel, to kings and royal counsellors in Israel, to commanders of armies that invaded Palestine, and

[1] Philo (*De Agricultura*, 41ff) refers to the contention of the Stoics that the wise alone are kings and so earn the title used by poets, 'shepherds of the people'.

to the Messiah. This is a purely arbitrary order, but it will serve as a guide in the course of the discussion.

(1) *The Shepherd-Ruler Metaphor Applied to Jahweh*

The use of this metaphor figures quite prominently in the doctrine of God in the OT, but this was by no means peculiar to the OT. Other nations also thought of their gods as Shepherd-Kings. Cf. e.g. these quotations from Assyrian literature: '(In) Bad-tibira, En-meṅ-lu-Anna ruled 43.200 years; En-men-gal-Anna ruled 28.800 years; the god Dumu-zi, a shepherd, ruled 36.000 years. Three kings (thus) ruled it for 108.000 years.' 'Etana, a shepherd, who ascended to heaven (and) who consolidated all countries became king and ruled 1.560 (var. 1.500) years.'[1]

But the application of the Shepherd-King metaphor to the deity is very common in the OT where Jahweh is the subject. See e.g. Isa. 40.10f where the two roots משל and רעה are conjoined to describe God's activity. The phrase, 'His arm rules (משלה) for him', is followed by the words, 'As a shepherd his flock he will feed.' Jahweh's arm which 'rules for him' (v.10) is that in which He 'gathers the lambs' (v.11).

In Ps. 80.1, רעה is again closely linked with the kingly rule of God. The divine 'shepherd of Israel' who 'leads Joseph like a flock . . . sitteth upon the cherubim.' Undoubtedly this latter phrase (in Hebrew it reads יֹשֵׁב הכרובים) is a reference to Jahweh's throne. In 1 Sam. 4.4, 2 Sam. 6.2, 2 Kings 19.15, the phrase is used with reference to the cherubim above the Ark of the Covenant where Jahweh was thought to be enthroned. We have, therefore, in Ps. 80.1, the dual idea of the divine Shepherd-King of Israel enthroned in heaven and dwelling in the midst of His flock on earth. The same phrase also occurs in Ps. 99.1, where again it is closely related to the kingly rule of God. It is immediately preceded by the words, 'The Lord reigneth' (מלך). Cf. also v. 4 where God is called 'the mighty king'. See also 2 Kings 19.15-19. Obviously the RSV has good grounds for rendering יֹשֵׁב הכרובים 'Thou who art enthroned upon the cherubim.' Now, it is this pregnant phrase that is so closely conjoined with Jahweh's shepherdly care over Israel in Ps. 80.1. The

[1] *Jas. B. Pritchard, Ancient and Near Eastern Texts*, p 265, col.b.

psalmist sees no incongruity in describing 'The shepherd of Israel' as He who is 'enthroned above the cherubim'. And it is from this exalted position that He issues forth to exercise His kingly-pastoral care over His people (Ps. 80.1f). A similar association of ideas is found in Ps. 95.6f where the exhortation, 'O come, let us worship and bow down, let us kneel before the Lord our maker' is addressed to 'the people of his pasture, and the sheep of his hand'.[1]

Micah also brings together the royal rule and pastoral care of Jahweh in ch. 2 of his book. When He brings His people back from exile Jahweh 'will set them together like sheep in a fold, like a flock in its pasture' (v. 12). But in order to accomplish this, 'their king (מלכם) will pass on before them' (v. 13). And the prophet makes it plain that 'their king' is Jahweh by adding, 'the Lord at their head'. Again in Ps. 78.52ff where Israel's liberation from Egypt (due to the exercise of the Lord's kingly power) is described in metaphors borrowed from pastoral life (v. 52).

(2) *The Shepherd-Ruler Metaphor Applied to Certain National Leaders in Israel*

In Num. 27.16ff Joshua's leadership of the nation is referred to in terms of a shepherd's care for his sheep. He is to lead Israel out and bring her in 'that the congregation of the Lord be not as sheep which have no shepherd'. In 1 Kings 22.17 the same simile is used in reference to Ahab. The connexion between the historical ruler of the people and the metaphorical shepherd of a flock is unmistakable.

In 2 Sam. 7.7 the Shepherd-Ruler metaphor is applied to the Judges who ruled in Israel. The Lord asks Nathan, 'Did I speak a word with any of the judges (reading with the parallel passage in 1 Chron. 17.6 שפטי for שבטי, tribes) of Israel whom I commanded to shepherd (לרעות) my people Israel?'

Parallels to this use of the figure of speech are, of course, found in non-Jewish literature. Hammurabi, for example, is both king and shepherd. 'Hammurabi, the shepherd, called by Enlil, am I . . . the efficient king.'[2] And again. 'I,

[1] cf. also Philo, *De Agricultura*, 50-53, who, in a comment in Ps.23.1 speaks of 'God the Shepherd King'.

[2] *Jas. B. Pritchard, Ancient and Near Eastern Texts*, p. 164, col.b.

Hammurabi, the perfect king . . . whose (i.e. the people's) shepherding Marduk had committed to me'.[1] Lipit-Ishtar is also spoken of in similar terms. 'When Anu (and) Enlil had called Lipit-Ishtar—Lipit-Ishtar, the wise shepherd whose name had been pronounced by Nunamir (another name for the god Enlil)—to the princeship of the land in order to establish justice in the land.'[2] This style of address is also used of Esarhaddan. 'Property of Esarhaddan, great king, legitimate king, king of the world, king of Assyria, regent of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four rims (of the earth), the true shepherd, favourite of the gods.'[3]

The most interesting OT parallel to the foregoing is King David, and since he was originally a shepherd (1 Sam. 16.11, 17.15, 34,40; Ps. 78.70f) the use of the metaphor is particularly appropriate in his case.[4] That David was reckoned to be both king and shepherd is clear from 2 Sam. 5. On his being elevated to the throne the people say to him, 'The Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt be shepherd (אתה תרעה) of my people Israel, and thou shalt be prince (נגיד) over Israel, (v. 2). S. R. Driver observes[5] that this is the first metaphorical use of תרעה in the OT, and here it refers to the ruler's care for his people. Cf. also 2 Sam. 7, Mic. 5.4, Jer. 2.8, Ezek. 34. That נגיד in 2 Sam. 5.2 means king is clear from v. 3 where מלך in reference to David occurs three times.[6] David's kingly rule is also expressed in terms of the shepherd's care for the flock in Ps. 78.70ff. God took David from the sheepfolds 'to shepherd Jacob' (v. 71). 'So he shepherded them' (v. 72).

(3) *The Shepherd-Ruler Metaphor Applied to the Nobility in Israel*

Jer. 2.8 is of special interest here because it refers explicitly to the three main groups into which the middle and upper classes were divided, viz. priests, prophets, and 'the shepherds'. Here the רעים are the political leaders, the kings and princes who, along with the leaders among the priests and prophets, con-

[1] ibid., p. 164, col. b. [2] ibid., p. 159, col. b. [3] ibid., p. 289, col. a.
[4] cf. Matt. 4.19 where Jesus' disciples, Galilean fishermen, are called 'fishers of men'.
[5] *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel*, p. 257.
[6] נגיד is also used of Saul (1 Sam. 9.16), of David again (2 Sam. 6.21), of Solomon (1 Kings 1.35), Jeroboam (1 Kings 14.7) and other kings.

stituted the ruling classes. In Jer. 25.34-36 these 'Shepherds' are called אדירים 'lords of the flock' who in virtue of their high station governed the land. Zechariah also speaks of these Shepherd-Rulers (10.3) but there he uses the term עתודים, he-goats, in reference to them. Compare also Isa. 14.9; Ezek. 34.17. This is indeed a striking metaphor for the leaders of the people. Just as the he-goats push their way through the gate of the fold when it is opened (Jer. 50.8) and so lead the rest of the flock (the term is also reminiscent of the bell-wethers of the flock) so the aristocracy in Israel, in virtue of their wealth and culture, naturally assume leadership in national affairs.

Alas, their conduct in the political life of the nation resembled the behaviour of careless shepherds who neglected their sheep (Jer. 2.8, 23.1) and were, therefore, destined to be replaced by other shepherds who would be faithful to their charge (Jer. 3.15; 23.4). Ezekiel also adds his condemnation of the policy which these shepherds pursued but he too anticipated the time when they would be deposed (cf. 34.2-10 with 34.23; 37.24). Perhaps Ezek. 34 does emphasise the spiritual rather than the political aspect of their work but in v. 23 the false shepherds are contrasted with the true Shepherd of the House of David, which suggests that the prophet had in mind the political not the priestly office. Ezekiel's use in v. 4 of רדה, to have dominion over, is also significant here. These political shepherd-rulers had been pursuing a policy that had impoverished the people and enriched themselves (34.7-11), so that the account of their handling of national politics is a sorry tale of misrule (Jer. 50.6) which could issue only in exile.

(4) *The Shepherd-Ruler Metaphor applied to Gentile Military commanders*

Perhaps the most interesting OT reference to this group is in Mic. 5.5f. There are two things to notice here. (*a*) The remarkable collocation in the phrase 'seven shepherds and eight princes (נסיכי) of men' who were to subdue Assyria.[1] The parallelism in Mic. 5.5f must mean that the 'shepherds' were part of the nobility from whose ranks the military

[1] Cf. Ps. 2.6 where נסך is used of the Messianic king; Joshua 13.21 where נסיכים is parallelled with נשיאים; and with נדיבים in Ps. 83.11.

commanders were naturally taken. (*b*) These Shepherd-Commanders were to 'rule' Assyria with the sword. The word for rule is רעה, which conjures up a graphic picture of the devastation which these 'shepherds' were to work in Assyria. Just as a shepherd's flock crops the grass in the meadows so the armies, led by these shepherd war-lords were to strip and denude the land of Assyria. The 'shepherds' in Jer. 6.3 are also Gentile military commanders. See the marked military flavour of the language in vv. 4, 5, and notice that רעה is there used in the same sense as in Mic. 5.6. Zion is to become a meadow on which the enemy armies will pasture. In Jer. 12.10ff the 'shepherds' are called 'destroyers'.

In Nah. 3.18, where mordant sarcasm is directed against the now humiliated king of Assyria, the prophet throws out the taunt that the doomed monarch's 'shepherds' slumber. Nahum calls them אדירים, the nobles upon whom devolved the government and defence of the kingdom. The closing words of Nah. 3.18 are strongly reminiscent of the panic and ensuing aimless wandering of sheep bereft of their shepherd. There is an interesting use of the word for shepherd in one of the Amarna Letters[1] which is significant here. The writer of the Letter, the Governor of the beleaguered Jerusalem, protests to his Egyptian overlord saying:

> Behold, I am not a regent (or prince).
> An officer (deputy) I am of the king my lord;
> Behold, I am a shepherd of the king.

This description which a member of the ruling class gives of his governorship of Jerusalem agrees well with the OT's use of the term shepherd in reference to the Gentile military commanders. In the OT the shepherd-ruler metaphor is also applied to Cyrus. In Isa. 44.28 he is called 'My shepherd' whom Jahweh is raising up to fulfil His purpose. The description that follows in Isa. 44 of the kingly might and triumphant progress of Cyrus shows once again that here 'shepherd' connotes ruler of a nation.

(5) *The Shepherd-ruler Metaphor applied to Messiah*

This concept, of which David was the ideal embodiment, was finally associated with the person and rule of the Messianic

[1] *J. A. Knudtzon, Die El-Amarna Tafeln*, no. 288, v.11.

king. The earliest application to Messiah in the prophets of this figure of speech is in Mic. 5.2-4. The 'ruler' (מושל) who was to come out of Bethlehem Ephrathah and 'feed his flock' was to be no ordinary ruler. His 'origins' were 'from of old, from ancient days'. His kingly rule was to be 'in the majesty of the name of the Lord his God', and he himself would be 'great unto the ends of the earth'.

In another Messianic passage, Ezek. 34.22-24, Messiah's kingly rule is again described in both regal and pastoral terms. When Jahweh has gathered together His scattered 'flock' (v. 22), He will 'set up over them one shepherd' who 'shall shepherd them and be their shepherd' (v. 23). But this 'shepherd' is called 'my servant David' (vv. 22, 24); i.e., the Messiah of David's line, an ideal ruler such as David had been. And that his shepherd care is to be understood in terms of regal authority is made plain by the use of נשׂיא (prince) in v. 24. Ezekiel's use of נשׂיא to describe this Messianic Shepherd-King is a feature of his writings; cf. especially chapters 44-46 and 48.

The same association of ideas occurs in Ezek. 37. 'My servant David shall be king (מלך) over them; and they shall all have one shepherd' (רעה) v. 24. In v. 25 'my servant David' is to be 'their prince' (נשׂיא) for ever.' The Messianic flavour is unmistakable, as is also the conviction that Messiah is to be a Shepherd-Prince. The actual occurrence of the terms shepherd, king and prince in reference to Messiah recalls Philo's words when speaking of the Logos: 'taking over the care of this sacred flock like the vicegerent of a great king.'[1]

II

The question which we must now ask is, How did the NT use the Shepherd-Ruler figure of speech which it borrowed from the OT? We have seen that this dual metaphor was, in the OT, applied to five different categories, but it is obvious at the very outset that the NT had no reason to manifest interest in all five of these. In the NT it is never God who leads the sheep; it is Christ. Then, again, there was no occasion for the NT to refer to the shepherd-rule of Gentile military commanders. In fact, NT writers apply the figure of speech in

[1] *De Agricultura*, 50-53.

only three instances. They applied it to the leaders of the Jewish people in the period covered by the four Gospels; to Jesus Christ; and to the leaders of the Christian Church. This is, again, a quite arbitrary order, but it lays down a convenient method of approach to the subject.

(1) *The Shepherd-Ruler Metaphor applied to the Leaders of the Jewish People*

Apparently the sight of vast concourses of people never failed to move Jesus; the reason being that they always seemed to Him to be like sheep which, having no shepherd, are distressed and scattered (Matt. 9.36; Mark 6.34; cf. Num. 27.17, 1 Kings 22.17; Ezek. 34.5). Notice too that it was to 'the lost sheep of the house of Israel' that both Jesus (Matt. 15.24) and His disciples (Matt. 10.6) were sent. Now the Gospels leave us with the impression that the people were in this sad case because their leaders were behaving as their OT prototypes had done. It was in reference to the unfaithful rulers of ancient Israel (whom Ezekiel had denounced as unworthy shepherds), and to the false shepherd-rulers of His own time that Christ used the words 'thieves and robbers' (John 10.1) and 'hirelings' (John 10.12f). Although they sat 'on Moses' seat' (Matt. 23.2), professing to interpret the Torah and feed the flock, and deciding who should be admitted and who should be cast out from the fold (John 9.22, 34), they had in fact become mere hireling shepherds (John 10.12f; cf. Ezek. 34.2ff; Jer. 23.1ff; Zech. 11.3ff,17) who were bent on self-aggrandisement at the expense of the sheep (John 10.10).

Probably much of the point that the Parable of the Good Shepherd had for its original hearers derived from the fact that it was a continuation of the conversation (John 9.35ff) between Christ and the man who had been excommunicated from the Synagogue (John 9.23, 34). C. H. Dodd observes: 'It would in fact be quite possible to read 9.41-10.5 as what it formally is, a single speech of Jesus, directly motivated by the situation depicted in ch. 9.'[1] And notice too that it is in the course

[1] *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 359. See further the footnote on the same page where he points out that only in ch. 9 does the Fourth Gospel refer to the relations between the authorities and the people 'as distinct from their relations with Jesus Himself. There is therefore no other place where the discourse about true and false shepherds could be so fitly introduced.'

of this parable that Jesus makes plain who it is who has authority to admit to the true fold or to exclude from it.

It is fairly obvious, as C. H. Dodd points out[1] that Ezek. ch. 34 is the basis of John 10.1-18. In both passages the false shepherd-rulers are condemned for robbing and killing the sheep (Ezek. 34.3; John 10.1, 10), and for abandoning them to their enemies (Ezek. 34.8; John 10.12f). In excluding from the fold the man to whom spiritual as well as physical sight had been restored by our Lord these shepherd-rulers were scattering the flock. With true prophetic insight Ezekiel had looked forward to the time when the false shepherds would be deposed and the Messiah would become the true Shepherd of God's flock; but the successors of the OT shepherds still had oversight of the flock. It is not surprising, therefore, that to Jesus the multitudes that thronged Him were like a flock of sheep which, neglected by the shepherd, were hunted and footsore. The shepherds of God's flock were only shepherds by profession, men devoid of the shepherd heart, incapable of even understanding the spirit that prompted the desire to get alongside the social outcastes in order to bring them in (Matt. 9.11). Had the people had men of the shepherd heart to tend and guide them how different had been their case. How natural for the Good Shepherd to send out His under-shepherds primarily to 'the lost sheep of the house of Israel'—'lost sheep' not wilfully, but because they were neglected, and therefore this OT phrase[2] is used by Christ not in blame but affectionate pity.

(2) *The Shepherd-Ruler Metaphor applied to Jesus Christ*

It was the most natural thing in the world for the NT writers to appropriate this figure of speech to their Lord. They saw[3] in His birth the fulfilment of Mic. 5.2, but in Matt. 2.6 the 'ruler' 'shall shepherd Israel' (cf. 2 Sam. 5.2). Now, what the union of ruler and shepherd in Christ involved is plain from the discourse on the Good Shepherd, to which reference has already been made. This divine Shepherd-Ruler is able to lead the sheep out (John 10.3), deliver them from danger, give them liberty and safe pasture (v. 9). More important still He gives to the sheep of His pasture 'eternal life' (vv. 10, 28),

[1] ibid., pp. 358f. [2] Jer. 50.6. [3] Matt. 2.6.

which involves 'a voluntary and vicarious self-sacrifice'. But even in laying down His life for the sheep (vv. 11, 15) the Shepherd-Ruler metaphor does not break down. In laying it down He exercises an inalienable right (ἐξουσία, v. 18). Far from anyone taking the life of this Shepherd-King He lays it down of His own accord (v. 18). Indeed He laid it down that He might take it again (v. 17).

It was natural, therefore, that when the Shepherd-Ruler metaphor was applied to Christ it should assume an even deeper significance in the spiritual consciousness of the NT Church. E.g. in Heb. 13.20 He is 'the great shepherd of the sheep' whom God had brought again from among the dead. In 1 Pet. 2.25 Christ is both a ποιμήν and an ἐπίσκοπος. This is certainly a verse which sends us back immediately to OT sources. Peter is addressing those who used to be 'as sheep going astray' (Isa. 53.6). Sheep go astray because their shepherds are devoid of the shepherd heart (Ezek. 34.6); but when the divine Shepherd-Overseer appeared straying sheep turned to Him instinctively in fulfilment of Ezek. 34.23. This Shepherd-Messiah of David's line had come that the sheep might have life in abundance, and having other sheep which were not yet of this fold He was under a divine constraint to bring them together.

It was a sure instinct, then, that led the Church in the NT to apply this potent figure of speech even to her transcendent, glorified Lord; and this at a time when her enemies were bent on her destruction. It is significant that this metaphor, used in relation to Christ, is prominent in the NT Apocalypse, a book that confines His shepherding to the future life. In 7.17 it is 'the Lamb who is in the midst of the throne' who is to shepherd (ποιμάνει) those who come out of great tribulation; this, be it noted, is yet another verse that sends us back to the OT. See e.g. Isa. 40.11; and cf. Ezek. 34.23; Ps. 23.1ff, 80.1.

The striking collocation in Apoc. 7.17 where the Lamb is at the same time a shepherd involves a bold mixture of metaphors; much too bold indeed for C. H. Dodd who in his book *The Fourth Gospel*[1] feels compelled to try to solve the problem posed by this mixture of metaphors. He points out that the word for lamb in 7.17 is not ἀμνός but ἀρνίον; and that in

[1] pp. 231f.

the Apocalypse it is not the sacrifice of the Lamb that is emphasised but His exaltation and power. The throne in glory is 'the throne of God and of the Lamb' (22.1, 3). The enemies of God 'war against the Lamb'; but He overcomes them because He is 'Lord of lords and King of kings' (17.14). And it is from 'the wrath of the Lamb' that all men, from kings to slaves, hide themselves (6.15-17).

Now this is the Lamb who is to shepherd the people of God (7.17); and Professor Dodd goes to Jewish apocalypse to find an explanation of the offending paradox. He refers to *Enoch* 89 where the leaders of God's flock are spoken of as sheep or rams (i.e. bell-wethers), and to 89.46 where David, first described as a lamb (ἀρήν), becomes successively a κριόν (ram), an ἄρχοντα (ruler), and a ἡγούμενος (leader). C. H. Dodd then quotes *Enoch* 90.6-19 where a battle is described in which victory finally lies with one sheep out of whose head 'there sprouteth a great horn'. It is in this sheep that he sees the prototype of the Lamb in the NT Apocalypse who in wrath makes war against His enemies. Compare also the *Testaments* (Jos. 19.8) where reference is made to a lamb that overcame all who made war against it.

Now it is true that these references in Jewish apocalyptic literature might be used to explain the paradox in Apoc. 7.17 but the question arises, Is the mixture of metaphors in 7.17 so very offensive? And does not the proposed solution do less than justice to the conviction of the Church in the NT that her Lord who is King of kings was also the Lamb of God who bore away the sin of the world? The way to the throne was a via dolorosa. In the Church's faith the King of kings was the Man of sorrows, tormented and crushed for our sins; who humbled Himself so that finally He was as a lamb led to the slaughter, and as a sheep that before her shearers is dumb. But He who thus emptied Himself and became obedient to the death of the Cross has now been highly exalted and given a name above every name; and in that name every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess that its Bearer is the Lord of glory.

In the light of this fundamental conviction held by the Church concerning her Lord it is surely more incongruous to wish to explain the Lamb in Apoc. 7.17 in terms of the bell-wether of the flock. Cf. also 12.5 which speaks of 'a man child who is to

shepherd (ποιμαίνειν) all the nations with a rod of iron'; see also 2.27, 19.15 which refer to the rod of iron and emphasise the regal authority of this Shepherd-King. The allusion to the rod of iron is based on Ps. 2.8f where the Massoretes read תְּרֹעֵם (from רעע) while the LXX, which has ποιμανεῖς, read תִּרְעֵם (from רעה). In Apoc. 19.15 the Shepherd-King smites the pagan nations with this rod of iron.

(3) *The Shepherd-Ruler Metaphor applied to NT Church Leaders*

Paul tells the Presbyters of the church in Ephesus that the Holy Spirit has made them ἐπίσκοποι of the flock in order to shepherd (ποιμαίνειν) the Church of God (Acts. 20.28). Cf. also Eph. 4.11.

Peter also, who himself had received a personal commission from the Chief Shepherd to feed His sheep (John 21.15-17), exhorts the Presbyters to shepherd the flock and exercise oversight (1 Pet. 5.1f). Now by both Paul and Peter it is recognised that these 'shepherds', in virtue of their appointment by Christ, exercised real authority (ἐπισκοποῦντες is the word Peter uses), and so were shepherd-rulers in the Church. This is also evident from the warning which Peter felt it was necessary to give in 1 Pet. 5.3, a warning against 'lording it over' the charge allotted to them, and also against exercising oversight for unworthy motives; e.g. 'for filthy lucre' (v. 2).

Now it is evident that NT churches suffered from false shepherd-rulers just as Jehovah's flock had suffered fearful depredation at the hands of their evil shepherds. As early as Acts 20.29f it was necessary for Paul to warn the leaders of the church at Ephesus that 'grievous wolves' would get in and try to scatter the flock. Even our Lord warned against 'false prophets'. Outwardly they were as innocent as sheep, inwardly they were 'greedy wolves', self-ambitious men bent on acquiring power and wealth at the expense of the flock (Matt. 7.15). And before the close of the NT period it was clear that the fears that prompted these warnings were not groundless. Jude speaks of 'shepherds who without fear feed themselves' (v. 12). And in the sub-apostolic age the *Didache* (12.5) names certain church leaders χριστέμποροι, a term which A. B. Bruce renders 'Christ-merchants'; men who cash in on

religious movements, and who exercise their ministry to satisfy personal ambition and to realise schemes for self-aggrandisement. Alas, those false shepherd-rulers were no new phenomenon. Their prototype had appeared centuries earlier within Israel.

BOOK REVIEWS

One Body in Christ. A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the Apostle Paul. By Ernest Best. S.P.C.K. Pp. 250. 25s. net.

Here is a powerful and pertinacious mind at work. This book deals honestly and thoroughly with the kind of issues that most commentaries on Paul only nibble at, or else fail entirely to see.

Dr Best studies not only the doctrine of the Body of Christ in its earlier form in Romans and I Corinthians, and in its later forms in Colossians and Ephesians, but also the kindred phrases: 'In Christ', 'Dying and Rising with Christ', 'Members of Christ'; the conception of Adam and Christ as contrasted Heads of humanity and the figures describing the Church as a building, and as the Bride of Christ. Of great value are his summaries of the views of earlier scholars on such matters as the meaning of 'In Christ' and the origin of the concept 'Body of Christ'. Best's opinion is that none of these ideas is for Paul, so to speak, the fountain-head of the rest, but that all are metaphors to describe various aspects of the relationship of believers to Christ and to each other in the Church, a relationship which he describes in terms of 'corporate personality'.

If we were to ask him whether, in his view, 'corporate personality' is itself a metaphor, he would say 'No'. It appears to be for him an idea incapable of logical formulation, and in this respect to differ from the metaphors which are used to describe it. If this relationship resists such formulation, it is, we might suggest, because it has no exact parallel in human experience, and therefore we are compelled, as it were, to aim converging metaphors at it. Thus, for Best, 'corporate personality' is the most fitting term to describe certain central elements in the Christian experience of the primitive Church as described in St. Paul's letters. It is from the experience that the term takes its particular colouring; the experience is not forced into a strait-jacket supplied by the term. Thus in this context Dr Best rejects all suggestions that hold that the personalities of the participants are submerged in a common organic life. And yet, where 'corporate personality' normally manifests itself, this is, to say the least, a danger. So long, then, as this emphasis is maintained, and so long as the concepts 'corporate

personality' and 'racial solidarity' are not presented to us in such a manner as to claim our approval of their questionable roots in such stories as those of Achar and Rizpah, then we shall be safe. It is, doubtless, of interest that there are many signs of a similar concept in the Old Testament, though a number of the passages cited by Dr Best in Appendix A at the end of the book do not require it for their interpretation. But so long as it is the reality in Christ which really determines the content of the term—and this is clearly Dr Best's intention—then we may well agree that here we have the thing of which the other terms discussed are the metaphorical and partial descriptions.

And that they *are* metaphorical expressions, Best leaves us in no doubt. Here he does us a great service, pointing out that writers so diverse as Mascall, Lietzmann and Moffatt claim that the description of the Church as 'Body of Christ' is to be taken 'ontologically and realistically'—though Mascall allows that it 'contains of course an element of metaphor'. Now what could the claim mean that a term like 'Body of Christ' was to be taken 'ontologically and realistically'? Would it not imply that all the characteristics essential to a living body were to be found in the Church?; that we could argue safely from the essential characteristics and structures of a living body to similar structures and characteristics in the Church? But Mascall himself concedes that in the Church 'we do not find an exact reduplication of the various organs in a physical body' (*Christ, the Christian and the Church*, p. 110).

The difficulty is that once we give up, with Mascall, the claim to complete realism, it is difficult to know where we are to stop, short of saying that the figure is a metaphor. We must not say 'a *mere* metaphor', for a metaphor, if well chosen, has a very firm grasp on reality.

The right conclusion would appear to be that which Dr Best draws, that the figure 'Body of Christ' when used of the Church, like the other figures employed by St. Paul for the same purpose, is to be used by us in these ways, and only in these ways, which were in the mind of the writer when he chose his figure.

A similar conclusion was reached long ago by Jülicher in the matter of the interpretation of the parables, when he declared that they were reliable only in the point which they were chosen to illustrate, and must not be treated as allegories, where every detail in the story had its counterpart in the reality.

One of the results of this decision of Dr Best's is that he refuses to regard the Church, on the strength of the metaphor 'Body of Christ', as Christ's instrument in the world, in the way that His body of flesh was in the days of His Incarnation. For when Paul

uses the term 'Body of Christ', he is thinking of the internal relationships of believers and the Church to Christ and to each other, and not of the Church's external relationship to the world.

It is probable, that in spite of this warning, writers of Confirmation manuals—no sneer is implied—will continue to make the effective teaching point that, just as Christ's body of flesh served His purposes in the the world, so the Church serves and must serve them in later ages. Put thus, there is no harm done—for it is not in doubt that the Church is called by Christ to perform a function in the world. There is plenty of evidence for this calling in other parts of the New Testament.

But when we come to the suggestion, based on the words 'Body of Christ', that the Church is a continuation of the Incarnation, then there are many who will feel that a vital truth is endangered, and that the error is due to the illegitimate extension of a metaphor beyond its intended sphere.

Best adduces very strong arguments why the figures chosen by Paul to describe the Church are parables and must not be taken ontologically and realistically. The very fact that the same figure changes in Paul's hands goes to prove this. For example, Christ can be the foundation, and then the coping-stone, of the Temple. And still more cogent is Paul's choice of one figure after another to describe various aspects of the Church and its life in Christ. To take anyone of these 'ontologically and realistically' is to put the rest out of count.

In all Paul's teaching about the Church, Dr Best points out, there is a tension. On the one hand there is an organic unity between Christ and the Church, so that members of the Church can be called members of Christ, and the Church can be for a moment at least equated with Christ Himself (1 Cor. 12.12). On the other hand, no further use is made of this idea, and Paul is continually and visibly restraining himself and using phrases which exalt Christ's position in the Church, His authority over it, and His distinction from its members.

In his conclusion the author rejects two extreme views of the Church—on the one hand the position taken by an individualistic liberal Christianity, which regards the Church as merely a society of likeminded individual believers; and on the other hand the view of some Roman Catholics, who are apt to talk of the Church as a second Christ.

Between these extremes there lie two more moderate views, the first being characteristic of much Protestant thought. Here the Church is thought of predominantly as the witness to the Revelation. This view, if taken as the whole truth seems to do but scant justice to

the element of fellowship between God and man, and man and men in the Church. The second view holds that the Church is an extension of the Incarnation. This view Best rejects for various reasons, of which some have been given above. The other grounds for rejection are that Atonement and Incarnation cannot be separated any more than Christ's person and work can be separated. (In the exegetical part of the book, Best has already given his own interpretation of Col. 1.24, arguing further that in a passage asserting the sole sufficiency of Christ's person and Work it would have been madness to insert a verse hinting that they needed to be supplemented by Paul himself.)

Further, the Church is imperfect and sinful, whereas Christ was sinless. Lastly, there is more New Testament evidence for the individual Christian being a continuation of the Incarnation than for the Church being so. But both views are to be rejected.

Reflecting on this problem we may say that probably it would be wrong even to claim that the Church continues Christ's mission. His mission was to *be* the Messiah; the Church's mission is, by word and action, to point men to Him. (John 20.21: 'As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you' does not necessarily mean that the missions were identical.)

But as Dr Best suggests, our imperfect witness in word and action in the Church does become through an act of grace Christ's action in saving men. There is an indirect but real unity at work here, which lies not within our control, but for which we are bidden to pray, and for which we have a right to hope.

In conclusion, it should be said that it is not only justifiable but necessary to undertake biblical exegesis from certain dogmatic stand-points which are held in good faith. This is surely only an extension of the old principle of the analogy of faith, according to which obscurer passages should be interpreted in the light of these which are more clear. Such preconceptions only become pernicious when a real difference between biblical writings is masked, or when our presuppositions blind us to the clear meaning of passages which tell against our general stand-point.

'One Body in Christ' is written by a man who stands on the Reformed side of the theological bamboo curtain, but it is the opinion of this reviewer, who shares this general stand-point, that Dr Best does face up honestly to the text. For him as a Presbyterian it is natural to emphasise Christ's Lordship over the Church and its utter dependence on Him, and on His finished work. How else can justice be done to the principle of justification by faith alone, through grace? But Dr Best also looks with open eyes at those Pauline passages which emphasise our Lord's unity and solidarity

with the Church. Others will judge whether, in their opinion also, he has reproduced the true balance and tension of St. Paul's teaching.

DAVID CAIRNS

St. Anselm and His Critics. A Re-Interpretation of the *Cur Deus Homo.* By JOHN MCINTYRE. Oliver and Boyd. 15s.

THIS volume reminds us that Anselm in his day was the most influential thinker in the realm of theology. His personal history and character are full of interest. From the obscurity of a French Monastery he rose by sheer ability to become Archbishop of Canterbury. He was not exactly happy in that exalted position, because of his conflict with William Rufus on the question of the royal supremacy. The stand he took helped to secure the constitutional liberties and privileges we now enjoy.

Anselm is remembered chiefly for his works dealing with the Incarnation and Atonement. Principal McIntyre offers a scholarly defence against most of his critics, including Ritschl, Harnack, Barth, Baillie and others. Yet he does not absolve his hero from certain obscurities and inconsistencies. Anselm displays a spirit of humility and reverence which is an example to many controversialists. He recognised the limitations of human knowledge in dealing with divine mysteries. One of his fundamental tenets was that in order to understand Christian truth we must first believe ('credo ut intelligam'). Principal McIntyre discusses this theory at some length and reveals a Scotsman's love of argument and metaphysical distinctions.

Anselm was reasonable in his treatment of unbelievers and was himself willing to wait for further enlightenment. His reflections and prayers in several other books are most impressive and truly devotional.

It may be candidly admitted that this work is not easy to read. It is divided into four sections, viz., Methodology, Hamartiology, Christology and Soteriology. The author fully justifies his claim that Anselm 'by a single stroke destroys what had obviously become a misconception of the early medieval penitential exercises, namely, that of themselves, apart from the Work of Christ, they achieved forgiveness for the sinner. He thus strikes a blow for evangelical theology, for justification by God's grace in Christ as against justification by works, the importance of which has not been fully realised'.

His conception of sin is that of a debt to God incurred by disobedience to His will. It is a debt man can never repay and

Anselm's purpose is to show how the atonement follows from the nature and will of God Himself, and not, as the critics hold, 'from some rational necessity external to God which constrains Him to act as He does, initiating a process which results in the satisfaction offered by the God-man instead of the punishment of sinners by the torments of eternal fire'.

It is only by giving Himself to death for the sake of God's honour that He makes sufficient satisfaction. 'It is only by dying of His own free will that the Deus-homo can make to God sufficiently great satisfaction for the dishonour done to God by man in sinning.'

This doctrine is substantially that of evangelical Protestantism of the old school. It may not be the whole truth, but the vicarious and substitutionary aspect has a large place in the New Testament and cannot be ignored. It has undoubtedly brought relief and peace and comfort to countless hearts and consciences in all generations. Its source must be found, as McLeod Campbell maintained, in the universal mercy and love of God for mankind. We are all debtors to the divine infinite compassion which bears the burden of our sin and sets us free to dedicate ourselves to Him in the service of others.

This author is to be congratulated on his ability and learning in this treatise, and especially on his last chapter on Soteriology which is clear and convincing.

Grateful acknowledgment is made of the assistance given towards the publication of this book by the Mrs Frances Mary Gillespie Memorial Fund, which is administered jointly by the Faculty of Theology of the Presbyterian Church of Australia in New South Wales and the Council of St. Andrew's College.

GEORGE R. S. REID

Demythologising and History. By F. GOGARTEN. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d. net.

AMONG recent contributions to the controversy initiated by the publication of Rudolf Bultmann's essay 'New Testament and Mythology', Professor Gogarten's book *Demythologising and History* is of outstanding importance. Gogarten takes us at once to the heart of the debate and elicits the question which both Bultmann and his critics attempt to answer. Put in general terms this is the problem concerning the character of the relation between faith and history.

He begins his main argument by pointing out that this problem first emerged for modern theology in the rise of scientific literary and historical criticism of the Bible. As a consequence of this

approach it is now no longer possible to regard the Bible as a tangible, 'objective' guarantee of faith; its authority can no longer depend upon a prior acknowledgment of its miraculous origin, nor can its religious validity depend upon its placing in the sacramental structure of the Church's life. No new factor, however, has been introduced into the relation between faith and the Bible. Indeed, in a remarkable way, criticism has recovered the personal immediacy of faith's encounter. At the same time the more familiar psychological interpretations of faith modelled on perceptual, volitional and cognitive experience have been shown to be inadequate. For while pyschological analysis has its place, it represents a point of departure for theology which is on the man-ward side of the relation and, as such, must necessarily distort its character. It is essential to the nature of faith that it is called into being by God's initiative; the Word of God is not a piece of information about man's relation to God, but God's verbal act giving rise to this relation. The task of theology is that of eliciting whatever information is contained within this relation, but it fails when it represents such information as a conclusion arrived at by logically legitimate inference. This implies that the only security known to faith is that which grows within this relation, as it is renewed again and again in the moment of encounter—the security of knowing the voice of the Good Shepherd and being known of him. The removal of any external security can produce no crisis for faith, but simply serves to expose the crisis which is faith.

Historical investigation cannot, however, rest content with a criticism of the documents of tradition; it must draw into its field of inquiry that which tradition transmits. In other words, the historical reality in which Christianity is rooted must in its turn be investigated. Theology has survived the attempt to divorce interpretation and fact and to treat the documents as if they were chronicles providing data for a 'biography' of Jesus. Gogarten sees its present danger in the enterprise which sees the theological 'interprefacts', which the documents of the community of faith offer, as historical judgments, and treats them in the same positivist spirit. The impossible embarrassments to which this leads is illustrated from quotations from contributions to *Ein Wort lutherischer Theologie.*

It is argued that to establish historical facts, is to offer some sort of guarantee of the trans-subjective reality upon which faith rests. We are assured that 'faith, as faith, knows itself to be motivated, supported and substantiated by facts'. On the other hand, there is an awareness that this sort of argument is not likely to commend itself to the historian. While a few attribute this failure to the

historian's lack of appropriate presuppositions, most assert that the events of redemption are historical facts possessing a supra-historical lining of meaning which must elude the historian's grasp. Hence the reservation is made 'that the objective factualness of these occurrences cannot as such be the basis of faith'. This dilemma is produced by the conflict of two legitimate interests. The *first* is the desire to preserve the historical character of God's saving acts. The understanding of the nature of historical reality which is implicit in this desire is, however, quite uncritical. It is a peculiar amalgam composed of positivist historiography, the metaphysical presuppositions of medieval theology and the Hebrew-Christian vision of history as a totality.

The positivist element manifests itself in the strange fascination which the highly troublesome word 'fact' possesses in these circles. The metaphysical presuppositions, reveal themselves in the substitution of the concept of the suprahistorical for the older one of the supernatural; and this simply serves to multiply the fallacies of natural theology. Finally, the Hebrew-Christian vision of history, or at least elements of it, survives in the futurist 'Apocalyptic' eschatology which flourishes with an uncritical attitude to history.

The *second* interest wishes to maintain the distinction between faith as personal encounter and the processes of inference. In the conflict of these interests there is no ground to give away respecting the character of faith; the decisive question for theology is therefore concerned with our understanding of the historical reality to which faith is related, and the answer depends to a great extent on what the historians have to say.

Gogarten learns a great deal from the writings of Dilthey and Troeltsch, and he follows Heidegger closely in his penetrating clarification of the historical character of human existence. History for him, therefore, can neither be the name of the past—a vast assembly of 'facts' scrutinised with detachment; nor can it be seen as a total process given meaning by the ingredience of non-historical reality. Fact-finding must serve a meta-historical purpose, but this purpose is to seek the meaning of historical reality within this reality. The achievement of historicism and of modern science is that of showing that man stands in a responsible relation to history and that he can escape from this relation least of all by writing history! In doing this it has recovered a fundamental insight to which St. Paul gave dramatic expression. When he argued that because man has reversed the order of being and has worshipped the creature rather than the Creator, thus betraying creation into chaos and perdition, he was affirming man's responsibility for history. And when he wrote of the promise of

deliverance given to creation in the freedom of faith belonging to the sons of God, he was asserting the possibility of authentic history. The dialogical character of historical reality corresponds to the concept of faith as personal response. And the historical character of the *kerygma*, that unique identity of message and messenger, can be seen in the role which it plays in turning the ontological possibility of authentic history into an actual possibility. This means freedom from the past and openness to the future, forgiveness and redemption.

Gogarten sees in Bultmann's work the practical outworking of the hermeneutical principle which developments of modern historiography have produced in their effort to grapple with the Christian understanding of history. The problem which Bultmann is facing is thus one produced by the Christian Faith itself, and is not the fruit of alien influences, which may be said to have created liberal theology. Fact-finding has its part to play, but there is nothing which such research can say which would serve to show that events or records of events qualify to be carriers of the Word of God. Herein lies the scandal of faith. The facts, in this case the documents, when they are allowed 'to be', and are not distorted by *a priori* metaphysical assumptions, are seen to be the mythological articulation of faith's self-understanding. Bultmann's doctrine of God as the One who is met in the 'moment' and cannot be grasped in conceptual terms, leads him to assert that it is this understanding alone that can be analysed ontologically.

Gogarten therefore sees in the so-called demythologising controversy a debate in which a genuinely Christian understanding of historical reality is in conflict with one which distorts the character of faith. Far from dehistorising the reality to which faith is related (as Liberalism does), Bultmann is seeking to identify what the historical character of that reality is. His work is essentially positive in intention.

This book has succeeded in giving the debate a sense of direction. It opens a point of contact in this country with the work of the late R. G. Collingwood, echoes of whose *Autobiography* and *Idea of History* may be heard throughout its pages. Finally, it leaves us with the question of how we can account for the positive relation between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith without a Barthian doctrine of the Word. And if the Barthian answer cannot be withstood: how can we give content to the concept of the Word without recourse to metaphysical categories? Gogarten is surely right when he says that the lines of investigation set going in this controversy will occupy theologians for generations to come.

JOHN E. OLFORD

The Gospel According to St. John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text. By C. K. Barrett. S.P.C.K. 63s.

In recent years the current of Biblical scholarship has been flowing beyond the detailed criticism of texts and sources to the deep ocean of theological interpretation. It is easy to lose one's bearings in such a sea, and it is necessary to check our course by constant reference to the original text and meaning of the author. Theology itself is enriched by the discipline of literary and historical criticism. This is especially the case in regard to the Fourth Gospel, and this commentary by the Rev. C. K. Barrett, who is a lecturer at Durham University and well equipped to deal with the manifold problems of the Gospel, is very welcome. Since the publication of Archbishop Bernard's commentary on the Greek text in 1928, a great deal of literary research has been undertaken and our understanding of the Fourth Gospel has been enriched thereby. Mr Barrett makes full use of this mass of material, but he never allows the message of the Evangelist to be obscured by a barren *Historismus*.

The author of the Gospel, he suggests, was one of the pupils whom John the Apostle gathered round him at Ephesus. Of these one wrote the canonical Apocalypse, and another was responsible for the First Epistle. The author of the Fourth Gospel was the most distinguished of this band. He was a bold thinker and one widely read both in Jewish and Hellenistic literature. Perhaps one reason for the slow acceptance of the Gospel by the Church as a whole was the fact that it was too original and daring a work for official backing. Mr Barrett, furthermore, suggests that the author may not have been very interested in the publication of the work and he may have written it primarily to satisfy himself. Yet we cannot doubt that he knew he was making a contribution to the understanding of the Christian faith at a critical period in the Church's history. 'He wrote to reaffirm the fundamental convictions of the Christian faith in the full light of new circumstances, new terminology, and new experiences' (p. 117).

In regard to the historical value of the Gospel, it is clear that Mr Barrett would not go so far as to say that it contains a tradition of Christ's life and teaching every bit as old and reliable as that contained in the Synoptic Gospels. The Evangelist, he says, does not hesitate 'to repress, rewrite, or rearrange' what he finds in Mark, and no doubt also in his other sources (p. 117). Mr Barrett feels that the Aramaisms are 'too few (if we leave out parataxis and asyndeton) to prove that the Greek was translated from an Aramaic Gospel, and probably too few to prove that the Aramaic tradition lies anywhere close to the surface' (p. 10).

He comes to the conclusion that the Markan tradition in regard to the place of the cleansing of the Temple and of the date of the passover are to be preferred to the Johannine chronology. He is unwilling to accept the existence of a 'discourse source' drawn upon by John. He thinks that 'much of the discourse material in the Gospel can be readily understood as having been originally delivered in sermons. An incident from the life of Jesus was narrated, and the Evangelist-preacher expounded its significance for the life and thought of the Church. As this process was repeated and prolonged, a body of material would grow under his hands until it was capable of formulation in the shape of a gospel' (p. 20). Nevertheless, when compared with apocalypticism and Gnosticism, John asserted the primacy of history. Mr Barrett sees clearly what is so important for the interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, namely, that the historical event and the reality it signifies are one in the mind of the Evangelist. The material he uses in the composition of his Gospel has been thoroughly digested and expressed organically in an organism which is primarily theological. This means that theories of dislocation and attempts to find a chronology of the ministry of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel are beside the mark. The unity of style and language which is found in the Gospel is 'no more than the outward expression of an inward unity of thought and purpose' (p. 20). This inward unity of thought springs from the fact that the Evangelist possessed an extraordinary grasp of the total significance of the parts of the earlier gospel tradition.

The notes on the Greek text contain comments on lexical and grammatical details and expand many of the points put forward in the Introduction. Valuable comments are found on the significance of contemporary thought for the interpretation of John. Hebraic and Hellenistic elements are to be found in the Gospel, but Mr Barrett shows that they are completely subordinated to the dominant purpose of proclaiming the essence of the historic Christian faith. For example, he expresses the opinion that 'John's description of the Christian salvation is richer than the Synoptic presentation, not because he has enriched it from non-Christian sources, but because he has used non-Christian, and non-Jewish, terminology to bring out what was from the first implicit in the primitive faith' (p. 76). And in regard to the vocabulary used in 3.1-21, Mr Barrett says that John 'perceived that the language of Judaism (the Kingdom of God) and the language of Hellenism (*γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν*) provided him with a unique opportunity of expressing what was neither Jewish nor Hellenistic but simply Christian' (p. 173). In the same way the mediating position

adopted by Mr Barrett in regard to the sacramental teaching of the Fourth Evangelist has much to commend itself. 'It is true that John does not teach a merely mechanical, or magical, view of the sacraments, but it is also true that he does not "spiritualise" them. Rather he is concerned to root their spiritual efficacy in the material, and the material in the real humanity of the Son of God' (p. 69).

Mr Barrett describes the Evangelist as perhaps the greatest theologian in all the history of the Church, and at a time when the relations between faith and history are of vital importance for the future of Christianity, no student can afford to ignore this exposition of the text and thought of St. John.

E. Kenneth Lee

World Problems of Today. By Cyril Garbett. Hodder and Stoughton. 4s. 6d.

The Archbishop of York has recently attained his eightieth birthday, in remarkable vigour of body and mind. It is noteworthy that he has produced all his books in the last ten years, so that they may indeed be taken as enshrining the garnered wisdom of a long and devoted life.

The present book is a collection of sermons and addresses on very live subjects, and the scope of the material is vast. It is 'intended as a small contribution to help the Christian to make up his mind on some of the most important problems of our time'—what the Christian standards and ideals are and how they may be applied in the realms of justice and freedom, to science and to ethics. Then follows discussion on such tremendous issues as world hunger and population, peace and war, communism, the race problem, nationalism, and the relations of Church and State. Great principles are stated with a view to promoting sound public opinion and alert Social conscience; and it is more than hinted that there may be too much declaration and passing of resolutions and too little action. There are not a few outspoken pages both in respect of the inward life of the Church and what goes on in the wider life of the world. It is easy to see, in reading a book like this, why the Press of the nation pays heed to what this Churchman says and reports it with a fulness that is almost unique.

George S. Gunn

Ways to Psychic Health. By Alphonse Maeder. Hodder and Stoughton. 12s. 6d.

The author is a well-known psychotherapist in Zürich with ex-

perience in this work extending over forty years. It is a translation of a book published in German in 1944, which has been already translated into five languages. Nowadays there are too many books of this kind, for it seems to be the easiest of subjects on which to get wrong ideas and unbalanced judgments. The present book is absorbingly interesting, because it has the minimum of theory and is 'a true picture of what actually happens during a consultation'. Dr Maeder believes that there are good reasons for revealing these case-histories which indeed have no sensational aspects. The great bulk of the book is devoted to the details of fifteen cases, with varieties of depression, insomnia, phobia, defiance neurosis, obsession, etc. It is intended mainly for the help of psychotherapists in practice or in training, but ministers of religion will get a good deal of guidance from it to assist them in spotting symptoms in their pastoral work. Much of the work described is in the realm of pastoral care. The method followed in all the cases is described as 'brief psychotherapy' as distinct from the prolonged and intricate treatment used in other cases.

Dr Maeder quotes the saying of Paracelsus that 'the foundation of medicine is love', and that gives an important clue to this man's approach to the whole subject. He himself has in the course of his professional life become converted to Christianity, and so he emphasises the religious aspect of this work as of basic importance. 'Man by himself cannot save himself; man is so embedded in his egoism and isolation that only a humble surrender to God, the Personal God, can really bring about a liberation and a transformation.' 'An exclusively scientific approach does not suffice if one is to give the patient the maximum help which he expects and requires.' This spiritual method of cure is relevant to every case, but especially in every situation where there is a profound sense of guilt. As he himself confesses he did in earlier days, so he now declares that the orthodox analyst frequently neglects the factors of specific religious importance, as if it were outside his function. He judges that the most characteristic feature of human nature is selfishness, and claims that the Christian attitude to full health or wholeness implies that there is a supernatural power to deal with this profound disorder of the inward life. The last chapter, 'Reflections on the Hardship and Inner Stability of the Psychiatrist', is most revealing. It is a subject that is not often written upon, and what Dr Maeder says on it seems full of wisdom. Such a book as this is to be welcomed by the Christian minister. A word of tribute for the excellence of the translation is well deserved, for no one would guess that it was a translation.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Recovery of Humanity. By James D. Smart. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. $2.50.

To make a fresh statement of themes which have often been written upon and which must be repeated to the end, because they belong to the very substance of the Christian religion, is no easy task; but the writer of this book has succeeded. It is an old story that 'the pulpit is losing its influence', and that has been said at periods when there was less evidence for it than now. At present there are some very ill-informed criticisms of preaching; but there are two charges for which there is not a little justification.

There are often great gaps in the preaching of some popular preachers. Either it is that they are constantly moving within the limits of a few favourite ideas and seldom proclaiming some of the great doctrines at all, or else they are doing it in a form which is but loosely connected with the palpable realism of Scripture. In other cases, the fault is that even nowadays the sermon preached is couched in too abstruse language, so that a large proportion of even the most intelligent congregation, if asked to state what precisely it was about, would be compelled to reply in the language of the Old Testament character, 'As thy soul liveth, I cannot tell'.

The remedy for both ailments is expository preaching. This book is a good example of what it is—for no great theme is omitted altogether; and, if some are slightly touched on, there remains no doubt that the writer is a preacher whose work will be well balanced by a regular, biblical exposition of all the vital doctrines of the faith, and who will not let the people 'be content with ABCs'. Also, there is not a sentence in one of these sermons which an ordinary reader would find difficult; and yet there is nothing shallow here, but things clear and deep.

Dr Smart, who is already the author of several books for young people, is a minister of the Presbyterian Church of Canada and lecturer in Homiletics and Christian Education at Knox College, Toronto; and he has in one of these sermons a few vigorous sentences in defence of his Church's position. He believes that 'thorough Biblical preaching has become a lost art'; and when, a few years ago, he gave up the editor's desk to return to the pulpit and the classroom, it was definitely with a view to work at this problem of expository preaching as 'the most urgent problem of the ministry'. Full account is taken of the more hopeful emphases of biblical scholarship in the last two decades.

The title of the book signifies what Dr Smart regards as the disease and the battle of our age. It is a deep conflict between humanity and inhumanity in which 'the distinctive human qualities have begun to lose their vitality'. 'Inhumanity like a tidal wave is sweep-

ing over the world' and 'its stronghold is the unconquered human self'. The only way for the Church to get out on the offensive is to realise that 'a powerful invasion of the world by God' has taken place. It is this idea of 'Divine invasion' that is the connecting link of the book, holding its two main sections together, and supplying the background assumptions of all the sermons. If the Church is too much given to compromise in the present world, the reason is its hesitation to accept in full the fact and the implications of the Divine invasion. There are some outspoken passages on public issues, the political scene, and international affairs; and there are sharp words on the Church's neglect of the outsider, those 'on the other side of the wall', and on the danger for the Church in its evangelism of standing in the shoes of the Scribes and Pharisees and in isolation from the publicans and sinners.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Person of Christ. By G. C. BERKOUWER. Eerdmans. $4.00.

IN his most interesting series of Studies in Dogmatics Professor Berkouwer of the Free University of Amsterdam has now turned to consider the crucial doctrine of the Incarnation. In the first instance, of course, the work was written in Dutch, but it has been fairly accurately and readably translated into good American. The only stylistic infelicity is the persistent use of 'one' in a way which reads very awkwardly in English, e.g. 'if one then continues fully to agree with Chalcedon he will almost naturally etc.' (page 287). There are also quite a number of rather obvious misprints (e.g. on pp. 245, 313, 351) which disfigure the text, not to mention a frequent disregard for the German Umlaut in the titles of books quoted.

These incidental blemishes do not detract, however, from the solid merit of Professor Berkouwer's treatment. As is only right he takes into full account both the scriptural teaching and the contribution of the early fathers and councils. But he does not confine himself to a recapitulation of the history of the doctrine. He addresses himself firmly to the problems raised not only in nineteenth century, but also in contemporary discussion. In this respect his work has a considerable value, because he is able to take into account the work of Dutch theologians which is not so well known or so readily accessible to the average English-speaking thinker.

The general trend of Professor Berkouwer's study is to defend the orthodox line of thinking implicit in the Bible itself, formulated at Chalcedon or reasserted by the sixteenth century Reformers. In this respect he shows a particular and healthy concern that the

true humanity of Christ should not be engulfed in His Deity. He realises that once the Deity of Christ is fully accepted, there is a constant and inevitable threat to His humanity. But again, Professor Berkouwer refuses to allow himself to be crowded by considerations of dogmatic logic. He insists that the starting point must be always the actuality of the event and person of Jesus Christ. What is logically possible or impossible must always give place to what actually is. Other valuable points which he makes are that we must not attempt to view the person and work of Jesus Christ in isolation from each other, and that the Christ is King precisely through and in His humiliation. Both these themes are powerfully worked out by Barth, with whom Berkouwer reveals sympathy in this well-informed study.

That the author does not solve the mystery of the Incarnation is not a fault with which he can be justly charged. Rightly rejecting every form of facile solution, including nineteenth century kenoticism, he is left at the end with the mystery of unity and duality which we can state and confess but not really explain. The failure to present a neat logical solution is perhaps a testimony to the author's fidelity to the biblical witness and the traditional affirmation.

In one or two respects, however, it may be doubted whether Berkouwer quite does justice to views which he opposes. For example, he is distrustful of the Christological exegesis of Vischer. Some of his arguments are shrewd enough. There is the risk of making the Old Testament a typological puzzle. And it is dangerous to try to divorce the Christological witness from the historical situation or message. But the example of Abraham's sacrifice in relation to God's self-giving of the Son is not very aptly chosen. And against the common pattern of God's action all the events and persons and constitutions and doctrines of the Old Testament do surely in their different ways indicate the Messiah. The things concerning Himself are found in all the Scriptures.

Again, the opposition to the *incognito* theory is rather too dogmatic. The term *incognito* is not biblical. The whole idea can be schematised, as it is to some extent in Kierkegaard, rather than related to the actual work of God. It can be pressed too far, to the point of denying and minimising everything supernatural in the life of Christ. It can even be pushed to the point at which the confession of Jesus as the Christ bears no real relationship to the historical fact and is therefore quite subjective. These dangers inherent in the *incognito* theory may be freely admitted. But Berkouwer does not avoid the three simple facts: that only faith will be able to confess Jesus as the Christ; that the manifestations of His glory are

plain only to believers (who but a believer would ever dream of accepting the Virgin Birth?); and that His coming in the likeness of sinful flesh has at least the necessity involved in His redemptive action as the sin-bearer—it is not merely a pedagogical device or technique.

The fact that Berkouwer takes account of these modern trends is an indication that we have here not merely the scholarly restatement of a traditional position but an informed and stimulating discussion. His critiques of modern positions may not always quite hit the mark, but they are always shrewd, and they deserve and demand detailed consideration. Above all, Berkouwer in his own way, is just as insistent as Barth that we must not make Jesus Christ the prisoner of abstract or doctrinaire possibilities but must proceed always from the given fact of His person and work, even though it does not always fit neatly into our own scheme. His insistence upon this point, which is the ultimate justification of Chalcedon, is perhaps the most valuable feature of the whole study.

G. W. Bromiley

God Hidden and Revealed. By J. Dillenberger. Muhlenberg Press. $2.50

This book is an 'interpretation of Luther's *deus absconditus*' and seeks to set out 'its significance for religious thought'. So we start with Ritschl and we go on with Kattenbusch, the two Seebergs, the two Harnacks, Holl, Heim, Otto, Brunner and Barth, not to mention Althaus, Elert and some others. How far this survey of German theology is competent I must leave others to judge. But the very fact that there is such a survey will prove useful for anyone who wishes to probe deeper into the mystery of God, which is today as perhaps always—our basic, though often unrecognised theological problem.

It is a pity, however, that the style is so cumbersome and the grammar so peculiar that the inevitable difficulty of the subject matter is increased rather than lessened by the manner of its presentation. It is an even greater pity that there is only the scantiest reference to literature in English, G. S. Hendry and P. S. Watson being just mentioned in passing, and H. R. Mackintosh not at all. And to the general public, as to your reviewer, the greatest pity of all is that the last chapter was not written first, opening up a problem for the solution of which we would have looked with keen interest at the work of the great authorities which Dr Dillenberger has brought within our purview. Except for the specialist on Luther and the German theologians of the last hundred years,

this book starts from the unknown and proceeds to the known.

But it will be sad if this means that the problem of the relation between the hiddenness and the revelation of God is not grappled with more energetically by contemporary theologians, not in the Lutheran tradition. For this is the basic problem behind so many practical devotional and evangelistic and missionary differences. Should the celebration of the Eucharist be behind an Ikonastasis or should the host be elevated or should the celebrant stand facing west or at 'the north end'? Is the 'Second Coming' a reversal of the First, ostentatious instead of self-effacing, or is it a repetition of the First, or what is it if we believe it is or will be at all? What about the relation of Yahweh to Baal and of Martin Buber's 'He!' to the metephysician's 'I am that I am'? What about extempore prayer and the reservation of the blessed sacrament and so many evangelistic and missionary techniques?

There is hardly any live and burning problem in the church today which does not in some way or other depend for its right solution upon a deeper understanding of the true nature of God, neither so revealed even in Christ as not to be still hidden nor so hidden apart from Him as not to be at all revealed. On the one hand stands the indisputable happiness of the New Testament Church and on the other the undoubted blessedness of the spiritually bankrupt of the first Beatitude. Between those who prize 'experience' above everything and those who despise it as nothing, the way of salvation, which is the way of the living God, hidden and revealed, is narrow indeed.

J E. Fison

Erkenntnis Gottes nach dem Buche Ezechiel. Eine Theologische Studie. By W. Zimmerli. Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments. No. 27. Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich, 1954. Pp. 75.

It has long been recognised that Ezekiel provides the prophetical setting for the dogma of salvation by grace. The people of God are unutterably helpless, their redemption depends wholly on divine intervention; God is indeed about to redeem them, for in His holiness He will not tolerate their abject depravity any longer. In weal and woe 'they shall know that I am Yahweh'.

This affirmation occurs nearly a hundred times in Ezekiel, and, with occasional expansions, invariably as a formula. Moreover, it has its peculiar significance, and Professor Zimmerli's 75-paged brochure deals with it: the historical and theological background of the formula, its text and syntax, its literary, form-critical and source-critical features.

Negatively, knowing God is never human discovery: rather it begins on God's level, and involves man in an attitude of worship. It is recognition of a divinely effected act of intervention, whether it be in destruction, shameful in its abomination (Ezek. 7. 2-4), or in restoration (Ezek. 37), or yet again in oracles on Israel's neighbours. Ezekiel's use of the formula implies not only that the people *will* know God because of what He does, but that they also *shall* know Him by reason of the dignity of the Divine Name. This is not simply an addition to their knowledge about God—the recognition that Yahweh is King, is Holy Judge, or even that God emerges from an examination of His deeds; but that He is Yahweh, which is the relevant point in Ezekiel, can be asserted only by Yahweh Himself. It is the formula that is the basis of the prophet's message, and in this respect Ezekiel stands apart from pre-exilic prophecy. It is not, however, the prophet's own expression. Its imperative quality is anticipated in Deuteronomy's parenetic tone, and the strict formula itself occurs in the story of the holy-war in 1 Kings 20. Its effect is felt in the verdicts of Deutero-Isaiah's condemnation of idols, and again in the Priestly source of the Pentateuch—both, of course, post-Ezekiel. The setting of the formula is Yahweh's self-revelation, and it thus belongs both to priestly-prophetic oracles and also to theophanies and Covenant-stories. It takes a prominent place among proof-signs, and is basic to the Decalogue and to its development in the Holiness Code. Ezekiel knows God from His self-manifestation, and the oracles are announced as the Word of God: what happens as a result is purposed as a proof of Yahweh's overlordship, for the formula is the means of implementing the events associated with its utterance. All Yahweh's deeds ultimately rest in Himself, and punishment and retribution alike are affected by His prerogative, because He is Yahweh.

The author admits that his conclusion is unsatisfactory for those who would find a theological uniformity in Ezekiel's prophecy. There exists a dichotomy: Yahweh destroys, Yahweh saves, and there is an arbitrary exercise of prestige in both acts. One is driven, however, to ask Professor Zimmerli whether this conclusion is inevitable, or whether it indicates that he has unnecessarily distorted his picture. Would he have come to the same conclusion had he included in his scrutiny another theological element so profoundly present in Ezekiel's theology, namely that Yahweh is holy? In His holiness Yahweh surely destroys that which is defiled, and He also reconsecrates, after the purge, that which is 'on His Name'. This element, surely, does give a proper sequence to Yahweh's merciful acts.

B. J. Roberts

The Origin of the Gospel of Mark. By H. A. Guy. Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

The author is Chaplain of Taunton's School, Southampton, and he has written a book which has something quite exciting about it, in its detective-like search for the origins of Mark. No theme of biblical scholarship has been more thoroughly investigated than this; but this is a book to be recommended without reserve as logical, able, well-informed, reliably familiar with the vast literature on the subject, and with much good scholarship and deep study behind its comparatively brief compass. It is all the more fascinating because of the fact referred to in the Preface that the book developed to conclusions different from what the author anticipated.

After long neglect, says Mr Guy, this Gospel has come to its own in this century, and is now universally regarded as of crucial importance in the development of Apostolic Christianity. The fundamental question is 'Why was it produced at all?' After a brief critical examination of the Papias tradition, the book proceeds to discuss the works of 'disorder' in the Gospel, of which twenty-three examples are given, and it is claimed that these are the most obvious ones. Yet the book is not entirely without order.

Mr Guy regards the view that the author of Mark is translating from Aramaic sources as still an open question. Mark is not interested in an orderly chronological account of the life of Jesus, and it is more a theological work than a life; but this recognition is not enough in itself to explain the problem of composition. A good part of Mr Guy's study is given to an examination of the actual contents of Mark, along the lines of the Form critics; and great weight is attached to the oral nature of the material, though the written tradition is not excluded. There is real insight in the exegesis of certain passages.

The central point of the argument is that Mark had at his disposal certain papyrus sheets which contained accounts of the deeds and words of Jesus and also comments by the early Christian preachers. The arranging and compiling of these sheets suggest the activity of both a compiler and an editor. A long list is given on pages 137 to 140 of words and sentences inserted by the editor; and if these are omitted, as we read, we then have the original work as it was left by the compiler; whereas the finished work as we have it now is from the hand of the compiler's successor, the editor. Peter's part in the Gospel is carefully looked at, and it is held that Mark himself is the compiler, not the editor. Responsibility for the repetitions rests on the editor; and this sheds light on the apparently abrupt beginning of the Gospel as well

as on its much-debated conclusion. There is a very suggestive closing chapter on Mark and Paul, and the argument is that Mark the compiler is much less Pauline in outlook than the editor is.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Herders Theologische Kommentar zum Neuen Testament. HERAUSGEGEBEN VON ALFRED WIKENHAUSER, Universität Freiburg. Band XIII: Faszikel 3: *Die Johannesbriefe* VON RUDOLF SCHNACKENBURG. Verlag Herder Freiburg, 1953.

WITHIN recent years Roman Catholic scholarship has been steadily contributing to the furtherance of biblical research, and a better understanding of the Bible. The new 14-volume Herder Bible Commentary, of which the first volume has appeared in Rudolf Schnackenburg's *Die Johannesbriefe*, bids fair to becoming a standard Catholic work. The general editor of the series, which is planned to cover the whole Bible, is Professor Dr A. Wikenhauser (whose recent *Einleitung in das neue Testament* has won deservedly high praise in all quarters). The new Commentary is designed to meet the needs of both professional student and interested layman, with an emphasis on the interpretation of Holy Scripture, without, however, neglecting the scientific material at the disposal of the modern exegete.

A brief survey of a few of the subjects treated in the Introduction to this first volume will give some impression of the nature of the work: The Historical Assumptions: the Heresy opposed; Relation to the Gospel; Textual Tradition—the *Comma Johanneum*; 1 John in the History of the Canon. On 2 and 3 John the author discourses or their origin, character and provenance. Twelve valuable *excursus* deal with such important topics as 'The Conception of the "World" in 1 John 2. 15-17', 'Love as the Nature of God' (*Die Liebe als Wesenseigentumlichkeit Gottes*), 'Christ and Sin'.

Dr Schnackenburg's discussion of the problem of the relationship of 1 John to the Gospel consists largely of a refutation of C. H. Dodd's arguments against identity of authorship. Identity of author, however, remains the best solution: but the Epistle need not have been later than the Gospel; it was possibly written c. A.D. 100 before the oral tradition of the Fourth Gospel had itself assumed written form. The nature of the 'heresy' St. John seeks to combat is discussed in the light of the most recent research: the view of Büchsel that it was a *verwilderte christliche Prophetie* (with Gnostic elements) is set aside in favour of a docetic Gnosticism more readily defined negatively than positively (rejection of the Incarnation, denial of the atonement, etc.); it cannot be identified with Cerinthianism (nor any known form of Docetism), in spite of

obvious connexions. Especially valuable, in exploration of the background of the Epistles generally, is the author's emphasis on the need for research in both Hellenistic and Jewish sources (more recently in the Judaean scrolls). The Commentary itself and Biblical exegesis maintain a similar high standard, characterised by thoroughness and, as in the *Einleitung*, a scrupulous and fair-minded attention to the labour of both Catholic and Protestant.

MATTHEW BLACK

Commentaire du Nouveau Testament XII: L'Épitre aux Hébreux. By JEAN HÉRING. Neuchâtel: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1954.

THE Epistle to the Hebrews has not received so much attention from scholars as some other books, and a new commentary is therefore something of an event, particularly when it bears on page after page the evident marks of wide reading and accurate knowledge of the relevant literature. This is not, however, purely a book for the scholar. Rather it is designed for those who seek a convenient and up-to-date exposition, thorough and comprehensive, yet not over-loaded with detailed discussion of critical theories.

Moffat fills some 76 pages of Introduction and 247 of Commentary, Westcott 84 and 495, and Spicq two large volumes of over 430 pages each. In contrast, Professor Héring deals with the Epistle in 131 pages altogether, of which six are devoted to Introduction. It will be understood, therefore, that we have here a summary treatment, although the important problems of interpretation receive due attention. The commentary is supplemented by references to other literature, and there is a brief bibliography of the more important books. The reviewer will not presume to assess the translation as a rendering into French; as a rendering of the Greek, it seems on the whole to bring out the meaning very well, although sometimes there is a tendency to paraphrase rather than translate.

Unfortunately it must be recorded that this book, despite its merits, might have been even better. The compression necessary to keep the commentary within its present limits has sometimes had unfortunate results, e.g. on p. 34, where the indentity κεκοινώνηκεν αἵματος καὶ σαρκός = *ils participent au même sang*, etc., is rather startling until it is realised that the Greek verb has a neuter plural subject. The commentary indeed presupposes a Greek text at hand for constant reference. Again, Hephaestus is not mentioned in the passage of Philo referred to on p. 68 (n.2). And was it really necessary to devote so much space to Crell's conjecture in the first verse?

More important are a number of small inaccuracies which tend to shake the reader's confidence. The translation is sometimes

not consistent with the notes, e.g. p. 62, where the commentary has '*mes chers*' and a footnote adds that this reading is better attested than ἀδελφοί; the translation however has the conflate reading '*chers frères*'. Again, on p. 84, the translation renders τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, although the commentary seems to follow Nestle in reading γενομένων. On p. 96, the translation attaches ἐφάπαξ to ἡγιασμένοι while the commentary says '*l'auteur souligne une fois de plus l'unicité du sacrifice du Christ*'.

Other errors appear to be the result of oversight: ἐξ ὑμῶν is rendered '*parmi nous*' on p. 43; 2 Cor. 4.6 is quoted on p. 59 as '*la lumière qui a resplendi dans VOS coeurs*'; δεκάτην is omitted from the translation on p. 69, while a phrase is omitted on p. 72 and another on p. 86. The reading of D at 7.27 is ἀρχιερεύς, not ἱερεύς. On p. 29 παραρρυῶμεν is described as '*un aorist second* PASSIF', while p. 59 has παραπταίοντας for παραπέσοντας.

Misprints have been noted on the following pages:
13, Claramontanus; 17, MacNeill; 26, n.4, Mowinkel; 27, και' ἀρχας; 53, *quavis esset filius . . . dicit oboedentiam*; 58/9, ποιησουσι; 60, Tertlulien; 60, n.3, *ains reconce*; 67, n.1, Treasurs; 84, 86, 91, 117, Moffat; 111, n.1, Sconpiace; 115, n.3, D. FAYE; 127, n.1, autorship, Hebrew; 130, n.1, Ryland's. On p. 85 the number (13) is attached to the comment on part of verse 12, while there is a superfluous comma after *repentir* on p. 57.

These blemishes mar an otherwise useful volume, and this is the more to be regretted in that Professor Héring has clearly given much thought and labour to his task. R. McL. WILSON

Notes on the Hebrew Text of 1 Kings XVII-XIX and XXI-XXII. By NORMAN H. SNAITH. The Epworth Press, London.

IT is a pleasure to welcome yet another volume in Dr Snaith's 'Study Notes on Bible Books'. This is the 12th book in the series, and should prove to be as useful as its predecessors. The fact that the chaps. from the Hebrew OT which are treated in the series coincide with the syllabus for the London B.D. curtails somewhat the appeal of the series so far as Scottish students are concerned, but where Dr Snaith annotates texts that are prescribed by universities north of the Border they will realise that he has rendered them a real service.

Dr Snaith is doing for present day students of Hebrew what the late Professor Kennedy did for an earlier generation when he published his valuable annotations on Ruth and other OT books. In each case the emphasis is on simplicity, but the gain in usefulness has more than justified this policy. Naturally, of course, this has

imposed limitations on the present series. E.g. advanced students of Hebrew who may chance to consult the notes in this and other books in the series will be disappointed; but they should remember that Dr Snaith is not catering for their needs. He has in mind students who are just beginning to read Hebrew texts, and those who study Hebrew without both the guidance of a teacher and the impetus that derives from studying in fellowship with others. The study of Hebrew in these circumstances presents many difficulties and by providing these Notes Dr Snaith goes far towards lightening the burden. The annotations on the Hebrew text are clear, concise and unambiguous. Nothing that might conceivably puzzle the solitary student is passed over. Indeed, if one may offer a criticism it is that perhaps the author has erred on this score. On the other hand, it is this insistence on the obvious that gives this series its value for the lone student.

These Notes also have a potential value for ministers who have allowed their knowlegde of Hebrew to lapse. The whole series might well be made the basis of a refresher course in the sacred language. They would find that a methodical use of these Notes would compel them to renew their acquaintance with the essential elements of Hebrew and thus engender a new enthusiasm for exegetical and expository preaching, a type of preaching that is well nigh impossible without a first-hand knowledge of the language which the OT writers used with such consummate skill.

The painstaking student will be particularly grateful to Dr Snaith for supplying throughout so many references to the standard Hebrew grammars, and to such valuable works as the Oxford Hebrew-English Lexicon of the OT, and Driver's Hebrew Tenses. In this way the author is constantly sending back the student to the main sources and ensuring that each point is thoroughly understood by anyone who cares to take a little trouble.

J. G. S. S. Thomson

Blinded Eagle. An Introduction to the Life and Teaching of Edward Irving. By H. C. Whitley. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

This picturesque title names a small book that fills a perceptible gap by giving a brief account and estimate of the enigmatic Edward Irving. Here is a man who, with Thomas Chalmers, was ranked among the Scotsmen of his day rightly called great, but whose brilliant, forceful, and in the last resort eccentric capabilities have perhaps had less than justice done to them by history and posterity. The author declares that when he made his own early inquiries, 'there always seemed to be a certain reticence about discussing him'. It is certainly true that, justly or unjustly forced to become

the founder of a Christian sect, the main stream of the life and thought of his native land has hardly troubled to assess him as carefully as his personal greatness warranted. For those who want, or who ought to make it their business, to know about this man, here is a most readable introduction to the subject.

Dr Whitley, with rather too great simplicity, takes position as defendant's counsel: in the *fracas* which issued in the deposition of Irving, the Church of Scotland was in his judgment at fault. It may well have been so; but not quite so unambiguously as the author makes out. If the question be framed: Did Irving impute sinfulness to our Lord?, the answer is no doubt in the negative. But was it only 'little men' who won here? After all most heresies are faulted not on what they explicitly say, but on the implications that follow from what they say, and this despite all the vehemence with which they repudiate them. Some of the drama drops out of the story when *parti pris* can so evidently be charged against the writer. Nor will some in the united Church of Scotland be reassured about the reliability of the author's judgment when they are invited to believe that 'against the background of a difficult Glasgow parish [Chalmers] would not have dared to put in jeopardy the Church's unity by throwing his weight on the side of the architects of disruption'.

The fact is that Irving was essentially the schismatic, as his eventual acceptance of some kind of form of reordination sufficiently shows. It would have required more patience and forbearance than the Church (alas!) usually has available for eccentrics—we will not say to find, for this could not be expected, but to *make* a place for him. One fears that a mission 'to rend the tomb of dead theology' is never likely to prove agreeable or easily acceptable. When such an aim is accompanied by an unreliable stress on the Second Coming and an over-indulgence, aroused in others if not manifested by himself, in the more extraordinary 'gifts' of the Spirit, the mission will not be facilitated, and the Church will be right to be on the alert. The Church of Irving's day, as well as of our own, is obliged by the Johannine injunction to test the spirits.

J. K. S. Reid

Traité de Liturgique. Essai sur le fondement et la structure de Culte. By Richard Paquier. (Manuels et Précis de Théologie XXV.) Delachaux et Niestlé, Neuchâtel et Paris, 1954. Pp. 228, sewn, Fr.s. 8, bound, Fr.s. 11.

Discussion on the liturgical movement is becoming steadily more widespread, and publishers are continually adding to the material

for discussion. Some seem to think that this is mainly a Roman Catholic movement of recent origin, and that where persons within the Reformed tradition show interest in liturgical renewal, they are really 'romanising' or 'anglicanising', or confusing aesthetic with worship. But the discussion is not really recent. In the Roman Church it can be traced back to Guéranger, Abbot of Solesmes in the middle decades of last century, and in the Scottish Church to Robert Lee of Greyfriars or even to those who early in the nineteenth century saw the need for aids to devotion and 'ministers' assistants'. But in the continental Reformed Church the interest was wakened earlier still, as in the publication in 1713 by Jean-Frédéric Osterwald of his Liturgy of Neuchâtel.

Altogether it is not surprising that the Church is becoming aware that, as Paquier says, 'the problem of worship is now at the centre of Christian preoccupation', and that 'the reform of worship has become a matter of urgency' (p. 5). The present work is written as a contribution from the Reformed side towards the solution of the problem, and at the same time as a directive towards the improvement of Reformed worship. We may say at once that this is an important and excellent book, which will help many even outside the Reformed tradition towards a true spirit and right expression of worship. It is not only practically suggestive, but also spiritually elevating. For the author insists constantly that Robert Will spoke truly when he said that 'liturgical unskilfulness (*impéritie*) is not solely want of taste but often want of consecration' (*Le Culte*. 1, p. 300). The minister who reads this work will feel that he must seek not only to worship, but to conduct worship, more and more in spirit and in truth.

It is clear that Paquier has learned much from the great work of Robert Will just quoted. He says rightly that that book has been too much neglected, though this is due to its very massiveness and solidity. It may be hoped that those who read Paquier and who appreciate the many quotations from *Le Culte* will turn to Will himself and enjoy him.

Paquier, however, is far from being merely an imitator. There is here much original thinking as well as practical advice. There are three main parts, the first being called 'L'initiative de Dieu'. It is the Lord who calls His people to worship, and He is present with them when they gather in His name, and He is the inspiration of all that they do. This section is largely a theology of worship. The second part is called 'L'obéissance de l'homme'. How does, how should, man respond to the initiative of God? In worship the response is collective, and therefore must be truly liturgical. Prayer must fulfil certain conditions. It must be theocentric and

Christocentric; the style should be 'classical', i.e. 'de valeur universelle et permanente' (p. 70). But the only style of this nature is that of the Bible. Various types of prayer are discussed; a chapter on 'Liturgical Time' deals with the Christian Year and makes some useful suggestions; the arrangement and decoration of the church, vestments and liturgical colours, and sacred music are all included here. The third section is called 'L'Ordo ecclésiastique', and is a rationale of the various services, the Liturgy of the Word, the Eucharist, the Divine Office, the Occasional Services, and children's services. There is a useful bibliography but no index.

Throughout there is a strong emphasis on the biblical and theological grounds of worship, and at the same time the outlook is ecumenical. The author's attitude may be indicated by the following details. He disapproves of all liturgical 'romanticism', of the sort of thing that is adopted because it is 'nice' or 'pretty' or merely sentimental. He objects to gloves and other personal articles and even flowers being placed on the Holy Table; he is suspicious of Christmas trees; he objects to the individual communion cup and recommends intinction for those who fear infection. He approves of lights at services for their symbolic value, and of the surplice as suggesting the joy of the Christian much better than black robes. He urges more widespread use in the conduct of services of the lateral position, except at the celebration of the Eucharist when the basilican position is proper. He would use the title 'Eucharist' more frequently, since it expresses the idea of thanksgiving. He feels the congregation should have a large part in the service, and indeed says that the restoration of dialogue is one urgent task of the present liturgical movement. He would prefer that the Word read should not be separated from the Word preached, and insists that liturgical restoration must not operate to the detriment of the sermon.

For all such points the author gives his reasons, and even if they are not all quite convincing, he makes out a good case for most of them. We hope that many readers will study this book—they cannot do so without great benefit, whatever their own opinions may be.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Epistles, Gospels and Tones of the Byzantine Liturgical Year. By IRMGARD M. DE VRIES. Obl.O.S.B., London, 1954. Pp. 39. 2s. 6d.

A SERIES of Articles on the Byzantine Liturgical Cycles appeared in 1953 in the *Eastern Churches Quarterly*, and as they proved of great interest and value, they are now, after revision and

rearrangement, offered in a welcome reprint. Clear explanations are given of the rather complicated system of the Byzantine Lectionary and of the Calendar. Tables provide a complete list of the proper lessons, both in the Greek and Malkite and in the Slavonic systems, for both the Annual Cycle and the Immovable Feast, the different ranks of the latter being fully described. This is a very useful and convenient handbook, and the enterprise of the *Quarterly* in issuing such reprints of valuable articles is to be warmly commended.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Murrayfield Psalms: A New Metrical Version and Notes. By JAMES ROSSIE BROWN, Edinburgh, Church of Scotland Committee on Publications, 1954. Pp. 361. 21s.

IT is indeed a work of piety on the part of the Kirk Session of Murrayfield Parish Church that the task on which their minister spent so long is now published under their care. Dr Rossie Brown had a double purpose in his work, to discover the original significance of the psalms, and to render them in suitable and singable form, thus overcoming some defects of the Scottish Metrical Psalter. In the achievement of this aim he had considerable success. His version is very largely, as a friend told him, in the 'psalm idiom', and though this is attained to some extent by the form used, especially the common and short metres, and by perhaps too frequent use of the apostrophe for elided vowels and of inversions of sentences, many psalms are finely rendered. But he is perhaps most happy where he escapes from his self-imposed limitations, and provides free versions as in the appendix, some of which will yet enrich our hymn-books. In any future revision of the Metrical Psalter, Dr Brown's work will certainly have to be reckoned with.

JOHN A. LAMB

Canadian Journal of Theology. A Quarterly of Christian Thought published by the Canadian Journal of Theology, Incorporated, and printed by the University of Toronto Press. Subscription rates $3.00 for one year, $5.00 for two years, and $1.00 for a single copy.

IT is a pleasure to greet this youngest of theological journals as, with already 650 'charter members', it starts upon its course, and to wish it well. New it is, but not quite without precedent, and the Editorial in this first issue states that it seeks to recover and further the achievements of *The Canadian Journal of Religion* which ran for a number of successful years until it fell casualty to the great depression. The change of title is itself significant. The

declared aim is by means of essays and reviews to make the cream of contemporary thinking available to those who do not have time for highly specialised studies, and to do this in and for the Canadian situation: 'we shall hear the Word of God only as we obey it in the Canadian milieu in which he has put us to serve him. Let no man be affronted', the Editorial continues, 'by the word *Theology* in our name, as if it stood for dry, abstract, unpractical discourse. To us it means the Word of Truth of God yielded as we shape our decisions on live human issues in the light of Christ.'

Dr G. R. Cragg of Montreal discusses 'Canadian Theology' in an early article. He notes that many Canadian centres have imported their professors from abroad, generously acknowledges Canada's debt to the 'stream of British (and perhaps especially Scottish) theologians', and says that until recently it has been necessary for Canadian students of theology to go abroad to pursue advanced studies for lack of facilities in Canada itself. Now opportunities for academic research exist in at least two important centres. Without becoming parochial or ceasing to send its ablest students abroad, Canadian theology looks forward to expansion in its own right.

Dr R. B. Y. Scott of McGill University asks: 'Is Preaching Prophecy?', and finds that, while the prophetic (and apostolic) Word is given once for all and the preacher is primarily its minister, 'he is prophet and preacher too' when he makes 'urgent declaration of the truth of God'. Canon Dillistone, Chancellor of Liverpool Cathedral and the only contributor from outside Canada, writes an article on 'Christianity and Communication', and says that while the first industrial revolution was 'brought about by the expanding use of the machine and the multiplication of manufactured goods', the second has already begun, with the large scale use of two modern inventions that are essentially instruments of communication, the aeroplane and the radio. It is these, with television and the film (he is prepared to hazard the judgment that such a film as *The Robe* is 'doing for our twentieth century what the mystery-play did in the fifteenth'), that must be utilised to the full for the 'continuing disclosure of the Person of the Son before the *eyes* of men'.

Professor George Johnston of Emmanuel College, Toronto, reviews Oscar Cullmann's recent *Peter* very favourably. A review of Tillich's *Love, Power and Justice* holds that, for all its valuable qualities, the work is too independent of Christian theology; while the reviewer of R. S. Wallace's *Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament* wants the author to embark on another volume devoted to assessment rather than exposition of the great Reformer.

The Journal, which thus makes an excellent start, possesses an influential Editorial Committee. Contributions are to be sent to Professor George Johnston, and subscriptions to Professor T. A. M. Barnett of Wycliffe College, Toronto. J. K. S. Reid

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